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Middles play a key role in shaping narrative form. However, while Edward Said has 
shown how beginnings shape the novel and a wide range of intellectual endeavors in 
Beginnings: Intention and Method, and Frank Kermode has explored the pull of the 
ending on Western narrative in The Sense of an Ending, there has been no comparable 
study of the middle. Defining the narrative middle as a central piece of text that has a 
transitional or transformational function, British Modernist Narrative Middles draws 
attention to the ways narrative middles have been used to construct distinctly 
modernist narratives through transformations of narrative form and technique. The 
various techniques employed in modernist narrative middles are demonstrated 
through close readings of three canonical modernist texts: Joseph Conrad’s Lord Jim, 
Henry James’s The Golden Bowl, and Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse; as well as 
three British neo-modernist texts: Rayner Heppenstall’s Saturnine, B. S. Johnson’s 
The Unfortunates, and Brigid Brophy’s In Transit. While the first five texts use 
  
narrative middles to alter their narrative form within a modernist poetics, In Transit 
employs a narrative middle that transforms the novel’s poetics from modernist to 
postmodernist. While not all modernist texts employ prominent narrative middles, 
when they do, these middles can be crucial to our understanding both of these novels’ 
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Narrative middles are a sort of ever-present, yet rarely interrogated concept in 
narrative theory. Aristotle writes in the Poetics that a story should be “a complete 
whole in itself, with a beginning, middle, and end” (1459a). Since that time, a great 
deal has been written about beginnings and endings, but the middle remains largely 
unexplored and undefined. While Edward Said has shown how beginnings shape the 
novel and a wide range of intellectual endeavors in Beginnings: Intention and 
Method, and Frank Kermode has explored the pull of the ending on Western narrative 
in The Sense of an Ending, there has been no comparable study of the middle. J. Hillis 
Miller comes closest, devoting several chapters of his Reading Narrative to middles, 
but here the middle must share space with the beginning and the end. Miller’s 
primary concern is the narrative line, and his analysis of the middle is primarily an 
analysis of the role of digression in that line. In this slippage—in which the middle 
stands for the whole of the narrative—we find the central problem of the middle. 
While it is relatively easy to point to the beginning or to the end of a novel, it is much 
more difficult to point to the middle. The common statement that one is “in the 
middle of reading” a book is similarly defined by its indefiniteness, and often carries 
a note of evaluative or interpretive uncertainty. All books, all narratives, have 
middles, but we are uncertain as to what they are or what they mean. 
Aristotle’s notion of a causally unified plot in the Poetics is grounded entirely 
in beginnings, middles, and ends, prompting the following definition: “Now a whole 
is that which has beginning, middle, and end. A beginning is that which is not itself 
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necessarily after anything else, and which has naturally something else after it; an end 
is that which is naturally after something itself, either as its necessary or usual 
consequent, and with nothing else after it; and a middle, that which is by nature after 
one thing and has also another after it” (1450b). Aristotle, then, insists on the 
naturalness and necessity of the existence of beginnings, middles, and endings, as 
well as their relationships to one another. Kermode, on the other hand, argues that this 
relationship is not necessary or natural, but instead a product of human psychology 
and social arrangements. Kermode suggests that life takes place entirely “in the 
middest,” and that to make sense of this muddled middle, people “need fictive 
concords with origins and ends, such as give meaning to lives and to poems” (7). 
What was naturalness and necessity in Aristotle, then, becomes a set of artificial 
constructs in Kermode. Nevertheless, while for Kermode beginnings and endings are 
fictive, the middle is real. Without beginning and ending, the middle becomes all of 
reality. Kermode turns our attention to middles almost as much as endings, but in so 
doing he perhaps expands the middle so far as to negate the possibility of making the 
middle an object of study. 
Where Kermode focuses on the power of endings to shape meaning, Said 
turns to beginnings, and in so doing, makes the middle almost invisible. Said defines 
the beginning as “making or producing difference” (Said xiii). Said ties the beginning 
closely to the intention, “an appetite at the beginning intellectually to do something in 
a characteristic way” (Said 12). That is, the beginning is for Said the beginning from 
the writer’s perspective—the beginning of writing or conceiving of a text—rather 
than the beginning of the text itself from the reader’s perspective. However, Said 
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shares with Aristotle the connection between beginnings and a discrete (if not 
necessarily whole) text. Said’s concept of difference at the beginning resembles 
Aristotle’s assertion that the beginning is that which does not necessarily come after 
anything else. However, whereas Aristotle views the separation between the 
beginning and everything that comes before it as natural, for Said this separation is 
produced by the beginning itself. The narrative with a discrete beginning, middle, and 
end is not quite, as it is for Kermode, artificial, but it is created rather than chosen in 
accordance with natural order. 
This very sense that the beginning of a text must be produced becomes for 
Said a key element of modernism: “one of the chief characteristics that Joyce, Yeats, 
Conrad, Freud, Mann, Nietzsche, and all the others share in common has been a 
necessity at the beginning for them to see their work as making reference, first, to 
other works, but also to reality and to the reader, by adjacency, not sequentially or 
dynastically” (Said 10). The modernists, then, create their beginnings in large part out 
of pre-existing material, but reject teleology in this relationship—that is, their 
beginnings reject the idea of a natural beginning. Teleology and hierarchy—the ways 
in which Aristotelian beginnings, middles, and endings, form natural narrative, and 
by which Kermode’s fictive beginnings and endings produce meaning for the 
middle—are struck down in Said’s modernism. If, as Said argues, the intention 
produces a characteristic way of doing or thinking, then I would argue the middle is 
where this intention is continued or carried out. Yet, if the modernist text suggests 
that there is no hierarchy to this intention—that the text is adjacent rather than 
subordinate to or “after” its predecessors, the middle may be similarly adjacent to the 
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beginning. That is, a modernist middle may not follow in an ineluctable narrative 
logic from the initial proposition of the beginning, but instead may stand beside it, a 
disjunction or disruption of the beginning. From the reader’s perspective, then, the 
modernist middle may multiply or revise our sense of the beginning intention, 
reshaping the text in its own image. Therefore, we are perhaps as likely to find a 
modernist text’s intention—the key principle which structures the narrative, its 
meaning, and its dominant poetic concerns—in the middle of the text as at the 
beginning or the end. 
With Tristram Shandy rather than modernism as his model of non-traditional 
narrative, Miller, too, disputes Aristotelian necessity, and along with it any clear 
means with which to choose beginnings and endings: “Is there really ever a beginning 
of a play that does not itself follow anything by causal necessity? Or is there is [sic] 
an ending that nothing follows? Are all the middle elements ever connected by a clear 
causal necessity to what comes before and after?” (Miller, Reading Narrative 9). 
Whereas Kermode asserts the reality of the middle, Miller asserts the importance of 
the middle to narrative. In stark contrast to Aristotle, Kermode, and Said alike, Miller 
even asserts the middle’s independence from the beginning and ending. However, 
much like Kermode’s concept of “the middest,” Miller’s concept of middles is really 
an attack on the notion of a complete, meaningful, natural Aristotelian narrative, 
rather than an examination of the middle as a distinct component of narrative. 
Miller’s exploration of middles, then, is really a discussion of causality. As such, 
Miller’s definition of the middle is modeled closely on Aristotle’s, simply removing 
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the causal element: the middle is “that part of narratives that comes after the 
beginning and before the end” (Miller, Reading Narrative 61). 
 Aristotelian causality—at least in its strong form—is dead, and, without it, 
Miller’s middles threaten to become infinite: as causal and thematic connections 
multiply, “[a] narrative tends to continue forever as an indefinitely displaced middle” 
(107). That is, if we imagine beginning and ending as points defining a narrative line, 
the line itself is the middle—yet that line defines a narrative trajectory that need not 
be confined by beginning and ending. Miller’s infinite middles, however, highlight a 
further problem with Aristotle’s definition: beginnings and endings as Aristotle 
defines them do not actually require middles. Imagine beginning and ending, instead 
of being two infinitesimal points, as instead two connected line segments. In 
Aristotle, these segments are actions, but we can also imagine each as a chapter, a 
scene, a paragraph, a sentence, even a word. Two such segments may be connected 
without a similar segment comprising the middle. Cause and consequence, as well as 
narrative segmentation, requires only two parts. The middle, to the extent that we still 
insist on retaining the concept, becomes, rather than the something between two 
points, the point of division between two somethings. Once again, however, the 
middle is of an entirely different nature from beginnings and endings. It always 
threatens to expand until it consumes the entire text and beyond, and to contract into 
nothing. 
However, despite this tendency to subordinate the narrative middle to 
beginning and ending or to conflate it with the text as a whole, the narrative middle 
seems ready to emerge as a distinct object of study. More recently, Caroline Levine 
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and Mario Ortiz-Robles have brought greater attention to the middle with a collection 
of essays entitled Narrative Middles: Navigating the Nineteenth-Century British 
Novel. Where Said and Kermode often seem to conflate textual or formal middle with 
the middle as a concept (philosophical, social, even existential), Levine and Ortiz-
Robles helpfully distinguish between formal and conceptual middles: on the one 
hand, there is the novel’s “formal middle—the bulk of its narrative space” and on the 
other “the problem of middlingness—the middle class, the unheroic, the ordinary” 
(Levine and Ortiz-Robles 3). 
There are problems, however, with both parts of this formulation. Their 
definition of the formal middle, while it does not make of the middle the entirety of 
the narrative, as does Miller, does make the middle most of the narrative. By this 
definition of the formal middle, a study of middles very easily may become 
indistinguishable from a study in narrative sequencing or narrative itself. Levine and 
Ortiz-Robles’ definition of the conceptual middle, on the other hand, seems to me to 
be tied very closely to nineteenth-century British novels, whose authors, Levine and 
Ortiz-Robles argue, “dwelling lengthily and lovingly on the middle, were absorbed in 
the experience of middleness per se” (7). What happens, then, to novels—even long 
novels (and thus those with a long formal middle)—from other places or periods? Do 
they lack a conceptual middle? Are their formal middles inevitably at odds with a 
poetics or thematics that is not interested in the experience of middleness? And why 
is this conceptual middle so different from Kermode’s “middest”? 
I would argue that there is little, if any, inherent connection between Levine 
and Ortiz-Robles’ conceptual middle and formal middle. Instead, both definitions are 
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fitted to the subject of nineteenth-century novels. We can see this problem again in 
Levine and Ortiz-Robles’ discussion of the center, which they argue is one particular 
way of approaching the middle: “Is there a midpoint, a heart of the novel, that holds 
everything together?” they ask (Levine and Ortiz-Robles 9). The editors of Narrative 
Middles argue that the answer is increasingly “no,” and they point to the “waning 
power of centrality” in the nineteenth century (Levine and Ortiz-Robles 10). In an 
argument for the de-centering of the text and a more democratic middle, Levine and 
Ortize-Robles point to narrative techniques such as free indirect discourse, which 
Levine and Ortiz-Robles argue “illustrate the centrifugal forces at work in the middle 
as narrative authority is multiplied, curtailed, and undermined by experiments in 
focalization” (Levine and Ortiz-Robles 10). The argument here, however, has nothing 
to do with the middle or the center of the text. Instead, what is highlighted by 
experiments in focalization is a source of narrative or textual authority, a single 
reliable point of view, which is multiplied, curtailed, and undermined. Here, “in the 
middle” seems to stand for “in the text,” or “in the nineteenth-century British novel.” 
There is much to admire in Narrative Middles, but I would argue that its approach is 
both too diffuse (in its definition of the middle) and too particular (in its attempts to 
bind a concept of the middle to the social concerns of nineteenth-century Britain) to 
bring us much closer to understanding middles as a distinct component of narrative. 
I will argue, therefore, for a more literally-minded approach to narrative 
middles. Narrative Middles does provide a model for this approach; among the 
narrative middles it explores are individual scenes or events at the center of the text, 
such as the interrupted wedding in Jane Eyre and Hyacinth’s vow in Henry James’s 
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Princess Casamassima. The former is an individual scene, while the latter takes place 
between the volumes of the New York Edition of the novel. In both of these cases, a 
single event in the center of the text re-shapes the novel’s plot and plays a key role in 
shaping the meaning of the entire novel. However, the narrative middle does not 
necessarily comprise a single event, but may also comprise a large set of events. In 
Middlemarch, for example, the text late in Part 3 and early in Part 4 (of six parts) 
largely concerns Casaubon’s illness, the terms of his will, and his death in Chapter 48 
of 86 numbered chapters. This represents a significant transformation in Dorothea’s 
circumstances, as she is simultaneously released from a stifling marriage, yet 
forbidden to marry Will Ladislaw. During this middle, too, Dorothea increasingly 
concentrates on charitable endeavors. That is, in addition to moving the plot forward 
in arguably unexpected ways, this middle creates for Dorothea an independent space 
to pursue her goals and identity outside of the marriage plot. In all of these Victorian 
narrative middles, there is a plot development that plays a key role in structuring the 
novel as a whole and serves as a plausible transition between beginning and ending. 
The existence of key, central narrative middles in many texts suggests that 
these middles might deserve attention similar to that afforded beginnings and endings. 
It might be noted that even a quick perusing of the internet turns up multiple lists of 
famous beginnings and endings of novels. These concepts hold sway, hold our 
memories, well beyond the walls of academia. Kermode and Said are both, in this 
sense, certainly right: meaning is generally formed, or created, from beginnings and 
endings. If we are, as Miller argues and Kermode implies, to take the middle 
seriously as more than a by-product of beginning and ending, it would perhaps be 
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useful to attempt, as some of the essays in Narrative Middles do, to examine how 
middles produce or create narrative form, meaning, and difference—and, what’s 
more, to examine them as distinct middles—separated as much as possible from the 
rest of the text, as beginnings and endings are separated from what is not the text. 
Said’s discussion of modernist beginnings, I have argued, implies that the middles of 
modernist texts may be more likely than others to exhibit this sort of difference. 
However, where Victorian narrative middles operate primarily by developments at 
the level of story, modernist narrative middles, as I will define them, operate 
primarily by changing the way the narrative discourse operates. While it is not the 
case that every modernist text contains a modernist middle, many modernist texts do 
contain prominent narrative middles. Just as Victorian narrative middles structure 
novels by reshaping the story’s plot, so do modernist narrative middles structure 
novels by reshaping the application of modernist devices such as stream of 
consciousness technique. 
While narrative middles are this study’s primary object, then, modernism both 
guides my selection of texts and informs how I read their middles. Modernism, if not 
so hazy a concept as the middle, is nevertheless highly disputed in both its historical 
timeframe and formal definition. Further complicating the matter is modernism’s 
status as something of a pan-cultural concept, covering a wide range of cultural and 
artistic productions, movements, and manifestations. Since this study is primarily 
concerned with the middle as a formal, rather than conceptual, object, and one related 
specifically to narrative, I find it most useful to work with Brian McHale’s definition 
of modernism, which is likewise primarily formal and specific to narrative. My 
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choice of McHale’s definition is pragmatic confined to the particular purposes of this 
study, rather than a prescriptive attempt to return modernist studies in general to a 
formalist framework. That is, I am interested in this study in narratives with the 
formal and thematic characteristics which McHale attributes to modernism—and how 
these characteristics are reflected and challenged in these narratives’ middles. I am 
not particularly invested in whether “modernism” is the best possible word for such 
texts or whether McHale’s definition is the best possible definition of modernist 
fiction for the field of modernist studies as a whole. In both cases, it is almost 
certainly not. Nevertheless, I believe McHale’s definition has some particular 
characteristics that make it both compatible with some developments in modernist 
studies and of continued relevance for the study of modernism as the field continues 
to evolve and expand. 
McHale defines modernism according to its dominant, the element which 
focuses and provides coherence to its structure, much like Said’s beginning intention. 
According to McHale, modernism’s dominant is epistemological, and as a result 
“modernist fiction deploys strategies which engage and foreground questions such as 
[…] ‘How can I interpret this world of which I am a part? And what am I in it?’” 
(McHale 9). Modernism doesn’t simply ask epistemological questions: it deploys 
strategies, or “practices a poetics of an epistemological dominant” (McHale 10). In 
this way, McHale distinguishes modernism from detective fiction, which asks 
epistemological questions, but does not employ epistemological poetics. McHale’s 
definition of modernism serves three major purposes in its original context in 
Postmodernist Fiction. First, and most obviously, McHale defines modernism in 
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order to clarify how postmodernism is different from and develops out of modernism 
in the context of “literary-historical change” (7). That is, McHale distinguishes 
modernism and postmodernism on a formal level while grounding that formal 
definition in the historical development of both styles. McHale’s distinction between 
modernism and postmodernism is thus both historically grounded and applicable to 
texts outside the primary geographical and temporal limitations of these movements. 
The ability to distinguish between modernism and postmodernism as distinct 
movements with a definition that nevertheless can be applied to periods and 
geographies outside of the original historical context, I will argue, remains highly 
relevant to modernist studies. Second, McHale’s definition distinguishes the poetics 
of modernist fiction from popular and traditional fictions originating from the same 
time and place—even those with similar thematic concerns. This remains highly 
relevant as modernist studies attempts to distinguish between any text produced under 
the conditions of modernity and a specifically modernist text. Finally, in order to 
provide a coherent account of postmodernism’s development out of modernism, 
McHale’s definition of modernism synthesizes common stylistic and thematic 
elements of modernist fiction under a single coherent concept, the epistemological 
dominant. McHale contrasts his synthesizing use of the dominant with “catalogues,” 
lists of stylistic or thematic features of a text (McHale 7). Even for critics and 
theorists who reject definitions of modernism that are rooted in the formal features 
common to canonical Anglo-American modernist texts, McHale’s definition provides 
a systematic account of the formal properties of modernist fiction to which different 
definitions of modernism—or different modernisms—can be more clearly contrasted. 
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In examining modernist middles, I will use the tools of narrative theory to 
examine the ways in which texts employ an epistemological poetics in their narrative 
middles. I will also examine ways in which middles structure and re-structure texts in 
ways that foreground epistemological concerns. However, I am not interested only in 
how modernist middles exhibit the poetics of the epistemological dominant. This 
study will also examine ways in which these middles deepen, alter, reconfigure, or 
disrupt this dominant. McHale’s definition of modernist fiction therefore provides a 
clear framework in which to discuss the ways the middles under discussion here 
engage with a key set of formal, stylistic, and thematic tropes. McHale’s definition, 
however, does not pretend to apply to modernism broadly, but only to modernist 
narrative. It is specifically adapted for discussions of narrative texts, and especially 
for narratological discussions of those texts. Since that is my purpose here, it is a 
particularly useful definition—one which I contend remains useful even in light of 
developments in modernist studies over the last 25 years. 
To highlight the continuing value and relevance of McHale’s definition, I 
would like to turn to two relatively recent competing and contrasting definitions of 
modernism by Susan Stanford Friedman and Fredric Jameson. Friedman’s definition 
is associated with the new modernist studies. The new modernist studies, beginning 
approximately with the founding of the Modernist Studies Association in 1999, has 
been characterized by what Douglas Mao and Rebecca L. Walkowitz in their seminal 
survey of the field in PMLA refer to as an “expansion” along temporal, spatial, and 
vertical lines (Mao and Walkowitz 737). That is, modernist studies has moved beyond 
the study of early twentieth-century (temporal) European and Anglo-American 
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(spatial) high art (vertical). In sympathy with this expansion, Friedman proposes a 
“planetary modernism” that facilitates our expanding notions of modernity, yet is still 
bound enough to be useful (Friedman, “Planetarity” 473). Friedman goes on to define 
modernity according to a “dynamics of change” (478). Modernism, in turn, is for 
Friedman “the expressive dimension of modernity” (Friedman, “Periodizing 
Modernism” 432). This definition, Friedman argues, allows for “multiple 
modernisms” while avoiding a “Eurocentric diffusionist ideology” and also avoiding 
a too-diffuse definition of modernism (“Periodizing Modernism” 427, 429). Friedman 
asserts that grounding a definition of modernism in this definition of modernity lends 
it enough specificity to be useful, yet I remain skeptical that modernism defined as 
“the expressive element of a historical dynamics of change” really does have much 
utility for applied work. This is particularly true for studies such as this one that are 
interested in the formal and stylistic properties of modernism. I am sympathetic to 
Friedman’s project of expanding the field of modernist studies without viewing early-
twentieth-century Europe (and the United States) as the ultimate source of all 
modernisms. However, I am not convinced that Friedman’s definition is adequately 
specific, even for her purposes. In any case, when studying any particular modernism, 
definitions such as Jameson’s and McHale’s help us to define the particular features 
of that modernism in regard to the particular research interests of the study.  
Like Friedman and other contributors to new modernist studies, Jameson is 
arguably more interested in defining modernity than in defining modernism. 
However, Jameson rejects the notion that there are multiple modernities. For 
Jameson, to assert that different nations, cultures, or times have their own modernities 
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“is to overlook the other fundamental meaning of modernity which is that of a 
worldwide capitalism itself” (Jameson, Singular Modernity 12). Jameson spells out 
the particularity of that meaning in contrast to postmodernism as follows: 
where modernity was a set of questions and answers that characterized 
a situation of incomplete or partial modernization, postmodernity is 
what obtains under a tendentially far more complete modernization, 
which can be summed up in two achievements: the industrialization of 
agriculture, that is, the destruction of all traditional peasantries, and the 
colonization and commercialization of the Unconscious or, in other 
words, mass culture and the culture industry. (Singular Modernity 12) 
For Jameson, modernity occupies the middle in the narrative of capitalism itself. It is 
this narrative, and not the narratives within modernist texts, that Jameson is primarily 
concerned with. Nevertheless, Jameson’s definition suggests that modernity, like the 
nineteenth-century British world as described by Levine, Ortiz-Robles, and their 
collaborators, has its own particular relationship to the concept of the middle. The 
middle of modernism is dynamic—the middle of transition. Despite Jameson’s 
objections to Friedman’s pluralizing of modernism, he too grounds his definition of 
modernity in a notion of change. Jameson’s modernism, then, is a sort of ideology of 
change, “passionately committed to the eruption of the genuinely, the radically, and, 
dare one even say, the authentically New” (Jameson, Singular Modernity 4). In 
traditional narratives of modernism, Jameson argues, modernist texts create the new 
out of a “realist core,” where “realism is grasped as the expression of some 
commonsense experience of a recognizably real world” (Jameson, Singular 
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Modernity 120). We can see in this definition the roots of McHale’s: modernism is 
epistemologically dominant because access to the realist core (presumably, for 
Jameson, grounded in the elements of social and economic organization that have not 
become fully capitalist) has been complicated, problematized, and changed—but not 
excised completely. 
Jameson’s own definition of modernism is also compatible with McHale’s 
notion of the epistemological dominant. Jameson argues that, in contrast to late 
modernist theorizers of modernism, who were concerned with the status of art, 
the high moderns as such were reflexive or self-conscious about 
representation itself. Most often they allowed representation to follow 
its own semi-autonomous course, according to its own inner logic: that 
is to say that they allowed it to separate itself from its content and its 
object, and is it were to deconstruct itself. They were content to 
foreground what we may call the arbitrariness of the signifier (rather 
than that of the sign), releasing the signifying material to demonstrate 
its own dilemmas and internal contradictions […] (Jameson, Singular 
Modernity 198) 
That is, for the high modernists, the signifier, in the case of narrative, the narrative 
discourse itself, is subject to self-conscious innovation, while the content and object 
remain anchored in some notion of reality. The innovations of modernism are 
epistemological, rather than ontological: the world remains stable (or, at least, 
recognizably a singular, changing world) as the signifier is destabilized. While 
Jameson’s notion that a definition of modernity must be singularly connected to the 
16 
 
evolution of capitalism strikes me as asserted rather than properly argued,
1
 his 
account remains a compelling and perhaps indispensable one for students of high 
modernism. However, Jameson is more interested in the “why” of modernism than 
the “what.” For those like myself who are interested in exploring the stylistic and 
formal elements of modernist narrative texts, a definition like McHale’s offers a 
useful supplement or substitute that nevertheless connects in important ways to 
Jameson’s account.  
It is telling that, despite their starkly opposing definitions of modernism, both 
Jameson and Friedman maintain the importance of modernism’s formal engagement 
with modernity in a way that ends up looking a good deal like McHale’s definition. 
Just as Jameson objects explicitly to the proliferation of modernisms in new 
modernist studies, Friedman herself acknowledges the continuing pull of the long-
canonical modernist texts, and in particular their formal and stylistic features, as the 
core of her concept of modernism: “I find it hard to call a novel like Brick Lane 
‘modernist.’ But I think this is my problem, not the problem of the more capacious 
understanding of modernism as the expressive domain of modernity I proposed 
earlier” (Friedman, “Planetarity” 476). Despite Friedman’s best efforts to move 
beyond her instinctual definition of modernism, which might follow something close 
to McHale’s formulation, she nevertheless turns to a text that exhibits traditional 
modernist stylistic features and even an explicit lineage with a canonical modernist 
                                                 
1
 Friedman herself engages Jameson directly on this point: “Such a reductionist view limits the 
nominalist definition, even more radically than Giddens does, to a set of one: capitalism. 
Jameson’s notion of singularity impoverishes what needs to be a complex approach to the 
overdeterminations of history and the enmeshments of different systems of power in 
understanding modernity” (Friedman, “Planetarity” 480). 
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text when she moves to apply her expanded definition of modernism. Friedman holds 
up the Sudanese author Tayeb Salih’s Season of Migration to the North as an example 
of postcolonial modernism that does not merely copy or echo the features of Anglo-
American modernism. Yet, Season of Migration to the North is a sort of re-writing of 
Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, and Friedman’s description of both texts’ stylistic 
features resembles McHale’s account of modernism: 
Even more than Conrad’s novel, Season of Migration to the North is a 
narrative of indeterminacy; of mysteries, lies, and truths; of mediating 
events through the perspectives of multiple embedded narrators; of 
complex tapestries of interlocking motifs and symbols; and of 
pervasive irony. Stylistically speaking, Salih’s novel is “high 
modernist,” having moved even further than Conrad from the 
conventions of realism.” (Friedman, “Periodizing Modernism” 435-
436) 
Friedman names Conrad and Salih’s texts as “high modernism,” that is, belonging to 
a particular modernism which she argues is not the only modernism. (She does not 
offer here a contrasting reading of a text belonging to a different modernism.) What 
makes these texts high modernist is the stylistic and thematic dominance of a 
catalogue of concerns which could be summed up by McHale’s definition of 
modernism: an epistemologically-dominant poetics. 
Thus, even in a field of plural modernisms, McHale’s definition remains 
useful in describing a particular type of modernism. In addition, McHale’s definition 
of modernism is flexible enough that it can be applied to texts outside of its initial 
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spatial and temporal confines. On the subject of whether this is the only type of 
narrative text which should be called modernism, I am agnostic. There are clear 
advantages to a broader, planetary range of modernisms, and there are advantages to 
grounding our definition of modernism in the features that initially piqued Friedman’s 
interest in modernism as well as my own. There are even advantages in abandoning 
the term “modernism” altogether; it is, even when deployed with care, a term that 
causes confusion for the layman. However, like Jameson, I believe we are stuck with 
the word modernism. Tying the term to the stylistic features of canonical modernist 
texts at least gives lends it a certain shape and continuity, even as the field of 
modernist studies expands. 
Just as I have chosen McHale’s definition of modernism in part because of its 
usefulness for narratological inquiry, so too can classical narratology provide further 
clarification about the nature of modernist poetics as defined by McHale. British 
Modernist Narrative Middles, by looking closely at how six British modernist texts 
construct their own middles, examines many of the different functions and forms of 
the central narrative middle. The primary theoretical tools employed are those of 
classical narrative theory, especially the work of Gérard Genette. Genette’s 
distinction between story, “the signified or narrated content” and narrative discourse, 
“the signifier, statement, discourse, or narrative text itself” (Genette, Narrative 
Discourse 27) may help clarify the distinction between the epistemological poetics of 
modernism and the epistemological plots of detective fiction, as well as to distinguish 
the epistemological dominant of modernism from the ontological dominant McHale 
associates with postmodernism (McHale 10). Epistemological problems—questions 
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of meaning and knowledge—are perhaps most evident in the gap between story and 
discourse—between what happens in the story and the rules of the world in which it 
takes place, and the medium through which the reader gains knowledge and 
perspective on the story. Many prominent modernist texts, from authors such as 
Joyce, Woolf, Mansfield, and Proust, adhere to certain level of stability, 
verisimilitude, and even a sense of the ordinary or undramatic when it comes to the 
story. That is, the events narrated in Ulysses or Mrs. Dalloway take place in a stable 
world resembling our own. However, the discourse, through techniques such as 
focalization, symbolic structures, and particular attention to the consciousnesses of 
characters, rather than outward events, tends to disrupt, limit, and multiply ways that 
the story is understood and interpreted. However, in modernist texts, the story itself 
remains singular and stable. In popular detective fiction, by contrast, the story of 
detection itself is rendered mostly unproblematically in the discourse—the 
epistemological problems are confined primarily to the story. In postmodernist 
fiction, on the other hand, the story itself becomes problematic and unstable. It is not 
simply that we do not know precisely what happens in a postmodern narrative, or are 
confronted with multiple or conflicted meanings for the same events, but instead 
these events and the worlds in which they occur may be multiple or unstable. An 
examination of modernist middles, then, is an examination of middles that pose 
epistemological questions primarily through their discourse. 
This study will explore the epistemological poetics of modernism as it is 
found and altered in various modernist narrative middles. Located near the center of 
the text, modernist narrative middles may, as in the gap between Molloy and Moran’s 
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narratives in Beckett’s Molloy, contain no actual discourse, but may simply mark a 
division of a text into two parts. They may also, as in Woolf’s To the Lighthouse, 
consist of a central segment of the narrative text—a short transition between parts one 
and two of a two-part text, or the middle part of a three-part text. In one case, B. S. 
Johnson’s The Unfortunates, I even explore a narrative middle that takes up most of 
the text between beginning and end. This is, however, an extreme case, where, 
because of the text’s randomization of the narrative discourse between beginning and 
ending, there cannot be a single central middle of the narrative discourse, while the 
structure of the text nevertheless highlights the narrative middle as a distinct narrative 
space. The goal of this exploration is not to establish single, totalizing theory of the 
narrative middle, or even of the modernist narrative middle, but to start from a 
working definition of modernist narrative middles that can provide a new way of 
looking at modernist texts and highlight particular ways modernists have used the 
narrative middle to structure their texts and develop key narrative techniques and 
explore epistemological concerns. 
Sometimes, as in the above cases, clear divisions in the text create one or 
more possible middles. In some cases, such as Joseph Conrad’s Lord Jim, chapters 
proliferate without any larger-scale division which would clearly mark the middle. In 
these cases, and in novels which provide no visually obvious structural divisions to 
their readers, it is more difficult to say what “the middle” is. Nevertheless, when we 
find a shift in narrative direction or technique, with a chunk of text either standing out 
as different from what comes before and after, or when we can identify a difference 
between what comes before and after, we have found a middle. The section of text 
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which marks this difference most prominently (if there is one) is the middle of the 
text. When the middle accomplishes this difference largely through a shift in narrative 
form or technique, rather than strictly through a crisis, revelation or other high or low 
point in the plot, it is a modernist middle. 
If narrative middles are my primary object of study, while modernism is a key 
focusing concept in both my selection of texts and reading of those texts, the qualifier 
“British” is less essential to the core aims of this project, but nevertheless provides it 
with a certain focus which makes room for another relatively novel contribution of 
this study: extended readings of British late modernist or neo-modernist literature. 
Even as I have adopted a definition of modernism that pre-dates the new modernist 
studies, and an approach that is largely formalist in nature, I consider British 
Modernist Narrative Middles to be affiliated with the expansionist aims of Mao, 
Walkowitz, and Friedman. In restricting this study to British modernism (as well as 
its focus on formal issues related to the narrative middle), I am mindful of Friedman’s 
assertion that the expanded reach of modernist studies requires a division of scholarly 
labor (Friedman, “Planetarity” 492). Thus, just as my adoption of McHale’s definition 
of modernism does not imply a rejection of other definitions of modernism 
appropriate to other methodologies or objects of study, the restriction of the present 
study of modernism to British modernism is not meant to imply a sense of priority. 
Instead, it is a restriction that provides both focus and a particular avenue for 
expansion. 
This study includes close readings of the narrative middles of six British 
modernist texts from the fin de siècle to 1973, when the deaths of Ann Quin and B. S. 
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Johnson mark an end to Britain’s neo-modernist movement of the 1960s. This 
movement, as well as its antecedents in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s is, with the 
exception of Beckett, who is often studied in the context of Irish, Continental, or 
international literature, has received perhaps even less attention than narrative 
middles, and it is another aim of this study to restore some of these writers to the 
general discussions on modernism and British literature in general. While 
experimental literature from many countries during and after World War II, whether 
it goes under the label of late or neo-modernism, postmodernism, nouveau roman, or 
postcolonial literature,  has been the subject of a great deal of attention, this is not the 
case for British experimental literature of the same period. Nevertheless, even in the 
face of the collapsing British publishing industry, a number of authors continued to 
write experimental literature under the explicit influence of the modernists. By 
restricting its field of vision to British literature, this study opens up room for a more 
thorough accounting of this British neo-modernism, which remained more often 
within McHale’s definition of modernism than its counterparts elsewhere. Thus, the 
British literature of the twentieth century is particularly fertile ground for exploring a 
wide variety of modernist middles. 
In addition to the goal of bringing attention to British neo-modernism, I have 
been drawn to British modernism by the particular role of British nationalism in these 
texts, as well as the position of Britain as a sort of middle space between the United 
States and continental Europe. Pericles Lewis argues that national consciousness in an 
era of international competition is a particularly potent force in modernist literature. 
Lewis relates the force of nationalism specifically to a McHale-like view of modernist 
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narrative, in which subjectivity relates in shifting and uncertain ways to a stable 
external reality: “the modernist novel does not reject external reality entirely; rather, 
it concerns itself with the relationship between the individual consciousness and the 
external reality that it confronts” (Lewis 4). I am also mindful of Patricia Chu’s 
argument that “increasing governmentalization” is one of the key aspects of 
modernization reflected in modernist texts, and particularly in their attention to form 
(Chu 17). For the purposes of this study, therefore, I have defined “British” according 
to governmental bureaucracy—that is, an author counts as British if she has been a 
British citizen at some point in her life. This definition is not perfect, but it allows for 
the inclusion of authors with varying relationships to British national identity, 
relationships that are differently shaped by a key aspect of modernity. 
British national identity is important in a number of the works discussed in 
this study, from Joseph Conrad and Henry James’s adopted Britishness, to the 
anxieties about a declining Britain’s position in the world expressed by Rayner 
Heppenstall and the changing relationship to nationalism expressed by the protagonist 
of his novel Saturnine, to B. S. Johnson’s anxiety about the position of experimental 
literature in post-war Britain, to Brigid Brophy’s (and her protagonist’s) mixed 
Anglo-Irish identity. In The Golden Bowl, England even serves as a sort of middle 
space, where Americans and continental Europeans meet and marry. Britain’s 
particular history in this period—explicit imperialism, its longer and more devastating 
involvement in the wars, and decolonization—make for a highly contrasting set of 
challenges to national identity and a received notion of reality than faced by the 
United States. From center of the English-speaking world, Britain becomes in this 
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period somewhat peripheral, a particular problem for a national literature. In 
examining British modernist middles, I therefore considered how these middles might 
represent transformations in a British national consciousness, or how they might 
reflect changes in Britain’s position on the world stage. However, while I believe, for 
example, that England remains an important signifier of the center in contrast to the 
periphery in Lord Jim, I have not found particular ways that Britain-as-middle 
connects to these novels’ narrative middles, nor ways that the narrative middles of 
these novels are particular sites of contestation for British national consciousness. 
That is, if this study was undertaken under the hypothesis that Britishness might be 
particularly important to these narrative middles, my initial findings are that this 
hypothesis was incorrect. A study of modernist narrative middles could therefore, 
without a great impact on my argument, be expanded to include American or Irish 
literature. Nevertheless, British modernist literature strikes me as more devoted to a 
particular stream of consciousness tradition of modernism than its American 
counterpart, giving a certain degree of focus to this study. This focus on a particular 
stylistic tradition—much like the focus on modernism itself—has allowed me to 
explore its variations in the narrative middle more deeply. 
 While close reading and narrative theory are the primary tools I use to 
investigate these texts, I will invoke other types of readings when I believe they help 
to illuminate the ways these modernist middles mark themselves as different from or 
transforming of the text that surrounds them. More importantly, I believe this sort of 
formal work to be a starting place, a groundwork upon which more historically, 
politically, or sociologically-oriented work on the two underexplored subjects of 
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middles and British neo-modernist texts may proceed. In short, I believe a formal 
approach to be useful in narrowing and focusing the scope of inquiry, as much as I 
consider narratological concerns to be a worthy of study in and of themselves. It is 
my hope that others who share different sets of concerns and approaches will take up 
these neo-modernist texts, as well as the subject of (modernist) narrative middles. 
Beginning with questions of how we find the narrative middle of a text, 
Chapter One explores multiple middles in Joseph Conrad’s Lord Jim. Lord Jim is 
famously a novel of two distinct halves: a sea-tale with an air of mystery exploring 
the guilt and wanderings of Jim following his abandonment of the leaking Patna with 
its cargo of pilgrims, followed by an exotic adventure tale as Jim attempts to redeem 
himself on the remote island of Patusan. With this shift in genre (and attendant 
approaches to meaning, tense, mood, and voice), the narrative middle would be the 
section of text that effects a shift between these two halves—or may be read as 
different from both of them. However, Lord Jim does not have a neat formal division 
into two Books to mark its halves. This chapter, then, is in part an examination of 
how readers might construct the middle of a text, as it discusses possible middles in 
Lord Jim before settling on an interpretation of the novel’s most prominent short 
middle: the much-discussed passage in Chapter XX in which Marlow meets with the 
merchant Stein, who offers Jim the job in Patusan. Stein’s key act is not monetary, 
but interpretive in nature. By re-reading Jim as a Romantic, and setting the terms of 
that Romanticism, he sets down a narrative goal and structure which is met by the 
Romantic adventure tale that follows. In so doing, he also shifts the narrative from 
one that is oriented around beginnings (the Patna episode and its meaning) to one that 
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is oriented around endings (Jim’s ultimate fate on Patusan and its meaning). Stein—
and the middle which he dominates—not only binds together two disparate genres, 
but creates a complete story with beginning, middle, and end, thus transforming 
epistemological questions into narrative form. Ultimately, then, it is this middle—an 
act of re-interpretation specifically narrative in nature—that structures this novel. 
 Whereas Lord Jim’s middle is as much about a shift in the story as it is a shift 
in the narrative discourse, Chapter Two moves us more clearly into modernist 
territory, as well as a more clearly marked middle, with Henry James’s The Golden 
Bowl. The Golden Bowl is divided into two Books, The Prince and The Princess, with 
Prince Amerigo and Maggie Verver, respectively, taking on the role of primary 
focalizer in each part. The middle of this novel—defined primarily by the blank space 
between the two parts and secondarily by the surrounding chapters which frame this 
textless middle—thus marks not so much a turn of the screw in the plot (though the 
consummation of Amerigo’s affair with Charlotte Stant at this point is certainly 
important) but a shift in narrative point of view. Furthermore, the middle marks not 
only a shift of the narrative’s attention to Maggie’s consciousness, but a shift in 
Maggie’s consciousness itself. In contrast to Dickens’ Little Dorrit, which bases its 
two-part structure on a gap in time between “Poverty” and “Riches,” James’s novel is 
not only concerned with shifts in the social world, but primarily in the inner world. At 
first glance, this shift in The Golden Bowl appears to be perfectly balanced, leaving 
the middle as the fulcrum of a perfectly aligned scale in which beginning and end 
weigh on either side. However, whereas the Prince is the focalizer in less than half of 
his chapters, Maggie dominates her Book. The middle of The Golden Bowl is an 
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invisible shift not only in narrative point of view, but in narrative form, from a social 
novel that seeks to examine a situation through many different consciousnesses to a 
novel where the development of a consciousness is the primary subject, so much so 
that the plot itself becomes largely determined by that consciousness. The middle, 
absent, unspoken, but highly prominent, binds these two halves into a single novel, 
while interrogating the mood of each half. 
 If the middles of The Golden Bowl and Lord Jim exist primarily in relation to 
the halves of the novels which they shape, the middle of Virginia Woolf’s To the 
Lighthouse takes on a life of its own. “Time Passes,” the second of three sections in 
the novel, is as much contrast as transition between the beginning of “The Window” 
and the ending of “The Lighthouse.” Chapter 3 explores the ways “Time Passes” both 
bridges and separates “The Window” and “The Lighthouse.” By creating a middle 
that is extremely prominent in the novel’s structure, but also in its stylistic and 
technical differences from the rest of the novel, Woolf connects two slice-of-life 
episodes into a novelistic whole, but also creates textual space between them. 
Meanwhile, by challenging and exploring the limits of the modernist conventions of 
time, focalization, and story established in the outer parts of the novel, “Time Passes” 
creates a fissure not only in the text of the novel, but in the reader’s understanding of 
the text’s relationship to reality, foregrounding as well as reconfiguring the 
epistemological problems associated with modernist narrative. 
Like The Golden Bowl and To the Lighthouse, Rayner Heppenstall’s 
Saturnine explores issues of focalization. Saturnine’s first-person focalizer is highly 
autobiographical, and his story is grounded in a world which closely resembles the 
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real world, yet the novel explores its subject at a time of psychological instability, 
blending a naturalistic world with a highly subjective world of delusion or 
spirituality. Chapter 4 examines both Saturnine’s long middle, in which a series of 
apparent delusions culminating in a near-death experience pepper an episodic 
Picaresque tale, and its short middle, a chapter in which the narrator and protagonist 
Frobisher follows a man who turns out to be himself. While both middles help lend 
the apparently episodic narrative structure while creating sometimes unresolved 
epistemological problems for both the reader and Frobisher, this short middle in 
particular dramatizes the split in consciousness at the novel’s halfway point. This split 
is complicated by the narrator’s position, exploring fundamental modernist 
epistemological questions related to the self, reading, and narration. Both middles add 
to these modernist questions nascent postmodernist ontological questions, as the 
epistemological problems associated with Frobisher’s narration and consciousness 
spill into ontological questions about the status of the real world, as it is blended with 
both the fictional world of narration and the possibility of a spiritual realm. 
Saturnine’s short middle poses these questions in their most ambiguous and 
unresolved form, following almost exactly Freud’s description of the double in “The 
Uncanny” and haunting the apparent resolution provided by the death and 
resurrection that marks the end of the novel’s long middle. 
If Saturnine stretches the limits of modernism by using the consciousness to 
access realms beyond the physical world, B.S. Johnson’s The Unfortunates instead 
suggests postmodernism in its own physical form, a series of unbound episodes 
presented to the reader to be taken from the cardboard box that contains them and 
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read in any order. Chapter 5 explores how The Unfortunates’ apparently random long 
middle—the beginning section is marked “First” and the ending marked “Last”—
creates an almost entirely stable fabula, in which a narrator who bears no apparent 
differences from Johnson himself remembers his encounters with a friend who has 
died of cancer. Instead, the novel’s radical form affects only the novel’s syuzhet, 
while perhaps limiting to some degree the reader’s knowledge of the order of the 
fabula. In addition, the entire physical form of the novel becomes a metaphor for 
memory—accessed largely at random, but consisting of largely discrete events which 
can be to varying degrees verified against reality. This chapter uses cognitive 
linguistic theory to examine how the novel relates the act of remembering with the 
linguistic process of creating (and reading) a novel. In writing The Unfortunates, 
Johnson seeks to objectify his memory, to change what has been a temporally-
accessed process (verb-like) into a solid thing (a noun). In the middle, the reader re-
creates the verb, but, in doing so, finds The Unfortunates to be a stable noun. By 
creating stability out of apparent randomness, Johnson re-focuses the apparently 
postmodern structure of an unbound novel into epistemological modernist questions 
of the relationships between memory, reality, and representation. 
 Chapter 6 at last takes this discussion of modernist middles over the edge that 
divides the epistemological and the ontological, and into postmodernism. If The 
Unfortunates and Saturnine suggest in different ways the ontological problems of 
postmodernism while remaining mostly within the epistemological poetics of 
modernism, Brigid Brophy’s In Transit uses its middle to transform a modernist 
novel into a postmodernist one. Like The Unfortunates and the second half of 
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Ulysses, the second half of In Transit features highly prominent deviations from the 
focalization in ordinarily-formatted prose of most modernism—including a splitting 
of the text into two separate columns. But unlike these two novels, and also unlike 
Saturnine’s more ambiguous splitting of the self, once In Transit has passed its 
middle, the stable story that characterizes much of modernism as well as realism is 
gone. After the middle, various ontological disruptions occur, as the main character’s 
male and female selves walk off into their own stories, and the novel engages in 
various genre parodies. A short section in In Transit’s middle dramatizes this leap 
from epistemological uncertainty into ontological multiplicity. The middle of In 
Transit also marks the boundary between modernism and postmodernism. As in Lord 
Jim and The Golden Bowl, the middle holds two very different approaches together 
into a single novel, creating both continuity and disjunction between the dominant 
experimental modes of twentieth-century fiction. 
 Modernist middles, and middles in general, are a varied breed. In long-form 
narrative in particular, they are subject to the various constructions of both author and 
reader. However, middles in general—and in particular the prominent modernist 
middles read here—also serve to structure narratives for both readers and writers. 
Any definition of middles must be both provisional and tentative, but I argue that a 
middle is not simply the piece of a narrative between beginning and end, but that 
prominent piece or gap between beginning and end that structures the narrative, 
transforming or redefining it in plot and form, and bridging, separating, and 
binding—even creating—the beginning and ending, thus making a single story of the 







Chapter 1: “The Plague Spot”: Finding the Modernist Middle in 
Joseph Conrad’s Lord Jim 
All narratives have beginnings, middles, and ends. This we all know, or at 
least have known since Aristotle. This knowledge may be purely tautological, but it is 
in some sense indisputable: every narrative act must begin and end somewhere 
(whether these points are determined by narrator or recipient), and there must be 
something between these points. Yet, these three dimensions of narrative, unlike 
dimensions in space, are not equal: we have, after all, two points and a “something,” 
the space or content between those points. I begin to read, I read, I end reading. 
Beginnings and ends have definition but no content; the middle between them has 
content, but no definition. Any discussion of middles tends therefore to collapse into 
a discussion of its defining terms, beginning and ending (typically in relation to 
causality, as in Frank Kermode’s The Sense of an Ending), or instead to expand (as in 
Hillis Miller’s Reading Narrative) to cover everything but beginnings and endings. 
Beginnings and endings constitute distinct topics of discussion; the middle, on the 
other hand, is the text. In order to pursue the middle as a definite, distinct object of 
study, I have argued for a more precise sort of middle: a central piece of text that has 
a transitional or transformational function. As I have discussed in the Introduction, in 
traditional narratives, this transition or transformation occurs primarily in the fabula: 
that is, there is a crucial change in the story. In Victorian novels in particular, there 
may be a marked change in the material and social circumstances of the characters. 
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Modernist texts may also contain middles that serve a transitional function for plot 
and character; however, a truly modernist middle reflects the epistemological 
dominant of modernism by changing how the story is interpreted or how the reader 
acquires knowledge of the story. In most cases, this means a significant change in the 
relationship between fabula and syuzhet, or in other aspects of the narrative discourse. 
 However, identifying a modernist middle is not always a simple matter. Not 
all modernist texts necessarily contain a modernist middle as I have defined it. Even 
texts that contain a modernist middle will not necessarily offer the reader a clear 
guide to this middle’s location. Structural markers, such as volumes, chapters, or 
books, may identify and obvious middle, as may obvious differences in the narrator’s 
point of view, such as a change in focalization. However, the absence of such markers 
does not necessarily mean the absence of a modernist middle. Moreover, few texts 
isolate transitions in epistemological poetics from transitions of plot or character. 
Lord Jim represents a challenge on both of these fronts. Its chapters are not divided 
into parts or books, and Marlow narrates the tale from near the novel’s beginning to 
near its end. Despite the absence of clear textual markers, critics (most famously 
Frederic Jameson) have consistently divided the novel into two distinct parts, 
suggesting the presence of a narrative middle as I have defined it. However, this 
middle is in large part plot-driven: there is a significant change in Jim’s 
circumstances, as he ends his wanderings in favor of a more permanent post in 
Patusan. Nevertheless, I will argue that this middle is as much a transition in 
meaning, a re-interpretation of Jim and his story, as it is a change in the story itself. 
This change in meaning is largely effected by a change in literary genre, a system that 
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combines both plot and epistemology. I will argue that the transition at the plot level 
of Lord Jim is effected by a transition in epistemology, both through an active re-
interpretation of Jim and his story in the novel’s middle, and through a shift in the 
systems of meaning that accompanies a shift in genre. In Lord Jim, plot and 
epistemological questions are deeply embedded with each other, marking this novel 
as a transitional text between Victorian and modernist middles. 
Critics have found different middles for Lord Jim, corresponding to different 
ways of dividing the text and different ways of interpreting that division. For 
Guerard, “The major break comes not with the introduction of the Patusan material 
(Chapters 21, 22) but with the end of Marlow’s oral narrative (Chapter 35). The 
important question is whether the novel and its reader are violated in a serious way” 
(167-8). Lothe, too, focuses on “the tripartite division of the novel’s narrative: with an 
omniscient narrator (chapters 1-4), with Marlow speaking (chapters 5-35), and with 
Marlow writing (chapters 36-45)” (138). For Watt, meanwhile, the “central section” 
begins with Marlow’s story and ends with Stein (265). Wendy Perkins, on the other 
hand, provides a more segmented approach in which small “chapter group[s]” provide 
irreconcilable interpretations of Jim and his story (28). Perkins opposes Conrad’s 
method to the strict causal chains of the traditional Victorian novel: “The classic 
realist text has trained us to expect to find a problem revealed in the beginning of the 
novel; solutions posed and avoided (along with possible detours) in the middle; and a 
denouement in the final pages that will end equivocations, resolve the problem, and—
in Roland Barthes’ phrase--bring the ‘vast hermeneutic sentence’ to its close” (10-
11). If we define the beginning as the omniscient narrator’s section (the first four 
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chapters), and the end as Marlow’s written narrative (Chapters 36-45, the episode of 
Gentleman Brown), can we read Lord Jim as conforming to this pattern? 
 The problem posed by the first four chapters seems to be a problem of facts: 
“What had happened?” (Conrad 20). As Guerard observes, Marlow’s entrance serves 
not to resolve that problem, but to extend it: “the first narrator could not have justified 
much longer such a refusal to explain. But Marlow has a good reason not to tell his 
listeners that the Patna didn’t sink” (Guerard 135). Marlow thus serves to extend the 
middle. Yet his purpose is not to pose and avoid solutions to the initial 
epistemological problem, but to reject it entirely: “They wanted facts, Facts! They 
demanded facts from him, as if facts could explain anything!” (Conrad 22). The great 
middle embarked upon by Marlow is the result of a rejection of the initial 
hermeneutic sentence, to be replaced by an endless inquiry into Jim’s character and, 
by extension, the character of the colonial enterprise and all of its participants. The 
very first chapter has provided what seems to be a neat solution to the problem even 
to the why of Jim’s jump—it has something to do with the influence of his father, as 
well as his daydreaming and reading of adventure fiction. Yet the middle continues, 
as Lothe, Watt, and Perkins, among others, have observed, constantly re-reading Jim, 
never satisfied with an end to interpretation. 
 In searching in particular for a modernist middle, Lothe’s approach has a 
certain obvious appeal, since marks a clear difference in the narrative voice. We may 
sympathize with the hearers of Marlow’s oral narrative in Lord Jim—a narrative 
middle of sorts that threatens to overwhelm the text as well as, famously, the realistic 
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limits of a night of storytelling.
2
 This is the middle of Conrad’s novel, defined both 
by Marlow’s speech and by the absence of the knowledge of Jim’s origins we get 
from the initial, apparently impersonal or heterodiegetic narrator, as well as the 
knowledge of Jim’s death we get from Marlow’s written correspondence. Here, 
“Marlow speaking” constitutes the middle of the novel (Lothe 138). In the first five 
chapters, an apparently heterodiegetic narrator relates Jim’s early career as a water-
carrier, the circumstances of his life that led him to that profession, the incident on the 
Patna, and subsequently when Jim and his superior officers stand trial for abandoning 
the ship. Marlow then narrates his own encounters with Jim at the trial and in the 
following years. The end of Jim’s tale, including his death, are related again by 
Marlow, but this time in a letter, which relates not Marlow’s first-hand knowledge of 
Jim, but instead contains what Marlow has been able to piece together from 
“fragmentary” information (Conrad 203). We therefore have a plausible modernist 
narrative middle, which has different epistemological claims from the beginning and 
ending, as well as a different narrative voice. 
 However, variations in narrative voice, including multiple narrative levels, do 
not necessarily indicate modernist technique. In H. G. Well’s The Time Machine 
(1895), for example, the Time Traveller’s oral narrative is a second-degree narrative, 
contained within the homodiegetic narrator’s story about meeting the Time Traveller. 
This metadiegetic narrative takes up most of the novel. The use of homodiegetic 
narrators, and particular the metadiegetic oral narration of a fantastical story, could 
                                                 
2
 Conrad defends the verisimilitude of the length of Marlow’s oral narrative in his 1917 Author’s Note 
to the second English edition of Lord Jim, contending that Marlow’s narrative “can be read through 
aloud, I should say, in less than three hours” (Conrad 5). 
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potentially be used to highlight epistemological issues. An extremely skeptical reader 
might read the Time Traveller’s tale as madness or fraud, or the first-level narrator as 
the Time Traveller’s dupe or a teller of tall tales himself. However, the novel gives us 
no clue as to what particular alternate point of view one might take on the events 
related by the Time Traveller. Instead, the first-level narrator authenticates the Time 
Traveller’s story. Much as Marlow invokes the tales of the comfortable “after-dinner 
hour” at the beginning of his oral narrative (Conrad 25), the first-level narrator of The 
Time Machine provides at the novel’s beginning a degree of verisimilitude by 
creating a familiar setting, an after-dinner fireside conversation, for the Time 
Traveller to explain his theories and reveal his machine. Professional personages such 
as the Psychologist and the Medical Man serve as skeptical voices: “Wait for the 
common-sense of the morning,” the Medical Man says, highlighting the power of the 
right atmosphere to lend credence to the absurd (Wells 15). The narrator himself calls 
the Time Traveller “too clever to be believed” (Wells 17). That is, the professionals 
object on grounds of verisimilitude. Their very objections, however, ground the 
narrative as a whole in a world of professionalism and probability. The Time 
Traveller’s tale initially seems to violate the norms of this world. Yet, when the 
narrator returns another night to hear the Time Traveller’s tale of his travels through 
time, the oral narrative and its embodied teller are cited by the narrator as 
authentication of the story’s intensity, if not its veracity: “You read, I will suppose, 
attentively enough; but you cannot see the speaker’s white, sincere face in the bright 
circle of the little lamp, nor hear the intonation of his voice. You cannot know how 
his expression followed the turns of his story!” (Wells 26). The narrator places the 
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reader in an inferior epistemological position to himself in a way that, rather than 
creating doubt or ambiguity around the narrated events, is meant to remove doubts. 
The Time Traveller tells his story without the skeptical interruptions that characterize 
the beginning of the novel. That is, a well-told, coherent tale, delivered with 
conviction, is given greater epistemological weight than abstract theories. The Time 
Traveller’s story, then, is introduced as a narrative space in which we can set aside 
our doubts. 
When the Time Traveller’s story is completed, the Editor nevertheless remains 
skeptical, exclaiming, “What a pity it is you’re not a writer of stories!” (Wells 146). 
That is, the Time Traveller’s narrative exists in an epistemological binary at the first 
narrative level: for the narrator, the Editor, and the others who hear the tale, it must be 
either wholly true or wholly fiction. However, this skepticism ultimately serves to 
authenticate the tale. Skeptical voices are heard, but the narrator is a witness to the 
Time Traveller’s unexplained appearance at the novel’s end, and he bears “two 
strange white flowers” as physical evidence of the veracity of the Time Traveller’s 
tale (Wells 152). These flowers serve a similar function to the “gleaming metal cone” 
of “unbearable” weight that is found near the end of Borges’ “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis 
Tertius”: physical evidence of an ontologically, rather than epistemologically, 
different story world. However, where Borges’ story presents the relationship 
between Tlön and our world as something of a puzzle (an epistemological, then 
ontological, problem), The Time Machine  presents no such puzzle. The naked fact of 
the flowers as well as the narrator’s story of the Time Traveller’s disappearance, 
serves to resolve, rather than open, the mystery (irrelevant, in my view, to the novel’s 
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middle) of the veracity of the Time Traveller’s tale. To the extent that epistemology is 
at issue here, it is the Victorian epistemology of suspense, modeled on scientific 
experimentation, as defined by Caroline Levine: “the experiment always implied a 
narrative of suspense: experimenters might mobilize the most convincing hypotheses 
about the hidden facts of the world, but they were always required to wait to see how 
the world would respond” (Levine 6). This is, then, the epistemology of the detective 
story, plot-driven and subject to resolution. The Time Traveller’s oral narrative is thus 
a sort of anti-modernist narrative, a complete fantastical tale that must either be 
accepted or rejected in its whole by the characters in the first-level narrative—and 
preferably based on concrete evidence. Furthermore, their skepticism exists primarily 
to anticipate and refute objections to the Time Traveller’s oral narrative. If there is a 
modernist poetics at work here, it is in the beginning and ending, rather than the 
middle—and the power of that middle largely serves to override the epistemological 
problems, such as they are, of beginning and ending. 
Lord Jim’s oral narrative has greater claims to a modernist poetics than The 
Time Machine’s, yet it remains a relatively weak candidate for a modernist middle. 
From the beginning of his oral narrative, Marlow calls Jim’s tale “mysterious,” and 
this mystery is not resolved by the “naked fact” of Jim’s abandoning the Patna, but 
instead created by it. We may contrast the objections to the verisimilitude of the Time 
Traveller’s story to John Attridge’s interpretation of Lord Jim, in which Jim’s leap 
from the Patna violates both standards of professional conduct and “classical 
verisimilitude”—that is, it cannot be connected to a maxim that connects his actions 
to a standard causal explanation, creating “the modernist opacity at the heart of the 
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narrative” (Attridge 285). In dispute in The Time Machine are the basic facts of the 
tale, whereas the facts established at trial in Lord Jim are never under serious dispute. 
Instead, in dispute is the causal system of meaning that can place these facts in a 
comprehensible narrative. The question of connecting facts to a system of meaning is 
at the heart of Lord Jim’s modernist poetics. The mystery of Lord Jim, then, is a 
mystery of interpretation, which cannot be resolved by material evidence. By the end 
of the oral narrative, this mystery remains: Jim is for Marlow “a vast enigma” (199). 
However, at the end of the novel, Marlow still insists that Jim is “inscrutable at heart” 
(246). There is also little if anything in the text to indicate that any of the facts of the 
narrative are more or less subject to doubt depending on whether they are given by 
the first-level narrator in the novel’s beginning, by Marlow as witness and oral 
narrator in the novel’s long middle, or by Marlow as editor and written narrator at the 
novel’s end. Instead, the reader faces different challenges in processing Jim’s story—
the immediacy and confusion of the Patna episode in the beginning, are replaced with 
the challenges of various anachronies, multiple levels of narration, and the weight of 
Marlow’s voice as interpreter in the middle and ending. To the extent that these shifts 
in the narrative discourse create different points of view, different epistemological 
problems, or different ways of engaging the reader with the same epistemological 
problems, Marlow’s oral narrative is indeed a modernist middle: a distinct segment of 
text that re-configures the novel’s epistemological poetics. However, these 
differences do not directly address Lord Jim’s central epistemological problem: the 
problem of the interpretation of Jim and his actions. A modernist middle that 
addresses these problems re-configure the narrative’s approach to the meaning of 
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Jim’s actions within a causal narrative system. As I shall argue, there are better 
candidates for this function than Marlow’s oral narrative. 
In addition to the search for a middle that re-configures the text’s central 
epistemological concerns, I have stated a preference for centers when searching for a 
modernist middle—smaller segments of text that are roughly equivalent to a segment 
of text that we may think of as a beginning or ending. A long middle like Marlow’s 
oral narrative very easily becomes an Aristotelian or Millerian middle: everything 
between beginning and end. In this context, the beginning becomes a frame, setting 
up the background for the story, and the written narrative an epilogue, informing us of 
Jim’s death and providing a certain degree of plot closure. Indeed, Marlow’s oral 
story is a complete story within the narrative level that it occupies. Marlow’s oral 
narrative has some of the characteristics of a modernist middle, and we should not 
completely dismiss it as such, but it would be better to search for a smaller section of 
text that nevertheless provides a strong transition in the way the novel approaches the 
epistemological problems surrounding the mystery of Jim: that is, the transition from 
Jim’s peripatetic life at sea to his life on Patusan. This transition has the added benefit 
of being a more traditional narrative middle, similar to some Victorian texts: there is a 
significant change in the protagonist’s circumstances which moves the plot in the 
direction of its ending. While it is possible to separate modernist narrative middles 
from Victorian or other plot-based narrative middles, it would perhaps be best to 
avoid this sort of complication in favor of a single narrative middle, which may have 
both traditional and modernist aspects.  
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The division of Lord Jim into two parts—and the denigration of its latter 
half—is a longstanding one, and the frequent recognition of this division is perhaps 
the best case for locating the novel’s middle in the transition between the two parts, 
rather than in the whole of Marlow’s oral narrative. However, this does not resolve 
the problem of finding the novel’s middle. In terms of pages, Marlow’s meeting with 
Stein in Chapter 20 occurs at the center of the novel—and we may take this chapter, 
or the entire episode with Stein, as the novel’s middle. Indeed, I will argue that the 
Stein episode is the best candidate for the novel’s middle. However, while one of the 
key structural features of Lord Jim is that it seems to contain a narrative middle that 
divides the book into two parts, the precise location of this middle is not easy to 
identify. In discussing the multiple interpretations of Lord Jim’s middle, I will show 
not only the importance multiple critics have placed on the division at the middle of 
the novel, but I will also discuss some of the various critical approaches that hang on 
this middle. These approaches both affect and are affected by not only recognition 
that Lord Jim is a novel divided, but by the particular place at which that division is 
made—that is, by the location of the middle. 
In terms of chapters, Chapter 23, in which Jim goes to Patusan, is the novel’s 
center. The middle quickly shrinks to a point, becoming the division between the 
novel’s two parts. Conrad himself, in a letter to Edward Garnett on Nov. 12, 1900, 
refers to this division as “the plague spot” (Conrad 306). The middle is not, in 
Conrad’s view, a discernible chunk of text, but an illegible mark of disease that 
threatens to destroy the bodily unity of the text. However, it is worth noting that an 
early review in the Pall Mall Gazette places the point of division not at Jim’s journey 
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to Patusan midway through the novel, but at the end of the account of the events of 
the Patna about a third of the way through the novel—making of both Patusan and 
Jim’s wanderings “an afterthought” (“Phantasmagoria” 281). The Gazette review 
objects to the absence of an Aristotelian unity of action. In this view, the problem 
with the novel is that is has a middle: a transition that divides the text, creating a 
whole that is in a classical sense unnatural. In this view, further transitions or 
divisions in the text become irrelevant, and there is little point in looking for a center. 
With the first violation of the unity of action, the text has ended. That is, a middle as I 
understand it is an ending as the Gazette reviewer understands it—the ending of a 
proper narrative. This is essentially the opposite view to Hillis Miller’s: where for 
Miller digression is at the heart of what makes a novel a novel, for the Gazette 
reviewer digression is anathema to narrative. The middle is, in this dichotomy, either 
all or none of the narrative. The Gazette review, nevertheless, points to a plausible 
narrative middle as I have defined it. However, Jim’s wanderings following the Patna 
incident are one of multiple shifts in Jim’s fortune and in the narrative’s action, and it 
is neither located near the novel’s center, nor is it the most often-cited division in the 
text. 
The Gazette’s division of Lord Jim also suggests a larger, displaced middle to 
the text (a middle that ends at the text’s mid-point or center), beginning around 
Chapter 14 with the inquiry’s verdict and including both Jim’s wanderings and the 
encounter with Stein. It is quite possible that an erasure of this middle—Patna 
followed immediately by Patusan—would have satisfied this early reviewer, making 
the latter episode less of an afterthought and more of an immediate consequence of 
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the Patna incident. The presence of this middle, however, looses the bonds of 
necessity. Jim’s jump from the Patna does not clearly cause his jump from 
imprisonment in Patusan, and Jim’s final submission to execution by Doramin is less 
clearly the completion of his submission to the Patna inquiry’s justice because the 
text contains too much middle. Ian Watt is able to recover such causal and thematic 
connections to the extent that he views the second part as “a concluding thematic 
variation” (348). There is much debate as to just how tight the connection is between 
the Patna and Patusan episodes. Whereas in the first half of the novel connections are 
immediate—we move from episode to episode by what Watt calls “thematic 
apposition”
3
 (280)—Patusan is removed from the Patna episode not only by the 
temporal and spatial distance within the world of the text, but by the temporal and 
spatial distance within the text. Textual space and reading time delay the connection 
of the text’s major episodes, and this delay takes the form of a plausible narrative 
middle. Time and space reduce the likelihood that the reader will make causal and 
thematic connections—a problem intensified by the very different nature of the 
Patusan episode itself. 
 However, a division of the novel into two parts, rather than three, has been the 
primary way that critics have viewed Lord Jim’s structure. While the Gazette review 
provides an early precedent, this division has largely been framed by F. R. Leavis’ 
dismissal of “the romance that follows” the novel’s earlier events in The Great 
Tradition (1948) (Leavis 190). Leavis identifies the division in Lord Jim not only as a 
                                                 
3 Similarly, Hillis Miller refers to the novel as “a pattern of eddying repetition,” in which the novel’s 
repetitions of events both provide and deconstruct the novel’s formal unity, as well as the unity of 
plot and of the subject (“Repetition as Subversion” 449). 
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violation of the unity of action, but as a violation of Conrad’s narrative method in 
favor of genre writing. Leavis is somewhat vague as to the exact point at which the 
“good Conrad” of the first part gives way to the romance of the second part (Leavis 
190), but later critics have been more willing to identify the beginning of the Patusan 
episode, rather than the ending of the Patna episode, as the novel’s dividing point. 
When we begin to consider the Patusan episode as distinct from the rest of the novel, 
the middle is squeezed to a point or spot, a fissure in the text that can only be detected 
by examining what lies on either side. Accounts of the nature of this fissure have been 
varied. Albert Guerard, in 1958, is already able to speak of Lord Jim’s “alleged 
formal weakness: its apparent break into two separate novels, with the second one 
inferior to the first,” countering that “[t]he most remote place and unrelated 
circumstance discovers, in us, the character with which we set out” (167). For 
Guerard, then, what can be characterized not only as a break between parts of a novel, 
but a break between novels, is unified by character—and the disjunction itself serves 
to confirm this unity of character. The break here is primarily a break in the action. 
Regardless of the persuasiveness of Guerard’s argument that Lord Jim is a unified 
artistic object by virtue of being a character study, it is clear that Guerard, like Leavis, 
is motivated to read into the novel the formal unity demanded by New Criticism. 
Once again, we are reminded of the importance of Miller’s approach to middles, 
which helps us to read the digressions and differences in the text’s middle as 
something other than a challenge to the unified textual object that must either be 
resolved through analysis or condemned as an irredeemable flaw in the object. I 
would argue, however, that Lord Jim’s status as a unified textual object—one that is 
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conceived, marketed, disseminated, and printed as a single novel (usually a physical 
book)—is less a product of a particular critical approach than the ground on which 
both Miller’s and Guerard’s approaches are founded. That is, once we view Lord Jim 
as a single narrative text, we can read that text as composed of varying degrees of 
unity or digression. Tautologically, Lord Jim is a single novel because it is a single 
novel, with a middle that connects beginning and ending. When we divide a novel 
into two or three parts, a narrative middle creates both digression and unity. That is, 
the middle is what transforms these parts into a particular narrative text. Rather than 
textual unity being created by the unity of Jim’s character, the unity of Jim’s 
character as a source of textual unity is instead created by the unity that already exists 
as soon as we consider Lord Jim as a single text. Once we view Lord Jim as a single 
text, a central disruption that divides the novel into two parts becomes the middle of a 
single novel, rather than a division between two separate texts. 
The most famous reading of the division of Lord Jim into two parts, however, 
comes from Jameson, who, like Leavis, views the break as generic. In Jameson, we 
have a clear articulation of Lord Jim’s middle as a re-configuration of the narrative’s 
modernist poetics. He registers 
a tangible “break” in the narrative of Lord Jim, a qualitative shift and 
diminution of narrative intensity as we pass from the story of the Patna 
and the intricate and prototextual search for the “truth” of the scandal 
of the abandoned ship, to that more linear account of Jim’s later career 
in Patusan, which, a virtual paradigm of romance as such, comes 
before us as the prototype of the various ‘degraded’ subgenres into 
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which mass culture will be articulated […]. (Jameson, Political 206-
207) 
Lord Jim’s middle is for Jameson the break between two opposed cultural products of 
capitalism: the modernist novel of epistemology which attempts to resist 
commodification even as it reifies aesthetic experience (thus making it available as a 
commodity) and the openly commodified genre fiction of mass culture—or, on the 
other hand, the postmodernist fantasy that parodies such genre fiction. Thus, in 
Jameson’s view, the break goes even deeper—each half of Lord Jim is not merely a 
separate narrative, but a separate (if interdependent) type of novel, and the break 
comes to represent a break not in the textual object alone, but in capitalism, its 
cultural productions, and their ideological work. The fissure made by capitalism is 
between activity and value, and Conrad creates the fissure in his novel in an attempt 
to repair that fissure in capitalist society: 
the union of activity and value, of the energies of Western capitalism 
and the organic immanence of the religion of pre-capitalist societies, 
can only block out the place of Jim himself. But not the existential 
Jim, the antihero, of the first part of the novel: rather, the ideal Jim, the 
‘Lord Jim’ of the second half, the wish-fulfilling romance, which is 
marked as a degraded narrative precisely by its claim to have 
‘resolved’ the contradiction and generated the impossible hero [...] 
(Jameson, Political 255) 
Although Jameson is speaking of the unity of two abstract concepts, it is worth noting 
that the unity Jameson finds here inheres in a character, the ideal Jim. However, as 
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Jim becomes an ideal unity, he destroys his unity as a character (and the text’s unity 
as a work with the traditional verisimilitude associated with realism). Jameson’s view 
of the break turns out to be almost the opposite of Guerard’s: Lord Jim is completed 
not by distant action which proves the unity of character, but by completion of a 
thematic system that destroys the unity of both character and action. Unity of 
character does not provide unity of theme; rather, unity of theme destroys unity of 
character. The fissure runs straight down the middle not of a text or of a plot, but of 
the capitalist subject. 
Lord Jim’s middle, then, brings together two contradictory responses to 
capitalism in a single text, through a differing set of narrative conventions. These 
contradictions are reflected in character, action, and poetics. Under Jameson’s 
reading, Lord Jim is half modernist, half popular modern pop culture. The middle that 
divides two such halves is thus different from the middles of traditional narratives, 
which produce difference in the narrative primarily through plot developments—that 
is, differences in action and character. What Jameson clarifies that previous critics 
only seemed to sense is that differences in action and character are bound up in 
differences in the novel’s approach to the problems of modern capitalism—in part by 
abandoning the epistemological dominant of modernism. Jameson’s reading thus 
produces a half-modernist middle: a middle that transitions the novel away from 
modernism, and that does so through story as by discourse. Jameson, however, unifies 
the text, somewhat ironically, around his own particular critical concern: the 
contradictions of capitalism and the text’s unconscious expression of those 
contradictions. Rather than accept or reject such a reading, I would argue that 
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Jameson shows how the difference between to the novel’s two parts itself creates 
epistemological complexity. For example, whether we are interpreting the character 
of Jim as a cultural commodity or as a “real” person within the world projected by the 
text, we must interpret him as the product of these two separate genres, just as 
Marlow does—as both the “ideal” romantic Jim of Patusan and the mystery of the 
Patna. The result is either more mystery—how can two such different people be 
one?—or a complex, fragmentary view of character. That is, once we read the novel 
as composed of two parts with differing poetics, genres, or approaches to the 
challenges of capitalism, we are inevitably presented with the epistemological 
problems associated with modernism. 
 It is worth noting that Jameson’s division of the novel between modernism 
and wish-fulfilling romance is not necessarily followed, even by other critics who 
note the middle as a site of generic transformation. For Robert Hampson, Lord Jim 
does not divide into high culture and low culture genres, but two mass-culture genres: 
“It is now generally accepted that Conrad structures the narrative of Lord Jim by 
reference to light literature: in the first part of the novel, he produces a counter-
version of the sea-life romance; in the second part of the novel, in Patusan, he re-
creates the colonial world of adventure romance” (129). The echoes of the contrast 
between modernism and mass culture or postmodernism remain only in the contrast 
between a counter-version and a re-creation. For Lissa Schneider, however, gender is 
the key difference: “Structurally, Lord Jim does divide into two distinct parts: the 
‘masculine’ sea tale of Jim’s experiences aboard the Patna and the ‘feminine’ 
domestic drama detailing his romance with Jewel and his self-imposed banishment to 
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the isolated community of Patusan” (109). Schneider’s emphasis here is on what 
Marlow calls “the story of his love,” that is, Jim’s love for Jewel, that begins in the 
middle of Chapter 26. Marlow is indeed insistent on this generic designation, telling 
his audience in the middle of a paragraph in the middle of Chapter 31, “Remember 
this is a love story I am telling you now” (Conrad 177). Generic designation justifies 
the description of “a beautiful night” (177). Both of these interpretations, like 
Jameson’s, are plausible. Indeed, there is a strong case to be made that Lord Jim is a 
generic hybrid throughout, including the Polish literary tradition and Medieval 
Romance (Pospiech 57). However, it seems obvious from both the critical history and 
my own reading that these generic influences are re-configured at the novel’s middle. 
The particular genre of each of the parts of the novel is less important to my approach 
than the fact of this difference, which produces a unity out of contradiction. It seems 
to me, based on this variety of readings, that neither beginning or ending is able to 
gain priority as the ultimate arbiter of meaning in Lord Jim. Instead, the framework 
by which the novel is interpreted is displaced onto the middle, onto the division itself, 
creating a sort of epistemological uncertainty that extends from the true nature of Jim, 
which is Marlow’s concern, to the generic framework by which the novel itself 
should be read. This framework—which guides both plot and interpretation—is not 
simply hybrid or multiple, but specifically divided, fragmented, thus foregrounding 
the problems of making sense of Lord Jim both as narrative and as cultural-political 
object. 
 Differences in genre are not merely implicit, but also explicit in the text. The 
“love story” genre in particular suggests that the novel is composed of multiple 
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genres, connected by multiple middles. Furthermore, genre awareness is identified as 
critical to the hearer’s (or reader’s) correct reaction to the tale, as well as the teller’s 
correct telling. Marlow delays the story of love by noting its hearers’ relation to its 
genre: “We have heard so many such stories, and the majority of us don’t believe 
them to be stories of love at all. For the most part we look upon them as stories of 
opportunities: episodes of passion at best” (165). Marlow is prepared for the cynical 
male’s reaction to feminine genre fiction and counters with a declaration of difficulty: 
“To tell this story is by no means so easy as it should be—were the ordinary 
standpoint adequate” (165). The difficulty comes from the “melancholy figure” of 
Jewel (165). Genre, then, must be both identified and countered—the sea-going 
romance by the difficulties of Impressionism, the adventure or domestic romance by 
the recognition of the humanity of the commodified woman. Domestic romance and 
adventure romance are thus not a unified genre in the Patusan episode, but two 
competing genres—with the love story taking place in the middle of the Patusan 
episode. Such a complex generic understanding of the Patusan episode, in 
combination with Hampson’s observation that the first half of the novel also has its 
roots in a popular romance genre, tends to soften the break between the novel’s two 
parts. However, Marlow’s association of the Patusan episode with a feminine genre 
indicates that even within the broad generic class of “romance,” different frameworks 
create different interpretations of events. In particular, the gendering of genre disrupts 
an ethic in which Jim’s honor is constructed out of exchanges between men and his 
actions defined in terms of his ability as a white man to protect Muslim males in a 
system of paternal colonialism. Jewel emerges, then, as an alternative subject in 
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transactions of honor—Jim swears oaths to her (184), and she is in turn able to 
declare him “false” (208). Furthermore, Jewel may be seen as an alternative parallel 
to the pilgrims: on behalf of the Malays, Jim takes the incorrect action, but it is Jewel 
whom he abandons, as he did the pilgrims. This incomplete reading of the role of 
Jewel and the tale of love in the Patusan episode as well as Lord Jim as whole is not 
meant to be in any way definitive. It serves instead to illustrate the great complexity 
of the relationship between the first and second halves of the novels, one of the many 
ways by which the text marks the different ways in which narrative and its meaning 
can be constructed, even as the “facts” of the narrative are not under dispute. 
Furthermore, making Jewel the key figure in the novel’s transitional middle focuses 
that middle on a figure marginalized and commodified by gender. This suggests that 
each half of the novel is in itself a gendered commodity—and it should be 
unsurprising that the second half gained its poor reputation under male critics, while it 
is generally female critics such as Schneider who attempt to rehabilitate it. Lord Jim 
is thus a novel of multiple middles, which can be produced depending on one’s 
critical approach. This also reveals how the exact interpretation of the difference 
between the two halves of the novel both shapes and be shaped by the selection of a 
central middle, a key section of the novel’s text that guides interpretation of the 
differences and unities produced by the division of the novel. 
 Meanwhile, the potential interpretations of the novel’s central middle that 
divides Patna from Patusan continue to multiply, particular in critiques informed by 
postcolonial theory. For Padmini Mongia, the Patusan episode is an “imperialist 
romance” (182). Here, the generic shift acquires a political-ideological edge, much as 
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it does in Jameson’s reading. However, there is another element to the break in the 
middle that is highlighted most strongly by a postcolonial perspective. Scott A. Cohen 
argues that, “[i]n addition to the significant shift in form and tone that occurs midway 
through the novel, this break registers most loudly in terms of space” (374). For 
Cohen, the Patusan episode highlights Jim’s attempt to escape the globalizing 
colonial space. The first part of the novel is characterized by movement and 
commerce, or “traffic,” as Cohen puts it (386). Patusan, on the other hand, is 
characterized by “the violence of colonial reconciliation” as well as “proto-
postcolonial” potentiality, unresolved from Marlow’s (and the novel’s) imperial 
metropolitan perspective (393). In Cohen’s reading, the two halves of the novel are 
unified by the problem of imperial and colonial spaces: their extension, their 
movements, their boundaries, but characterized by a different chronotopic perspective 
on those problems. Marlow illustrates Jim’s spatial status in these two chronotopes 
with geometric metaphors. First, in flight, Jim “did after a time become perfectly 
known, and even notorious, within the circle of his wanderings (which had a diameter 
of, say, three thousand miles), in the same way as an eccentric character is known to a 
whole countryside” (Conrad 119). The circle—to be drawn on a map—encases both 
Jim’s wanderings and the public knowledge of those wanderings. It is, of course, an 
Eastern circle, and Jim is encased in the middle of colonial space—here easily 
distinguishable from London, the center of that space. Meanwhile, in Patusan, he has 
found “his new sphere” (Conrad 164). Cohen is most interested in the edges of Jim’s 
circles and spheres. For my purposes, however, the metaphors suggest that Jim is 
encased in the middle of a circle or sphere. As Kermode suggests that life takes place 
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entirely “in the middest,” and that to make sense of this muddled middle, people 
“need fictive concords with origins and ends, such as give meaning to lives and to 
poems” (Kermode 7), Lord Jim suggests that, spatially as well, life always takes place 
in the middle. The bordering encasement may expand and contract, may stretch itself 
out two-dimensionally on a map or three-dimensionally on a small kingdom, but we 
are never anywhere but in the middle of our own circle or sphere. Narratives, too, 
may throw out one chronotopic sphere for another—and they may do so, as in Lord 
Jim, nearly instantaneously. Nevertheless, even postmodernist texts—as the Patusan 
episode is occasionally characterized—remain in the middle of their spatial spheres 
so long as they have space at all. We are always in the middle of time; we are always 
in the middle of space. The edge of colonial reach in Patusan is the middle of Jim’s 
own colonizing project—and, with this project, he brings the reach of colonial space 
with him. That is, narratives, even master-narratives such as the colonialist narrative 
of expansion and progress, like narrative texts, create their own middles within a 
narrative space. The narrative space both defines, and is defined by, the middle. 
 Exploration of colonial boundaries in Lord Jim can also lead us back to older 
concerns about causation. Laverne Nishihara, in an article that discusses the 
boundaries of both space and stereotypical characterization, argues that both Conrad 
and his critics use the language of fate to link the novel’s two episodes (Nishihara 
59), but that, “[a]lthough Conrad struggled to endue his narrative with the unifying 
quality of inevitability, he conceived of incoherence as fundamental to his narrative, 
perhaps more important than any ordering principle” (54). Thus, the very insistence 
on causation in the form of fate is the result of the greater prominence of chaos in the 
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text, since only a vast rupture requires such insistent bridging. Nishihara thus 
highlights the crucial importance of the middle to both Lord Jim’s structure and its 
poetics. That is, the middle is the part of the text that insists that incoherence is 
coherence, that a violation of ordering principles can itself be a fundamental quality 
of the narrative. The middle holds these contradictions together. While I have so far 
largely explored this middle as an invisible and even unfixed division between two 
halves, a division of the text rather than a segment of text, I will argue that Lord Jim 
actively works to shift the direction and genre of the narrative through a particular act 
of interpretation: Stein’s analysis of Jim as a romantic, an act of interpretation that 
results directly in an attempt to shape Jim’s narrative through action. That is, Stein 
models the epistemological problem of Lord Jim (and Jim himself) as a single text, 
serving as the primary diegetic agent for the simultaneously divisive and unifying 
action of the novel’s middle. 
 Marlow’s interview with Stein, then, is an episode at the novel’s center in 
terms of chapters, which not only provides the plot-level mechanism that moves the 
novel’s action to Patusan,
4
 but it also is directly concerned with the shaping of a 
narrative and its system of meaning in the middle. Before moving to a discussion of 
this episode, however, I would like to take one last look at the novel’s multiple absent 
middles (that is, transitions that have no textual content of their own) by way of 
examining Jim’s jump from the Patna itself. Jim hears a call from the boat, “Geo-o-o-
o-orge! Oh, jump!” (Conrad 69). Jim then describes his assessment of the ship’s state: 
                                                 
4
 Baxter sums up the Stein episode’s importance as a transition, with a nod to the prominence of this 
view in the critical literature: “Jim’s itinerancy is brought to an end through Marlow’s consultation 
with Stein. This consultation is often and rightly seen as providing a pivot between the first and 
second parts of the novel, moving Jim from a life at sea to a life inland” (110). 
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“She was going down, down, head first under me. . . .” (69). These words of Jim’s are 
followed by a description of Jim by Marlow: “He raised his hand deliberately to his 
face, and made picking motions with his fingers as though he had been bothered with 
cobwebs, and afterwards he looked into the open palm for quite half a second before 
he blurted out—” (69). Then Jim speaks again: “ ‘I had jumped . . .’ He checked 
himself, averted his gaze. . . . ‘It seems,’ he added” (69). The jump itself is an absent 
middle, the unnecessary, unrecoverable term between cause and consequence—filled 
up, as the novel as a whole is, by Marlow’s voice. Watt, in fact, finds the cause of 
Jim’s jump complete in this passage:  “it can most plausibly be explained as a reflex 
action” (Watt 313). Thus, we have in the sequence the cause of the reflex action (the 
command to jump) and the result of that reflect action (had jumped), but we do not 
have the action itself. Marlow speaks to Jim, at least in part, to get beyond the facts of 
the inquiry—but, at the most crucial moment, Jim can provide only disconnected 
facts, for which Marlow, his hearers, the readers of the novel, must all provide causal 
connections. There are no sense impressions of the jump, so Marlow provides his 
own, gestural moments to the face, reflexive motions again that seem aimed at 
removing the impediment to the impressions of the senses. If the absence from the 
record of the cause of the Patna’s bulging hull points to a concern in Lord Jim with 
beginnings, and questions of fate, as well as Marlow’s need to provide the Patusan 
episode as coda to Jim’s life (and the Gentleman Brown episode as coda to the 
Patusan episode) points to a concern in Lord Jim with ends, Jim’s missing jump 
points to a concern with middles, particularly in their capacity to disappear from 
sight, to escape both comprehension and narrative necessity. Similarly, we do not 
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actually see Jim make the deal with Stein to go to Patusan. The actual decision that 
divides the novel in two is absent, leaving a fissure that has puzzled critics since the 
novel’s publication. Crucial actions that shape the relationship between cause and 
consequence are absent, leaving only the possibilities of fate and chaos. 
 Stein’s role in the text is largely to assert the primacy of order in Jim’s 
narrative as well as in the world as a whole. Yet the forcefulness of his intervention 
itself reveals chaos. That is, he acts to assert a unified narrative for Jim, but this 
action itself produces difference. It is this simultaneous production of order and 
chaos, of a text unified and divided, that makes the Stein episode such a powerful 
narrative middle for Lord Jim. It actively seeks to bind together his narrative through 
re-interpretation, while also shifting the narrative action as well as its meaning. Thus, 
John Peters argues that this narrative middle serves as a sort of center of meaning, 
placing it at the heart of the novel’s mediation between order and chaos, with Stein 
desperately clinging to the former: 
His assertion that the ‘mighty Kosmos’ is ordered is a denial of a 
chaotic universe. In refusing this possibility, Stein attempts to show 
predictability (or at least probability) in the occurrence of events; 
otherwise human existence and future events become haphazard and 
worse—unknowable. And if the universe is one of chaos rather than 
order, then human beings have no control over their existence and are, 
consequently, subject to the whims of chance. (Peters 50) 
Peters’s interpretation of Stein and his obsession with order and classification, for 
which his insect collecting serves as both metaphor and metonym, resembles 
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Kermode’s account of life in the middest. Human beings, faced with an untethered 
middle, seek to tether it to a divine order, to a causal chain, to beginnings and ends. 
They seek to make Jim’s jump not an unknowable reflex, an action created only by 
the word jump, but instead an action both explainable and correctable. 
 However, even Stein himself is not without his contradictions. Jameson 
observes that Stein’s life is divided in two—the colonial adventures of his youth and 
the sedentary collecting of insects and wealth in which we find him (Jameson, 
Political 238). For Jameson, of course, Stein’s story does not simply reflect the 
novel’s bifurcated structure, but “is the story of the passing of the heroic age of 
capitalist expansion; it marks the end of the era when individual entrepreneurs were 
giants, and the setting in place of the worldwide institutions of capitalism in the 
monopoly stage” (237-238). Jim moves back in time, as Marlow does in Heart of 
Darkness, not to a primitive world outside of European capitalism, but into the past of 
European capitalism. It may be only Stein’s privileged status as an embodiment of the 
history of the colonial project that makes the chance in Patusan significantly more 
agreeable than the earlier chance of the guano island offered by Chester and 
Robinson. To lord over coolies or to lord over Malays and bushmen—either case in 
isolation, either case in extreme danger—and, in the case of Patusan, much of the 
danger comes from Stein’s unfinished business with Cornelius. 
In either case, Jim is being set up, but Stein shrouds himself in the 
ameliorative garb of philosophy and romance. As Baxter argues, Stein and Marlow 
set Jim up to live out the romantic adventures stories that had initially shaped his 
view of sea life, holding him to a new, romantic standard of conduct—or framework 
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for interpreting his own life and the meaning of his actions—to replace the 
professional code of conduct that shaped interpretations of Jim’s actions in the first 
part of the novel (Baxter 112). Stein provides in Patusan, then, a setting that as 
closely as possible mirrors romantic adventure narrative—sets Jim up to play a 
prescribed role in a pre-determined narrative. In this sense, Stein actively creates the 
shift in the novel’s genre. Stein attempts to remove the framework of professionalism 
that, when combined with Jim’s actions failure on the Patna, resulted in the 
epistemologically-dominant modernist narrative of the novel’s first half. Yet, this new 
romantic framework ultimately results in more epistemological problems, as it cannot 
be completely isolated from the rest of Lord Jim. Furthermore, as Baxter shows, Stein 
only succeeds in putting a separate code of conduct—and thus a separate narrative 
framework—into conflict with the facts of Jim’s life: “If Jim undermines for Marlow 
the strength of shared ‘fidelity to a certain standard of conduct’ for the merchant 
marine in the first part of the novel, he finally undermines the power of fidelity to a 
certain romantic egoism in the second part of the novel. Jim fails the test of each, the 
practical and the romantic” (Baxter 115). Stein’s narrative middle re-frames Jim, 
from failed professional to striving ego, arresting one story at the middle and 
asserting a new one. Yet these stories have a common modernist interest in the 
inadequacy of these narrative frameworks to produce narratives that satisfactorily 
embed events in a system of causality and meaning. 
 As Bruss notes, the prominence of Stein in the critical literature derives not 
only from his active role in shifting Lord Jim’s narrative genre, but also in part from 
his position at the center of the narrative text (Bruss 502). That is, the narrative 
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middle as I have defined it—a segment of text or transitional moment close to the 
literal center of the text—has a certain amount of priority in terms of guiding 
interpretation of a text that may not generally rise to the level of beginning or ending, 
but is nevertheless greater than the long middle that includes all text between 
beginning and ending, or other locations of narrative segmentation, such as the end of 
the Patna episode. This middle of the novel is also the center of the plot: “the Stein 
interview comes at the structural centre of Lord Jim: Stein is sought out by Marlow in 
a final attempt to find a genuine solution to Jim’s problem, and the interview 
immediately promotes the Patusan venture which constitutes the second half of the 
novel” (Lothe 162). It is also the middle in the sense that it moves us from a narrative 
focused on beginnings—the Patna episode, its mysteries, its meanings, as the driving 
narrative force—to a narrative focused on ends—the Patusan episode, Jim’s actions, 
Jim’s fate.
5
 Stein’s words, partaking of Biblical narrative, mark this shift, though the 
remarks refer to Stein’s own adventurous past: “That was the way. To follow the 
dream, and again to follow the dream—and so—ewig—usque ad finem” (Conrad 
130). The repetition here echoes Jim’s wanderings, but, while Jim’s movements had 
been motivated by flight—escaping from what was behind him—Stein demands a life 
motivated by what is ahead—the unattainable end.  
 However, Chapter 20 has its concern with middles as well. Soon after he has 
identified Jim as a romantic, Stein announces a “cure” from the self (Conrad 128). 
Marlow responds, “the question is not how to get cured, but how to live,” which 
                                                 
5
 Watt writes, “In the first nineteen chapters, Conrad’s narrative focus tended to centre our attention on 
Marlow’s discussions with Jim, rather than on Jim himself. [...] This changes completely with 
Stein; events, characters, themes, and narrative devices all converge to propel Lord Jim into a 
single and unchecked forward movement to its end” (305). 
61 
 
garners an enthusiastic response from Stein (128). Marlow redirects Stein’s attention 
from ends to middles, from purpose to process. Stein, in turn, modifies Shakespeare’s 
most famous line to conform: “How to be! Ach! How to be” (128). The rejection of 
ends in favor of middles results also in a rejection of binary thinking—also the 
thinking of the colonial adventurer: to jump or not to jump, to attack or not to 
attack—and of the formal processes of judgment—to submit to judgment or not, to 
condemn the judged or not. The Manichean language which suffuses Lord Jim is soon 
invoked by Stein in his account of man: “He wants to be a saint, and he wants to be a 
devil” (Conrad 129). Here, the shift from “or” to “and” keeps the binary of ends 
away, even as the binary language seems to restrict the more open-ended possibilities 
of the question “how,” and of Stein’s declaration that “[w]e want in so many different 
ways to be” (Conrad 128). This is one of the great puzzles of Stein and of Lord Jim as 
a whole: to what degree can middles be unyoked from ends—and, in particular, from 
extreme, definitive, culturally pre-packaged ends? Marlow may succeed in unyoking 
Jim’s character from the saint/devil binary, but he cannot resist extending his 
narrative until Jim’s death. Indeed, the whole of Lord Jim, at least from the beginning 
of Jim’s wanderings, is an extension of middles in search of traditional narrative 
endings. The novel cannot find its end in the sea-adventure, so it searches through 
other genres, searching for a place that Jim can re-enact his submission to the 
tribunal—what should have been his end, but turned out to be his middle or even his 
beginning. At Doramin’s hand, Jim at last faces the logical conclusion not of the 
Patusan episode, but of the Patna episode. In a romantically ordered world, the hero’s 
failure results in his death, but Jim must contend instead with how to live, and Lord 
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Jim therefore looks to Stein to extend the narrative with a shift in how the narrative 
discourse creates meaning from the raw material of the story. 
 As Marlow ruminates on Stein’s ends-directed view of life, his desire to 
follow the dream, Marlow sees the middle as a place of disconnection from ends: 
Yet for all that the great plain on which men wander amongst graves 
and pitfalls remained very desolate under the impalpable poesy of its 
crepuscular light, overshadowed in the centre, circled with a bright 
edge as if surrounded by an abyss of flames. When at last I broke the 
silence it was to express the opinion that no one could be more 
romantic than himself. (Conrad 130). 
Here, at the center of Lord Jim, a center which seems to shine a new light on Jim by 
overtly identifying him as a romantic and by using Stein to express a romantic 
philosophy, Marlow defines the center as a place of darkness. Here in the center, the 
light of the dream is completely shut out. When one is most assuredly in the middle, 
narrative loses its guiding direction, purpose and causation overshadowed by—what? 
There may be an overshadowing object—the sheer weight of life, perhaps, of middle 
age, or of those graves and pitfalls—but the rest of the passage suggests not a 
shadowing object, but simply a distance from the edge whence the light comes. The 
metaphor also seems to defeat any notion of origins, or any clear path. This is not 
Marlow’s river leading to the heart of darkness, but a directionless plain encased by 
the light of death. One passes, perhaps at the middle of one’s life, but also perhaps at 
any time in one’s undirected wanderings, through a center (for all except for death is 
in the middle) from which the ends cannot be seen. Once again, life is figured as a 
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circular encasement, which has the effect of destroying a linear conception of time 
and narrative and replacing it with a planar conception. 
 The end of Chapter 20, then, offers attempts to repair this directionless 
middle. Marlow offers the belief that he “saw only the reality of [Jim’s] destiny, 
which he had known how to follow with unfaltering footsteps, that life begun in 
humble surroundings, rich in generous enthusiasms, in friendship, love, war—in all 
the exalted elements of romance” (Conrad 131). In other words, Marlow shuts his 
eyes to all but fate, clinging to concept of romance so conveniently provided by Stein 
to restore narrative comprehensibility to Jim and his story. At the beginning of 
Chapter 21, Marlow precisely figures Patusan as an escape from the circular 
encasement of life which he had so recently provided as his great existential 
metaphor: 
there’s many a heavenly body in the lot crowding upon us of a night 
that mankind had never heard of, it being outside the sphere of its 
activities and of no earthly importance to anybody but to the 
astronomers who are paid to talk learnedly about its composition, 
weight, path—the irregularities of its conduct, the aberrations of its 
light,—a sort of scientific scandal-mongering. Thus with Patusan. 
(Conrad 132). 
Patusan is thus both an exotic oddity of interest only to specialists and outside of the 
sphere of the earth itself. It is, indeed, outside the human scale of causation. 
Nevertheless, this destiny will be played out in the form of popular genre-writing. 
Indeed, Marlow’s language suggests that the unearthly (and thus, in this context, the 
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exoticized other) can be comprehended only in terms of the familiar. We learn about 
the irregularities and aberrations of stars, not their conformities. And we are 
interested in their conduct, an anthropomorphization, and in their light—literally the 
light of a star, but also echoing the light of the dream. There is no reason to expect the 
Patusan episode to conform to Western genre narratives—especially after Marlow 
insists again on the difference of what is to come: “had Stein arranged to send him 
into a star of the fifth magnitude the change could not have been greater” (Conrad 
132). The key here, though, is the arrangement: Marlow and Stein have arranged for 
an end for Jim, and that end, like any journey into a star, can only be death. 
Wandering aimlessly in the center of the circle, Jim is at last given a purpose, but 
Marlow allows no end-purpose other than an abyss of flames. The middle of Lord 
Jim, then, is a conspiracy between Stein, Marlow, and Conrad to arrange an end for 
Jim and for the novel. As arranged by human characters, this end must feature the 
blunter generic narrative that follows. 
 Lord Jim’s narrative middle, then, is deeply bound up in its shaping of the 
novel’s ending and its disruption of a narrative that had been motivated by beginnings 
(Jim’s biography, the Patna episode).  This chapter has sketched out a reading in 
which Jim’s submission to execution by Doramin completes the action of the Patna 
episode. None of this, however, solves the initial problems of the text: what happened 
on the Patna, and why? To these—and to Marlow’s inquiries into Jim’s character—
there can be only simple answers or no answers. The problems cannot be solved to 
the satisfaction of the text that has been built up in Marlow’s oral narrative. Instead, it 
answers the questions posed in the Stein episode: what will become of Jim? The 
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text’s initial questions are beginning-directed, but the middle abandons the search for 
origins and causes, preferring ends and consequences. Thus, what might have been a 
tight causal chain—Jim fails on the Patna, and is therefore doomed to die in 
Patusan—is disrupted by Marlow’s interventions, as well as by a beginning that asks 
questions primarily of beginnings. To go with this beginning interested primarily in 
beginnings and an ending primarily interested in ends, we have a middle which is 
strongly connected to neither. I hesitate to argue definitively that this is a middle 
primarily about middles—since the causal chain with its beginnings and endings rears 
its ugly head so often—yet it is at least a middle that tries to be primarily about 
middles, to engage as much as possible with the question of how to live when 
beginnings have failed and endings are nowhere in sight. Gentleman Brown and the 
final episode in Jim’s life in this reading represent not a return of Jim’s repressed 
past, or of the repressed evils of the colonial project, but a return of the repressed 
need for endings, of the middle’s dependence on the points between which it lies for 
its very existence. 
 Yet, Lord Jim also reveals how these beginnings and endings can be shaped 
by middles. Furthermore, it reveals—and is even centrally concerned with—the 
flimsiness of simple causal narratives, which prescribe clear motives and 
consequences for actions. Narrative epistemology itself—the production of 
knowledge through the embedding of events within a narrative—is revealed at the 
novel’s middle to be arbitrary and inadequate. Whether we view Stein’s intervention 
as shifting the novel from modernist text to romantic genre narrative, or from one 
type of romantic genre narrative to another, the effect of this intervention itself is to 
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produce a narrative text that is divided into two parts. The division of the text into 
two parts is in large part defined by Stein’s assertion of a system of meaning 
associated with a romantic narrative—and he supplies a setting and cast of characters 
to match. However, though the Patusan episode echoes romantic novels, shifting the 
narrative genre, there is nothing in the text to suggest that it occurs in a different level 
of reality than the novel’s first half. Narrative middles as I have defined always 
provide a transition or a difference in the text. If Lord Jim had a postmodernist 
narrative middle, the shift to Patusan would raise questions about the nature of the 
reality in which Jim exists, perhaps by indicating that Patusan is diegetically a 
fictional land which Stein or Jim had read about in an adventure novel. If Lord Jim 
were a traditional nineteenth-century narrative, its middle might provide Jim with a 
similar change in fortunes, but it would not embed this change of fortunes in a 
different system of meaning, nor would it incite critics to entertain the idea that the 
two halves do not properly belong in the same novel. Instead, Lord Jim’s narrative 
middle is precisely a modernist middle because it challenges us to interpret two 
disparate parts as a single narrative, reimagined, redirected, and reinterpreted, 




Chapter 2: Modernist Points of View: 
A Middle Without Text in Henry James’s The Golden Bowl 
 Henry James’s The Golden Bowl has, in some ways, the most conventional 
middle in this study. Although its structure has been the subject of a good deal of 
scholarly discussion, The Golden Bowl’s reputation as an early or proto-modernist 
classic lies primarily in the late James style, with its labyrinthine sentence structures, 
heavy abstraction, and, most importantly, its restricted point of view which, coupled 
with an obsessive attention to the details of mental processes, creates a modernist 
Impressionism that often borders on a stream of consciousness style. Where Lord Jim 
introduces a new character to forcibly arrest the novel’s narrative direction and genre 
in a pivotal scene, The Golden Bowl builds to a crisis in the plot at the novel’s 
structural middle, which clearly identified by conventional markers.
6
 The novel’s 
forty-two chapters are divided among six Parts, which are in turn divided evenly 
among two Books. The chapters generally narrate a scene, or a few closely connected 
scenes, and they generally take the point of view of one (and occasionally two) 
characters in that scene. Longer scenes may take up more than one chapter. 
Significant events or lapses in time take place between the Parts. 
 So far, there is nothing unusual here: the two-volume novel may have been 
less common than the three-volume novel in the nineteenth century, but Dickens’ 
Little Dorrit, for example, used the two-volume format in an apparently similar 
manner to The Golden Bowl. Both novels even title their Books. However, the titles 
                                                 
6
 Wilson offers an acute summary of the function of the novel’s middle in terms of the novel’s outward 
plot: “Book First will set out the origin and development of the crisis, Book Second will trace the 
course and nature of its resolution” (60). 
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offer an essential clue to what makes The Golden Bowl a modernist novel in structure 
as well as style. Whereas Little Dorrit contrasts “Poverty” with “Riches,” separating 
its books both by time and material fortune within a well-defined contemporary social 
structure, The Golden Bowl offers “The Prince” and “The Princess,” titles which 
suggest, combined with the contrast of the novel’s contemporary setting, a certain 
timelessness and a long-gone or even mythical social structure. It is the tie of the 
mythic and timeless to the contemporary and specific, as well to the minds of James’s 
characters, that makes this a modernist, rather than a postmodernist, move. The Prince 
of Book First is Prince Amerigo, a poor Italian of aristocratic heritage and the 
primary focalizer of his Book. The Princess and primary focalizer of Book Second is 
Maggie Verver, the American heiress of the wealthy American art collector Adam 
Verver; she marries Amerigo early in the novel. Book Second, meanwhile, takes 
place not after a lapse in time from Book First; instead, its beginning overlaps Book 
First’s ending, offering, for the first time excepting a partial glimpse during Adam 
Verver’s Part Second, a rendering of Maggie’s consciousness just at the moment it 
begins to awaken. 
 This is, not coincidentally, roughly the moment of Amerigo’s consummation 
of an affair with Maggie’s friend and Adam’s wife, Charlotte. Warhol associates what 
she calls a “practice of […] narrative refusal” in James’s The Spoils of Poynton” with 
the relegation of the marriage plot to the background. In Poynton, this is achieved 
through disnarration, or saying you did not say something, and unnarration, or 
narrating what did not happen (Warhol 259). The Golden Bowl, by contrast, avoids 
the marriage plot largely by displacing it to before the novel’s beginning. But, just as 
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it seems that the marriage plot is to be replaced by a tale of a scandalous love affair, 
The Golden Bowl engages in its own startling act of non-narration. The middle of The 
Golden Bowl, a textless gap between Books, is thus a modernist gap: not a temporal 
ellipsis but a paralipsis. This paralipsis not only omits crucial information from 
explicit scenic narration, but alters the novel’s established order by which both reader 
and the novel’s characters understand the diegetic world. This paraliptic middle 
effects a shift in the novel’s narrative consciousness, as Maggie Verver not only 
becomes almost the novel’s sole focalizer (whereas Amerigo is focalizer for less than 
half of his Book’s chapters), but also in the relationship between focalizer and 
narrative, as Maggie takes a more active role in shaping her destiny than the largely 
passive Prince. 
 The Golden Bowl’s middle, then, serves as a hinge in the novel’s narrative 
structure. This structure is articulated not only by a traditional narrative method—a 
crisis in the plot—but by a re-ordering of narrative form through a shift in 
focalization. As Robyn Warhol argues, James’s method makes the choice of focalizer 
crucial to a poetics that emphasizes epistemological concerns: 
According to this theoretical model, when narration is filtered through 
the consciousness of a single focal character (as is so often the case in 
James’s impressionist novels), the thoughts and motives of all the 
other characters can only be read through their words, gestures, and 
actions. […] This is the expected procedure of literary impressionism 
as practiced by James, Joseph Conrad, Ford Madox Ford (and, in 
earlier iterations, Emily Brontë and Jane Austen herself), and it 
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inevitably leads to the kind of complex narrative undecidability that 
gives the form much of its aesthetic value, from a new-critical point of 
view. (Warhol 263) 
However, while Warhol emphasizes the sorts of knowledge James’s choice of 
focalizer denies the reader—knowledge about thoughts and motives of multiple 
characters. This approach emphasizes thought as instrumental to outward drama: a 
source of knowledge which can clarify the plot and relations between various 
characters. However, James himself argued that the choice of focalizer was crucial, 
not because it created narrative undecidability in the plot or outward drama, but 
because it opened up a different sort of drama entirely. Especially later in his career, 
James argued that the central drama of his novels was to be found the consciousness 
of his main characters. In the Preface to Roderick Hudson, James writes, “The centre 
of interest throughout Roderick is in Rowland Mallet’s consciousness, and the drama 
is the very drama of that consciousness” (Critical Muse 460). That is, the focalizer’s 
consciousness is not a source of knowledge about an outward drama; instead, in a 
reversal of figure and ground, the outward plot is source of knowledge about the 
drama of consciousness.  
James further demonstrates this principle in the Preface to The Portrait of a 
Lady, by narrating a drama within his own consciousness: “ ‘Place the centre of the 
subject in the young woman’s own consciousness,’ I said to myself, ‘and you get as 
interesting and as beautiful a difficulty as you could wish. Stick to that  – for the 
centre; put the heaviest weight into that scale, which will be so largely the scale of 
her relation to herself’” (Critical Muse 489). James repeatedly insists not only on 
71 
 
centering his novels within his protagonists’ consciousnesses, but on placing the 
drama and tensions of his novels within the chosen consciousness. The close 
association in these passages between center and consciousness has led many critics, 
as William B. Thomas points out (108), to make “center of consciousness” the 
Jamesian term for focalizer.
7
 But the emphasis in James’s Prefaces is not who is the 
center of consciousness, but the placing of a novel’s central drama as well as its 
central narration within a consciousness. The Golden Bowl’s middle specifically 
refuses to narrate the consummation of an affair not only to avoid narrating what 
standards of propriety would forbid narrating, but also to put the entire outward 
narrative of the affair into the background, in favor of the drama of consciousness. 
 In The Golden Bowl, the choice of the center of consciousness is not made at 
the beginning, but in the middle. Superficially, if we look to the titles of the two Parts 
as guidance, this shift appears to be nothing more than a switch from one primary 
focalizer to another. If it were, this would be enough to mark the middle of The 
Golden Bowl as an important point for modernism, anticipating, for example, the 
shifts in focalization in Faulkner’s As I Lay Dying or The Sound and the Fury, as well 
as, in its male/female contrast, the dramatic shift to Molly Bloom’s stream of 
consciousness at the end of Ulysses. However, since the Prince is not a simple 
primary focalizer, this middle also enacts a choice for consciousness in which the 
novel’s center will be placed. Faulkner, as well as James’s own short story, “The 
Point of View,” often accords equal or near-equal status to several focalizers. The 
Golden Bowl, however, switches between centers of consciousness in its first half. 
                                                 
7 See also Prince, Dictionary of Narratology, Revised Edition, whose entry for “central 
consciousness” cites James alone. 
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Amerigo begins as primary focalizer, but focalization shifts to Charlotte Stant and 
Adam Verver. The novel’s structure suggests balance in focalization, and thus a novel 
balanced at its center, but in truth there is no balance. The Golden Bowl’s structure is, 
among other things, a drama of focalization. The moment of choice, dramatized in the 
Preface to The Portrait after the novel’s writing as an event that occurred before the 
novel is written, is, in The Golden Bowl, dramatized within the novel itself. James’s 
Prefaces argue that this choice is crucial—what makes a novel a novel of 
consciousness is not simply the rendering of consciousness, but the centering of the 
drama within a consciousness. In the first half of the novel, the choice has not been 
made, so by James’s theory, there is no drama of a consciousness with itself—or, at 
least, not at the level of the novel or its first half, “The Prince.” Center and 
consciousness go together, but they do not go together automatically. Instead, the 
novel tries out, in more or less isolated chapters or scenes, the drama of consciousness 
for three of the novel’s leads—Amerigo, Charlotte, and Adam. Part First, then, rather 
than a drama of consciousness, serves as a sort of testing or probing the 
consciousnesses of these principles, a search for a drama of consciousness in the 
arrangement of the four principles. These three focalizers, however, are discarded at 
the novel’s middle, particularly when the former two choose to make their narrative 
the ordinary story of an affair between two old lovers. 
 Maggie, on the other hand, does not receive so much as a tryout in the first 
half of the novel. She possesses, up until the middle of the novel, a consciousness 
even less interesting to the narrator than her fellows. The middle of The Golden Bowl 
represents not only a shift in focalization, but a shift from multiple, de-centered to 
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singular, centered focalization—a shift from a drama that that is seen through 
consciousnesses to a drama centered in consciousness. Even more, the middle 
represents the emergence of a consciousness worthy of being a center. And Maggie is 
not only worthy of being the center, she actively asserts her own centrality. As S. 
Salina Jamil argues, however, the shift in focalizers is also a shift in narrative 
authority, an authority which Maggie exerts to a much greater degree than Amerigo 
(Jamil 112). This shift in authority moves from male to female, from author to 
character, and from group to individual. The last is perhaps the most important if we 
are to understand The Golden Bowl as a modernist examination of the individual 
consciousness. In its very structure, The Golden Bowl announces the end of the 
Victorian social novel and announces that the novel will be ruled by individual 
mental processes. James makes this shift not with a piece of transitional narrative, but 
with an unnarrated middle, the space between Book First and Book Second. The 
Golden Bowl’s middle marks a shift in narrative form more than of plot. The narrator, 
then, is absent at the very moment in which he cedes many of the traditional grounds 
of his authority: his ability to shift between characters at will and his control over the 
story, as Maggie’s mental processes take increasing control of both action and 
narration. 
 The Golden Bowl is not James’s first novel structured around a crucially 
absent event at its middle. The Princess Casamassima is structured around a vow that 
the reader never sees. The novel’s protagonist, Hyacinth Robinson, vows to commit 
an act of violence, later revealed to be an assassination, to the shadowy revolutionary 
leader Hoffendahl. As Kent Puckett argues, the placement of this crucial event, which 
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shapes the sense of suspense as well as Hyacinth’s internal tensions until the novel’s 
ending, makes it the purest of possible middles: “The scene is, because of its absence, 
the novel’s middle in a way that something coming at the end of the first part or the 
beginning of the second never could be” (Puckett 84-85). In The Princess 
Casamassima, James uses what Puckett calls the “absent middle” (85) to structure 
plot and psyche. Crucially, this event is not an action—it is a word—a word that is 
spoken by Hyacinth, but one that is not written in the novel. There is therefore in The 
Princess Casamassima a priority of the spoken word over the written word, over 
actions, and of the psychic work of judgment that both Hyacinth and the reader must 
make. 
 By contrast, The Golden Bowl for most of Book First seems to be building to 
the middle—the culminating action to which the plot has been building in the novel’s 
first half. After Hyacinth’s vow, we wait for the moment at which he must act upon 
his vow. Narrative momentum proceeds from the middle to the end. But in The 
Golden Bowl, the plot of Book First reaches its culmination with an affair and the 
breaking of two marriage vows. By this narrative logic, in The Golden Bowl, action 
takes priority over spoken words. However, Charlotte and Amerigo’s rendezvous 
does not actually take place during the novel’s absent middle. Instead, it takes place 
in the space before the final two chapters of Part Second—or perhaps even during 
those chapters. Before the final two chapters, Charlotte and Amerigo make their 
plans. Lady Castledean has sent all her other guests away from Matcham, leaving 
Charlotte and Amerigo behind as cover for her own affair. Charlotte, having 
concluded that Castledean wishes to be left alone, has made arrangements at a nearby 
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inn. The lovers will return to Charlotte and Adam’s home in Eaton place later in the 
evening, on the pretense of visiting some local cathedrals. The novel leaves us with 
James’s assent, but before Part First ends, there are two chapters set later in that same 
day and evening, consisting mostly of Fanny Assingham’s conversations with her 
husband Bob. Not only are Charlotte and Amerigo likely to have consummated their 
affair during this time, but Fanny has guessed that they have done so. Furthermore, 
Fanny narrates Maggie’s actions that evening (for Bob’s benefit, but also for the 
reader’s): Maggie has decided to return home to Portland Place rather than remaining 
with her father at Eaton Square, as had been her custom. Fanny concludes from this 
not only that Charlotte and Amerigo have had an affair, but that Maggie has begun to 
suspect the existence of this affair, and that this suspicion is connected to a change in 
Maggie that will make her the driving force of the novel’s plot. 
 Therefore, while Charlotte and Amerigo’s rendezvous at the inn remains 
unnarrated at the novel’s absent middle, and this unnarrated action may be foremost 
in our minds during the middle,  the action has been slightly displaced from the 
absent middle itself. It has also, before the absent middle, been paired with an action 
of Maggie’s, which, unlike Charlotte and Amerigo’s rendezvous, is given to us by 
Fanny as fact. Since we leave Fanny and Bob late in the evening, it seems likely that 
any accompanying change in Maggie’s consciousness that evening has also occurred 
before the absent middle. So both Charlotte and Amerigo’s action, and Maggie’s 
occur before the novel’s second half, but we do not have direct narration of their 
actions. Maggie’s story, however, is related in the novel’s second half, including both 
a detailed account of her waiting up that evening for Amerigo and the shifts in her 
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mind as she does so. These events are, however, narrated retrospectively, from a point 
ten days later, when Maggie has further come to understand her own actions and 
motivations as well as Charlotte’s and Amerigo’s. When Book Second begins, 
therefore, we have jumped from an evening in which crucial events have taken place, 
to a day when Maggie reflects on those and subsequent events. Thus, Charlotte and 
Amerigo’s affair remains the key unnarrated action once we have passed the absent 
middle, but the narrator has shuffled it off to the side. The narrator’s shift in 
focalization, indeed, makes it impossible to narrate this action retrospectively. The 
absent middle has skipped over this crucial moment not through a leap forward in 
time—for not only have we already passed the moment before the middle, but the 
narrator’s access to characters’ memories assures the reader that a moment of the 
fabula so missed may yet be recovered in the syuzhet. The tools of modernism, with 
its access and obsession with thoughts, memories, and reconstructing the past, would 
still leave this moment open to narration. To close it off, then, James shifts the rules 
by which these tools are deployed. James’s rendering of consciousness, which in the 
novel’s first half serves to give the reader access to multiple impressions of the 
novel’s situation, with Fanny’s speech to further fill in the gaps, in Book Second is 
used to close us off from objective knowledge of most of its characters’ thoughts and 
actions. Instead, these are all filtered through Maggie’s consciousness. In contrast to 
Warhol, however, I argue that we should not consider this simply as an 
epistemological problem for the reader attempting to analyze the main drama. 
Instead, this method gives the reader a more complete view of the drama within 
Maggie’s consciousness, to the point where many critics have argued that Maggie’s 
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consciousness itself seems to control the narrative. I will argue, instead, that Maggie’s 
consciousness is the narrative’s primary setting, that the story is no longer so much 
about the arrangement of the principle characters, but about the development of 
Maggie’s thoughts on that arrangement. From this perspective, however, even access 
to the Prince and Charlotte’s thoughts would not represent the events of the absent 
middle. That is, if we view the story of The Golden Bowl as occurring in the primary 
narrative frame—that is, in the minds of the characters that recollect past events, 
rather than in those events themselves—then fabula and syuzhet are in concordance, 
producing a linear narrative with a temporal ellipsis between Book First and Book 
Second as well as a shift in focalization. 
 At the beginning of Book Second, Maggie has already begun to realize that 
her friend and husband, and the world at large, may be less than worthy of her trust. If 
this were a simple epistemological problem—Maggie gathers enough impressions to 
make an observation about the world—The Golden Bowl would resolve in Book 
Second rather neatly in a story of detection and social maneuverings: epistemological 
problems about the outside world, ontological problems about how to use that 
knowledge to effect change. Indeed, Jonathan Freedman offers a brilliant analysis of 
Maggie’s (and, to a lesser extent, Charlotte’s, Amerigo’s, and Adam’s) social 
maneuverings in the context of game theory. In Freedman’s reading, Maggie 
eventually wins back her husband because she “possesses both the epistemological 
and financial power […] to change the rules of the game” (Freedman, Jonathan 109). 
As regards the fabula of Book Second, Freedman’s reading is stunning in its depth 
explicatory power, as concepts such as the prisoner’s dilemma make Maggie’s murky 
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maneuverings more readily understandable even as they build more thoroughly to a 
tragic ending which serves also as a critique of financialized capitalism and the 
commodification of social relationships. However, one might suppose, 
contrafactually, that such a tale might have been more readily served by a more 
straightforward omniscient narrative. If Part Second turns The Golden Bowl into a 
game of cards, why not show us more clearly each player’s move? Why linger on, for 
example, the famous image of the pagoda that stretches across the early pages of 
Book Second? Jonathan Freedman’s suggestion of why Maggie succeeds gives us a 
clue: “while they play, she thinks” (Freedman, Jonathan 102). While Part Second is 
not uninterested in Maggie’s social maneuverings, it is much more interested in the 
thoughts that determine the play, rather than the play itself. The crucial drama of 
Book Second is not the social drama of the game, but the drama of Maggie’s mind, 
which is both its primary setting and its subject. It is the drama of Maggie’s 
consciousness that begins in the novel’s absent middle. This division between Book 
First and Book Second, between a drama of multiple points of view and a drama that 
takes place within a single consciousness, structures the novel as a whole, both 
separating two different approaches to an epistemological poetics and binding these 
disparate halves into a single story. In his illuminating book-length study of The 
Golden Bowl, Wilson argues against earlier critics who place Maggie consistently at 
the novel’s center, arguing that Book Second must be read in the context of Book 
First, and that Maggie is no more the novel’s protagonist than any of the others 
(Wilson 64). Pick modifies this approach of reading continuity in The Golden Bowl 
grounded in Book First, converting Wilson’s idea of multiple authorial stances 
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created, in part, by the use of multiple focalizers, into a continuous tale of evolving 
ethics: in Book First, “characters remain wholly and intimately open to one another” 
in a state of “polygamy”; in Book Second, there is an “emergence […] of a social 
order” and “the birth of the order of justice. […] The order of ‘justice’ in Book Two 
is derived by necessity from the so-called injustices of Book One” (Pick 118). That is, 
in Pick’s reading, we have a single plot, centered around not a single consciousness, 
but around social order. In Wilson and Pick’s readings, Book Second serves as a sort 
of fulfillment of the multiplicity of consciousness or point of view in Book First: The 
Golden Bowl as essentially a social novel, problematized by the epistemological 
isolation of its protagonists. 
Wilson’s approach contrasts with Freedman’s, which, in emphasizing 
Maggie’s playing of the game in Book Second, inevitably makes her the protagonist. 
In Freedman’s reading, and, I would argue, those of most others who emphasize 
Maggie’s role, Book First is a sort of extended introduction: the setting up of a 
problem that the single protagonist (Maggie) must solve. I will analyze this later 
using a simplified version of Propp’s functions. Others who emphasize Maggie’s role 
in the novel notably include Norrman, who in discussing James’s use of symmetry 
emphasizes not the symmetry between the multiplicity of focalizers or centers of 
consciousness in Book First with the singular focalizer of Book Second, but the way 
Maggie in Book Second combines both passive and active roles in the drama 
(Norrman 210). However illuminating these sorts of readings may be, they are in 
some sense unbalanced, emphasizing endings rather than beginnings. They do, 
however, reveal the degree to which a single focalizer can become the center of the 
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novel, even when that focalizer is confined to the novel’s second half. Others, such as 
Schor, however, emphasize the disruptive force of the middle: “in the middle of the 
novel, James pulls the rug out from under us” and asks that the reader re-assign 
allegiance (Schor 241). I am not so confident that Charlotte and Amerigo ever have 
the reader’s allegiance (for my own part, I find that Fanny Assingham holds mine 
throughout Book First). There is not, in this novel, simply one side and then the other: 
there is the side of multiple focalizers, and the side of a single focalizer. As the 
various readings of the novel suggest, there is no thoroughly convincing way to 
resolve the tension between Book First and Book Second—nor even to determine 
whether the middle represents a fundamental disruption of the novel’s plot and 
technical approach, or rather a sort of tipping point in a continuous evolution. 
However, if we are to consider The Golden Bowl as a whole, it is clear that this 
middle is of prime importance. The Golden Bowl is both a single novel, and a novel in 
two books. While James’s prose, and his technical approach to representation in any 
particular chapter, show little if any change from Book First to Book Second, the 
switch from multiple focalizers to a single focalizer nevertheless has a drastic effect, 
one which has been read differently by different readers. Both approaches have been 
commonly used in modernist literature; by structuring this novel around a modernist 
middle, James is able to combine them into a single novel. By combining the 
epistemological problems of single and multiple points of view, James emphasizes 
that these approaches themselves are points of view. By using the middle to structure 
his novel around this contrast, James poses for his readers a third, irresolvable 
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epistemological problem: how do these two Books make a single novel, a single 
story? 
 James uses middles as a structuring device not only for the novel as a whole, 
but for its subdivisions as well. He does so through narrative mode, contrasting events 
which move the plot forward with both private thoughts and dramatic scenes (those 
dominated by dialogue or staging—that is, the positioning and lines of sight between 
characters in a defined space). Interweaving these modes are contrasts in the mode of 
narration, through shifts in focalization, as well as often unnarrated shifts in the 
narrative—that is, major developments in the plot often take place between chapters 
of the novel. 
 Book First of The Golden Bowl consists of three Parts, with the gaps between 
each Part marking a gap in time and a marriage. Between Part First and Part Second, 
Maggie and Amerigo are wed, spend time in New York, have a child, and return to 
Fawns in England. Between Part Second and Part Third, Adam and Charlotte marry, 
and two years pass. As James rotates the situation between his characters, he also 
rotates the point of view. Part 1, consisting of six chapters, is dominated by the 
Prince’s point of view; he is the focalizer for the first three chapters as well as the 
fifth. Chapter four consists of a conversation between Fanny and Bob Asshingham. 
These characters, in the dramatic dialogues which punctuate much of the novel, serve 
as a somewhat unreliable two-person ficelle in the sense James describes Maria 
Gostrey in the Preface to The Ambassadors: they are there to give the exposition 
without disrupting the scenic nature of the novel—that is, the ficelle gives the 





 They also serve as something of a Greek chorus, commenting on the events 
with the voice of communal values, which are notably split along gender lines. There 
is little to no thought narration in their chapters, making the drama both interpretive 
(rather than action-oriented) and external. They also frequently appear, as here, in a 
middle of sorts, reshaping our understanding of a narrative in progress. In Part First, 
they are followed by a return to the Prince as focalizer. However, the end of Part 
First, which also forms a transition with the beginning of Part Second, moves to 
Charlotte’s consciousness. The Prince leaves her in an antique shop as she examines 
the titular golden bowl. Charlotte, alone, is tempted by the bowl, but decides both it 
and an affair with the Prince would come at too high a price: she observes in her 
subsequent interactions with Amerigo “the effect of their having, by some tacit logic, 
some queer inevitability, quite dropped the idea of a continued pursuit. They didn’t 
say so, but it was on the line of giving up Maggie’s present that they practically 
proceeded—the line of giving it up without more reference to it” (88). But, whereas 
her decision not to buy the bowl is both financial (she is too poor) and tied 
metaphorically to her relationship to the Prince, the Prince’s statement is at the same 
time more material and more superstitious—not based on the particular relationships 
between particular people and particular things, but on particular observations tied to 
general laws: “I saw before I went out,” he says. “It was because I saw that I did go 
out. […] I saw the object itself. It told its story. No wonder it’s cheap. […] A crack is 
a crack—and an omen’s an omen” (89). That is, for the Prince, direct, trained 
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 James writes that Gostrey’s “intervention as a ficelle is, I hold, expertly justified. Thanks to it we 




observation leads immediately and indisputably to predefined narratives. To 
Charlotte, however, the bowl is an object with its own beauty, tied not to the general 
narratives she dismisses as superstitions, but to the particular relations between 
herself, Maggie, and Amerigo. For the Prince, we act our parts within a defined 
narrative—if the bowl is cracked, we do not buy it, and we know what will happen if 
we do. For Charlotte, we act according to our desires, our means, and our 
interpretation not of general signs, but of the unspoken relations between individuals. 
At this early transition, James is already defining contrasting and gendered concepts 
of narrative. These concepts of narrative, and not the characters of Maggie and 
Amerigo, or the archetypal figures of the Prince and Princess, are what truly define 
the two Books of the novel. And these Books themselves are defined by the novel’s 
middle, just as their theories are initially put forth in this earlier transition. 
 There is so much packed inside of the absent middle and the chapters that 
surround it, that it is worth thinking about the function of each of these elements in 
terms of the narrative as a whole. Emma Kafalenos has produced, for her readings of 
The Ambassadors and Kafka’s “Before the Law,” a useful distillation of Vladimir 
Propp’s narrative functions, devised for an analysis of Russian fairy tales, as they 
apply generally to traditional narratives. In brief, Kafalenos/Propp’s functions are 
changes in the narrative situation, each brought about by an actant. In a sense, all 
functions are narrative middles, because they move us from one narrative state to 
another—the two states making up a beginning and an ending. For Propp, however, 
functions do not stand alone to make a narrative. A complete narrative sequence takes 
us from one state of equilibrium to another by means of several functions. Kafalenos 
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adapts a total of eleven functions; out of these eleven, six (marked by a star) are 
mandatory for the completion of a narrative sequence, while the middle seven are 
undertaking by a single character, the C-actant: 
*A (or a) disruptive event (or reevaluation of a situation) 
B request that someone alleviate A (or a) 
*C decision by C-actant to attempt to alleviate A (or a) 
*C’ C-actant’s initial act to alleviate A (or a) 
D C-actant is tested 
E C-actant responds to test 
F C-actant acquires empowerment 
G C-actant arrives at the place, or time, for H 
*H C-actant’s primary action to alleviate A (or a) 
*I (or Ineg) success (or failure) of H 
*K equilibrium 
    (Kafalenos 119-120) 
In Kafalenos’s reading of The Ambassadors, the reader is forced to constantly re-
evaluate the functions of the narrative, as the primary narrative sequence evolves 
from one involving external action (the rescue of Chad Newsome) to one concerned 
with Strether’s personal growth. What emerges is a narrative that is modernist in at 
least two senses: it is incomplete (that is, we do not reach function K, but stop at 
function F), and it is inwardly focused. The result is a set of narrative actions that are 
“resonant in psychic impressions but utterly ineffectual in altering the external world” 
and thus “characteristic responses of modern man’s ironic reflections on his own 
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ineffectiveness” (Kafalenos 125). Strether learns something of the world, but he does 
not complete his mission, and he does not attain an equilibrium. 
 This turn to the incomplete narrative of a psychic journey is, however, 
anticipated formally from the beginning with The Ambassadors’ use of Strether as 
sole focalizer; and it is only completed, in Kafalenos’ reading, by a final re-
interpretation of narrative functions at the novel’s end. That is, the modernism of The 
Ambassadors is primarily a product of beginnings and endings—even as the novel 
itself seems to end in a sort of narrative middle. Additionally, the stable focalizer who 
also clearly serves as the novel’s protagonist leaves us with a clear C-actant. The 
Golden Bowl, by contrast, uses Maggie only briefly as focalizer, in chapters 9 and 10 
of Book First, and then only in tandem with her father Adam. Yet she dominates 
Book Second nearly as much as Strether dominates The Ambassadors. The Golden 
Bowl’s absent middle, then, is the location of multiple key narrative functions which 
must be interpreted and re-interpreted at the novel’s middle not only with respect to 
the object of the narrative, as in The Ambassadors, but also in terms of the narrative’s 
subject, the C-actant. 
 Let us begin with the Prince and Charlotte’s infidelity. This action (which is, 
at least, clearly an action, and thus most amenable to Propp’s formulation) can be, as 
the title of Book First suggests, from the Prince’s point of view. In this case, we may 
read Charlotte’s arrival as function A, a disruptive event that disturbs the Prince’s 
stable engagement, itself the conclusion of an unseen action to alleviate instability in 
his family’s finances. At the outset of the novel, the Prince thinks of his engagement 
as a successful pursuit, though one that nevertheless leaves him uneasy: “There was 
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nothing to do as yet, further, but feel what one had done, and our personage felt it 
while he aimlessly wandered. It was already as if he were married, so definitely had 
the solicitors, at three o’clock, enabled the date to be fixed” (4). Fixity and 
aimlessness suggest the end of a goal-oriented plot, the marriage plot that precedes 
the novel. But Charlotte’s arrival provides a new disruption: “A handsome, clever, 
odd girl staying with one was a complication” (33).  
 The Prince makes various attempts to alleviate the situation, through hiding 
his past relationship with Charlotte, through various hints that, perhaps, it might not 
be the best idea for Adam to marry Charlotte or for Maggie to leave Charlotte and 
himself alone. As Amerigo’s efforts gradually shift from avoiding or hiding 
Charlotte’s disruptive presence to pursuing an affair, the question comes whether the 
object of the narrative in which Amerigo is the actant is the consummation of the 
affair or the preservation of his marriage. Sent off to accompany Charlotte at 
Matcham, the Prince places himself as the actant who will determine the course of the 
situation in which he has been placed: “Being thrust, systematically, with another 
woman, and a woman one happened, by the same token, exceedingly to like, and 
being so thrust that the theory of it seemed to publish one as idiotic or incapable—this 
was a predicament of which the dignity depended all on one’s own handling” (245). 
That is, for the Prince at this moment, the goal is neither to consummate nor avoid an 
affair: it is to preserve dignity, and for that either action may serve. When Charlotte 
reveals that she has anticipated Amerigo’s plan of leaving on the pretense of visiting a 
cathedral in Gloucester, and that she has “wanted everything,” Amerigo’s response is 
to anticipate that H will stabilize the narrative situtation: “Well, it was all right. ‘You 
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shall have everything’” (266). In this version of the narrative, the novel ends at Book 
First. The Prince has faced the problem posed by Charlotte’s disruptive presence and 
resolved it. From Charlotte’s point of view, as well, the narrative concludes at the 
novel’s middle: Amerigo’s marriage is the disruption to her life, both bringing him 
back into view as an object of desire and denying her possession of that object, which 
she sets out, through various actions, to alleviate in Book First, and which she 
succeeds in alleviating at that Book’s conclusion. The middle, as Charlotte sees it, is 
the end, the completion of “everything.”
9
 
 However, we may also interpret this moment for Amerigo as function E, the 
actant’s failed response to a test. In this interpretation of the narrative sequence, 
Amerigo’s object is to defend his marriage from the disruption posed by Charlotte. In 
this interpretation, the novel’s middle represents the exact middle of the Kafalenos’ 
narrative sequence. Amerigo is later empowered by Maggie. He eventually acts to 
side with Maggie, restoring to equilibrium both his marriage and his finances. The C-
actant does not come off particularly heroic in this sequence, but he does follow a 
complete, traditional narrative sequence, composed mostly if not entirely by discrete 
social actions. Finally, where Amerigo is concerned, we may consider, as in 
Kafalenos’ interpretation of The Ambassadors, that both Amerigo and the reader 
                                                 
9 Sarah Campbell examines the use of the words “nothing” and “everything” in The Golden Bowl, 
arguing that “everything” “stands for consummation—this time, the intimate ‘knowledge’ that is 
the extramarital relationship between Charlotte and the Prince” (Campbell 105). Furthermore, this 
knowledge of “everything” marks the beginning of Book Second and “inaugurates a new phase in 
Maggie’s experience, that part of her education in which speech acts as the means by which she 
finally and successfully manages what she knows.” (Campbell 108). Campbell’s interpretation not 
only highlights how James’s use of words with vague or multiple meanings emphasizes 
epistemological concerns, but also emphasizes how outward sources of knowledge—speech acts—
inform the reader about the drama of Maggie’s consciousness. 
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regularly re-evaluate the object of his narrative sequence, so that the middle, which 
may seem to both Amerigo and the reader like an ending, is gradually re-conceived as 
the middle. That is, we have the same process Kafalenos reads in The Ambassadors, 
but the incomplete narrative sequence is applied not to the novel as a whole, but only 
Book First. That is, Amerigo’s narrative, initially perceived by the reader as a one-
volume novel, becomes a two-volume novel. Notably, however, in this two-volume 
novel, Amerigo is not the central consciousness. 
 The Prince’s final appearance as focalizer, near the end of Book First, casts a 
heavy shadow on the novel’s middle. In chapter XXII, Charlotte reveals to the Prince 
that she has made the final arrangements for their rendezvous, having secured a room 
for the two of them at an inn in Gloucester. The chapter concludes with the Prince’s 
famous assent to Charlotte, “You shall have everything.” The sexual euphemism, like 
many throughout the chapter, is comical in its obviousness, particularly when read 
aloud. James’s narrator is, in effect, in a position similar to Strether’s—loathe to 
confirm absolutely the existence or extent of an extramarital affair, physical act 
unseen—no matter how obvious the social or verbal cues may be. That is to say, 
standards of propriety and standards of proof conspire to deny James’s readers 
epistemological certitude on the affair. The night at the inn is a gap that we might 
easily fill in, that Amerigo’s words beg us to fill in with everything. This seems to be 
the perfect setup for the novel’s absent middle—a crucial moment, unwritable by 
standards of decency, strongly implied to the point where it becomes an inside joke 
that the author shares with the reader. We can see here why D.H. Lawrence was once 
considered a central figure in modernist narrative—James teeters up as closely as he 
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can to the sheer unspeakable narrative power of sex in Victorian narrative, pointing 
with both the novel’s structure and his characteristically euphemistic dialogue at the 
power and absurdity of it all. We are ready, it seems, to leap from Amerigo’s decision 
and the words that seal the act, straight over the act itself, to the story of Maggie’s 
thoughts trained upon that empty middle action.
10
 
 However, Book First does not conclude with Amerigo and Charlotte. Instead, 
standing between The Prince and The Princess are two chapters featuring the 
Assinghams. In these chapters, time continues to move forward. Fanny and Bob are 
apart for most of the day; when Fanny at last speaks to Bob, it is with an antithetical 
echo of Amerigo’s words: “We were all wrong. There’s nothing. […] Between 
Charlotte Verver and the Prince” (269). Eliding Bob’s prompt, as I have done here, 
emphasizes that we are still in the world of overloaded sexual euphemism here. There 
is Fanny’s intended euphemism—vaguely connoting an inappropriate relationship 
which may range from mere flirtation to an outright sexual affair—and then there is 
James’s euphemism for the sexual act itself, with literally nothing between Charlotte 
and the Prince’s bodies. And this dialogue takes place at a plausible moment for the 
sexual act—midnight on the very same night. And, indeed, James seems to obliquely 
warn his readers about the follies of making assumptions, as Fanny insists, “I have 
seen,” precisely when both Fanny and the reader do not see (269). Indeed, Fanny’s 
                                                 
10
 Early in Book Second, Maggie attempts to understand the look on Amerigo’s face as he checks in on 
her upon his return; the meaning of this look seems for Maggie “the key to everything” (308). For 
Campbell, Maggie’s pursuit of the knowledge of “everything” initiates the novel’s second volume 
and “inaugurates a new phase in Maggie’s experience, that part of her education in which speech 
acts as the means by which she finally and successfully manages what she knows.” (Campbell 




dialogue in chapter XXIII repeatedly refers to what she and the four main characters 
do or do not see, including a declaration that both Maggie and Adam are “blind” 
(271). Fanny comes very near to parodying the concept of focalization, declaring, “it 
was as if I were suddenly seeing through their eyes” (272). This, then, is Fanny’s 
evidence, what she has seen: a focalized vision, leading her to the opposite conclusion 
to what the novel’s own use of the Prince as focalizer has led us. 
 From sight, the dialogue eventually turns to thought—Fanny dismisses the 
relevance of her own thoughts, but Maggie’s seem more crucial. Fanny wishes to 
protect Amerigo and Charlotte “from a sudden scare. From the alarm, I mean, of what 
Maggie may think” (273). Fanny is less certain that Maggie sees nothing than she is 
that Maggie thinks nothing. Here we have a clue to the novel’s fulcrum: the crucial 
questions of the novel have shifted from not only from Amerigo and Charlotte to 
Maggie, but from epistemological questions surrounding vision, including point of 
view and our ability to observe discrete actions or behaviors either present or absent, 
to questions of thought. The problem that will be posed through the novel’s absent 
middle, Fanny suggests, is not what we can see and what we cannot, nor from whose 
perspective we can see it—but instead a problem of what one particular mind can 
think. And thoughts are, for Fanny, dangerous things: “I perpetrate—in thought—
crimes” (273). Thought, then, is equivalent to action, in a way that vision is not. 
 By the end of the chapter, Fanny seems to have reversed herself. Rather than 
being confident that Amerigo and Charlotte will studiously avoid an extramarital 
affair, she is struck  with an “inner vision” she vows to deny: “Whatever they’ve done 
I shall never know. Never, never—because I don’t want to, and because nothing will 
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induce me” (277). Fanny, then, refuses to convert vision into knowledge. But it is 
crucial that, particularly, this is an inner vision. The suggestion is that thought and 
contemplation lead to sight that is truer than that available through observation and 
even focalization. Fanny comes to this vision by contemplating Maggie—and 
Maggie’s thoughts first of all. She then leads herself through Maggie’s actions 
throughout the evening. And here, again, what might have been a crucial action to fill 
the novel’s absent middle is narrated before the end of Part First: Fanny recalls that 
Maggie, unusual for her, drove Fanny home—that is, left her father’s before she was 
accustomed to. This thought, in turn, leads Fanny to contemplate the possibility that 
Charlotte and Amerigo would not return home that evening. With one chapter 
remaining in Part First, Fanny has already informed the reader that Maggie has 
behaved unusually, and traces this action back to a further reminder of the unnarrated, 
but perfectly obvious, action Charlotte and Amerigo have taken. Both of these actions 
are, before the middle, distinctly in the past, and the site of little if any 
epistemological uncertainty. Epistemological uncertainty, and narrative suspense, is 
moved from Charlotte and Amerigo’s actions to Maggie’s thoughts. 
 Chapter XXIV continues to prepare the reader for a transition to Maggie as 
the novel’s sole focalizer, with thoughts rather than actions the crucial elements of the 
drama. Fanny analyzes Maggie’s manner, slowly growing more confident that 
Maggie has begun to undergo a change. While R. B. J. Wilson’s argument that 
Maggie’s role as focalizer in Part Second does not reduce the reader’s interest in the 
three other principals is admirable, Fanny seems to be preparing us for more than a 
change in the novel’s point of view: “She’ll carry the whole weight of us” (279). 
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Fanny’s vision is not simply a tale of four or six persons balanced on one of those 
persons—but a tale of a single person: “We might have pitied her before—for all the 
good it would have done her; we might have begun some time ago. Now, however, 
she has begun to live” (281). But Maggie’s “triumph” will not contain a simple 
action: “It isn’t a question of recovery. It won’t be a question of any vulgar struggle” 
(281). Instead, “her sense will have to open […] [t]o what’s called Evil—with a very 
big E: for the first time in her life. To the discovery of it, to the knowledge of it, to the 
crude experience of it” (282). And as Maggie gains this knowledge and experience, 
she will attempt “[t]o keep her father from her own knowledge” in order to “save” 
him” (283). 
 As Fanny reviews the events of Book First, she rewrites the narrative with 
Maggie as the driving force: “Before she knew, at any rate, her little scruples and her 
little lucidities, which were really so divinely blind—her feverish little sense of 
justice, as I say—had brought the two others together as her gross misconduct 
couldn’t have done. And now she knows something or other has happened—yet 
hasn’t heretofore known what” (290). Fanny speaks a tangled web of thoughts, 
actions, vision, and knowledge. There is an allusion to blind justice—ideas without 
vision—conceived of as worse than ill-intentioned actions. Knowledge—the very 
knowledge Fanny herself in chapter XXIII explicitly refused—is here conceived of as 
crucial. Yet, knowledge is a tangled thing for Maggie: Maggie “knows something” 
but doesn’t know precisely what she knows. The problem for Maggie, Fanny argues, 
is not working out what has happened, but working out what she already knows. That 
is, it is not an epistemological problem of vision, which would sit between the mind 
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and the objective world. Instead, Maggie’s epistemological problem is a problem of 
thought—set between the mind and itself. 
 Having established the new prominence of Maggie’s thoughts, Part First 
concludes with a series of statements on what will not take place in Book Second. 
First, Fanny declares, this will not be a tale of actions: “Nothing—in spite of 
everything—will happen. Nothing has happened. Nothing is happening” (294). This 
declaration goes beyond a euphemism demanding silence regarding a sexual act. The 
Golden Bowl seems to parody at this moment, through Fanny’s mouth, its length, its 
structure, its plotting. In a Jamesian novel of the major phase, Fanny says, echoing 
any number of bored readers, nothing happens. If you expect that the novel is about to 
get moving, for action to speed it to a denouement, you will be disappointed. But 
Fanny goes further still. What action that seemed to occur in Book First did not, in 
fact, occur. Small wonder that so many readers seem to regard Book First as mere 
prelude in Maggie’s story, then, when the novel’s ficelle herself declares Book First 
null and void. Having erased both past and future, Fanny is still unsatisfied: not only 
does The Golden Bowl lack past and a future, but it lacks a present as well. One of the 
classical epistemological problems associated with modernism, and particularly with 
stream of consciousness technique—the problem for the reader of determining what 
is happening in the novel’s objective world when that knowledge is filtered through a 
particular character’s consciousness—is also null and void. There is no present action 
to know. Indeed, Fanny declares, “We know nothing on earth” (294). Taken directly, 
of course, this series of nothings is merely a vow of silence between the Assinghams, 
and Bob himself points this out—nothing is happening, Bob says, “For us” (294). We 
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aren’t to understand that The Golden Bowl literally has no plot, no objective world in 
which actions take place. Nevertheless, we are told that this world, and particularly 
Charlotte and Amerigo’s place in it, are increasingly irrelevant. The novel’s stakes are 
now stakes about knowledge—or, more precisely, signs of knowledge. Fanny insists 
that Maggie will watch her father “[f]or the first faint sign. I mean of his noticing” 
(295). Fanny herself is confident that Adam has not noticed because she has been 
watching Maggie—and sees no sign in Maggie that she has seen a sign from her 
father: “Nothing—from him—has come” (295). Once again, the driving force and 
epistemological question posed is not one about the state of the objective world. 
Instead, this is a recursive epistemological problem about knowledge and thought. It 
is not even that Adam must be kept ignorant—but that Maggie must receive no sign 
that he is anything but ignorant. Knowledge, thoughts, and the social cues that 
communicate them are the keys to Book Second. Fanny announces, then, that Book 
Second will pose epistemological problems about thought. The mind, then, rather 
than the external world, becomes (if it was not already) the setting for The Golden 
Bowl’s story. 
 In the final line of Book First, Fanny underlines how much objective reality 
and its plot elements have become subsidiary to subjective consciousness and its 
internal drama. Fanny asserts to Bob her certainty that Adam has given no sign that 
he knows anything of his wife’s infidelity:  
‘Nothing—from him—has come.’ 
 ‘You’re so awfully sure?’ 
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 ‘Sure. Nothing will. Good-night,’ she said. ‘She’ll die first.’ 
(295) 
Death, then, is no longer the potential ending that drives the action forward. Instead, 
death is, like Athena in Euripides’s Ion, a deus ex machina whose purpose is to stop 
the plot’s primary motion, to deny the characters the knowledge they are about to 
attain. Ion, however, has more traditional epistemological concerns: the eponymous 
character seems poised to learn that he is the son of the god Apollo, who raped his 
mother. Athena denies him the knowledge and sends him on his way to found the 
Ionian people. Fanny, by contrast, promises that the narrative logic of the novel 
dictates that death will intervene not before Adam knows about the affair, but before 
he signals his knowledge to Maggie. The impossibility is no longer knowledge of 
infidelity—it is knowledge of knowledge. The stakes of this meta-epistemological 
plot, Fanny insists, are so high that the tragic denouement would be short-circuited by 
what is either incongruous objective plotting (that is, fate intervenes and causes the 
death) or wholly sentimental plotting (Maggie somehow senses that a sign is about to 
come from her father, and dies or wills herself to die as a consequence). That is, The 
Golden Bowl will prioritize the psycho-social stakes of its meta-epistemological plot 
over any adherence to objective realism or plot logic. 
 The dialogues between Fanny and Bob that conclude Part First, then, set up 
the structure and themes of Part Second. They also, crucially, create a middle that is 
not driven by traditional questions of plot—either suspense (forward-looking) or 
epistemological (backward-looking). While two key objective events—Charlotte and 
Amerigo’s night in an inn and Maggie’s return home—are important to understanding 
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The Golden Bowl’s absent middle, they are by this middle already in the novel’s past. 
Rather than a plot development, what has happened in this empty space is a change in 
narrative form and interest. In Book First, The Golden Bowl is a novel of multiple 
points of view, building our knowledge of four characters and their relationships as it 
builds to a single act of infidelity. Book Second might have centered itself with 
reference to this infidelity, now in the novel’s past, playing out its consequences on 
multiple characters. It might even have become the story of Maggie-as-detective, and 
there are still elements of this particular plot. However, by delaying the novel’s 
middle until after the infidelity has occurred and been discussed, and after Maggie’s 
possibly-simultaneous decision to return home that night, James fills the absent 
middle not with actions but with thoughts. Fanny may speculate about these 
thoughts—but we do not know yet how they have developed in Maggie’s mind. And 
we anticipate a plot driven by what she thinks of what her father thinks. The absent 
middle, then, contains a shift in the novel’s form that allows us to shift from 
epistemological concerns about the objective world to epistemological concerns that 
occur within and between consciousnesses. Rather than a sexual act, there is a shift 
between Books First and Second not of consciousness. This is a shift both in 
Maggie’s consciousness and in the novel’s consciousness, as it rearranges its form 
and point of view, rewriting Book First in the process, and plunging deeper into 
modernist concerns with consciousness and epistemology. 
 The beginning of Book Second marks clearly the change that has happened in 
both the novel and in Maggie Verver: 
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It was not till many days had passed that the Princess began to accept 
the idea of having done, a little, something she was not always doing, 
or indeed that of having listened to any inward voice that spoke in a 
new tone. Yet these instinctive postponements of reflection were the 
fruit, positively, of recognitions and perceptions already active; of the 
sense, above all, that she had made, at a particular hour, made by the 
mere touch of her hand, a difference in the situation so long present to 
her as practically unattackable. (299) 
Maggie’s mind has already begun to open to the possibilities associated with a 
broader, deeper understanding of “the garden of life” (299). Maggie, like Amerigo 
and Charlotte, has done something in the closing chapters of Part Second that is 
unusual, upsetting the stable world of habit that characterized, for her, the world of 
Part First. Confirming and clarifying Fanny’s account of the evening, Maggie recalls 
that she had gone home to wait for her husband’s return from Matcham, rather than to 
her father’s house. But she has also heard an inward voice, speaking where the novel 
offers only silence. Unlike Hyacinth’s words, though, Maggie’s inward voice does 
not bind her to a cause, a future action, or to a human being. And while we can 
discern, if not the exact words of Hyacinth’s vow, at least the general character of the 
promise to fulfill an obligation that will drive the plot of that novel inevitably towards 
it conclusion, Maggie’s inward voice is more indistinct. We might guess more of 
Maggie’s inward voice than she does at the moment—that it is tied to her husband’s 
infidelity—whereas Hyacinth knows more of his vow than we do. But this knowledge 
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ties the inward voice not to the novel’s ending, but back to the middle from which it 
originates. 
 It would be a mistake, however, to think of Maggie’s mind primarily in terms 
of a “voice.” Alan Palmer’s work on the narration of fictional minds provides a useful 
framework for thinking about just what it means for a story to be primarily concerned 
with the mind. While Palmer is primarily concerned with revising our narratological 
approach to narration of the mind in order to open up greater concern for non-verbal 
thought, his model suggests that we might think of the narrated mind as a setting. 
Following Dorrit Cohn’s work on psycho-narration, which he calls thought report, 
Palmer emphasizes the importance of the narration of the mind that includes more 
than the representation of verbal thought. Thought report, Palmer argues, should not 
be consider a more distant representation of conscious verbal thought than direct or 
free indirect thought. A narratological framework that models the narration of thought 
on the narration of speech results in the “impression that characters’ minds really only 
consist of a private, passive flow of thought” (Palmer 32). Instead, Palmer argues, 
thought narration may represent non-verbal aspects of the mind, including the social 
context of thought. For our purposes, one of the implications of Palmer’s observation 
is that the mind may be represented like any other environment—that is, narrative 
discourse may dramatically represent language within the mind, but may also narrate 
abstract events in the mind, describe the scene of the mind, and otherwise narrate a 
story that occurs within the mind. The Golden Bowl, particular in scenes of characters 
in contemplation, is often radical in how directly it presents the mind as a scene in 
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which a story unfolds, and perhaps nowhere more so than at the beginning of Book 
Second. 
 The famous image of the pagoda is notable not only for its exoticism (in a 
novel concerned entirely with Western high society) and its elaboration, but also for 
how it places the very plot of the novel (the “situation”) in Maggie’s mind, which is 
figured explicitly as a setting. This rendering of the mind as a setting is accomplished 
by rather elaborate thought report: 
This situation had been occupying, for months and months, the very 
centre of the garden of her life, but it had reared itself there like some 
strange, tall tower of ivory, or perhaps rather some wonderful, 
beautiful, but outlandish pagoda, a structure plated with hard, bright 
porcelain, coloured and figured and adorned, at the overhanging eaves, 
with silver bells that tinkled, ever so charmingly, when stirred by 
chance airs. She had walked round and round it—that was what she 
felt; she had carried on her existence in the space left her for 
circulation, a space that sometimes seemed ample and sometimes 
narrow; looking up, all the while, at the fair structure that spread itself 
so amply and rose so high, but never quite making out, as yet, where 
she might have entered had she wished.  (James, Golden Bowl 299) 
The pagoda, though exotically Orientalized (it is later figured as a Mosque), is 
contained at the center, specifically, of Maggie’s life. It is her garden the pagoda 
occupies. Maggie is no longer a figure in the plot of the novel—the plot of the novel 
is a figure in her life. And all of this is contained within her consciousness: 
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If this image, however, may represent our young woman’s 
consciousness of a recent change in her life—a change now but a few 
days old—it must at the same time be observed that she both sought 
and found in renewed circulation, as I have called it, a measure of 
relief from the idea of having perhaps to answer for what she had 
done. The pagoda in her blooming garden figured the arrangement—
how otherwise was it to be named?--by which, so strikingly, she had 
been able to marry without breaking, as she like to put it, with her past. 
(James, Golden Bowl 300) 
The image here is referred to is not actually the static visual image. Instead, it is a 
scene suggested by the narrator, complete with action—and with figurative language 
nested again within the scene: “She had knocked, in short—though she could scarce 
have said whether for admission or for what; she had applied her hand to a cool, 
smooth spot, and had waited to see what would happen. Something had happened; it 
was as if a sound, at her touch, after a little, had come back to her from within; a 
sound sufficiently suggesting that her approach had been noted” (300). A change in 
Maggie’s consciousness is figured as an action within an image. And within that 
action, there is not so much a sound as a further layer of Maggie’s consciousness, as 
the Maggie within the image imagines a sound, or has an experience that to the 
narrator suggests a sound. And this whole elaborate image is itself a way of 
describing Maggie’s consciousness as she thinks back on the last few days: her mind 
contains not only the plot of the novel, but contains its own evolution. 
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 When Amerigo arrives, Maggie’s contemplation of her situation ends—but 
only in the retrospective timeline. The action described remains within Maggie’s 
consciousness. Dorrit Cohn, in a brilliant analysis of the first two chapters of Book 
Second, notes the “dual narrative situation” and “dual time scheme” at play here: the 
novel has jumped forward ten days and narrates Maggie remembering the night of 
Amerigo’s return from Matcham (Cohn, “First” 6). Amerigo’s arrival marks “the 
final sharp extinction by the outward” (308). The narrator at this point fills us in on 
what happened that night: Maggie’s return home to Portland Place to surprise 
Amerigo; Amerigo’s return; his initial surprise at her presence, shifting quickly into 
an eager embrace; his insistence on changing alone before dinner; and a second 
embrace upon his return. In this sense, what we have is a narrative of Maggie’s 
contemplation of the novel’s absent middle.  
 Maggie’s mind, then, begins to contain the entire situation of The Golden 
Bowl, which amounts almost entirely to the relationships between four people. But 
just as Maggie’s mind consumes the situation, so too is it consumed by the situation. 
Just as her mind takes over the novel, her mind seems to be nothing but the novel. 
Whether she is a master of game theory, an arrogant plutocrat, an enlightened 
moralist—the compass of her mind scarcely penetrates beyond the arrangement of 
these four people. It may even be her lack of interests that gives her advantage. As the 
others sit down to play cards, which “were as nought to her,” Maggie thinks of “the 
sharp-edged fact of the relation of the whole group, individually and collectively, to 
herself” (467). She has scarcely a thought even for her son: for example, when she 
looks upon her napping son in chapter 39, Maggie’s thoughts are primarily for the 
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crib which holds her son and her father, who sits behind him (521). The Principino, 
then, serves primarily as a symbol around which the four principles rotate. Even more 
so, though, Maggie’s mind as represented in the novel seems to consist of few 
thoughts beyond the arrangement of the novel’s principles—that is, the understanding 
and manipulation of the story.  
 The story Maggie chooses to for herself, then, is the realization of a delayed 
marriage plot: securing for herself a husband. To do so, she determines that she must 
leave her father—her life can contain only one man. Furthermore, this arrangement 
involves the sacrifice of Maggie’s most significant friendship with another woman 
(Charlotte) and leaves her friendship with Fanny (more of a surrogate mother to her 
than a peer) strained, impersonal, and dishonest. Freedman reads the Amerigo at the 
end of the novel as Maggie’s automaton, but, with Adam out of the picture, Maggie 
no longer has her father’s financial power with which to control her husband 
(Freedman, Jonathan 113). She has bought herself a traditional marriage, sacrificed 
the power of an unusual arrangement to nab a husband. When Isabel Archer discovers 
her husband’s illicit plotting with another woman, she turns away from him, reasserts 
her interests outside of the marriage even if she is unwilling to leave the marriage. 
Maggie discovers an illicit affair and decides she wants her husband. And nothing 
else. From a feminist perspective, this makes the novel deeply depressing, even if we 
do not consider Maggie’s actions. She simply cannot imagine anything other than her 
husband that she could want. Maggie has learned how to manipulate the people 
closest to her, but she has not learned how to see beyond them. One leaves The 
Portrait of a Lady wondering what will become of Isabel Archer, what she will 
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accomplish, who she will meet, what she will read, how she will navigate her difficult 
situation, what she will be like when she reaches Mme Merle’s age. The ending of 
The Golden Bowl, however, leads us only back to its middle, where Maggie’s mind 
expanded to take in a world, and the world shrank to fit inside her mind. In the 
ending, as in the middle, the sexual consummation of a new arrangement of people 
remains outside the narrative, beyond both narrative proprieties and, perhaps, James’s 
method of thought report to represent. 
 The Golden Bowl’s middle has multiple structural functions that encompass 
both traditional plotting and modernist poetics. The middle may be read, as Wilson 
has argued, as the crisis in a fairly simple plot, in which an unusual arrangement of 
the four principle characters, developed over the novel’s first half, leads to an extra-
marital affair that destabilizes the situation until its final resolution in the novel’s end. 
The middle is also the sexual consummation of that affair itself: an empty space for 
the unnarratable. However, the middle is also a transition between narrative methods: 
between a Book First that includes multiple focalizers to a Book Second that includes 
only one. The use of multiple focalizers in Book First poses particular 
epistemological questions, as we understand particular developing events through the 
point of view of Amerigo, Adam, Charlotte, and (briefly) Maggie. The emphasis, 
then, is on the incomplete knowledge and varying motivations of each, as well as on 
the reader’s task of constructing a sequence of events from a narrative discourse that 
consists mostly of dialogue and the narration of subjective thought. In Book Second, 
by contrast, Maggie is the sole focalizer, and the implications of James’s internal 
focalization become quite different. Rather than an extra-diegetic narrator 
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representing multiple points of view, the extra-diegetic narrator represents a single 
point of view, which in turn constructs the multiple points of view. The story, as I 
have argued, is encompassed by Maggie’s mind, so much so that it is useful to think 
of Maggie’s mind as being the primary setting of the story, and its development the 
narrative’s plot. Yet, Maggie’s mental development seems to consist entirely of her 
developing thoughts about the narrative’s external plot. Thus, the shift in the narrative 
discourse in The Golden Bowl’s middle represents a sort of collapse of the internal 
and the external, multiple points of view and the single point of view, the mind and 
the world. Book First reminds us that the world is populated by multiple minds, each 
attempting to understand and manipulate that world through a partial point of view. 
Book Second reminds us that no single point of view is static, that the mind itself is a 
developing, dynamic thing, not simply a focalizer through which the world may be 
narrated, but a world unto itself. Book Second, however, is also an exploration of the 
limits of narrative’s power to represent multiple points of view. For the reader of The 
Golden Bowl is, like Maggie, only a single mind; any attempt to cross the chasm that 
separates that mind from the world and the other minds that occupy it occurs 
ultimately within that single mind, as a second-order point of view. This is a middle 
that, by re-arranging the modernist representation of the mind, highlights both its 
powers and its limitations. 
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Chapter 3: “Time Passes”: The Middle as Corridor in Virginia 
Woolf’s To the Lighthouse 
 With Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse (1927), we have arrived at a sort of 
middle for modernist narrative itself: high modernist stream of consciousness 
narrative. This vaguely defined category has itself largely defined modernist 
narrative, centering our history of modernist narrative in the 1920s. In Peter Nicholls’ 
study of different types of modernism, narrative becomes central to his discussion 
only with the high modernist novels and narrative poems of the 1920s. Woolf 
represents one branch of high modernist narrative, defined by stream of 
consciousness, “characterised by an interest in the contents of consciousness and the 
self’s labile existence in time” (Nicholls 254). More generally, Woolf’s novels, along 
with Ulysses, The Waste Land, and other defining works of 1920s high modernism, 
are “concerned primarily with the new rather than with the original, with the 
reconstituted rather than the immediate” (Nicholls 253). That is, high modernism 
stands in a sort of middle: new, yet reconstituting the past; in time, yet not fixed. It is 
perched, on high, at the middle of things. In the case of To the Lighthouse, that means 
that both novelist and reader approach the narrative from a position after World War 
I. The war itself takes place in the novel’s middle, “Time Passes.” In this middle, 
Woolf challenges and reshapes the very conventions of high modernist stream of 
consciousness narrative which the novel’s beginning and ending helps to codify. 
During composition, Woolf described “Time Passes” as “the most difficult abstract 
piece of writing—I have to give an empty house, no people’s characters, the passage 
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of time, all eyeless & featureless with nothing to cling to” (Diary, April 18, 1926)
. 
Familiar characters and familiar consciousnesses leave the scene, the labile 
consciousness replaced by an accelerating forward movement of time. Stream of 
consciousness, such as it is, is still new, yet no longer original, and not completely 
adequate for reconstituting a traumatic past. The self’s labile existence in time 
becomes, in this case, a complete novelistic narrative only when held together by a 
contrasting middle which holds its own, contrasting view of time. “Time Passes” is 
also the most prominent middle discussed in this study: it is its own  section, in a 
sense coequal with beginning and ending. Its difference is a cleavage in both senses, 
separating and binding beginning and ending. At the middle of modernist narrative, 
then, the modernist middle is at its most visible: the peak that defines the landscape 
which surrounds it.  
 Lord Jim (1899-1900) and The Golden Bowl (1904) occupy a different sort of 
middle, the literary-historical transition from the Victorian era to the modern(ist), 
with assists from the powerful arbitrariness of the turn of the century and the brief 
Edwardian period, ending just before the First World War. While both of these early 
modernist novels feature middles marked by sharp structural changes in narrative and 
point of view, in both cases these changes are at least partly motivated by the core 
component of traditional narrative, as suggested by Aristotle and later systematized 
by narrative theorists such as Vladimir Propp and Claude Bremond: a human, or 
human-like, protagonist, takes an action, producing a change in the narrative 
situation. In the case of Lord Jim, Stein redirects the narrative with the intent of 
restoring the principles of Romanticism—an attempt to reverse the historical-
107 
 
narrative force towards modernist moral and epistemological doubt. In the case of 
The Golden Bowl, Charlotte and Amerigo arguably make a similar attempt to turn 
their own narrative back in time. By consummating their affair, they not only revisit 
their own personal history, but frame their marriages in a European aristocratic norm 
of assumed marital infidelity that, though the novel’s fairy-tale framing of “The 
Prince” and “The Princess,” echoes back to Medieval ideas of courtly love. But that 
middle is even more dominated by Maggie’s own mental action, which ultimately 
shapes the narrative, arguably through a more modern financial-capitalistic view of 
human relations. In both cases, human agents face the transition to modernism from 
within, actively shaping the narrative from its middle, though with limited control of 
its end. 
 In addition, Lord Jim and The Golden Bowl maintain the unity of the 
traditional narrative even through their disruptive middles by avoiding any highly 
marked changes  in prose style or overly-explicit markers of narrative difference. In 
Lord Jim, the middle is produced primarily by the differences between what comes 
before and after, and secondarily by the re-centering power of its exegetical 
discourse. It occurs approximately at the center of the text, but it has no obvious 
markers—and, indeed, Lord Jim’s structure offers several possible alternative 
middles. The Golden Bowl maintains a formal sense of unity through its disruptive 
middle through, on the one hand, a stylistic unity and, on the other hand, through 
formal parallelism: Book First: The Prince is echoed by Book Second: The Princess, 
and the two Books are approximately the same length. Thus, neither middle explicitly 
calls attention to itself as a disruptive narrative force or as a disruption of traditional 
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narrative form. Though they disrupt narrative point of view, genre, and the direction 
of the plot, these middles are themselves hidden: Conrad’s by the absence of formal 
markings, James’s by the absence of the middle itself. 
 To the Lighthouse, on the other hand, identifies its middle through a clear 
three-part narrative structure, so that the reader is able to identify the middle even 
before she begins to read. Woolf described the novel’s form as “Two blocks joined by 
a corridor,” accompanied by a drawing resembling an outlined letter “H” with a 
single stroke below (Holograph, Appendix A 48). Woolf’s phrase and diagram are 
highly suggestive of Todorov’s description of the two types of narrative episodes, 
“those which describe a state (of equilibrium or of disequilibrium) and those which 
describe the passage from one state to the other” (Todorov 111). These are, 
respectively, the adjectival and the verbal, Given Woolf’s choice of the word “block” 
to describe the stative beginning and ending, we might also associate the adjectival 
with the nominal phrase in a narrative predicate. If narrative, as in Woolf’s diagram, 
consists of two dimensions (or, in Todorov’s theory, two parts of speech) the 
beginning and ending primarily provide one of these two dimensions, while the 
middle provides the other. Woolf’s underline emphasizes that these parts combine to 
create a narrative whole. Without “Time Passes,” then, To the Lighthouse would not 
be a narrative—but instead two unconnected descriptive episodes. Put more modestly, 
“Time Passes” does the work of turning modernist adjectival episodes into a single 




 Even as “Time Passes” serves an important function in the novel’s overall 
narrative structure, it also represents a certain level of emancipation of the middle 
from beginning and ending: a middle that exists in some ways apart and by itself, a 
prominent and distinct textual object. “Time Passes”  is clearly different in style and 
content from the surrounding text.  If Lord Jim and The Golden Bowl’s middles shift 
the form or direction of the narratives that come before into the different forms or 
directions that come after comes after, it is “Time Passes” that is different both from 
what comes before and what comes after. This difference, along with its greater 
prominence as a separate section of the text, invites readers to examine “Time Passes” 
not only as a corridor joining beginning and ending, but as a substantial narrative 
episode—if not a complete narrative. The title, “Time Passes,” in itself meets 
Abbott’s simple definition of a narrative: “the telling of an event” (261).
11
 By contrast 
to this complete clause, the titles of the opening and closing sections of the novel, 
“The Window” and “The Lighthouse,” consist of nominal phrases that refer to 
objects—like the vertical blocks of Woolf’s “H.” The titles in and of themselves do 
not suggest a narrative, and may be interpreted as subjects or objects of narrative 
actions—or of any other sort of discourse. “Time Passes,” on the other hand, suggests 
a narrative function for the novel’s middle, a change of state compatible with the idea 
that this middle constitutes a narrative function. However, more restrictive definitions 
of narrative require not only an the telling of an event, but an event involving human 
agents: “where there is no implied human interest (narrative events neither being 
                                                 
11 Prince’s definition is similar to Abbott’s, if a bit more complex: “The representation (as product 
and process, object and act, structure and structuration) of one or more real or fictive events 
communicated by one, two, or several (more or less overt) narrators to one, two, or several (more 
or less overt) narratees” (58). 
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produced by agents nor experienced by anthropomorphic beings), there can be no 
narrative, for it is only in relation to a plan conceived by man that events gain 
meaning and can be organized into a structured temporal sequence” (Bremond 390). 
The use of an abstract subject in the title of “Time Passes” suggests a middle that 
exists outside of the traditional narrative realm of action taken by human agents. It 
does not simply shift the point of view among a largely existing cast of characters; 
instead, it vacates the scene and the novel itself of these characters. The result is a 
middle that not only disrupts the novel’s status as a traditionally unified narrative, but 
disrupts the basic building blocks of traditional narrative itself. Some critics have 
even interpreted “Time Passes” as poetic, rather than narrative, discourse. 
Nevertheless, its position in the middle of a novel means that it is inevitable if many, 
if not all, readers will interpret “Time Passes” as narrative. As Abbott argues, when 
we label a text a narrative, “[n]arrative tolerates non-narrative, because the latter can 
sit on top of it. Narrative operates as a platform” (Abbott 261). That is, it is incorrect 
to argue that “Time Passes” is not a narrative because we can identify part or all of its 
discourse as non-narrative. Instead, its departures from traditional narrative discourse 
can (perhaps even must) be read as challenges to or expansions of the traditional 
bounds of narrative.  
 This disruption of the human center of narrative at the novel’s middle is made 
starker by the novel’s historical and technical position at the center of modernism 
(rather than at the middle of a transition into the modernist period). In making Woolf 
and To the Lighthouse central to his seminal study of the “stream of consciousness” 
technique, Robert Humphrey not only makes Woolf central to perhaps the defining 
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technique of modernist narrative, but also makes the human mind central to Woolf’s 
technique, even as that same technique mutes the importance of action: in Mrs. 
Dalloway, To the Lighthouse, and The Waves, “the search for reality is not a matter of 
dramatic external action. [… t]he search, thought Virginia Woolf, is a psychic activity, 
and it is the preoccupation (it surrounds us) of most human beings. The only thing is 
that most human beings are not aware of this psychic activity, so deep down is it in 
their consciousness” (Humphrey 13). If, as Humphrey argues, the goal of this stream-
of-consciousness technique is specifically to reveal the search for reality within the 
human psyche, a middle that nearly eliminates human characters for large stretches 
and limits the reader’s access to their psyches is at least equally disruptive to Woolf’s 
modernist narrative form as it is to the traditional narrative featuring easily identified 
human agents engaging in clearly identifiable actions. Furthermore, this narrative 
innovation takes place largely during, though spatially separate from, World War I. 
Fussell argues that “the masters of the modern movement,” including Woolf, left war 
to “lesser talents—always more traditional and technically prudent” (Fussell 314). 
Even more, he argues that the title of Woolf’s posthumous novel, Between the Acts, 
invokes the trope of war as drama to suggest that novel’s inter-war setting, while 
making no mention of To the Lighthouse (Fussell 230). To the Lighthouse doesn’t go 
so far as to narrate the fighting of the war, but its very difference suggests that war, or 
its trauma, creates a different sort of wartime that affects even a spatially distant 
narrative, and one that extends beyond the temporal bounds of the war itself to its 
prelude and aftermath. Furthermore, here it is wartime that is between the novel’s 
beginning and ending acts, which, is not dramas themselves, are at least more easily 
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imagined as traditional dramas than “Time Passes.” This wartime disruption of a 
seminal modernist technique is, rather than a sign of the end of modernism, or a 
desire to move beyond modernism, essential to modernism. For the modernist mode 
is the mode of the epistemological dominant, probing and questioning the means by 
which knowledge is attained, exploring multiple points of view, including literary 
technique. A stable literary technique is itself a sign of epistemological stability—a 
single point of view. That is, formal experimentation may be more essential to 
modernism than any particular formal technique. At modernism’s middle, Woolf 
maintains modernism by disrupting the very modernist techniques she had so recently 
developed, allowing Woolf to narrate war, or “history” writ large, from a new point 
of view. 
 Pushing against the highly disruptive, yet paradoxically unifying, nature of 
“Time Passes,” the apparent simplicity and unimportance to the plot announced by 
this title given to the middle section of To the Lighthouse disguises the crucial 
importance of the middle of this novel to its narrative form. Whereas the romantic 
narrative intervention of Lord Jim’s middle serves to create the possibility of 
narrative fulfillment; “Time Passes,” cuts off most possibilities of narrative 
fulfillment. It has often been noted that To the Lighthouse replaces traditional 
narratives—for example, the marriage plot—with non-traditional and more symbolic 
narratives. As Rachel Blau DuPlessis observes, “Time Passes” is critical to Woolf’s 
ability to move beyond the traditional endings available to women in traditional 
fiction: “By the midpoint of the novel, both of the traditional endings—marriage and 
death—have occurred, a sharp critical statement on Woolf’s part that clears the 
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ground of any rival solutions to Lily’s plot. The third part of To the Lighthouse 
surpasses these classic resolutions, moving beyond the endings they propose, to 
brother-sister links, to male-female friendship, and, even more, to a vision that 
overwhelms all the binary systems on which the novel has been built.” (DuPlessis 
96). “Time Passes” destroys (often by fulfilling) any number of more traditional 
narrative possibilities. When Prue Ramsay is married, and then dies “in some illness 
connected with childbirth,” both events noted in a reporterly manner in brackets, in 
the span of about a page. Meanwhile, Mrs. Ramsay’s death comes early in “Time 
Passes,” quickly quashing any expectations that she will take her son to the 
lighthouse. Indeed, from the moment “Time Passes” slips from a narrative of the 
night following “The Window” into a more rapid movement through time by 
ruminating at the opening of its third section, “But what after all is one night?” (127), 
Mrs. Ramsay’s promise of a journey the next fine day has receded from a possibility 
of near-term fulfillment. “Time Passes,” by taking the reader to the moment of 
fulfillment ten years later, implies that personal, impersonal, and world events have 
taken the possibility of the next fine day out of the temporal scale of what can broadly 
be termed the stream-of-consciousness tradition. The passage of time eliminates 
many conventional narrative possibilities, leaving the more symbolic narratives (the 
journey to the lighthouse, Lily Briscoe’s attempt to paint a portrait of Mrs. Ramsay) 
as possibilities.
12
 In this non-teleological narrative universe, a complete narrative is 
produced through connections that are produced between temporally disparate events: 
                                                 
12 Humphrey describes the form of To the Lighthouse and Woolf’s other stream-of-consciousness 
narratives as “symbolic design” (102). The overall design is effected, however, not by stream of 
consciousness proper, but by its disruption in “Time Passes,” as extreme internal focalization is 
mostly replaced by zero and external focalization. 
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a reconstitution across the middle, rather than a forward movement from beginning to 
end. 
 “Time Passes” represents one of Woolf’s solutions to the problem of making a 
coherent long-form narrative out of the stream of consciousness. In preparing to write 
what would become The Waves, Virginia Woolf offers a critique of “conventional” 
novels that echoes Henry James’ famous charge that the large, history-spanning 
narratives exemplified by War and Peace are loose, baggy monsters: 
Say that the moment is a combination of thought; sensation; the voice 
of the sea. Waste, deadness, come from the inclusion of things that 
dont belong to the moment; this appalling narrative business of the 
realist: getting on from lunch to dinner: it is false, unreal, merely 
conventional.  Why admit any thing to literature that is not poetry—by 
which I mean saturated? Is that not my grudge against novel[ist]s—
that they select nothing? (Diary Vol. 3 209-10) 
Here, Woolf links a preference for poetry over prose, truth over convention, and the 
heightened moment over the passage of time. In this poetic moment, Woolf includes 
the internal (thought), the external (the voice of the sea), and the mediation between 
the internal and the external (sensation). The external, moreover, is also figural: rather 
than include a social and a natural world in the moment, Woolf gives the natural 
world a voice. In doing so, she is able to elide the social world that is the primary 
concern of realist novels. Furthermore, Woolf rejects temporal rhythms of 
conventional novels, what Genette calls “the connective tissue par excellence of 
novelistic narrative, whose fundamental rhythm is defined by the alternation of 
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summary and scene” (Genette, Narrative Discourse 97). Woolf rejects these 
conventions not only on formalist terms (they select nothing) but also realist terms (it 
is false, unreal, merely conventional). Woolf, mounts, then, an attack on the 
traditional narrative subject as well as the very basis of narrative: the flow of time. 
This flow of time can be found not in the presence of a beginning and an end, but in 
the “getting on” from one to another. Instead of a connective tissue of alternating 
rhythm, Woolf uses the middle to create a different narrative rhythm. “Time Passes” 
thus returns the flow of time to modernist narrative, but in a way particularly suited to 
Woolf’s concern with individual “moments of being,” reconnecting these moments to 
the flow of time even as it disrupts and reconfigures the way that flow of time is 
represented and how it shapes our understanding of the narrative. 
 Woolf would later utilize other techniques for incorporating the flow of time 
into her novels which rely less on the prominent middle. The Waves would cope with 
the linked problems of middles and the passage of time by alternating frozen 
descriptions of the natural world at different stages in the sun’s passage across the sky 
with monologues of six characters at various stages of life. Similarly, Woolf’s final 
novel, Between the Acts, alternates scenes from a play depicting discrete stages of 
history with scenes involving the viewers and producers of the play. The repeated 
pattern of alternation creates a certain level of balance from segment to segment of 
the text, reducing the prominence of one particular middle. Nevertheless, the 
noontime sun and the death of the speakers’ friend, the charismatic young imperialist 
Percival, both mark the middle of The Waves and make it the point of crisis in the 
plot. The Waves uses the space between its sections to solve the problem of getting 
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from lunch to dinner (or, more properly, from sunrise to sunset and from birth to 
death) but the problem of the middle remains. The middle serves to give structure to 
the plot and to the novel’s form, which, through the rise and fall of the sun and a 
shifting of its characters’ lives from a focus on the future to a focus on the past (and, 
simultaneously, from life to death), achieves directionality as well as segmentation. 
The Waves, though it does not solve the problem of the artificiality of plot and the 
way that plot implicitly defines events in the flow of time as beginnings, middles, and 
endings, does, through its pattern of alternating segments, largely separate the 
problems of the passage of time from the problem of middles.
13
 
 To the Lighthouse, however, completed months before the above-quoted diary 
entry was written, directly links middles with the passage of time. “Time Passes” 
links two days, set ten years apart in the same summer house in Scotland. Here, the 
appalling narrative business of getting from one moment to another is tackled not 
with the Jamesian ellipses of The Waves or even, as Woolf suggests in Orlando, “by 
the simple statement that ‘Time passed’ (here the exact amount could be indicated in 
brackets) and nothing whatever happened” (69). In refusing to simply skip over the 
passage of time, Woolf engages with the conventions both of traditional narrative and 
with the modernist conventions she establishes in the beginning section, “The 
                                                 
13 For D.A. Miller, the ending is false. However, beginning, middle, and ending are linked concepts: 
if one is arbitrary, all are. That is, the middle is the middle of something. The middle always sits 
arbitrarily between arbitrary beginning and arbitrary ending. In praising the digressive middle as a 
distinct, truer concept than the arbitrary ending, Miller vacates the concept of the “middle” of any 
meaning. In Reading for the Plot, Miller offers a compelling study of digressive and non-
teleological narrative. His use of the term “narrative middles” in this study is at best superfluous 
and at worst misleading. What he means to emphasize is a different sort of relation between 
middle, beginning, and ending. But the very term “middle” implies the finitude of narrative, and 
thus makes the middle as arbitrary as any ending. 
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Window,” and the ending section, “The Lighthouse.” While these sections are 
concerned primarily with the consciousnesses of a select group of well-educated 
bourgeois characters—the Ramsays, largely based on Woolf’s own family, and their 
guests and neighbors at their summer vacation home—“Time Passes” depicts the 
same space as it is evacuated of these consciousnesses. Woolf’s moment is replaced 
with time accelerated and re-interpreted, so that  ten years pass over the course of 
about twenty pages. These ten years, however, are also figured in “Time Passes” as a 
single night, as the consciousnesses of the novel’s main characters pass into sleep in 
its early chapters and awake as “Time Passes” ends. 
 On any given page in “Time Passes,” it is often impossible to tell when in 
time the narrative is placed and how fast time is passing. Even the ontological status 
of some narrated events is slippery, as when the narrator insists of the housekeeper 
Mrs. McNab, “Visions of joy there must have been at the wash-tub, say with her 
children” (131). That is, as the narrative’s relationship with the passage of time 
becomes less glued to the moment, the epistemological relationship between 
consciousness, narrator, and diegetic reality dissolves. Nevertheless, the narrator 
maintains an interest in thought, sensation, and the voice of the sea. In the absence of 
the novel’s primary characters, however, the narrator turns to inanimate objects, the 
working-class people who maintain and repair the house, and, above all, a greater 
willingness on the narrator’s own part to interpret the world. The result is a narrative 
form radically different from the rest of the novel even as it strives to maintain 
Woolf’s narrative of the moment in the face of the passage of time. “Time Passes” 
challenges the conventions of Woolfian stream of consciousness and extends the 
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conventions of modernist narrative by examining what is left out of that narrative 
form. Nevertheless, in seeking out focalizers and attempting to distill the passage of 
time into metonymic or imagined moments, narrator also works to maintain the 
novel’s dominant mode.  
 Meanwhile, the very act of getting from the dinner of “The Window” to the 
breakfast of “The Lighthouse” suggests a return to traditional narrative. As I have 
already suggested, however, in the context of the entire novel, this rapid resumption 
of “getting on” in the middle of the novel is an alternative to, rather than an 
affirmation of, the traditional flow of time in the novel as described by Genette: the 
regular alternation of summary and scene. Comparing To the Lighthouse to Forster’s 
claim that the novelist cannot completely abolish time, even if the philosopher might, 
Ann Banfield argues that the very title of “Time Passes” “affirms the realist position” 
(475). However, the mere passage of time is not adequate to affirm the realist 
position, except in the broadest sense. That is, as a work of modernist fiction, To the 
Lighthouse generally affirms a stable ontology for its diegetic world, even as 
epistemological problems, such as our perception of the flow of time, shape the 
novel’s poetics. Time exists, then, but we do not fully understand it, and the ways we 
might perceive it—and its effect on the rhythms of narrative—may vary greatly. 
There are further problems with Banfield’s assertion that the title of “Time Passes” 
affirms the realist position. “Time Passes” vacates the human subject of the 
traditional narrative episode. We can go even further—the title “Time Passes” 
extracts everything but the flow of time from the traditional elements of narrative. As 
I shall discuss later in more detail, even this flow of time is given a non-traditional 
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presentation in “Time Passes.” In this title, not only is there no human or human-like 
subject, but there is also no suggestion of causally-linked events—or even specific 
events at all. 
 Nevertheless, what we may think of as traditional narrative events do occur in 
“Time Passes,” and with them some broader notion of large-scale personal and 
national history. However, these events are largely confined to the briefest summary. 
Passages contained in brackets  inform the reader of the deaths of major characters 
and set the passage of time within the context of World War I. Susan Stanford 
Friedman echoes Woolf’s definition of the poetic in her contrasting definitions of 
lyric and narrative: “Narrative is understood to be  a mode that foregrounds a 
sequence of events that move dynamically in space and time. Lyric is understood to 
be a mode that foregrounds a simultaneity, a cluster of feelings or ideas that project a 
gestalt in stasis. Where narrative centers on story, lyric focuses on state of mind, 
although clearly each mode contains elements of the other” (“Lyric” 164). In this 
sense, “Time Passes” serves as narrative against the surrounding lyric moment. For 
Friedman, then, in “Time Passes” “the power of time, death, of linear narrative 
horrifyingly reasserts itself” within the broader lyrical structure of the novel (“Lyric” 
173). However, if traditional narrative consists of a sequence of causally-connected 
events with human subjects (if not agents), it is worth noting just how disconnected 
the bracketed events are—both from each other and from the bulk of “Time Passes.” 
With the exception of an early mention of Carmichael late at night, they all occur far 
away from the house (to whose environs the rest of the narrative is confined). And the 
causal connection is not between the particular events, but between each individual 
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event and the passage of time. By suggesting that the passage of time is the only link 
between events, “Time Passes” implies that narrative events are not causally linked to 
each other, and that their selection is arbitrary. “Time Passes” emphasizes the 
sequential, temporal aspect of narrative that is de-emphasized in “The Window” and 
“The Lighthouse,” and makes a space for large-scale traditional narrative events in To 
the Lighthouse. But it also atomizes these narrative events, making a parody of 
traditional narrative’s drive to connect events into a causal sequence. In containing 
most of the novel’s forward flow of time to a brief, disruptive middle, To the 
Lighthouse fundamentally undermines the claims of realist narrative. The sequence of 
events is no longer the whole of narrative: it is a middle framed by the heightened 
moments of consciousness that surround it. The sequence of events no longer has a 
beginning, middle, and end: instead, the sequence of events is defined as a middle in 
relation to the modernist narrative’s beginning, middle, and end. A parodic summary 
bereft of the human agency that is traditional narrative’s other defining element, the 
sequence of events is utterly transformed to serve its binding function in To the 
Lighthouse’s modernist form. 
 In constituting its narrative in the middle, To the Lighthouse reflects 
traditional forms and theories of narrative. As Meg Jensen notes, the novel’s tripartite 
structure echoes traditional Victorian three-volume novels (Jensen 119). It also 
echoes Claude Bremond’s concept of the elementary sequence, in which each action 
or narrative process contains three stages, or functions: first an action or event is 
expected; second, the action or event takes place; and third there is an “attained 
result” (Bremond 387). In Bremond’s theory, then, the middle is always the place 
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where things happen. Events are made narrative by being surrounded by expectation 
and result—which are the beginning and the end, respectively, of the elementary 
narrative sequence. But action or event itself—including both the passage of time and 
a change of state—is contained entirely in the middle. Similarly, “Time Passes” 
includes the actualization of events—both historical and personal—while “The 
Window” and “The Lighthouse” primarily look forward towards and backward at 
these events. The minimal narrative action contained in “The Window” and “The 
Lighthouse” set the highly eventful “Time Passes” into sharp relief. In this sense, 
“Time Passes” is both the most narrative section of the novel and a Bremondian 
middle for the overall narrative of the entire novel. By setting this middle off so 
starkly from the beginning and the end, Woolf reveals the essential importance of the 
middle to narrative and also reveals the non-eventful nature of the beginning and the 
end of Bremondian narrative.  
 Even as “Time Passes” reveals the middle as the location of traditional 
narrative events, it disrupts these events’ role in a causal chain as well as traditional 
novelistic rhythms. Not only are these events shorn of most of the vestiges of 
agentive action and narrative causality, but they are to a very small duration, even 
within the “Time Passes” section. Genette considers the problem of duration a tricky 
one, since “no one can measure the duration of a narrative” (that is, the syuzhet) in 
order to compare the duration of the story itself (the fabula). Nevertheless, relative 
judgments are easy to make, as twenty pages for ten years can be easily contrasted 
with 120 for ten hours. Genette’s taxonomy of duration effects can further help 
emphasize the cramped syuzhet into so much apparent fabula has been squeezed. The 
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Golden Bowl  reduces key narrative events to zero, leaving what Genette calls an 
“ellipsis,” or “infinite speed” (Genette, Narrative Discourse 93). “Time Passes” does 
not go quite so far, but occupies the more traditional category of summary. According 
to Genette, before the twentieth century, summary was “the most usual transition 
between two scenes, the ‘background’ against which scenes stand out, and thus the 
connective tissue par excellence of novelistic narrative, whose fundamental rhythm is 
defined by the alternation of summary and scene” (Genette, Narrative Discourse 97). 
When we consider that Aristotle wrote about beginnings, middles, and ends in the 
context of dramatic productions that were quite literally nothing but scenes, we can 
begin to see the disruption “Time Passes” poses to the fundamental rhythm of the 
nineteenth-century novel. Ten years of events are compressed into a brief summary at 
the novel’s middle, the most seemingly crucial of those events confined within 
brackets—exiled from the narrative proper and the dominant narrative voice. In To 
the Lighthouse, events are not the scenic meat of the narrative, but the connective 
tissues that hold the scenes—even the scenes within “Time Passes”—to the bones of 
the novel’s form. 
 What may be considered the basic plot suggested by the novel’s title also 
reflects this three-part narrative movement. In the first section, “The Window,” half a 
day or so passes in a professor of philosophy’s summer house in Scotland. The book 
begins with Mrs. Ramsay, the professor’s wife, promising her favorite son, James, 
that, if the weather is good, they will go to the lighthouse the following day. Mr. 
Ramsay objects—the weather will not be good enough to go to the lighthouse. By the 
end of “The Window,” Mrs. Ramsay has conceded the point to Mr. Ramsay, but she 
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has promised James that they will go to the lighthouse “the next fine day” (115). In 
the second section, “Time Passes,” night falls, seasons pass, Mrs. Ramsay (among 
others) dies, the first world war begins and ends, and the house is prepared for the 
return of the Ramsays and their guests. In the third section, “The Lighthouse,” Mr. 
Ramsay and James at last make the journey to the lighthouse. 
 In this bare plot, the window is the beginning—both a beginning location and 
a frame through which the goal of the lighthouse is viewed; the lighthouse, both a 
location and a broadly symbolic goal, is the end. The movement from beginning to 
end can be viewed, quite simply, as a movement from the window to the lighthouse. 
This movement from window to lighthouse is paired at the textual level with the 
movement from “The Window” to “The Lighthouse.” But, while the most obvious 
middle for a narrative that describes a journey in space from window to lighthouse is 
the journey itself (the journey suggested by the novel’s title), this journey occurs 
entirely in “The Lighthouse.” Instead, the plan of the novel suggests that the spatial 
and symbolic journey from window to lighthouse has as its middle not a spatial act by 
human agents (movement through space), but the agentless passage of time. 
 Nevertheless, “Time Passes” is in some ways more lyrical than the rest of the 
novel, as is suggested by its figurative, rather than literal, importance in the overall 
plot of the journey to the lighthouse. What seems to be the central story of To the 
Lighthouse, as announced by its title and by the titles of its sections, stretches nearly 
to the breaking point Bremond’s definition of a story by removing most human 
agency. “Time Passes” mostly drops the free indirect discourse which typifies the 
narration of the rest of the novel as it flits from mind to mind. Instead, it adopts the 
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position of a disembodied narrator confined to the house and its environs: zero 
focalization, but with a confined point of view. This narrator, nevertheless, seems to 
be in search of a human-like subject, if not a focalizer. It follows “certain airs,” 
breezes that flit about the house, as well as shadows and light. It reports marriages 
and deaths parenthetically. When the housekeeper Mrs. McNab finally appears to 
restore the house, she is viewed externally. With the bourgeois agents of the other two 
parts absent, the narrator observes non-human agents, then the housekeeper, with zero 
focalization arguably moving to external focalization and then, briefly, internal. 
Mitchell Leaska’s stylistic analysis of To the Lighthouse identifies 76% of the 
discourse of “Time Passes” with the omniscient (nonfocalized) narrator, as opposed 
to 17% in “The Window” and 10% in “The Lighthouse” (Leaska, Virginia 208). Bette 
London associates this narratorial voice that dominates “Time Passes” with a feminist 
lyrical freedom that extends beyond the limits of individual embodied 
consciousnesses: “the voice of this interlude embodies a pulsating rhythmic life. It 
offers a fluid, all-encompassing narrative matrix to oppose the characters’ bounded 
texts. It is a voice marked by uncensored digressions and lyrical effusiveness. 
Collective in number and colloquial in tone, the voice dispenses with the masculine 
monologic mode” (146). In London’s reading, “Time Passes” creates a sort of 
collective lyricism, as it asks questions on behalf of “any sleeper” (TTL 129) and 
questions and interprets the meaning of the empty house. By concentrating on 
different aspects of “Time Passes,” London is able to come to the opposite conclusion 
as Friedman: “Time Passes” is the lyric section of the novel. 
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 For Lucio Ruotolo, however, this narratorial voice’s abandonment of 
Flaubertian detachment for lyrical effusiveness carries with it not an all-
encompassing inquisitiveness, but a tyrannical attempt to end the collective 
questioning of readers: “The threat of a world deprived of Mrs. Ramsay’s governing 
influence moves Woolf’s narrator to deploy language as a means of softening the 
shock of non-being” (132). The absence of human order is figured in particularly 
human terms as, for example, when “divine goodness, twitching the cord, draws the 
curtain” (TTL 128). Ruotolo accuses the narrator of affecting a “baroque and 
sentimental idiom,” including a “personification of the seasons” (133). Meanwhile, 
the section as a whole is dominated by a clichéd romanticism: “Like an early Keats 
poem or the succulence of Mrs. Ramsay’s Boeuf en Daube, such offerings seem 
designed to tease us out of thought. Ironically, a no-less-romantic allusion serves to 
interrupt the narrator’s monologue” (Ruotolo 134). This allusion is to “Mrs. McNab, 
tearing the veil of silence,” who is figured as “a ship at sea” (TTL 130). The stylistic 
lyricism and zero focalized narration of “Time Passes,” then, carries with it the 
potential for questioning and collective voice, but it also carries with it the worst 
possibilities associated with lyricism: pretty language re-creating and enforcing stale, 
collective figurations that hide, rather than reveal, the true nature of the world. The 
stylistic lyricism of “Time Passes” reflects DuPlessis’ sentiment that “To the 
Lighthouse [...] both idealizes and criticizes romance” (48). It is Woolf’s narrator 
herself, then, who opens and then swiftly shuts the curtain. 
 This same reliance on images (received or otherwise) moves the lyricism of 
“Time Passes” beyond the stylistic level, undermining the narrative’s ability to tell a 
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series of events within time. That is, regardless of the merits of the narrator and its 
sentiments, and the relative importance of temporal flow and narrative voice to the 
concept of lyricism, “Time Passes” is notable for the presence of a great deal of non-
narrative discourse. Thus, Ralph Freedman calls the entire section an “extended prose 
poem” (234). Rather than a narrative in which events occur within the linear order of 
time, “Time Passes” turns the passage of time itself into a lyrical moment: 
“Anticipating The Waves, it depicts the moment through images, transforming it 
finally into a larger image of time itself. Freed from dependence on human beings, it 
renders, in a more abstract form, the interrelation between the inner and outer worlds 
of protagonists on the one hand and a symbolic world on the other” (Freedman, Ralph 
233). In this sense, “Time Passes” does not offer a traditional narrative counterpoint 
to modernist lyrical narrative, but radically encases some elements of traditional 
narrative—the passage of time, the presence of events—within a radical lyricism. 
That is, within “Time Passes,” non-narrative discourse is given a prominent, even 
dominant, position, while the restoration of some elements of traditional narrative are 
compensated by the removal of others. The absence in many places of bourgeois or 
even human protagonists removes “Time Passes” even further from the realm of 
traditional or even modernist narrative. Bremond defines narrative as follows: “All 
narrative consists of a discourse which integrates a sequence of events of human 
interest into the unity of a single plot” (390). In To the Lighthouse, the middle 
provides the sequence of events, while the beginning and the end provide the human 
interest. While beginning, middle, and end all contain some of each element of 
Bremondian narrative, they also each minimize a key element. Further, only 
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beginning, middle, and end together form the unity of a single plot. “Time Passes” is 
both narrative and poetic because it contains parts of a traditional narrative, so that, 
combined with the parts contained in the beginning and end, a full narrative is formed 
not only in sequence but in terms of the elements that would be present throughout a 
traditional narrative. 
 The close reading of “Time Passes” that follows will flesh out the ways the 
middle of To the Lighthouse offers a different set of challenges to traditional narrative 
than the rest of the novel. “Time Passes” challenges To the Lighthouse’s own 
modernist conventions while using aspects of those conventions to challenge realist 
conventions. The passage of time returns the novel to the realm of eventful narrative, 
but the acceleration and jumbling of the passage of time threatens to remove the novel 
from the realm of narrative entirely by, to paraphrase Woolf, giving us nothing to 
cling to. Meanwhile, as the narrator grasps for lower-class and nonhuman focalizers 
through which to narrate the world, it seems to extend itself beyond the limited point 
of view of the bourgeois novel, whether modernist or realist. Simultaneously, though, 
the narrator reveals its limitations, as it anthropomorphizes the natural world and 
maintains a bourgeois view of its working-class characters.
14
 “Time Passes” asks 
what is left out by traditional and modernist narrative forms, but its ability to get 
beyond these forms and to include what has been left out is limited. 
                                                 
14 As Tratner argues, Woolf’s presentation of Mrs. McNab and other working-class women is mixed: 
“they are not seen as replacing ‘us,’” but there is “a genuine sense of having gained something 
from them, of having followed their lead in moving toward something new” (Tratner 65). We can 
see the narrator enact this ambivalence with the shift from external focalization to a brief internal 
focalization: a narrator that is exploring these characters rather than being guided by their thoughts. 
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 Just as “Time Passes” is both lyric and narrative, a challenge to and a 
confirmation of the limits of literary conventions, it is both separate from the rest of 
To the Lighthouse and the binding force that creates the novel as a single narrative 
whole. I have already argued that the use of summary in “Time Passes” marks that 
section of the narrative as a sort of connecting tissue. Other critics have emphasized 
the between-ness of this connecting tissue, its function of filling the gap between 
dramatic scenes. Louis Kronenberger, in a 1927 New York Times review of To the 
Lighthouse, calls “Time Passes” an “interlude” (Majumdar 197). More recent critics 
have picked up the term (Abel 52; Briggs 131; Freedman 234; Leaska, Virginia 63). 
The OED’s first definition of “interlude” reflects the word’s Latin etymology, 
“between play”: a drama “usually of a light or humorous character” given between 
the acts of a more serious morality or religious play. The second definition is more 
general: “the pause between the acts, or the means (dramatic or musical) employed to 
fill this up.” Both of these definitions suggest a middle whose role is to fill the 
temporal space between parts of a larger whole through contrast and relaxation. The 
Grove Dictionary of Music, however, suggests that the interlude serves as a link as 
well as a break and a contrast: “In instrumental music an interlude is usually a short 
connecting episode between movements rather than a movement in itself,” while “In 
a theatrical performance an interlude consists of an instrumental item between acts 
[...] or, on a more elaborate scale, an entertainment [...]. Debussy’s Pelléas et 
Mélisande and Berg’s Wozzeck, for example, include important interludes that are 
dramatically related, indeed essential, to the whole design” (Grove Music Online). In 
both instrumental and dramatic music, then, the interlude is both separate from and 
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integral to the musical and dramatic whole. It both contrasts and connects—not only 
or necessarily by providing a lighter form of entertainment, but by differing in form. 
 The interlude is, however, not a complete unit unto itself: while a single 
instrumental movement might be played separately from the larger piece of music of 
which it is a part and completes, in a sense, its own musical story, the interlude assists 
in the completion of the larger story. Julia Briggs emphasizes the prominence of the 
interlude in music to connect “Time Passes,” as well as its very narrative engagement 
with changes both personal and public wrought by the passage of the years, and 
especially by World War I, to the most abstract of art forms: “In ‘Time Passes’, the 
concept of cultural break is reworked as a quasi-musical, or even cinematic interlude” 
(Briggs 131). It is precisely this aspect of “Time Passes” that I wish to emphasize: its 
power to combine the abstract with the concrete, the timeless with the historical, the 
narrative with the poetic, the integral with the separate. “Time Passes” is both the 
binding force that holds To the Lighthouse together as a single narrative and a break 
from its personal narrative of momentary saturation. It both confirms and rejects 
modernist and traditional narrative alike, opening up a new space for the middle while 
at the same time deepening the middle’s dependence on the beginning and the end. It 
is an interlude: the brief play that by its difference of form and content both separates 
and connects. 
 “Time Passes” consists of ten sections, covering a period of ten years, from 
the fall of darkness on the day of “The Window” to the moment Lily Briscoe wakes 
up the morning after a September evening return to the Ramsays’ Scottish summer 
home. The first section is narratively continuous with “The Window,” as it follows an 
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evening conversation between William Bankes, Andrew and Prue Ramsay, and Lily 
Briscoe. All the lights except that of the poet Augustus Carmichael are turned off. 
The mode of the novel has not obviously changed: the section is dominated by 
dialogue between already-familiar characters, and the lyrical mode
15
 as well as the 
rapid passage of time which dominates much of “Time Passes” is absent. This 
continuity in both subject and mode of narration binds “Time Passes” to “The 
Window.” Although “Time Passes” later establishes its radical narrative differences 
from the rest of the novel, in the beginning its difference lies purely in the natural 
conditions of the narrated world: nightfall. This suggests that, rather than night 
serving as a metaphor for the passage of time, war, and the absence of the conscious 
bourgeois human mind, instead the meditations and subjects of “Time Passes,” 
including the passage of time itself, are suggested—if not determined—by the 
narrative problems of narrating the night. Daylight, by contrast, brings with it 
conscious thought and the possibility of scenic narration in a stream-of-consciousness 
mode. It is the absence of light and consciousness that enables the narration of 
historic and major life events, which proceed, unlit, in summary. The interlude 
suggested by “Time Passes,” then, is not the purely formal interlude of a contrasting 
piece of music between two fully-developed movements. Instead, its formal elements 
                                                 
15 Ralph Freedman describes the lyrical nature of “Time Passes” as follows: “Anticipating The 
Waves, it depicts the moment through images, transforming it finally into a larger image of time 
itself. Freed from dependence on human beings, it renders, in a more abstract form, the interrelation 
between the inner and outer worlds of protagonists on the one hand and a symbolic world on the 
other” (234). Susan Stanford Friedman, by contrast, does not consider “Time Passes” to be lyrical, 
though she considers To the Lighthouse to be lyric in its overall structure (173). She defines 
narrative and lyric as follows: “Narrative is understood to be a mode that foregrounds a sequence of 
events that move dynamically in space and time. Lyric is understood to be a mode that foregrounds 
a simultaneity, a cluster of feelings or ideas that project a gestalt in stasis” (164). 
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spring from the narrative problem of representation of the night, when the tools of 
vision and consciousness no longer provide access to the scene. While the challenges 
“Time Passes” takes upon itself and, in turn, creates for the reader, are both formal 
and representational in nature, it announces the object to be represented as the 
foundational principle of its existence. In this sense, “Time Passes” remains true to 
the modernist epistemological dominant: the problem is how a narrator gains access 
to a darkened (though ontologically stable) world, and how knowledge of that world 
may be transferred to the reader. 
 This act of representation becomes difficult in the second section, when all of 
the story’s characters are asleep. Although there is not yet a rapid acceleration in the 
passage of time, the narrative mode established in “The Window” is already greatly 
strained. A narrative which has concerned itself primarily with representing conscious 
minds finds difficulty to maintain the narrative mode itself. Instead, the second 
section is a meditation on the darkness: “Nothing, it seemed, could survive the flood, 
the profusion of darkness which, creeping in at keyholes and crevices, stole round 
window blinds, came into bedrooms, swallowed up here a jug and basin, there a bowl 
of red and yellow dahlias, there the sharp edges and firm bulk of a chest of drawers” 
(125-26). Although the narrator seems to be narrating specific events, the narrator 
initially must resort to the Biblical metaphor of the flood to provide a narrative 
framework—and she does so with little certainty. Indeed, the events that are narrated 
here are quite vague, without a clear temporal ordering or even a sense of what this 
“profusion of darkness” might be as an agent. In the absence of human agents, the 
narrator takes an interest in inanimate objects. The very desire to narrate the darkness 
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as an agent—rather than to narrate, with greater accuracy, the absence of light, 
indicates the narrator’s continued desire to maintain the comprehensible form of 
traditional narrative: absence of light is understood as presence of water both because 
it provides an agent, and thus easier narratability, and also because it makes the 
night—an iterative natural process—understandable as a singular, meaningful event 
with particular resonance. 
 Here, the “certain airs,” considered by some to be focalizers
16
 for much of 
“Time Passes,” are introduced. They are introduced, however, in this same 
speculative mode: 
“Only through the rusty hinges and swollen sea-moistened woodwork 
certain airs, detached from the body of the wind (the house was 
ramshackle after all) crept round corners and ventured indoors. Almost 
one might imagine them, as they entered the drawing-room 
questioning and wondering, toying with the flap of hanging wall-
paper, asking, would it hang much longer, when would it fall?” (126) 
In contrast to the narrator’s focalization on Mrs. Ramsay and other human characters 
in “The Window,” then, the airs as conscious subjects are explicitly fictional. This is 
not a narrator who enters into the minds of inanimate objects. Instead, it is a narrator 
                                                 
16 See for example David Sherman (169) and Madeline Moore, who identifies the “certain airs” as 
one of four points of view in “Time Passes,” along with the sleeper(s) or mystic, Mrs. McNab, and 
the bracketed voice (76). Moore therefore minimizes the importance or even possibility of an 
independent point of view for the narrator, while Leaska emphasizes the dominance of an 
omniscient narrator (Leaska 42). My own view is that, while there are few passages that can clearly 
be ascribed only to an omniscient narrator (many if not all of the musings can be ascribed to the 
sleeper/mystic), there are also few which can be ascribed clearly to a focalizer, as the free indirect 
style is rarely if ever clearly tied to a particular scene. Furthermore, it is perhaps simplest to view 
the sleeper as well as the airs as false focalizers—conceits drawn up by the narrator, whose voice 
therefore dominates almost the entire section. 
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who creates a mind for inanimate objects. It is through the very will to narrate in 
human terms the inanimate that “Time Passes” substitutes the lyric mode for the 
narrative mode. Instead of an attempt to narrate the night objectively, the narrator 
insists on a subjective mode of narration. In the absence of human characters in the 
story to serve as subjects for an internally focalized stream of , the narrator provides 
subjective ideas and impressions of her own, though she still attempts to efface 
herself with impersonal pronouns. Section two is ultimately the narrator’s 
impressions of the night—but, reluctant to openly state her impressions, the narrator 
devises the narrative framework of the certain airs. But this framework ultimately 
reveals the lyric mode behind the apparent narrative: the narrative of the airs exists 
primarily not as a series of objective events in the story-world (even the idea of such 
airs as objects is generated by the narrator’s will to narrate) but instead as a figurative 
construct created by a subjective observer (the narrator) to understand a basically 
non-narrative occurrence. In showing a narrator so determined to create subjects and 
events to narrate, Woolf reveals the arbitrariness of all narrative, as the narrator 
portions up the nightfall into a set of discrete objects and events which often have no 
clear existence outside of the narrator’s ability to constitute them. Without human 
subjects to provide thoughts and interpretations of the world, the narrator reveals her 
own subjectivity and, in doing so, begins to collapse narrative itself as agents and 
events occurring through time give way to meditation, figuration, and speculation on 
the vaguely temporal object of nightfall. 
 To counter the narrator’s increasingly subjective and lyrical mode, the second 
section of “Time Passes” also introduces a more rigorously objective form of 
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narration. At the end of the section, the novel uses brackets for the first time: “[Here 
Mr. Carmichael, who was reading Virgil, blew out his candle. It was midnight.]” 
(126). The brackets, which  for the rest of “Time Passes” are used to briefly narrate 
events taking place outside the vicinity of the house, in this first instance indicate a 
separation of the primary narrator from the characters that dominate the rest of the 
novel. Though Carmichael is still present in the house, he is in some sense outside the 
range of the narrative: his actions are a secondary punctuation against the actions of 
the certain airs and the house itself which immediately precede the brackets: “At 
length, desisting, all ceased together, gathered together, all sighed together; all 
together gave off an aimless gust of lamentation to which some door in the kitchen 
replied; swung wide; admitted nothing; and slammed to” (127). Rather than a human 
consciousness directing the narrative, here a human consciousness seems to be 
directed by inhuman, though anthropomorphized, forces. Time, however, is still clear, 
coordinated, and, if flowing a little faster than in “The Window,” still on a familiar 
narrative scale. What’s more, the brackets provide the reader with a clear temporal 
location. They provide a contrast, therefore, both to the primary narrative subject of 
“Time Passes” and to its primary narrative mode. “The Window” and “The 
Lighthouse” generally provide a balance between subjective and objective narration 
through the use of focalizers. In “Time Passes,” we have a primary narrator who, 
rather than filtering subjective judgments through one of the novel’s characters, is 
increasingly willing to engage directly in subjective judgment and essayistic 
reflection—that is, in non-narrative discourse. Meanwhile, “Time Passes” also 
contains a secondary narrator who seems to be purely objective, rendering neither its 
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own thoughts nor that of any character. In its narrative modes, then, “Time Passes” 
provides multiple contrasting alternatives to the mode established in “The Window” 
and resumed in “The Lighthouse.” In doing so, it lays bare the strengths and 
limitations of certain modernist techniques, even as it establishes itself as an 
experiment in modernist technique in its own right. 
 In the second section, the narrative moves away from familiar human 
consciousnesses, but it maintains its grounding in the arbitrarily-chosen day of “The 
Window.” The third section, however, eliminates not only the grounding in a 
particular temporal location, but the idea that time can be reliably measured: “But 
what after all is one night? A short space, especially when the darkness dims so soon, 
and so soon a bird sings, a cock crows, or a faint green quickens, like a turning leaf, 
in the hollow of the wave. Night, however, succeeds to night. The winter holds a pack 
of them in store and deals them equally, evenly, with indefatigable fingers” (127). If 
the second section of “Time Passes” disrupts the narrative mode and focalization 
technique that the novel has worked to familiarize its readers to throughout “The 
Window,” the third section disrupts the novel’s established chronotope. Mikhail 
Bakhtin defines the chronotope as “the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and 
spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature. […] In the literary 
artistic chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one carefully 
thought-out, concrete whole. Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes 
artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements 
of time, plot, and history” (Bakhtin 84). More than a setting in time and space, the 
chronotope is defined by the rules of the world the novel projects and in turn defines 
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its genre (Bakhtin 85). “Time Passes” holds the spatial axis of To the Lighthouse’s 
staunchly realist chronotope in place, but unmoors the temporal axis completely. 
Rather than define a new flow of time and a new set of plot and narrative genre rules 
to match, the third section of “Time Passes” suggests that any set of narrative rules set 
up to fabricate the flow of time is inherently arbitrary: the medium of language neatly 
conflates the darkness of a day (night) with the darkness of a year (winter). “Time 
Passes” suggests that language makes the single, thought-out Bakhtinian chronotope 
an unstable proposition at best. Arguably, this is a new sort of chronotope, but this 
goes beyond Bakhtin’s definition of a unified whole—a fragmented, multiple 
chronotope, if any at all. If, as Genette writes, no one can measure the duration of 
narrative, the duration of the narrated story is as easily lost, unless the narration 
devotes itself entirely to setting up temporal markers. Add in the metaphorical 
slipperiness of language, and the chronotope becomes, rather than an anchor, an 
intractable epistemological problem. 
 Furthermore, the narrative quickly conflates a singular night with the plural 
nights, undermining not only the ability of the narrative to distinguish discrete units 
of time, but also the precision with which “The Window” attends to each individual 
moment. There are no unique moments, this section suggests, and, despite the sense 
suggested by the title of “Time Passes” that Part 2 of To the Lighthouse will track the 
flow of time between narrative episodes, time in this section does not flow. Instead of 
day giving way to night, as in the first section of “Time Passes,” night gives way to 
night: time does not flow, but it skips, associationally. Time is not literal, but 
metonymic and metaphoric, comprehensible only by the limited capacities of 
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language, and thus subject to the commonplace poetical associations of language. 
“Time Passes” thus refuses to establish for itself a stable temporal axis for its 
chronotope. It is questionable whether an unstable temporal axis can produce a 
chronotope, and thus whether it can produce narrative. It is not only because of prose 
style, then, that critics call “Time Passes” “lyrical” (Leaska,  Virginia 121; Moore 78; 
Naremore 112). Much of “Time Passes” shares with lyric poetry an atemporality that 
undermines or even eliminates the possibility of narrative. This third section of “Time 
Passes,” furthermore, takes on a form reminiscent of a sonnet in order to reduce this 
unstable, poetical temporality: three paragraphs of moderate length develop the 
premise of the flowing nights, followed by a bracketed sentence in which the reader 
learns of Mrs. Ramsay’s death. This pivotal moment occurs precisely when the 
narrative has been unmoored from time, the reader left as disoriented as Mr. Ramsay: 
“[Mr. Ramsay, stumbling along a passage one dark morning, stretched his arms out, 
but Mrs. Ramsay having died rather suddenly the night before, his arms, though 
stretched out, remained empty.]” (128). The specific moment narrated in the brackets 
contrasts sharply with the unspecified nights with which the section has been 
primarily concerned. However, Mr. Ramsay’s confusion echoes the confusion of the 
unspecified “sleeper”: “The hand dwindles in his hand; the voice bellows in his ear. 
Almost it would appear that it is useless in such confusion to ask the night those 
questions as to what, and why, and wherefore, which tempt the sleeper from his bed 
to seek an answer” (128). Mr. Ramsay seems to be specified as the sleeper, and his 
confusion at the loss of his wife seems to echo the confusion of all who sleep, but the 
brackets maintain the separation between specific event and lyric. However, unlike 
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Mr. Carmichael’s midnight candle-blowing, neither Mr. Ramsay’s confused moment 
nor Mrs. Ramsay’s death can be specifically placed in time. The indeterminability of 
time in “Time Passes” overwhelms its remaining traditional elements of narrative, 
leaving them cast as islands in a sea of unstable time. 
 The fourth section continues to follow the “certain airs” through stillness and 
storm and into the middle of the night, where the housekeeper Mrs. McNab is 
introduced: “Then again peace descended; and the shadow wavered; light bent to its 
own image in adoration on the bedroom wall; and Mrs. McNab, tearing the veil of 
silence with hands that had stood in the wash-tub, grinding it with boots that had 
crunched the shingle, came as directed to open all windows, and dust the bedrooms” 
(130). When a human presence enters the stage (the stable house-and-environs topos 
of the unstable chronotope), narrative immediately attaches itself to that human 
presence: it bends to its own (human) image as the light on the bedroom wall. “Time 
Passes” thus attempts and deliberately quashes the idea of a nonhuman narrative (a 
project which Woolf would attempt on very different terms in Flush). The title of this 
middle part promises intransitive action (passing) by a nonhuman agent (time), but it 
cannot represent this action directly. Instead, it grasps at light and movement—of air, 
of doors—and ascribes to nonhuman objects agency and human-like narrative 
moments. When a human enters the stage, she immediately becomes the focus of the 
narrative. The narrator of “Time Passes,” then, operates as something of a narrative 
detector, with narrative defined roughly in Bremond’s terms: change from one state to 
another through time by a human agent. To the extent that “Time Passes” attempts to 
understand or fill in the nonhuman elements left out by “The Window,” “The 
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Lighthouse,” and narrations of the passage of time as specifically human history, it 
runs into the same problem faced by Shelley in “Mont Blanc”: narrative, just like 
poetry, can comprehend the nonhuman only with reference to the human.  
 Even Mrs. McNab’s human presence, however, leaves the narrator’s poetic 
voice and its attendant narrative vagueness in a dominant role. In the fifth section, 
Mrs. McNab is the central figure though, as Anna Snaith and Pamela Caughie as well 
as Tratner have noted, the narrator remains at a distance from her (Caughie, 
“Wo(o)lfish” 75; Snaith 77). Mrs. McNab is here a symbol for her class and for the 
nonhuman other which “Time Passes” and its narrator have been unable to 
comprehend. Makiko Minow-Pinkney argues that Mrs. McNab refigures Mrs. 
Ramsay as Culture to her Nature (Minow-Pinkney 101). Although in section six 
McNab is figured as a tropical fish, to Mrs. Ramsay’s drowning sailor, here Mrs. 
McNab’s nonhumanity is not part of a simple Nature/Culture opposition. She is 
compared explicitly to “a ship at sea,” “leering,” “swinging sideways,” “creaking and 
groaning” (130-31). Mrs. McNab stands between humanity and nature: a humanly-
produced object taking the damage of the years upon herself. Margaret Tudeau-
Clayton argues that Mrs. McNab represents “redemptive labor,” but she is also 
“associated with the natural forces of degeneration and destruction that she works 
against” (Tudeau-Clayton 305). This association, however, is perhaps a bit weak: 
neither tropical fish nor creaking ships are forces of degeneration or destruction. 
Instead, the ship and the fish alike navigate the storm. Mrs. McNab’s redemptive 
work takes place in the larger context of great natural forces; thus her place in “Time 
Passes.” She bends, but does  not break, as a ship takes on the motions of the sea, 
140 
 
particularly in a storm. Her voice, meanwhile, “was like the voice of witlessness, 
humour, persistency itself, trodden down but springing up again” (130). Mrs. McNab, 
rather than an individual agent, to the narrator represents survivalism: she represents 
humanity (or elements, tasks, and abilities associated with the working class), but she 
too bound up in her work to produce the sort of sophisticated consciousness that 
might arrest the narrator’s full sympathy merge their voices. 
 In its early sections, then, “Time Passes” keeps a balance between the human 
and the nonhuman: gusts of wind are treated as human agents, while human agents 
are treated with a sort of mystified distance. This serves, in part, to maintain the 
novel’s poetic stance and unfixed temporality: Mrs. McNab has a symbolic role to 
play in mediating between humanity and nature, but both her actions and her thoughts 
are unfixed and nebulous. This blending of the human and the nonhuman not only 
contributes to a destabilizing of the narrative events associated with consciousness, 
but it also, as Hermione Lee notes, destabilitzes character itself: “Through death and 
absence, character is merged with nature, and becomes the stuff of folklore and 
legend in the myth-creating minds of Mrs McNab and Mrs Bast” (Lee 130). The class 
distance noted by Snaith and Caughie, which marks the narrator as similar to the 
Ramsays and others who populate the ends of To the Lighthouse, and thus gives even 
this slippery narrator a sort of continuity with the narrator of those more conventional 
sections, also creates the radical difference in the middle sections of “Time Passes.” 
 That is, the same de-humanization of Mrs. McNab that allows us to mark the 
narrator’s conventional bourgeois position also works to maintain the temporal 
instability of “Time Passes.” Mrs. McNab is necessary for the narrative at this point 
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in so far as her presence helps the narrative maintain momentum and contact with the 
human world—but that same humanity which the narrative needs also threatens the 
nebulous passage of time. “Time Passes” needs to maintain its difference from the 
parts that precede and follow it, both because this is what marks it as a middle, and 
because this is what allows it to serve its function. In order to link two segments of 
modernist narrative, “Time Passes” maintains its difference both from the 
conventions of modernism established in “The Window” and from the conventions of 
traditional narrative—but it can only stray so far. Its ability both to link, and to 
investigate what is left out by both traditional and modernist narrative modes, is 
dependent both on its distance from those modes and on its ability to maintain a 
connection to those modes. Thus, it must investigate the nonhuman while maintaining 
an anchor in the human, just as it destabilizes the temporal element of the chronotope 
while maintaining the spatial element. 
 Section six, the second-longest of the sections, and positioned approximately 
in the middle of “Time Passes” both in terms of the number of sections and in terms 
of volume of text, contains the heart of the war. Bracketed sections, at their most 
plentiful here, announce the marriage and subsequent death in childbirth of Prue 
Ramsay, as well as the death in war of Andrew Ramsay. This section seems to fit 
Friedman’s reading of a “Time Passes” in which “the power of time, of death, of 
linear narrative horrifyingly reasserts itself” (Friedman, “Lyric” 173). However, even 
as certain elements of traditional narrative reassert themselves—and it should be 
noted that these sorts of events are among the elements of narrative largely 
suppressed in “The Window” and “The Lighthouse”—this middle of To the 
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Lighthouse’s middle continues to scramble temporality through the layering of 
multiple scales of the passage of time (day, season, historical and personal event) as 
well as through the use of discourse that is lyrical both in its atemporality and in its 
use of rhetorical and metaphorical language. 
 The section is framed primarily by the passage of seasons, which does not 
have a clear relationship to the passage of years or the bracketed events that constitute 
the continuity of the section with the narrated world of “The Window” and “The 
Lighthouse.” Section three has introduced the winter, which seems to share 
metaphoric space with the night. Section six, however, begins with the spring: “The 
spring without a leaf to toss, bare and bright like a virgin fierce in her chastity, 
scornful in her purity, was laid out on fields wide-eyed and watchful and entirely 
careless of what was done or thought by the beholders. [Prue Ramsay, leaning on her 
father’s arm, was given in marriage. What, people said, could have been more fitting? 
And, they added, how beautiful she looked!]” (131). Spring here appears to be both a 
particular spring in which Prue has been married, but also a metaphorical spring: the 
renewal of nature made consonant with the renewal of the traditional family and its 
attendant narrative. Spring is also, notably, anthropomorphized roughly in the manner 
of a Renaissance allegory. This very narrative act of anthropomorphization—which 
makes spring comprehensible in the conventional language of narrative—is used to 
emphasize the season’s distance from human minds. This is explicitly not the 
figuration of any particular person or group of persons—but a figuration unaware of 
human consciousness. Nevertheless, nature’s very ignorance of human thought is re-
humanized by the narrator—not only in the sense that this ignorance is figured in an 
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anthropomorphizing narrative—but in the sense that it becomes ex post facto a 
metaphor for Prue Ramsay on her wedding day, laid out for human viewers (and later 
by her husband) in a ritual presentation of her body. Spring is simultaneously virginal 
and sexual—and this is mirrored in marriage’s simultaneous celebration of prior 
virginity and future fertility. However, the seasonal narrative provides a further clue 
to the mixing of the virginal and the fertile in the figure of spring: Prue seems to be 
married in the spring and dies in childbirth in “that summer” (132). This aspect or 
section of the narrative has the chronotope of a masque or allegorical narrative, but 
this chronotope is at most suggested rather than fully established. That is, the narrator 
engages various generic or discursive modes, but these are more rhetorical allusions 
than fully establishes chronotopes. This chronotopic sketch is echoed in a sketch-like 
accounting of narrative events themselves. The seasonal narrative and its relationship 
to the bracketed narrative is vague enough that Prue’s pregnancy at the time of her 
marriage is more suggested than defined. However, Woolf is able to use the multiple 
levels of narrative, as well as the lyrical mode of its primary narrator, to at least 
suggest the violation of—and the violation inherent in—the traditional, optimistic 
marriage plot. 
 “Time Passes” does not stay long in the spring—in the very next paragraph 
(and sentence), “summer neared, as the evenings lengthened” (131). The movement 
from spring to summer is associated not with light and day, but with lengthening 
evening: paradoxically, the decreasing nighttime seems to increase, if not the night 
itself, at least the anticipation of the night. “Time Passes,” even as it explores seasons 
and scenes of daytime, is at pains to remind the reader that this is essentially a story 
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of the night. Seasonal narrative, even as it seems to contradict the narrative of a single 
night, attempts to conform itself to the night’s logic and to the basic metaphors of fear 
and destruction which night commands. Initially, however, the late spring is still a 
time of optimism, cementing collectively the consonance between nature and 
humanity suggested by the juxtaposition of the spring with Prue’s marriage. The 
mystic or visionary introduced in section five, asking existential questions on the 
beach, gives way to a mass of “the wakeful, the hopeful, walking the beach, stirring 
the pool” (132). For these anonymous visionaries, the “mirrors” of nature seem to 
provide “the strange intimation […] that good triumphs, happiness prevails, order 
rules” (132). Although Prue’s death and the end of spring seem to break the 
confluence of nature with optimistic human narrative, they do not (initially at least) 
break the connection between seasonal and human narrative. If anything, this 
connection strengthens, as spring “seemed to have taken upon her a knowledge of the 
sorrows of mankind” (132). Once again, spring anticipates bracketed events: the next 
sentence contains the first sorrowful individual event of To the Lighthouse: “[Prue 
Ramsay died that summer in some illness connected with childbirth, which was 
indeed a tragedy, people said, everything, they said, had promised so well.]” (132). 
Not only does spring’s knowledge of sorrow foreshadow Prue’s death, but Prue’s 
death is explicitly related to attempted heterosexual reproduction. The disruption of 
the relationship between the narrative of the seasons and the narrative of human 
events is initially one of defied expectations, rather than a complete break between 
the levels of narration. 
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 In the initial description of summer, this confluence continues: summer is 
described as tumultuous and destructive, mirroring both Prue’s death and the 
unnarrated beginning of World War I. Summer mirrors winter as “the wind sent its 
spies about the house again” (132). The narrator continues to emphasize the night, as 
the lighthouse shines inside the otherwise-dark summer home of the Ramsays. This 
light is initially figured as a “loving caress,” but even so it proves destructive (133). 
This destruction is not narrated, as earlier, in terms of the overall wear and tear on the 
house, but in terms of the loosening of a shawl and the falling of a rock from a 
mountain, both introduced in section four’s description of the middle of the night. 
This repetition of particular metonyms for decay, destruction, and chaos further 
undermines their status as actual narrated events. In section four, “one fold of the 
shawl loosened and swung to and fro” (130). Under the lighthouse’s caress in section 
six, “another fold of the shawl loosened” (133). Then, “later in the summer ominous 
sounds like the measured blows of hammers dulled on felt, which, with their repeated 
shocks still further loosened the shawl and cracked the tea-cups” (133). While it is 
possible that three discrete incidents of shawl-loosening are being narrated here, the 
shawl’s symbolic aspect takes on increasing prominence. The shawl retains its 
improbable capacity to continue to loosen as the narrator needs a concrete object and 
event to symbolize the destruction of the human order by the passage of time. 
Similarly, the fall of the rock from the mountain remains vague, initially introduced 
not as a real event, but as a metaphor for the unfolding of the shawl. In short, the 
narrator may or may not be narrating events that actually occur in the story-world, but 
it is their lyric, not their narrative importance, that is foregrounded. In section six, this 
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lyric importance once again serves as a foreshadowing of actual narrative events in 
brackets, but also as a way to bind the narrative of the house through the years to the 
cyclical seasonal narrative that is superimposed upon this linear narrative. 
Meanwhile, the narrative conceit of a single night remains—and all of this maintains 
a connection to specific narrative events (whether associated with Mrs. McNab, who 
briefly appears “looking like a tropical fish” in section six, with nonhuman events 
such as the unfolding of the shawl, or with the bracketed events concerning the 
characters introduced in “The Window”) and to the broad historical events of World 
War I. 
 I will say more about the general effects of the superimposition of different 
levels of narrative time later in this chapter. At this point, it is worth noting the 
specific re-calibration in the relationship between the seasonal narrative and the 
human-scale narratives brought on by World War I. If Prue Ramsay’s death inverts 
the expected relationship, World War I eventually destroys it. In the summer night, 
“the thud of something falling” is immediately juxtaposed to a battle scene: “[A shell 
exploded. Twenty or thirty young men were blown up in France, among them 
Andrew Ramsay, whose death, mercifully, was instantaneous.]” (133). Once again, 
the brackets mix objective reportage with the viewpoint (“mercifully”) of the 
community, though here the community is no longer marked off from the objective 
narrator by the reporting clause “they said.” This is the only mention of World War I 
in “Time Passes” until the primary narrator’s assertion in the final section that “peace 
had come” (142). Instead of directly narrating the destruction created by the war, the 
narrator returns to “those who had gone down to pace the beach” (133). This time, 
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they find “something out of harmony with this jocundity and this serenity” (133). 
Seasonal specifics are notably gone here—and, instead of summer storms, there is a 
calm beauty to the natural world of the beach. The pacers on the beach ask questions 
which seem directed to an optimistic confluence of natural and human narratives but 
ends with a repudiation of the possibility that observation of nature can relate in any 
way to human goals and human narratives: 
Did nature supplement what man advanced? Did she complete what he 
began? With equal complacence she saw his misery, his meanness, and 
his torture. That dream, of sharing, completing, of finding in solitude 
on the beach an answer, was then but a reflection in a mirror, and the 
mirror itself was but the surface glassiness which forms in quiescence 
when the nobler powers sleep beneath? Impatient, despairing yet loth 
to go (for beauty offers her lures, has her consolations), to pace the 
beach was impossible; contemplation was unendurable; the mirror was 
broken. (134) 
This passage suggests a break not only between man and nature, but a break between 
a specific object and broader human events. The narrative has shown nature not only 
happily mirroring hopeful human narratives, but also mirroring human 
disappointment and destruction. Furthermore, in later sections, the chaos of nature 
mirrors the chaos of World War I. These confluences are here revealed to be matters 
of selective choice: the narrator makes the seasons (which, after all, pass ten times 
over the course of “Time Passes”) match up with human events. The correlation of 
the Ramsays’ house and environs with broader events, meanwhile, is also revealed in 
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this passage to be a matter of metaphorical selectivity. Storms sometimes rage on the 
Isle of Skye, but not always. At the moment of greatest despair, the location to which 
the primary narrator is confined appears most out of step with broader events in 
Europe. Narrative events are not causal, but arbitrary. “Time Passes,” pointedly 
refuses to narrate the battles of World War I, even as this and other narrative events 
return with a vengeance. These events are still confined to the occasional bracketed 
passage and the realm of poetic inference. Instead, the narrator of “Time Passes” 
insists on continuing to look at the broken mirror of nature, while also maintaining 
the novel’s limited geographic scope. The novel marks the limits of its narrator’s 
capacities for representation in a modernist stream-of-consciousness framework, but 
also transcends this framework with new narrative strategies, including non-narrative 
discourse. Similarly, the section ends with the collective return to lyric comforts in 
the face of representational failures: “[Mr. Carmichael brought out a volume of 
poems that spring, which had an unexpected success. The war, people said, had 
revived their interest in poetry.]” (134). The seasons return, and so do their traditional 
metaphorical connotations: spring is renewal. But here, metaphorical renewal is 
related only to a renewal of metaphors. 
 Section seven continues the return of the seasons, but they lack their previous 
narrative solidity. Instead, the various levels of narrative are mashed together into a 
vision of chaos: 
Night after night, summer and winter, the torment of the storms, the 
arrow-like stillness of fine weather, held their court without 
interference. Listening (had there been any one to listen) from the 
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upper rooms of the empty house only gigantic chaos streaked with 
lightning could have been heard tumbling and tossing, as the winds 
and waves disported themselves like the amorphous bulks of 
leviathans whose brows are pierced by no light of reason, and mounted 
one on top of another, and lunged and plunged in the darkness or the 
daylight (for night and day, month and year ran shapelessly together) 
in idiot games, until it seemed as if the universe were battling and 
tumbling, in brute confusion and wanton lust aimlessly by itself. (134-
35) 
One the one hand, the relationship between natural and human narrative is as strong 
here as at any point in “Time Passes.” The chaos of the war is mirrored not only in 
the specific actions of anthropomorphized inanimate objects in the house, but also in 
the very jumbling of the various natural cycles which have served as both metaphors 
for and alternate orders of the passage of time. The universe battles just as much of 
humanity battles. On the other hand, the attempt to mirror in nature the historical 
events of World War I results in a destruction of narrative altogether. Where 
previously the passage of time in “Time Passes” was difficult to follow and 
proceeded on multiple levels (day, season, years), at varying speeds, here that 
passage, along with the symbolic order constituted in it, is explicitly destroyed. Day, 
night, and seasons lose their specificity, and thus their ability to signify lyrically in an 
independent manner. Without the ability to follow the passage of time, the narrator 
announces her incapacity to narrate. Instead, there are only metaphors for chaos. 
Instead of the return of history, of concrete historical events, with or without narrative 
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cause and consequence, World War I is narrated as the complete absence of history. 
After Andrew Ramsay’s death, nothing specific happens. Time does not pass, but 
instead “ran shapelessly together.” Battle does not occur through time, but instead 
time itself battles. The war, in short, consumes time, while narrative is only possible 
when time and event are comprehensible as distinct aspects operating at different 
levels of comprehension. With the melding of time with the war, history exists in 
“Time Passes” as presence beyond not only scenic narration, but direct narration in 
summary as well, instead narrating them metaphorically. The narration remains 
anchored in a particular place, without direct access to these major historical events. 
It remains, then, a sort of stream of consciousness, though without any particular 
consciousness as an anchor. 
 In order to maintain a sense of narrative in the face of lyrical and real-world 
chaos, in sections eight and nine of “Time Passes,” the narrator largely abandons the 
seasonal narrative and heavy figuration of the middle sections of “Time Passes” for 
human focalizers. In part, this marks a gradual return to the normal narrative mode of 
To the Lighthouse. However, there is a difference in these sections from the parallel 
earlier sections featuring Mrs. McNab which provides a deeper challenge to the class 
orientation of the novel and narrator as a whole. Mrs. McNab, along with Mrs. Bast, 
who joins her in preparing the house for the Ramsays’ return, receives the same sort 
of focalization characters do in “The Window” and “The Lighthouse.”  
 The first of these sections narrates a particular occasion in which Mrs. McNab 
cleans the house and shuts it up. Section eight ends, “The rain came in. But they 
never sent; never came. Some of the locks had gone, so the doors banged. She didn’t 
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like to be up here at dusk alone neither. It was too much for one woman, too much, 
too much. She creaked, she moaned. She banged the door. She turned the key in the 
lock, and left the house alone, shut up, locked” (137). Mrs. McNab here has a voice, 
as well as a particular grammar which marks her class position. She is also both 
opposed to nature and the effects of the nonhuman passage of time and a symbol of 
those effects. She desires more help to stop the creaking of the doors, to maintain the 
house’s status as a protective zone for human activity. This opposition to nature 
continues in section nine, as nonhumanity again dominates the house: “What power 
could now prevent the fertility, the insensibility of nature? Mrs. McNab’s dream of a 
lady, of a child, of a plate of milk soup?” (138). Yet, Mrs. McNab is herself like the 
decaying, nonhuman house: creaking and moaning (wordlessly) like the door as she 
comes into contact with it. The fertility of nature, too, is like the fertility of Mrs. 
McNab and her fellow workers as they seek to scrub nature from the household: 
Attended with the creaking of hinges and the screeching of bolts, the slamming and 
banging of damp-swollen woodwork some rusty laborious birth seemed to be taking 
place, as the women, stooping, rising, groaning, singing, slapped and slammed, 
upstairs now, now down in the cellars. Oh, they said, the work!” (139). 
 Work itself resembles to this narrator the workings of nature. Yet, at the same 
time, the presence of Mrs. McNab, and later Mrs. Bast and her son, is licensed by the 
Ramsays as work against nature and provides the narrative with human focalizers. 
Working-class people, and the work that they do, is invisible to the narrator in the 
presence of bourgeois narrative possibilities, as for example, when Mrs. Ramsay 
orders a silent, undescribed maid to “Yes, take it away” during dinner (87). Only the 
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emptying out of all other humanity makes them visible to a narrator sensitive to any 
narrative possibilities. What Minow-Pinkney calls “the formerly excluded Otherness” 
emerges not only, as she argues, with the figurative breaking of the mirror through 
which the seekers on the beach hope to see humanity reflected in Nature, but with the 
removal from the scene of a familiar bourgeois humanity to be reflected (Minow-
Pinkney 100). It is the nonhumanness of the narrative of “Time Passes,” and of its 
fixed location, that makes the inclusion of the working class possible in To the 
Lighthouse. At the same time, the working class is available only as an agent of the 
bourgeois against nature and as a symbol for the bourgeois of nature. This is true both 
on the level of the narrator, who repeatedly positions working-class people in relation 
to nature, and also on the level of the story, in which Mrs. McNab, Mrs. Bast, and her 
son appear only at the behest of the Ramsays. The stable location of To the 
Lighthouse is owned by the bourgeois whose consciousnesses serve as the narrative’s 
model. Working class people enter the narrative space only when permitted by its 
bourgeois owners, and only to maintain the space as a bourgeois space, as a refuge 
from chaotic nature, from death, from work, from war. Thus, with the arrival of Lily 
Briscoe at the end of section nine, the working class figures disappear from the 
narrative. They have served their transitional function: bringing day to night, 
nonhuman space to human space, indeterminate time to the modernist time of human 
consciousness. 
 The transition is completed in the final section of “Time Passes,” as the 
narrative intermingles the methods of sections one and two. The tenth section 
announces, “Then indeed peace had come” (142). This refers, on the one hand, to the 
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armistice, but it follows so immediately upon Lily’s return that it also signals the 
narrative peace afforded by the return of bourgeois minds to the novel’s narrative 
space. This final section of “Time Passes” flirts with the section’s poetic pose as it 
follows its bourgeois subjects through one definite night before Lily awakens at the 
end: 
the sigh of all the seas breaking in measure round the isles soothed 
them; the night wrapped them; nothing broke their sleep, until, the 
birds beginning and the dawn weaving their thin voices in to its 
whiteness, a cart grinding, a dog somewhere barking, the sun lifted the 
curtains, broke the veil on their eyes, and Lily Briscoe stirring in her 
sleep. (142-3) 
Here, again, the nonhuman has humanlike—and, particularly, benevolent—agency, 
which is only ceded, outside of parenthetical asides, to Lily as she nears 
consciousness. Mr. Carmichael, however, is given full waking narration which 
parallels his bracketed actions in section two: “And it all looked, Mr. Carmichael 
thought, shutting his book, falling asleep, much as it used to look” (142). The return 
of Lily and Mr. Carmichael, the sleeping and waking, the folding in and lifting of the 
darkness, returns the narrative, strengthens the narrative’s connection to the beginning 
of “Time Passes.” As a narrative of a single night, then, “Time Passes” both erases its 
own middle—in which time is destabilized, characters die, war rages, and ten years 
pass—and also its status as a middle for all of To the Lighthouse. It suggests, in other 
words, that not much time has passed, that there is no temporal chasm that must be 
bridged between “The Window” and “The Lighthouse.” The chronotope, too, is the 
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same: we are in the same place, with some of the same characters, and it can be 
narrated in the same fashion. A single night, this transition suggests, may seem the 
same as ten years; nothing is different, and everything is different. 
 On multiple levels, “Time Passes” includes what is excluded in “The 
Window” and “The Lighthouse.” It gives attention, and then voice, to working class 
characters, thus challenging the parameters of the bourgeois novel of manners and 
ideas. It gives attention, and even focalization, to the nonhuman, thus challenging the 
human basis of narrative. It gives space for its narrator to expound separately from 
the mind of any character, challenging the modernist allegiance to narrative 
objectivity and the stream-of-consciousness devotion to the narrative rendering of 
subjectivity. An anonymous “mystic” or “visionary” on the beach quickly becomes 
plural, “asking themselves ‘What am I,’ What is this?’”, challenging not only the 
humanist unity of character, but also the objectivity of the narrative event and the 
reliability of a seemingly omniscient narrator (131). Finally, within short bracketed 
passages, events are narrated—often major, often traumatic, often far away from the 
Ramsays’ summer home—in a reporterly tone, challenging the spatial, dramatic, and 
narratorial unity of the text. 
 “Time Passes” also shows how closely matters of voice are related to story as 
well as discourse . The absence of bourgeois guests in the house necessitates 
strategies of voice other than the primary mode of “The Window” and “The 
Lighthouse”: indirect discourse rendering bourgeois thought. Conversely, focalization 
through Mrs. Bast and the “certain airs,” as well as the various modes of 
heterodiegetic discourse (that is, originating from outside the story-world) taken on 
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by the narrator, allow a world unpopulated by the Ramsays and their ilk to be 
narrated, while the bracketed narrator further allows the world outside the summer 
home and its immediate environs to be narrated as well. Shifts in voice and in story 
content are thus inextricably paired. To the Lighthouse thus reveals many of the 
narrative limitations of the bourgeois modernist voice as represented in “The 
Window” and “The Lighthouse.” 
 Most of these challenges to the narrative voice of the first and third sections of 
To the Lighthouse, however, can be understood within Genette’s basic model of 
narrative voice, in which the novelist must choose “between two narrative postures 
[…]: to have the story told by one of its ‘characters,’ or to have it told by a narrator 
outside of the story” (Genette, Narrative Discourse 244). Genette adds in a note that 
“in fiction nothing prevents us from entrusting that role to an animal […] or indeed to 
an ‘inanimate’ object” (Narrative Discourse 244n). The narrator of “Time Passes” 
remains clearly outside the story, while its focalizers shift between the animate and 
the inanimate. This is why Leaska is able to assign, at least provisionally, every word 
in To the Lighthouse to a particular voice, “omniscient” or otherwise, within Woolf’s 
“multiple-point-of-view method” (Leaska, Novels 142). Although “Time Passes” 
does, through the narrator’s uncertainty and its recourse to a largely Romantic poetic 
discourse in the absence of human agency, challenge that narrator’s claim to 
omniscience, the narrator remains solidly heterodiegetic. 
 However, though it remains a relatively simple task to define the voice of 
“Time Passes” within Genette’s scheme, it is more difficult to define this voice’s 
relationship to the story-world. When the narrator describes, for example, the emptied 
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house, it is difficult to tell where concrete description stops and metaphor begins: 
“Now, day after day, light turned, like a flower reflected in water, its sharp image on 
the wall opposite. Only the shadows of the trees, flourishing in the wind, made 
obeisance on the wall, and for a moment darkened the pool in which light reflected 
itself; or birds, flying, made a soft spot flutter across the bedroom floor” (229). The 
paragraph initially invokes both a specific time (now) and an iterative (day after day), 
thus blending specific event with a repetition of similar events. The second sentence 
initially offers a narration of exclusivity—no other shadowing events occur. It then, to 
use Brian Richardson’s term for when “a narrator denies significant aspects of his or 
her narrative that had earlier been present as given,” denarrates this exclusivity to 
offer another possibility (Richardson, Unnatural Voices 87). It is also difficult to tell 
whether these possibilities are mutually exclusive—or whether the trees or birds 
might cast shadows. 
 There is an additional possibility: that none of the above passage is a narration 
of specific events, repeated or otherwise: instead, the play of shadow and light is a 
metaphor plucked not from the narrator’s knowledge of events in the story-world, but 
from the narrator’s imagination. The mystic on the beach presents a similar set of 
problems: events of uncertain frequency, involving an uncertain (and even altered) 
number of agents, which might even be the purely hypothetical concoctions of a 
narrator seeking to narrate the unnarratable. This same phenomenon permeates much 
of “Time Passes” and is deeply connected to the features which have resulted in many 
critics labeling the section “lyric” or “poetic.” It puts into question the narrator’s 
reliability—and even the terms on which we might establish that reliability. 
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Furthermore, passages like this fundamentally undermine the traditional narrator-
story relationship as described by David Herman: “According to standard accounts, 
narrative is by and large factive in nature. Narratives characteristically (re)produce, 
from a stance of relative certainty, chains of singular and past events” (Herman, 
Universal 87). The narrator of “Time Passes” is often so divorced from traditional 
“events,” so willing to give narrative focalization and human meaning to animals and 
inanimate objects, and so invested in metaphorical language, that its relationship to a 
factive world is highly mediated, if not fundamentally challenged. 
 The effect is similar to that of the “Circe” episode of Joyce’s Ulysses, in 
which the discourse takes the form of a dream play. This dream-play discourse 
represents a story with fantastical elements (a hobgoblin), speaking roles for 
inanimate objects (the pianola), and other manifestations of characters’ subconscious 
minds and elements from other parts of the novel (William Shakespeare). However, 
none of these unrealistic elements have actually taken place in the story-world of 
Ulysses—instead, the reader is meant to infer from the episode itself, as well as 
information presented in subsequent episodes, that a more ordinary drunken trip to a 
brothel has taken place. “Circe,” then, contains two levels of story for one level of 
discourse. The situation in “Time Passes” is not as extreme, but is in some ways more 
complex. The highly metaphorical, speculative discourse that dominates much of the 
section creates a veil between story and discourse. It produces narratives that may or 
may not have occurred one or more times in the story-world, narrates events that may 
or may not have happened, but that are meant to represent, in a general fashion, the 
passage of time and its effects on the summer-house, the beach, and a general or 
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hypothetical consciousness (the mystic, people in general, the narrator itself) which is 
placed there. Beyond the beginning and the end of the section (when the Ramsays’ 
guests are still around), the scenes involving Mrs. McNab, Mrs. Bast, and her son, 
and the bracketed passages, there are no solidly factual events in “Time Passes.” Yet, 
neither is the section completely unmoored from the factive world: it is simply that 
the form of narration of the section rarely narrates the factive world directly—largely, 
if not entirely, because there is nothing there which can be the subject of traditional 
narration. 
 This leads me to the greatest challenge “Time Passes” poses to traditional 
narrative analysis, as well as its most fundamental difference from the sections which 
precede and follow it: its treatment of time. Genette analyzes time in narrative with 
regard to three major elements: order, duration, and frequency (Genette, Narrative 
Discourse 35). Frequency I have already mentioned briefly when discussing the 
(possibly) iterative nature of certain events in “Time Passes.” While “Time Passes” 
often narrates in a way that makes frequency indeterminate, this does not create 
significant problems in and of itself, since events that may or may not repeat (or may 
or may not happen in a particular way) serve only to generally represent the passage 
of time: we understand that this is the sort of thing that happens. Order, meanwhile, is 
not a significant problem in “Time Passes.” The section contains few obvious 
anachronies, or passages in which the order of events of the discourse is different 
from the order of events in the story-world (Genette, Narrative Discourse 40). 
 This is a stark contrast to the rest of the novel, whose structure highly 
anachronic. Dorrit Cohn describes the novel’s primary mode of indirect discourse 
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(“narrated monologue”) as “a choice medium for revealing a fictional mind 
suspended in an instant present, between a remembered past and an anticipated 
future” (Cohn, Transparent 126). What Cohn calls “narrated memories” abound in 
“The Window,” as Mrs. Ramsay, Lily Briscoe, and other characters recall past events 
(Cohn, Transparent 128). Meanwhile, the novel also repeats scenes or snatches of 
time from multiple perspectives, most famously the juxtaposed final scenes of Lily 
Briscoe completing her painting and the Ramsays reaching the lighthouse. “Time 
Passes” has no focalizers to launch such anachronies, with the exceptions of Mrs. 
McNab and Mrs. Bast, whose memories tend to be general (“They lived well in those 
days.”) or non-immersive (“The young gentleman was dead.”), at least for the reader, 
who is told that Mrs. McNab is “wantoning in her memories,” but is not given 
unfettered access to these unfettered memories (140). The narrator uses Mrs. McNab 
as a focalizer, following her eyes to “the old gentlemen, then entering narrated 
monologue: “He never noticed her. Some said he was dead; some said she was dead. 
Which was it? Mrs. Bast didn’t know for certain either. The young gentleman was 
dead. That was sure. She had read his name in the papers” (140). While this is clearly 
free indirect discourse, it is ambiguous whether this is narrated internal monologue, or 
whether it is spoken dialogue. Here we see one of the limitations of “Time Passes” as 
an antidote to the socially-limited view of the rest of the novel: even when it accesses 
the minds of working-class people, those minds do not open completely and 
unambiguously. 
 Yet it has been easy for critics to overstate the limitations here, and to ignore 
the narrator’s growing sympathy for Mrs. McNab, and the move toward internal 
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focalization and even free indirect discourse. The early New York Times reviewer, in 
praising “Time Passes,” is able, in the same sentence that mentions the “forlorn 
women caretakers,” to state that “for ten years the house itself never received a 
human guest” (Critical Heritage 197). Cohn argues for a sort of guilt-by-association: 
the very inclusion of working-class characters in “Time Passes,” with its refusal to 
engage in the anachronic mode of the novel’s other sections, enables (even if it does 
not encourage) this sort of dehumanization, as they are included among the 
nonhuman and the anti-narrative, while being excluded from the web of narrated 
monologues (Cohn, Transparent 118). I have already shown an ambiguous case of 
Mrs. McNab’s narrated monologue. Later in the day, the case is less ambiguous, with 
the narration of Mrs. McNab’s mind shifting from summary to free indirect discourse 
to direct quotation of her thoughts: “She watched her son scything. He was a great 
one for work—one of those quiet ones. Well they must be getting along with the 
cupboards, she supposed” (TTL 141). By the end of the day, then, the narrator’s 
sympathy for Mrs. McNab seems to have increased—the narrator has edged closer to 
what Tratner calls “something new.”“Time Passes” may not be a web of narrated 
monologues, but it certainly uses Mrs. McNab as an internal focalizer, and it contains 
her narrated monologue. The differences by which “Time Passes” marks itself thus 
include and excludes these marginalized figures. The narrator notices and even 
focalizes on them, while at the same time its refusal of anachrony limits this 
focalization. However, these limitations may easily be overstated. McNab and Bast 
engage the past through conversation, and the absence of anachronies in the narrative 
while McNab is the focalizer may be attributed to the lack of idleness. In addition, 
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Mrs. McNab and Mrs. Bast are arguably not part of a web of narrated monologues 
because that web is also a web of social relations from which they are excluded. 
Finally, the house, where the narrator is located, is their place of work. The absence 
of anachrony may be more of a representation of a state of work, and a particular 
social web, than it is a limitation to the narrator’s growing sympathy with the 
working-class figures. The narrator is limited by a literal place than it is limited by 
sympathy or capacity for focalization. 
 Nevertheless, the absence of clear anachronies makes “Time Passes” linear to 
an almost unusual degree. It duration, or speed, “the relationship between a duration 
(that of the story, measured in seconds, minutes, hours, days, months, and years) and 
a length (that of the text, measured in lines and in pages)” on the other hand, is highly 
varied (Genette, Narrative Discourse 87-88). Genette identifies four speeds at which 
narrative texts conventionally operate: the descriptive pause, in which the time of the 
story stops while narration continues; the scene, in which, usually through dialogue, a 
conventional equivalence is achieved between story-time and discourse-space; the 
summary, in which story-time moves faster than it does in scene; and the ellipsis, in 
which time passes in the gaps in textual discourse, as between chapters in The Golden 
Bowl (Genette, Narrative Discourse 93-94). Genette offers a further possibility: “a 
sort of scene in slow motion” which covers space between pause and scene 
(Narrative Discourse 95). As a whole, “Time Passes” is a sort of summary, since ten 
years pass in the space of about twenty pages. Meanwhile, much of “The Lighthouse” 
and “The Window” takes place in a sort of slow motion, as characters’ thoughts 
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expand within a limited amount of story-time.
17
 So, while most of To the Lighthouse 
is scene, and the modernist scene as it is slowed by the rendering of thought, “Time 
Passes” is an experimental expansion of the words that comprise its title—an 
expansion that nevertheless maintains the mode of summary. 
 However, “Time Passes” begins much in the mode of the preceding section, as 
the guests come in and turn out the lights. It then accelerates rapidly, as the night 
passes into seasons, which pass into years. At the end, “Time Passes” returns to the 
pace of most of To the Lighthouse, so that its duration has a symmetrical form: an 
acceleration from scene to rapid summary (ten years in twenty pages), followed by a 
deceleration back to scene. As we have seen above, however, at the level of 
discourse, this rapid passage of time is not always rendered precisely by summary: 
rather, the summary is often inferred from the rendering of iterative or metaphorical 
scenes. It is also punctuated by hypothetical scenes, as when the narrator proposes, 
“should any sleeper fancying that he might find on the beach an answer to his doubts, 
a sharer of his solitude, throw off his bedclothes and go down by himself to walk on 
the sand, no image with semblance of serving and divine promptitude comes readily 
to hand bringing the night to order and making the world reflect the compass of the 
soul” (128). The sleeper is later mirrored in (or returns as) the mystic, followed by 
“those who had gone down to pace the beach” (133). When those on the beach ask, 
“Did Nature supplement what man advanced? Did she complete what he began?” it is 
                                                 
17 For example, the opening section of “The Window” includes dialogue which seems as though it 
should fall one line immediately after another, but which is instead punctuated by long paragraphs 
of thought and description: “ ‘Yes, of course, if it’s fine tomorrow,’ said Mrs. Ramsay. ‘But you’ll 
have to be up with the lark,’ she added” (TTL 3). A paragraph intervenes. “ ‘But,’ said the father, 
stopping in front of the drawing-room window, ‘it won’t be fine’” (4). Another intervening 
paragraph. “ ‘But it may be fine—I expect it will be fine,’ said Mrs. Ramsay” (4). Etc. 
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unclear whether time flows forward, whether we have a single or an iterative scene, 
or whether this is a representation not of actual trips to the beach, single or multiple, 
but of a general state of mind to which the narrator, the sleeper, the mystic, and those 
on the beach give voice (134). Meanwhile, the narrator’s musings often seem to stop 
the flow of time entirely as, for example, when the narrator says of an 
anthropomorphized divine goodness hidden behind a curtain, “our penitence deserves 
a glimpse only; our toil respite only” (128). Such discourse, according to Genette, 
does not even qualify as narrative, but is another sort of pause, a “commentarial 
excurse” (Genette, Narrative Discourse 94n). Just as it is possible to view “Time 
Passes” on the whole as a summary, it is also possible to view it as a non-narrative or 
lyric section which does not narrate the passage of time, but instead offers 
commentary on the idea of the passage of time. Finally, “Time Passes” is punctuated 
by more conventional narrative scenes when Mrs. McNab and Mrs. Bast arrive. The 
section is therefore a complex structure in which accelerating and decelerating 
summary is both punctuated and bookended by scene, and in which the speed as well 
as the frequency and even story-world existence of any particular passage is likely to 
be unclear. We are approaching, then, the equivalent for duration of Genette’s 
achrony, in which “temporal reference is deliberately sabotaged” (Genette, Narrative 
Discourse 35). Herman is skeptical that indeterminate temporal order is truly 
achrony, preferring the term “temporal indefiniteness” (75). Following Herman, it 
seems best to say that, where the duration cannot be determined, “Time Passes” has 
an indefinite speed. 
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 However, it is not simply the case that we cannot tell how fast (or whether) 
time is passing at any moment in “Time Passes.” Rather, “Time Passes” overlays 
multiple levels of summary, all moving at different speeds. First, there is the section’s 
initial conceit: the passage of ten years is the passage of one night. It is this basic 
conceit that binds the novel together: because they are figured as an evening and the 
following morning, “The Window” and “The Lighthouse” obey the Aristotelian unity 
of time. We are allowed to see the whole of the novel as one dramatic action—except 
for “Time Passes,” which is outside that action, an interlude that by its very between-
ness enables that unity of action. Second, there is the conceit of the passage of 
seasons: “Time Passes” moves through winter, spring, summer, and back to early fall. 
In this conceit, one year passes. Third, there is the real passage of story-time, the ten 
years between “The Window” and “The Lighthouse.” Since so much of “Time 
Passes” is concerned with the narration of the passage of a night or the passage of the 
seasons, these slower speeds cannot be easily dismissed, even if they must ultimately 
be deemed metaphorical. Rather, they are metaphorical only within the novel as a 
whole: within “Time Passes” and its unique discourse space, they are narrated. “Time 
Passes,” therefore, while it contains passages of indefinite speed, and otherwise varies 
its speed throughout, as a whole is composed of three orders of speed operating 
simultaneously. As Herman argues that novels which encourage the reader to imagine 
multiple temporal orderings of the same events are polychronous, I suggest that 
“Time Passes” should be considered a polytempic text (Herman, Universal 75). 
 “Time Passes,” therefore, serves as both a linking and dividing middle which, 
through its differences from the text which surrounds it, challenges not only the 
165 
 
conventions of modernist and traditional narrative, but the very foundations of 
narrative itself. It does so by challenging three basic components of narrative: the 
presence of human agents (which are absent for much of the section), the occurrence 
of actions or events (which, where human agents are absent, are frequently nebulous 
or even non-existent), and, most fundamentally, by multiplying and disrupting the 
very flow of story-time, which distinguishes narrative from other modes of discourse. 
Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this project, though, “Time Passes” 
establishes itself as a text in and of itself within the larger text of To the Lighthouse: a 
middle distinguished by its own narrative laws and presence. 
 The very title of “Time Passes” suggests its inconsequentiality to the rest of 
the narrative, while its mode of narration—which challenges the limits of narrative 
itself—marks it off as something separate from the rest of the novel. In both its 
difference and apparent inconsequentiality, “Time Passes” resembles traditional 
interludes from music and theater. Yet the space of the interlude opens up new 
possibilities. “Time Passes” seeks to include in the middle what is excluded by the 
narrative conventions of the beginning and the end. It alters and destabilizes the 
chronotope of To the Lighthouse in order to move both beyond a narrative of 
bourgeois consciousness, and beyond the limitations of narrative within a focus on 
human agency through definite time. Yet, at each moment, its inclusions are only 
partial: it does not narrate the nonhuman on anything but human terms. It does not 
narrate the working class without reference to the bourgeois. It does not narrate 
events of great political or personal consequence within its primary narrative voice: 
the brackets set off these events in their own narrative space and mode, deploying the 
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rhetoric of newspapers rather than encompassing large-scale historic events into the 
same voice that narrates individual consciousness. Each attempt to include what is 
unnarrated in “The Window” and “The Lighthouse” comes up against some sort of 
barrier or limit. 
 On the one hand, these limits might be read as failures of bourgeois 
modernism or of Virginia Woolf in particular. In this sense, “Time Passes” serves 
primarily as a critique of the still-developing conventions of modernism, and an 
acknowledgment of the limitations that came with Woolf’s own privileged 
perspective. “Time Passes,” with its remarkable narrative agility and the collage-like 
intrusion of bracketed narration, compellingly gestures to what is beyond the novel’s 
primary mode of stream-of-consciousness narration. In so doing, it suggests the 
epistemological limitations of any particular mode of narration. As such, it is both an 
extension and a self-critique of this particular mode of modernism. Its function as 
critique, rather than solution, to the limitations of narrative, is consonant with much 
of modernism which, even in the hands of revolutionaries such John Dos Passos, was 
geared more towards critiquing the modern world than providing it a positive 
direction. “Time Passes,” then, on multiple levels, cannot escape the limitations of 
either modernism or narrative. 
 On the other hand, we can see the limitations of “Time Passes” as the 
limitations not of modernism, but of the middle. “Time Passes” struggles both to 
establish its independence as a narrative unit and to maintain its status as the middle 
of a larger narrative. As a middle, it necessarily comes between the beginning and the 
end of the novel. It challenges the very vagueness of that Aristotelian definition of the 
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middle by making itself markedly different from the beginning and the end. It also, 
however, challenges the weakness of that definition by insisting that the middle is not 
simply between the beginning and the end, but that it bridges the narrative gap 
between beginning and end. Despite the stark division provided by the part’s title, 
“Time Passes” transitions gradually from beginning to end: without that title, we 
would perhaps find the beginning of the middle of To the Lighthouse in section two 
or three of “Time Passes.” “Time Passes,” as middle, is both distinct from and melded 
to the beginning and end. It is marked by its difference from the narrative of 
beginning and end, but it cannot separate itself completely from the narrative 
conventions already established. Its locational fixity both marks its similarity from the 
beginning and the end (it shares a location) and its difference (it maintains this 
location even when all other narrative elements have left). 
 Fundamentally, though, the middle both separates and holds together the 
narrative. It provides a gap between “The Window” and “The Lighthouse” in both 
reading time and story time. But it also, as James Naremore notes, closes a ten-year 
gap by imagining the gap as a single night: “the section begins with the characters 
coming in from outside and preparing for bed, and ends with everyone reluctantly 
waking up to a new day” (Naremore 116). Paradoxically, by including multiple 
temporal frameworks, Woolf is able to give a novel which takes place over a ten-year 
period a temporal as well as spatial Aristotelian dramatic unity. This unity is 
achieved, however, only through the great lyrical force of the middle. It is the ten-
year gap narrated by “Time Passes” that holds the beginning and the end together 
conceptually as a narrative: only the passage of time allows us to read “The 
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Lighthouse” as the flawed realization of the human-lifetime-scaled expectations of 
“The Window.” Similarly, the greater prominence given to the war and to death in 
“Time Passes”—the attention to catastrophic events—gives broader narrative license 
to the dwelling on bourgeois consciousness of the beginning and the end. Because 
“Time Passes” looks upon such consciousness as both insignificant in the face of the 
nonhuman passage of time, and sees such consciousness as the only available model 
for narrative, the middle of To the Lighthouse serves as a guide for reading the minds 
of Lily Briscoe and the Ramsays within a specific historical and political context. 
“Time Passes” attempts, but ultimately fails, to narrate the war and the nonhuman 
passage of time, and it has limited success in providing space for working-class 
consciousness within modernist narrative. 
 “Time Passes” does, however, put its beginning and end, in which the 
anxieties of the bourgeois play out over seemingly inconsequential events, within the 
context of what they do not narrate. It suggests, ultimately, that what holds the 
beginning and the end together is the middle, and what holds the narrated together is 
what it does not narrate. “Time Passes” is a middle of what is passed over—a fleeting 
suggestion of what is left between the beginning and the end, what is obscured by the 
finitude of narrative. In doing so, it suggests that the finite acquires both shape and 
meaning from the infinite, that the seemingly narrow focus of the modernist mode of 
“The Window” and “The Lighthouse” depends upon its broader historical and 
existential context. The moment of being, the slice of life, however small, exists only 
in the broader flow of time. It is this broader flow of time, then, that makes of these 
moments narrative. “Time Passes,” therefore, not only falls between To the 
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Lighthouse’s primary narrative parts, but produces To the Lighthouse as narrative. It 
contains the Bremondian change of state for the novel and, even more importantly, 
sews together these two sections of beginning and end. It is an interlude in the sense 
not only of something different that comes in between, something that can potentially 
be ignored if we are interested only in the primary narrative, but in the sense of 
something that makes To the Lighthouse a whole work rather than a pair of 
contiguous movements. It mediates between beginning and end through a careful 
balance of contrast and similarity: it is narrative that gestures toward the non-
narrative and the non-human, while at the same time it is the very engine of narrative. 
It is both wholly disposable and indispensable; it is both completely dependent on its 
position within the novel and unreadable as a part of that novel. Woolf responded to 
the baggy middles of Victorian novels with a middle that was a great deal shorter, 
even easier to ignore, and even more essential to the full meaning and narrative 
capacity of the novel. “Time Passes” is, in many ways, the middle pushed as far as it 
can go—a compression of middleness in its paradoxical essential disposability. It is, 
as Woolf described, a corridor: a functional passageway, but also a place in itself, and 




Chapter 4: Spirituality and Delusion: The Middle as Rupture in 
the Consciousness in Rayner Heppenstall’s Saturnine 
 World War II arguably marks the end of modernism as a historical movement 
in literature, with postmodernism emerging around the same time in many accounts.
18
 
This makes the war itself a sort of middle in the history of experimental literary 
movements in English language literature. While this study of modernist middles is 
primarily formal, rather than historical, in nature, McHale notes the importance of the 
history of such movements to his formal definitions of modernism and 
postmodernism, which is not merely a sequential, but a causal, history: 
“Postmodernism follows from modernism” (McHale 5). This causal element is 
actually what allows McHale to move from the historical to the formal: instead of 
simply following temporally from modernism, postmodernism also follows logically 
from postmodernism. Thus, we have the ontological dominant following from the 
epistemological dominant. This is all a roundabout way of saying: World War II does 
not mark an end of modernism, but rather, a sort of middle, after which it is no longer 
associated with the most influential experimental novelists. In Britain in particular, 
postwar modernist and experimental literature would generally be either ignored or 
subjected to ideological contempt, as realism became the resurgent standard for 
English literature (Green 99). It is worth considering, too, that World War II had a 
powerful, lingering economic effect that, beyond any direct effects on the culture, 
                                                 
18 The Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory, for example, places 
Modernism “in England from early in the 20
th
 c. and during the 1920s and 1930s,” (Cuddon, 
“modernism”), while postmodernism begins in “the 1940s and 1950s” (Cuddon, “post-modernism”). 
Notably, Calinescu tracks the first American use of the term “post-modernist” to Randall Jarrell in 
1946 (Calinescu 267). 
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served to marginalize experimental literature in Britain. According to Rayner 
Heppenstall, the subject of this chapter, “Before the war, it had been possible, though 
it had not been easy, to be a serious, full-time professional, free-lance writer,” he 
wrote in in 1963. “The species was now extinct” (Intellectual Part 50). Nevertheless, 
a few British writers continued to write in and expand the modernist form both during 
and after the war, and they continued in many cases to use middles to deepen, expand, 
and redirect the epistemological poetics of modernism, and to bind their narrative 
experiments into complete novelistic narratives. 
 The final two chapters of this study will concern themselves with post-war 
experimental British novels, both of which contend with and arguably participate in at 
least some aspects of postmodern literature. This chapter concerns a novel written and 
published during the war itself. While To the Lighthouse makes World War I and its 
trauma the middle of its narrative, a separation that binds the novel together, Woolf 
creates her narrative middle retrospectively, from a position after the war. In that 
novel, the middle stretches the conventions of both modernist and traditional 
narrative, but a stable modernist poetics governs both beginning and end. Between the 
Acts, set just before World War Two and written and published during the war, on the 
other hand, expresses in its end a sharp skepticism about the future of both modernist 
narrative that seems to point towards postmodernism: Miss La Trobe considers her 
play a “failure” (209), while Isa ponders changes in the ontology of narrative: “Surely 
it was time someone invented a new plot, or that the author came out from the bushes 
. . .” (215). The novel’s final pages are marked by darkness, uncertainty, 
contradictory thoughts, as the modern setting is transformed into the prehistoric 
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setting from the beginning of Lucy’s book, the Outline of History. Here, 
epistemological uncertainty has become so extreme that it threatens to tip over into 
ontological uncertainty. Nevertheless, Between the Acts maintains a stream-of-
consciousness technique throughout. Its middle offers no particular challenge to, 
disruption of, or modification of that technique. 
 Rayner Heppenstall’s 1943 novel Saturnine, by contrast, consists of a linear 
narrative, presented by a more conventional retrospective first-person narrator with a 
level of verisimilitude that caused many of its readers to regard it as autobiography, 
but punctuated by moments of acute epistemological uncertainty. At its middle, there 
is a moment of crisis, at which epistemological questions nearly tip into ontological 
questions. However, this middle does not coincide with war. Instead, the beginning of 
the war coincides with Saturnine’s end. With the coming of war, apparently at least, 
the epistemological uncertainties of modernism also come to an end. The novel’s 
middle, however, takes these epistemological uncertainties to an extreme, where they 
threaten to tip over into ontological uncertainties, as a result of an extreme crisis. 
However, where To the Lighthouse creates a middle that pushes modernist narrative 
to new territory through the removal of its focalizers from its setting, and further 
through the external pressures of war and death, Heppenstall pushes modernist 
technique near to its breaking point through internal crisis in a focalizer which it 
never leaves, a crisis which reaches its height in the novel’s middle. 
 At first glance, Saturnine does not appear to contain the narrative difficulties 
or structural complexities typically associated with modernism, or even with some of 
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the author’s other novels. Alick Frobisher, the novel’s semiautobiographical
19
 first-
person retrospective narrator, tells in mostly chronological order the story of an 
impoverished period of his life, between the death of his uncle-in-law and business 
partner Sam Thorpe in October of 1938, and his joining the military in June of 1940. 
Heppenstall’s first novel, The Blaze of Noon (1939), similarly has a straightforward 
first-person narration, but the erotic attention to physical detail and intellectual 
analysis of the sensory impression (“l’appréhension sensorielle immédiatement 
intellectualisée par la conscience”) provided by the blind masseuse who narrates the 
earlier novel later prompted Hélène Cixous to declare, “il a inauguré le nouveau 
roman” (Cixous). Heppenstall’s 1962 novel, The Connecting Door, meanwhile, 
shows the direct influence of the nouveau roman, and particularly Robbe-Grillet. In 
that novel, told in the present tense, the narrator encounters two other characters, 
Harold and Atha, who turn out to be prior versions of himself—versions whose 
stories are similarly take place in the present tense. In returning to a town on the 
Rhine before and after World War II, the narrator encounters his own past, mixing 
memory with immediate experience and splitting the self in three.  
Saturnine’s narrator does not provide such an obvious extension to modernist 
experiments in representing the conscious mind’s encounters with the physical world 
as does the blind narrator of The Blaze of Noon. Nor does it have the present-tense 
immediacy or temporal distortions of The Connecting Door. Instead, Frobisher, who 
                                                 
19  J.G. Bucknell, author of the only book-length study of Heppenstall, notes that Heppenstall’s belief 
in writing as dramatization is “reflected in Saturnine’s construction, in which a ‘realistic’ account 
of London life (drawn from Heppenstall’s own), encompassing bankruptcy, illness, collapsing 
buildings, literary production, homosexual acquaintances and military service is continually 
punctuated by fantastical interludes, self-reflection or metafictional ruminations” (Bucknell 40-41). 
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is undergoing a mental breakdown, relates unreal events, delusions, and visions in the 
same straightforward manner he uses to relay the more mundane events that dominate 
the novel. Though these disruptions of the novel’s mundane verisimilitude occur only 
occasionally, they mirror Frobisher’s persistent interest in Rudolf Steiner-influenced 
mysticism (propounded by the nonfictional Steiner’s fictional disciples at the Institute 
of Mystical Science) as well as his interest in astrology, such as the cold promise of 
death given by the Saturn of the novel’s title. Saturnine’s modernist experiment, 
therefore, lies in its representation not of the conscious mind’s encounter with real 
sensory data, but of the mind’s encounter with unreal sensory data, whether it be 
genuine mystical experience or madness. These unreal episodes reach a climax at the 
beginning of the fourth part of this four-part novel, in which Frobisher declares that 
he has died and proceeds to narrate an out-of-body experience before returning to his 
body. This near-death experience, which in many ways mirrors the Medieval journey 
to the afterlife, serves as a middle of sorts, as Frobisher re-commits himself to life and 
to his wife and soon-to-be first child before going off to war in the novel’s sequel, 
The Lesser Infortune, which chronicles another mental breakdown for Frobisher, this 
time in military service. It also serves as a coda to Saturnine’s long middle, marking 
the end of Frobisher’s delusions and providing a forceful philosophical and mystical 
resolution to the existential and narrative uncertainties that mark the middle of the 
novel.  
However, Saturnine also contains its own short middle, which anticipates The 
Connecting Door’s engagement with the split self. At nearly the novel’s exact center, 
in the seventh of thirteen chapters, Frobisher follows a man who turns out to be 
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himself. In an episode that resembles in many ways Freud’s account of the double in 
“The Uncanny,” Frobisher splits in two, narrating, eventually, his own thoughts in the 
third person. The result is a doubling of the division of self implied by first-person 
narration, calling attention to and even pathologizing the novel’s conventions. 
Meanwhile, the differences between mental and physical worlds and between fabula 
and syuzhet are confused if not collapsed entirely, as the contents of Frobisher’s mind 
take on physical form and Frobisher-as-character takes over narration and thus 
control of at least one level of reality. While the later episode of Frobisher’s “death” 
provides what is for Frobisher an intellectually comprehensible split between physical 
and astral body, the middle of Saturnine splits both physical body and consciousness 
in two, without explanation. It breaks the novel in two just as it breaks the self in two. 
It represents the crisis of Frobisher’s madness, just as it represents a crisis of the 
novel that attempts to depict, simultaneously, a physical reality and a reality of the 
consciousness, with all of the unreal implications the latter implies. What’s more, its 
pathological view of the self and uncertainty about the role and nature of narration are 
never fully overcome. This account of life, narrative, and the self as inevitably, 
confusingly, pathologically divided is echoed in the continued uncertainty of the 
Second World War, suggesting that endings and the clarity they bring are at best 
provisional in the face of the uncertain middle. Whereas Between the Acts emphasizes 
this point most clearly at its ending, Saturnine does so at its middle. 
 Saturnine’s episodic structure serves to release the novel from a particular set 
of conventions that bind the middle tightly to beginning and end, but Heppenstall, 
unlike J. Hillis Miller, does not see this freeing of the middle as a path to truth. Miller 
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offers a definition of the middle that emphasizes the digressive nature of the narrative 
line, particularly in long-form narratives. Much like Aristotle, Miller defines the 
middle as “all that series in a narrative between beginning and end” (“Narrative 
Middles” 376). However, for Miller, the novel does not share the traditional unity of 
plot which is provided in drama by a middle which draws a straight line between 
beginning and end. Following Friedrich Schlegel, Miller argues that the novel “does 
not depend on being a continuous, literally represented spectacle” (Miller, “Narrative 
Middles” 384). That is, the novel has a freedom in regard to duration—Genette’s term 
for the relative speed of events in the discourse (narrative time) relative to those in the 
story (story time), which even in scenic narration is conventional in nature (Genette, 
Narrative Discourse 87). Miller ascribes this conventionality specifically to the 
written word. However, Miller’s account of both the narrative line and the split 
between narrative time and story time presupposes an Aristotelian ideal of drama that 
has never been true. Aristotle’s account of the unity of action is not descriptive, but 
prescriptive: “The Unity of a Plot does not consist, as some suppose, in its having one 
man as its subject. […] One sees, therefore, the mistake of all the poets who have 
written a Herecleid, a Theseid, or similar poems; they suppose that, because Heracles 
was one man, the story also of Heracles must be one story” (1451a). That is, actions 
which are not unified are frequent dramatic subjects. And even Aristotle did not 
prescribe that a dramatic performance must have a duration equal to story time: in 
fact, Aristotle considered the time of performance to be beyond the scope of the 
Poetics: “As for the limit of its length, so far as that is relative to public performances 
and spectators, it does not fall within the theory of poetry” (1451a). The search for 
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unity between time story time and narrative or performance time is therefore a false 
standard, and it is a problem not unique to the novel, even if the novel by virtue of its 
length opens up new possibilities. 
 For Heppenstall, this split is essential to all narrative, and is actually more 
acute in drama: “Drama stands betwixt and between. It has the particularisation, the 
locality, of narrative fiction, but its action takes place in an eternal present. The 
passage of time in a theatre is always brought about by trickery and characteristically 
by the trick of stopping the play and sending the audience out for a drink. In general, 
drama is closer to lyric than to narration” (Double Image 124-25). That is, the 
conventions of narrative are more adapted to the necessary split between  narrative 
time and story time. Here, Heppenstall agrees with Miller: written narrative offers 
possibilities that can make it in some ways a more accurate representation of reality 
than drama. Moreover, this split is only a sub-set of the greater split between all 
forms of narrative and reality. Miller argues for digressive narrative, in a sense, on 
behalf of a sort of realism: a realism that presents life fully, without the over-
motivated selection of Aristotelean plotting. For Heppenstall, however, the anti-
Aristotelean view is simply another imposing philosophy: 
Either man’s life is continuous and coherent, obedient to a single 
principle throughout, originating in a known cause and proceeding to a 
known destination. Or it is accidental and chaotic, and any apparent 
principle is no less so. Those are the two songs that philosophy sings. 
Theology sings the former, and common sense hesitates between the 
two. It is the natural tendency of lyrical poetry alone to sing the 
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fragmentary song. The mind functions in categories and would like to 
believe them real. The literary forms of biography, drama and fiction 
implement this natural wish. (Double Image 69-70) 
As a result, the inherent lie of fiction is inescapable. What’s more, in its very 
fictiveness, narrative is bound up with biography, the attempt to write non-fiction. In 
giving up the attempt at realism through inclusiveness, Heppenstall makes his 
allegiance to modernism clear: 
The writing and reading of fiction and biography give the mind an 
agreeable sense of coming to grips with reality and with the supreme 
reality of individual human life. But nothing could be more remote 
from the reality of a man’s life than any version of it which could be 
written down. The mere writing gives form to things which had no 
form and substitutes an intellectual form for a form which once had 
reality. Every piece of writing is a dramatisation. Even a chemical 
equation dramatises the complicated mutual impact of substances. The 
equation is a brief synopsis. Certain common elements are abstracted 
and given balance and opposition. More is omitted than included. And 
this is true not only of shabby thought and cheap writing. It is only a 
little less true of the best of both. Biography is always tendentious and 
always untrue. Fiction and drama are further refinements of the 
biographical method. To praise no matter what play or novel for being 
‘true to life’ is to prove oneself a fool. The naturalists, the 
photographic realists, are the most crafty liars of all. It is only when we 
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accept the lying perspective as part of our material that we approach 
reality. Kafka was closer to reality than Zola. But what Kafka wrote 
was still fiction. (Double Image 70) 
For Heppenstall, no sort of plotting could help one come closer to reality. Instead, an 
author with the sense of the inherent unreality of the written word, or any other form 
of narrative, could employ any literary technique to attempt to approach reality. As a 
modernist, however, he still considers reality to exist firmly, and the approach to such 
a reality possible. 
 However, unlike Miller, Heppenstall does not trust in the power of digression 
to bring his narrative closer to reality. Saturnine is an episodic novel.
20
 Specifically, 
Heppenstall saw Saturnine as a picaresque narrative, a form which, according to him 
has “has no formal plot but that the episodes simply follow each other serially” 
(Heppenstall, Intellectual 46). It is unclear whether the concept of digression has any 
relevance in such a context. Miller employs the concept of the narrative line 
metaphorically, but, more literally, the only line in all but a few experimental novels 
is the line of text on the page. This line proceeds inevitably from beginning to end.
21
 
That is, without a particular expectation of how the beginning, middle, and end of a 
story is to be formed, the novelist and reader are free to explore new narrative forms, 
                                                 
20 Aristotle writes, “Of simple Plots and actions the episodic are the worst” For Aristotle, an episodic 
plot is purely sequential, lacking in “probability” or “necessity”: that is, causation (1451b). 
Between the Acts, too, may be considered episodic in nature. Like Saturnine, that novel lacks the 
clearly marked structural middle of To the Lighthouse, or even Mrs. Dalloway or Orlando. It is, 
however, like Saturnine, highly segmented, its stream-of-consciousness narrative divided by the 
acts of Miss La Trobe’s play. 
21 Once again, with a few exceptions, such as the subject of the next chapter, B. S. Johnson’s 
The Unfortunates, as well as hypertext and the Choose Your Own Adventure series of children’s 
books. Note that the exceptions to the linearity of the novel are, in all cases that I know of, highbrow 
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without any particular sense of either straightness of line or digression. The serial 
plot, so disdained by Aristotle, is one well-established method for doing so. 
 Simply avoiding a formal plot, however, was not for Heppenstall a method 
that would allow his narrative to approach reality. Instead, Heppenstall employs a 
particular narrative technique under particular circumstances to effect a particular 
approach towards reality. Frobisher, in his capacity as narrator, addresses novel’s 
apparently formless middle directly: 
It seems as if I were telling four or five stories at once, but that is how 
it was. I can imagine this story divided up between four or five distinct 
novels. There would be the novel dealing with a business man who 
crashed and upon whom a hitherto suppressed romanticism thereafter 
took its revenge, causing him to suffer delusions and eventually to lose 
his memory. There would be a novel dealing with the London of 
before the war and during the Sitzkrieg [sic], its decadent 
intellectualism, its circles of vice, the disintegration of personality later 
to be remedied by a national risorgimento. There would be novels of 
simpler theme, the downfall of an erotophile, the errant husband and 
wife brought together by the birth of a child. More interesting perhaps 
than any of these, there would be a highly atmospheric novel dealing 
with experiences in a half-world of death and rebirth. But in actuality 
these and other potential themes were inextricable, and I cannot 
truthfully say what effect attached to what cause or indeed which was 
                                                                                                                                           
experiments, a crossbreed of novels and games, or both. Of course, the reader of any text is free to 
disrupt its linearity, as any child who has skipped to the end before reading the middle (or not) knows. 
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cause and which effect. Any attempt at all-embracing consistency 
would be dishonest (and I believe that it is always so in life and that all 
novel-writing is dishonest in its degree). I can but play upon the 
surface and hint at underlying depths wherever I am aware of them. 
Nevertheless, I am certain that all things do cohere within a 
pattern, that anarchy and chaos are conditions not to be found in nature 
and that, if one were possessed of the necessary technique, the whole 
of a man and a man’s life could be read clearly from a single hair of 
his head, as some claim to read it in the palm of his hand. 
(Heppenstall, Saturnine 93) 
Frobisher describes the narrative middle as both inherently chaotic and inherently 
ordered. Rather than a single episodic novel, his story could be several, more 
traditionally formed novels, based around the plot. These multiple novels, bound 
together, create, in one sense, a relative chaos, because one cannot a single plot line in 
Frobisher’s story. It is the binding together of the novels, in Frobisher’s view, that 
makes his story episodic: these are not merely episodes of a single story, but episodes 
of multiple novels. However, they are bound together between beginning and end—
that is, in the middle—and through this binding of multiple narrative lines there is 
created a complex symbolic structure.  
 Furthermore, this middle is not simply a middle of the finished narrative 
product, but a middle of both life (that is, lived narrative) and writing. Frobisher 
abdicates responsibility for creating narrative coherence both on behalf of himself as 
narrator and on behalf of Heppenstall as author. Narrative coherence is, instead, a 
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matter of interpretation, an epistemological rather than ontological matter, and the 
product of a belief that the threads of narrative must inevitably weave together, even 
if we can see only their juxtaposition. But Frobisher is also vague as to where 
narrative coherence might come from, both in this novel and in general. The emphasis 
on an apparently directionless narrative, however, marks this as a middle-oriented 
novel, one which is not controlled by a motion from beginning to end, but by a 
continuous narrative motion subject to the reader’s power to create narrative 
coherence. 
Miller offers three specific possibilities for making coherence out of the 
chaos. The first—similar to Frobisher’s view—is the sheer force of the mind’s will to 
construe narrative coherence: “The human need for continuity is so strong that a man 
will find some principle of order in any random sequence” (Miller, “Narrative 
Middles” 375). Second, Miller proposes that the unity of the modern novel is not 
literal, but unspoken and thematic: “Its unity is the unity not of the letter but of the 
spirit, that is through an association of ideas relating each segment to the others by 
way of their common relation to a spiritual point which can never be represented as 
such, but only represented indirectly, in figure or in allegory” (“Narrative Middles” 
385). This appears to be at least the partial solution of many modernists, including 
such figures as Woolf’s lighthouse and Conrad’s Jim. 
Saturnine, too, seems to place its narrative faith in a sort of symbolic unity, 
particularly in relation to death. That is, the concern with death unites many of the 
plots mentioned by Frobisher and haunts all of them, providing a degree of structural 
and thematic coherence. The novel begins with Frobisher’s declaration, “Sam Thorpe 
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died on October, 1938” (7). Frobisher soon finds himself feeling a chill in the 
hospital, waiting for a diagnosis of what seem to be gall stones. Having met a woman 
whom he refers to as “Thea,” whom he believes he has wronged in a previous life, 
Frobisher again feels a chill and tells himself, “This is the planet Saturn which has me 
in its grip” (30). Moreover, immediately preceding the episode in which Frobisher’s 
self is split in two, Frobisher believes that, in striking his friend and benefactor, 
Richard St. Hilda, he has caused the man to disintegrate
22
. Frobisher’s near-death 
vision also includes an explicit discussion of the Freudian death-wish. Indeed, 
throughout the novel’s long middle, Frobisher views himself as doomed, and his 
apparent death at the end of this long middle fulfills that sense of fate in the manner 
predicted: a blow to the head from a loose piece of architecture. All of this personal 
concern with death takes place under the specter of World War II, a scale of death 
that seems largely incomprehensible to Frobisher and represents, in addition to the 
deaths of millions of people, the death of recognizable forms of nationhood. 
 Despite its distance from battle, Saturnine is in many ways a novel of the 
Second World War. Crucially, the war itself begins midway through the novel, 
                                                 
22  As Bucknell notes, St. Hilda also represents for Frobisher a Freudian splitting of the self (Bucknell 
42). Early in the novel, as Bucknell quotes, the narrator cites German anti-Semitism as a model for 
his own relationship to St. Hilda: “it is one of the elementary facts of existence that no man 
willingly contains a devil. He will try to exteriorize and as it were incarnate it. Thus the German 
race has tried to incarnate its devil in the Jews. […] In the same way, I tried to incarnate my devil 
in Richard St. Hilda” (Heppenstall, Saturnine 35). Frobisher further suggests that the Jews will 
become the German’s devils, destroying the Germans. This disturbing prediction is undermined not 
only by subsequent realities, but by the failure of St. Hilda to destroy Frobisher—instead, just as 
the Germans would burn the Jews, Frobisher (at least in his fantasies) disintegrates St. Hilda, yet 
St. Hilda survives. It is uncertain how much Heppenstall knew of the concentration camps at the 
time of writing, but it is clear the connection of the struggles of personal identity to not only 
national identity but the events of WWII is not accidental. Frobisher does his best to ignore the 
war; Heppenstall does not. 
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coinciding roughly with the splitting of Alick’s self following his conflict with 
Richard two weeks before the war. The war remains in the background until the end 
of the novel, when Frobisher reports for duty and receives a medical exam. However, 
it is easy to read Alick’s story as an allegory for the West, and, given Heppenstall’s 
interest in national identity as expressed most acutely in The Fourfold Tradition, 
Britain in particular over the same period of time. During the first half of the book, 
Frobisher dithers as Neville Chamberlain continues the policy of appeasement 
through most of 1938 and 1939. There is internal squabbling in the run-up to the war, 
the declaration of war revealing, as does Frobisher’s vision of himself, a crack that 
had already existed. (Here we might compare Maggie’s realization in the middle of 
The Golden Bowl—or the cracking of the bowl itself.) There is, near the beginning of 
the war, still false hope that things may return to the way they were. But soon it 
becomes clear that this war is something different—and Frobisher dies. His rebirth is 
constituted gradually over the final three chapters of the novel, with a rededication on 
Frobisher’s part to family and nation. The final chapter, however, ends on a note 
which suggests that, in some sense at least, everything will remain the same: the 
military is a ridiculous bureaucracy, from which Frobisher maintains an ironic 
distance which is continued in the novel’s sequel, The Lesser Infortune. This 
undercutting of Frobisher’s transformation is typical of the skepticism of modernism, 
leaving Frobisher-reborn a similarly ambiguous figure as Mr. Ramsay at the end of 
To the Lighthouse. In both cases, we are left with an individual male survivor as a 
stand-in for the uncertain transformation of Britain and Europe in the face of 
unprecedented war. Even these endings leave their characters and societies in the 
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middle of fundamental change; the uncertainty even in the face of epiphany reflects 
the devotion of these novels to the narrative of the middle, as well as modernism’s 
role as chronicler of historical middles. 
 Saturnine, however, not only narrates war as middle (both of the novel, and as 
a narrative middle of history), but was itself written and published in the middle of 
the war. In some sense, the book does not exist outside of the war: when it was 
reprinted, it was also rewritten and re-titled, as The Greater Infortune. Both Saturnine 
and its sequel were written while Heppenstall was a soldier in the war, and 
Heppenstall’s return to novel-writing was perhaps as much a product of the time on 
his hands during this period as it was a desire to document and fictionalize the events 
of his life. 
Meanwhile, the book itself bears the visible mark of war: below its 
publication date of July 1943, the War Economy Standard’s logo is imprinted, with 
the following text: “THIS BOOK IS PRODUCED IN COMPLETE CONFORMITY 
WITH THE AUTHORIZED ECONOMY STANDARDS” (4). The book’s obscurity 
can also be partially attributed to the war. The following page notes a production run 
of only 1,600 copies, and it is easy to see how, leaving aside these material 
limitations, Saturnine might have seemed neither serious enough nor escapist enough 
to capture the public’s attention in wartime. (It also lacked the scandalous publicity its 
predecessor, The Blaze of Noon, had received for its somewhat erotic depiction of a 
blind masseuse.) Heppenstall also notes that the episodic form of the picaresque 
narrative fit nicely with the material difficulties of the book’s composition—he could, 
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with relative ease, send the novel to his publisher one chapter at a time (Heppenstall, 
Intellectual 46). 
Because Saturnine is, unlike To the Lighthouse, a mid-war novel with a more 
conventional sequel, its ending is not only imbued with the spirit of the middle, but is 
itself a sort of middle. It takes place during the war, but so does its composition, 
precluding a conventional ending for perhaps the most archetypal of conventional 
narrative events. Not only does Heppenstall leave the war—and Frobisher’s 
relationship to it—unresolved, but they fundamentally cannot be resolved in this 
novel, due to its parasitical relationship to an unfolding reality and its textual 
relationship to a novel that had not yet been written. The ending of Saturnine 
corresponds both to the middle of the real war and the middle of a larger 
fictional(ized) story of which The Lesser Infortune would become the second half, a 
return to mental breakdowns in an uncertain world, though this time without the 
destabilizing formal effects of Frobisher’s visions and delusions. 
We might also read into Saturnine’s war-torn production and ending the 
temporary death of British modernism. It is largely Frobisher’s disintegrating 
personality that gives Saturnine its modernist character. Through Frobisher’s 
disintegration, the novel foregrounds not only the modernist themes of the 
disintegrating of the traditional self along with traditional Europe, but also gives us a 
narrator of almost Beckettian unreliability. Sequences in which a friend of Frobisher’s 
shrinks, in which Frobisher follows a man who turns out to be himself, and in which 
Frobisher dies and visits the afterlife are easily read within a modernist-realist 
framework as the delusions of the narrator. 
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However, like the stories Macmann and Lemuel in Beckett’s Malone Dies, 
these fantasies take on an interest and significance of their own. Like the fantastical 
elements of the dream-play in the “Circe” chapter of Ulysses, Frobisher’s delusions 
and mystical visions operate on a narrative level of their own, working as symbolic 
narratives within the narrator’s mind, even as a more humdrum reality plays out on 
another narrative level, the “real” world of the narrative. Relying strictly on 
Frobisher’s account—which rarely seeks to explain or fill in the gaps left by these 
fantasies—the reader is left only the barest sense of what has happened in the real 
world during these episodes. When Don Quixote returns from the Cave of 
Montesinos with a tale of a fantastical vision, Cervantes makes it clear that Quixote 
has simply fallen asleep. Frobisher, though he is, like Quixote, a picaresque hero 
fleeing an impoverished domesticity while displaying a somewhat ambiguous 
madness, is also the narrator of his own tale. What’s more, the autobiographical 
nature of the novel lends the character an extra authority. Heppenstall himself 
continued to believe to some degree in the astrology which guides many of 
Frobisher’s delusions. Perhaps it is unfair, then, to call these episodes delusions. 
Instead, they occupy an ambiguous space between delusion and vision. This is a 
novel, like its narrator, uncertain about the relationship between the natural world and 
the spiritual world. It thus pushes against the edges of a modernist poetics concerned, 
in Brian McHale’s analysis, with epistemological concerns. Like much modernist 
literature, Saturnine asks its readers to puzzle out what is going on in its world—
where Frobisher’s fantasies begin and end, where to trust his judgments—even as its 
main character himself tries to puzzle out what is happening in his own life and in a 
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world seemingly thrown into chaos. Also like much modernist literature, it takes the 
psyche of its main character as a serious object of novelistic representation. In 
allowing this representation to completely overtake the physical world in the primary 
narrative—providing an apparent physical reality of its own—it builds on the 
technique of “Circe.” But it goes beyond “Circe” in questioning the ontological status 
of this psychical world. Frobisher’s visions may be merely the delusions of a 
madman, but in the face of a physical world in the midst of an incomprehensible war, 
they may also be genuine spiritual visions. Heppenstall was a man of shifting beliefs, 
both spiritual and political, and Saturnine reflects that uncertainty in its ambiguous 
attention to noncorporeal worlds. 
Furthermore, where “Circe” and the Cave of Montesinos are clearly important 
events with symbolic significance in their respective narratives, they retain a 
primarily episodic character. Frobisher’s visions, on the other hand, occupy important 
structural positions in the novel, both marking and effecting dramatic shifts in 
Frobisher’s spiritual and psychological development. They function, in other words, 
as middles, providing form, meaning, and narrative direction to an otherwise episodic 
novel. The most important of these episodes, in which Frobisher is split in two, 
occurs in the middle of the novel, splitting the novel itself in two. The split is 
immediately precipitated by the shrinking episode and ultimately healed by 
Frobisher’s near-death vision. Death and visions thus mark out the middle of the 
novel—a long middle of picaresque adventures and disintegrating personality as well 
as a short middle where the physical and psychic/spiritual worlds collide, a climax 
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which takes Saturnine to the edge of postmodernism even as Frobisher seems to fall 
over the edge of madness. 
Like “Time Passes,” Saturnine’s middle chapter begins with nightfall. 
Frobisher has been in a fight with his friend and benefactor, Richard St. Hilda, whom 
Frobisher describes as first having shrunk before his eyes and then disintegrating 
under his hands. Frobisher opens the chapter by invoking the night in a way which 
suggests both his personal crisis and his possible redemption: 
To walk by night. I cannot know what reminiscence is provoked in 
other people by this phrase. To some, I fancy, who have little 
experience of solitude, it conjures up nothing unless it be that banality 
the moonlight excursion of lovers. To me and surely to a great many, it 
implies whatever lies deepest and most jealously guarded in their lives. 
It means hunger, homelessness and total frustration of the will. It 
means the piteous trade of a whore. It means restlessness at the full 
moon, when dogs bay and the lunatic cries aloud from the window of 
his room. 
 Above all, it means proximity to the divine. (70) 
Like Woolf’s narrator, Frobisher uses the night to probe mankind’s deepest 
insecurities. Like those in “Time Passes” who venture onto the beach at night, he 
seeks colloquy with the divine. However, here we see not a vacating of the individual 
human personality, but a revelation of its depths. And, rather than a distance from 
nature or divinity, Frobisher finds in the lonely darkness a sort of intimacy. In 
mentioning the lunatic, moreover, the narrator half-recognizes his own predicament, 
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and offers proximity to the divine as compensation for, if not the consequence of, his 
own physical and mental depredations. 
 Also as in “Time Passes,” this chapter does not lock itself in a literal 
nighttime, but instead uses the nighttime walk as a theme which suffuses the daytime 
content of the rest of the chapter. The following morning, Frobisher, who, like 
Heppenstall, had flirted with Catholicism, enters a church after a three-year absence.  
He describes his surroundings in precise material detail, but with little recognition of 
their significance: “A doll in purple sat askew upon a cupboard top, her black hair 
surmounted  by an enormous crown set with pieces of coloured glass. It was three 
years since I had been in such a place” (70). What was once familiar has become 
strange—what was once a potential solution to Frobisher’s spiritual problems is now 
a puzzle, a collection of objects and figures. Frobisher asks for a Father Tavener, but 
“I did not know Father Tavener, except by name. I had asked for him because his was 
the first priest’s name that came into my head, and I had known perfectly well that he 
would not be there” (71). It is unclear, at this point, how in control of his actions 
Frobisher is. He offers both a conscious and an unconscious motivation for asking 
Father Tavener—and here we can see one of the splits in his personality. Strangely, 
however, one of the priests knows Tavener, and, when Father Aspic arrives, “I knew 
at once that I could tell my story to him” (71). Once again, however, Frobisher is of 
two minds: when the two men speak, Frobisher tells Aspic that he is a Catholic, then, 
when Aspic is obviously skeptical, that he is “under instruction” (72). Frobisher says 
nothing more to his would-be providential confessor. By the end of the scene, 
Frobisher-as-narrator puts Aspic’s very existence into doubt: “I turned to Father 
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Aspic, to thank him for his kindness. He was not there. Perhaps he never had been 
there. Certainly, had I invented him, Father Aspic is a name that I might have given 
him” (72). Here, the role of madman and writer is conflated, with both having an 
ambiguous relationship to a divinely ordered world: Father Aspic may be Frobisher’s 
unwitting creation, or he may be, as the Latin root of “invented” suggests, simply a 
man he has come upon. Primarily, though, Father Aspic’s appearance marks a 
continuance of the nighttime walk in the morning light—a delusional, inward looking 
journey with an ambiguous connection to spirituality. 
 Though Frobisher’s afternoon wanderings have no such obvious delusions, 
they continue this theme of uncertain solipsism. After joining a tea party at the Vale 
of Health, Frobisher notes that “I had begun to enjoy my wanderings for their own 
sake. I was no longer searching. Or perhaps I was searching, but did not know for 
what. All I knew was that I must not go back to the flat in St. John’s Wood. Every 
now and then, I had a moment of panic, as if I had forgotten something of extreme 
importance” (72-73). This sense of forgetting something of importance suffuses 
Saturnine—its episodic nature, peppered with ellipses, following a character in search 
of a purpose in life, transfers this sense to the reader; Frobisher’s delusional episodes 
only serve to heighten this sense. The reader is left to wander like Frobisher, from 
story to story, perhaps not in search of a central narrative, but with a lingering feeling 
that there must be a central narrative somewhere in this novel. The supernatural 
episodes have some importance of their own sake, but they just as likely serve to 
cover up a material reality while standing in for a psychological one: we do not know 
quite what has happened at St. John’s Wood, but we are forced to obey Frobisher’s 
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compulsion to avoid it. Heppenstall therefore blends the psychological, the spiritual, 
and the narrative in Frobisher’s moments of delusion and panic, creating a multi-
leveled middle without apparent direction. 
 Still not in conscious control of his own wanderings, Frobisher arrives at the 
Institute of Mystical Science, which he has avoided since the early part of the novel. 
He suggests, in the narration, the possibility of meeting “Thea,” but, as with the 
episode in the church, the Institute is anti-climactic. Instead, a Burmese gem shop 
attracts Frobisher’s attention, and here, noticing a mirror, he splits in two: 
I stared into this shop window and felt extraordinarily happy. And then 
I turned round suddenly. I had felt behind me the presence of 
somebody in great anguish of spirit. I turned and saw a man with his 
jacket collar up and drying mud on his shoes. Our eyes met for a 
second, and then the man turned his heel and walked away, his hands 
in his trousers pockets. I felt impelled to follow him. (73) 
At this point, it is not entirely clear that the man is Frobisher, but the man’s distress 
and unkempt appearance, as well as the mentioning of a mirror, suggest a sort of 
Doppelganger. A re-reading (or a careful first reading) reveals that Frobisher has split 
his personality into a happy self and an anguished self, and the mirror seems to be the 
catalyst: seeing himself externally, rather than internally, produces happiness. 
Furthermore, splitting himself allows Frobisher the focalizer to serve as his own 
narrator: in the present moment, he sees himself and describes his actions. He has 
achieved the what Genette calls homodiegetic narration with external focalization—
the objective narration of the self (Genette, Narrative Discourse Revisited 124). 
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Whereas Genette’s discussion of homodiegetic external narration centers on first-
person narrative, which Barthes had argued was absurd or impossible,
23
 Frobisher’s 
homodiegetic external narration is in the third person. That is, the possible absurdity 
of homodiegetic external narration is fully externalized: the self is not simply outside 
of the self’s own thoughts, but outside of its own body. Narrative theory traditionally 
gives narrators a certain power over the story, but unlike Maggie Verver, who is able 
to control her own story by narrating it, Frobisher, in narrating his own movements, 
cedes whatever power over them he might have had left. External narration of the self 
splits not only mind but body, eliminating any hierarchical connection between the 
two. Of course, this homodiegetic external third-person narration is itself contained 
within homodiegetic internal first-person narration, creating a multi-leveled 
polyautonarration. An older Frobisher remains the first-person narrator of the 
protagonist’s story, narrating the actions and thoughts of his younger self without 
resort to free indirect discourse or interior monologue, mimics his younger self’s 
attempts at objectivity. The diegetic doubling of the self is then, in turn, a further 
iteration of the split that occurs between diegetic narrator and protagonist. To narrate 
oneself is to create two selves. To multiply the self is to diffuse control of the self. It 
                                                 
23
 Barthes in his “Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives” divides all narration into 
“personal” and “apersonal.” Third-person narratives are either personal or impersonal depending on 
whether a sentence may be translated into the first person with a simple substitution of pronouns. 
Barthes argues that the sentence, “the tinkling of the ice against the glass appeared to give Bond a 
sudden inspiration” cannot be so translated due to the impersonal nature of the verb “appeared” 
(Barthes 283). The verb “appeared” implies external narration: the narrator does not know whether 
the glass gave Bond an inspiration, whereas an internal narrator would know (or, rather, narrate) 
Bond’s true internal state, which cannot, from an internal point of view, be a matter of appearance. 
Of course, this line of argument implies a sort of unity and certainty about the internal self, a 
perfect knowledge of one’s own mental state by virtue of the internal point of view. The 
Unfortunates, as we see here, does not ascribe to this view of the self or the consciousness. 
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is no wonder that Frobisher as narrator imagines his novel as four or five, with a web 
of meaning that is beyond his control. In Saturnine, narration is not power.  
 While the doubling of the split between narrator and character certainly 
complicates matters, as does the ambiguous symbolic function of Frobisher’s double, 
this doubling very closely follows Freud’s description of pathological doubling in 
“The Uncanny”: 
By slow degrees a special authority takes shape within the ego; this 
authority, which is able to confront the rest of the ego, performs the 
function of self-observation and self-criticism, exercises a kind of 
psychical censorship, and so becomes what we know as the 
‘conscience’. In the pathological case of delusions of observation it 
becomes isolated, split off from the ego, and discernible to the 
clinician. The existence of such an authority, which can treat the rest 
of the ego as an object – the fact that, in other words, man is capable of 
self-observation – makes it possible to imbue the old idea of the 
double with a new content and attribute a number of features to it – 
above all, those which, in the light of self-criticism, seem to belong to 
the old, superannuated narcissism of primitive times. (Freud 142-143) 
In addition to Frobisher’s narcissistic self-narration, we have here the mingling of 
fantasy and reality, frequent element in Freud’s uncanny (Freud 140). On more than 
one occasion, Frobisher shows an interest in Freudian analysis, including a tentative 
self-diagnosis of a “castration complex” (Heppenstall, Saturnine 11). In one sense, 
then, we see in this scene not psychoanalysis as a solution to the epistemological 
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problems of the self, but instead psychoanalysis as a producer (or at least shaping 
force) of pathologies of the self. Frobisher himself will encounter such pop-
psychoanalysis in his near-death vision. Meanwhile, what is perhaps most notable 
about the Freudian parallels, in addition to the way the novel applies them not only to 
both fabula and sjužet, is their inability to provide a useful or even meaningful 
diagnosis for either Frobisher or the reader. We do not know why Frobisher has split 
in two, and we do not know precisely which part of himself he is attempting to expel; 
though this double seems to replace Richard St. Hilda as Frobisher’s personal devil, 
Frobisher does not seem particularly hostile or repulsed by his double, but is simply 
fascinated by him and unable to give up his pursuit. 
 It is also worth noting that there is nothing particularly uncanny about this 
scene, either for Frobisher (who seems not the least bit disturbed) or for this reader, 
who even on first reading was occupied more with epistemological problems 
(discovering what is happening in physical reality and determining the symbolic 
meaning of the double) than with atmosphere or emotional identification. Freud notes 
that the uncanny is largely dependent on uncertainty of belief—if one has not 
completely discounted belief, for example, in ghosts, then one finds apparent 
encounter with a ghost uncanny. But if one actively believes in ghosts, or if one’s 
materialist mindset is firm, there is no sense of old, suppressed beliefs returning, and 
thus no feeling of the uncanny (Freud 154). Not only does Frobisher fail to recognize 
this moment as a mingling of fantasy and reality—he believes wholly in his 
delusion—but he expresses for most of the novel an active mystical belief. The 
reader, meanwhile, is subject to the writer’s framing of the story (Freud 158). That is, 
196 
 
for Freud, the uncanny is as much an effect of syuzhet as fabula. In Saturnine, the 
attention drawn by the text to the syuzhet itself, as well as the narrator’s matter-of-fact 
relation of events that undermine our sense that the double might have a real physical 
existence, push against the effect of the uncanny. Instead, the novel concretizes 
Freud’s notion of the uncanny double and holds it up for the reader’s analysis, but, 
like Frobisher’s pursuit of his double, the reader’s pursuit of the uncanny here is both 
inevitable and something of an epistemological dead end. 
 As Frobisher follows himself through darkness—his increasingly delusive 
state is reflected in the returning nightfall—he finds his way to an archway and a door 
with two musicians. Frobisher’s Doppelganger tips a musician as he enters. Frobisher 
observes his other self closely: 
The man I was following looked at the musicians, peering into their 
cynically cheerful, vaguely dirty faces. The one who had stopped 
playing, the one with the mandolin, coughed and then ignored him, 
pushed his cap on his head and started strumming again. My man 
stood close to the two of them for a moment longer, opened his mouth 
to ask a question, was about to turn and go away and then at last 
moved up to the door in the archway, pushed it open and went in. I 
followed. (74) 
The material detail here, attending to apparently unimportant actions and physical 
traits, is in keeping with the style of narration of the entire novel, but at odds with the 
darkness of the scene. The narration would be much more plausible with the “man” 
replaced with “I,” particularly as it implies that Frobisher knows what his other self 
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sees in the faces. But here we can see that it is not only Frobisher the focalizer who is 
lacking in will: his other self is unable to go away and, even more significantly, 
unable to speak. Frobisher has three roles in this moment: a retrospective narrator, 
who offers no comment and, apparently, no insight into the situation; a focalizer, who 
supplies most of the content but can apparently do nothing but follow and observe; 
and an externalized self, whose actions the focalizer narrates. None of these three 
versions of Frobisher seems to have control of Frobisher’s actions or of the story as a 
whole. Furthermore, no Frobisher formally recognizes another Frobisher as himself 
and takes responsibility for his actions. The focalizer, like a standard modernist 
narrator, has attempted to vacate himself from the story; but in so doing he has only 
created another self who lacks subjective existence (even if the act of narration 
creates for him a sort of objective existence). By splitting Frobisher’s self, 
Heppenstall not only questions the idea of the unitary self, but the idea of objective 
narration which stands at the heart of much modernist storytelling from Flaubert on. 
Frobisher attempts to narrate objectively, describing only what he sees, but, 
unwittingly, he describes only himself. 
 Inside, Frobisher once again encounters a mirror, and he is able to give us this 
objective description of his own face, not yet recognized as his own, “a face 
intelligent and mobile but here and there setting in excessively definite lines, the pale, 
submarine eyes tremulous, hurt and withdrawn, the fair, partly bleaching hair untidy, 
the outline of cheek and jaw a little rough, shaved perhaps yesterday” (74). The clues 
to both Frobisher’s psychological (hurt, withdrawn) and physical (shaved perhaps 
yesterday) self are here again. Frobisher, however, does not question his own interest 
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in this man, and continues to narrate the man’s actions without paying attention to his 
own. Frobisher spends a page describing the man ordering a drink, then follows him 
back out the door. Once again, Frobisher shows an implausible ability to detect his 
subject’s inner state, replacing the first person with the third person: “He looked 
worried. Rather hungry, too. In the street was a costermonger’s barrow. He seemed to 
think he would buy some fruit to eat out here and began to feel for a coin in his 
pocket, but some vague anxiety stopped him” (75-76). One the one hand, the return of 
the word “vague” serves both to protect the focalizer from charges that he knows too 
much about his subject’s inner state. Heppenstall has created a situation which neatly 
challenges the narrative conventions of the late James, who also frequently used the 
word “vague” to describe characters and their states of mind. James’s narrators, like 
the focalizer Frobisher in this scene, narrate the detailed actions and thoughts of 
various characters while keeping themselves largely objective. James occasionally 
allows his characters moments of insight into each other’s minds. But the complex 
narrative situation in Saturnine points up the unreality of such narrators and insights. 
Here, the third-person narration is embedded inside a focalized version of a first-
person narrator: there is no objective heterodiegetic narrator to ground the description 
in a sense of reality. Moreover, the situation itself is unreal. Frobisher’s insights are 
not into someone else’s mind, but, as the novel will reveal shortly, into his own. But 
the insights are ultimately superficial—and Frobisher has throughout the novel shown 
himself with little ability to understand his own thoughts and motivations, let alone 
those of other people. Whereas James produced insight through objective narration of 
mental processes, in Saturnine the workings of mental processes overwhelm objective 
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narration. Frobisher has entered a world without objective facts and, therefore, 
without the possibility of an objective narrator. 
 Continuing along shop windows, Frobisher and his double reach a 
newsagent’s shop, where again the narrator shows unusual access to the man’s mind. 
After looking at several pre-war posters, the present begins to impinge: 
BLACK-OUT FOR ALL LONDON. My man again managed the half of a 
smile. Another placard apparently startled him for a moment. SOHO 
MURDER CASE DISCLOSURES. He looked away and looked at it again. It 
can have told him nothing, but a sweat broke out on his top lip. SOHO 
KILLING. MAN QUESTIONED. He breathed in quickly and stared across 
the street, squinting as it were into the huddled shadows of his own 
mind. But he knew already that this was only a pretence. There was no 
clue for him in this. (76) 
Here, Frobisher not only peeks into the man’s mind, but observes his mind observing 
itself. This is a particularly Jamesian moment, but there are, once again, several 
important differences. First, narrator, focalizer, and thinker are all one man. Second, 
while James’s focalizers generally cultivate impressions and analysis in search of 
greater aesthetic, moral, and psychological insight, Frobisher’s double seeks only a 
“clue.” The mystery tale that is, in McHale’s theory, modernism’s double is here 
revealed as such. We are reminded not only of Frobisher’s own entanglement and 
fugitive status, but of the reader’s own unusual predicament of not quite knowing 
what happened between Frobisher and St. Hilda, despite being witnesses to the 
former’s narration of the scene. This third element—the reader’s position of 
200 
 
bafflement toward a scene that has been fully narrated (as opposed to the Jamesian 
habit of simple omission)—is related to a fourth: a fixed, rather than indeterminate, as 
is common in James, ambiguity of reference in the final deictic pronoun. “This” may 
refer to the news placard, which offers no clue to Frobisher’s actions or the public 
response, or to the man’s own mind. Here again, Heppenstall emphasizes a key 
apparent break from the Jamesian modernist tradition: the investigation of the mind is 
not an opportunity for rich discovery and narrative redirection, but is instead an 
empty cul-de-sac, resulting in an absence of revelation and a narrative stasis. 
 The man is next confronted with a stereotypical Negro other who initially 
seems to offer some sense of wholeness to the fractured Frobisher, the Negro soon 
proves not to conform to stereotype: 
Coming towards him now was a tall, thin negro, flat-footed, with 
hands swinging loose, a big, curly-brimmed hat on the side of his 
head. The negro, too, was reassuring, being totally alien and remote. 
My man smiled at the negro and spoke. 
 He said: 
 ‘Is this Soho?’ 
 ‘Yeah, sure.’ 
 The negro said it like any English boy who has been to 
American films. The voice was not like any of the voices that negroes 




Frobisher is reassured both by the sense of encountering a well-defined cultural other 
whose very alienness is familiar from racist popular imagery. He is then further 
reassured when this pattern is reversed: the Negro is undefined in popular culture, 
but familiar, if not as a Negro, from real life. Furthermore, he is familiar not because 
his image is replicated by popular culture, but because his voice is itself a replication 
of popular culture. Perhaps Frobisher smiles because he delights in his expectations 
being defied, in finding a man more human than expected. I suspect, however, that 
Frobisher’s double’s delight is the product of a more complex production of an 
other, a man different from him in a manner which appeals specifically to his 
intellectual pretensions: rather than an exotic Negro, the man is a culturally vulgar 
youth. Furthermore, this man’s self, rather than Frobisher’s perception of that self, 
has proven vulnerable to cultural incursions. Frobisher may be split in two at this 
point, but at least, he can be reassured, the two are both native to himself. 
 This brief moment of assurance for Frobisher is immediately disrupted by the 
encounter which at last firmly reveals the identity of the man he has been following. 
In the following passage, which concludes the chapter, the narrator delves further 
into the man’s mind, using free indirect discourse, narrative description, and, on one 
occasion, direct discourse, to reveal the man’s thoughts. Throughout, Frobisher still 
fails to recognize himself even as objective events reveal the man’s identity: 
Then something was happening, and the man with mud-caked shoes 
and his jacket collar turned up was afraid. Two cars were hesitating 
round the corner, one grey and one blue. I heard the occupants of the 
two cars consulting with each other, shouting through the noise of 
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clutches holding their engines hard. 
 A woman’s voice was calling out to somebody by name: 
 ‘Alick. Alick . . .’ 
 The man’s first impulse was to run up and see what it was, see 
if he could help. A lovers’ quarrel, a drunken lark involving a girl, 
possibly a genuine crime. He might be useful. Then fear warned him 
again to turn away. He turned at once and marched off towards the 
distant main road, his heart beginning to pump hard. 
 The thought pulsed in his head: 
 ‘I don’t want to get mixed up in anything. I must go away. I’ve 
got to keep clear of things.’ 
 He strode out as fast as he could. There was no thought in his 
head, except that he must get away. 
 But the two cars were following him, were alongside, were 
pulling up two or three yards in front of him. People were getting out 
of them and banging the doors, from the grey car a woman and a large 
young man with a scar over one eye, from the other a police inspector 
and a constable. The man I was following strode on. He meant to 
ignore them. They stood in his path. 
 The woman kept saying: 
 ‘Alick, darling. Alick . . .’ 
 It was to him that she was saying it. He must have seen that she 




 He said, with his eyes now looking straight in front of him: 
 ‘I’m sorry. There must be some confusion.’ 
 He tried to get past, but the two policemen barred his way. 
 The inspector said: 
 ‘Now be reasonable, sir. You’re only . . .’ 
 He did not hear any more. His head went round faster and 
faster, until his body could do nothing but follow it. His shoulders 
swung round, and one foot crossed over the other. He toppled heavily 
in the gutter, knocking off the police-constable’s helmet as he went 
down. (77-78) 
This passage reveals a remarkable degree of both separation and unity of Frobisher-
as-narrator and Frobisher-as-character. On the one hand, the narrator retains distance 
from his subject. The final paragraph in particular mingles narration of physical 
events with narration of the man’s mental state in the same objective tone. On the 
other hand, the narrator adheres to a strict focalization, making only observations and 
judgments available to Frobisher’s mind in the moment, to the point where the 
chapter ends as he loses consciousness. This combination of unity and split echoes the 
split within Frobisher both thematically and technically, as, in the moment, Frobisher 
maintains a belief that he is only observing, rather than living, his life. 
 The scene reinforces this doubling with apparently objective aspects of the 
scene. There are two cars, two occupants in each, two policemen. The woman is twice 
quoted calling Frobisher’s name, repeating “Alick” twice on each occasion. The 
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impulse of fear comes to Frobisher twice before he begins to run away. Frobisher’s 
thoughts are similarly allusive, even as he seems less aware than ever of his own 
actions: he refers to the possibility of a lover’s quarrel (his own relationship with 
Richard being left ambiguous), and to the possibility of a crime. Previously, at the 
newsstand, he seemed at least somewhat aware that he himself was involved in a sort 
of crime—but here the crime is externalized, even from the “other” Frobisher. Most 
ironically, Frobisher quotes himself saying, “There must be some confusion.” This 
last piece of dialog not only reflects Frobisher’s mental state, but the position the 
narrator has put the reader in. The man and the woman are not clearly identified as 
Richard St. Hilda and Frobisher’s wife Margaret, even as the narrative of the two 
Frobishers seems to be resolving itself. Meanwhile, the split between Frobisher-as-
narrator, Frobisher-as-character is maintained, even heightened, at the very moment 
that the two Frobishers in the scene are definitively revealed as the same person. 
Frobisher’s disturbed mental state makes it difficult to grasp exactly what is going on, 
even if we are able to get the general idea. But the revelation of the identity of the 
Frobishers heightens the reader’s awareness of the narrator’s silence on this matter. 
Rather than state what is plainly true, the narrator maintains his modernist stance of 
objectively narrating subjective mental states. But there is something impossible 
about narrating the subjective mental state of a man who is two men, since only one 
mind can be narrated at once. We are left with a sense of not quite understanding 
what is going on inside of Frobisher, just as we are not quite sure what is going on in 
the scene. Frobisher’s mind is, at this point, beyond the traditional resources of 
modernist narration. More traditional narration—with its ability to summarize and 
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analyze mental states from outside the scene—might provide greater insight. 
Meanwhile, extreme techniques often associated with postmodernism—such as the 
parallel columns used by B.S. Johnson in Christie Malry’s Own Double Entry and in 
part of Brigid Brophy’s In Transit—might be able to directly render the split self. 
Heppenstall’s technique, instead, attempts to produce an impression of Frobisher’s 
split minds that is nonetheless continuous. This leaves the reader half in the dark. 
Happily, this incomplete rendering is perhaps more true to Frobisher’s subjective 
experience than these alternative techniques might have been: by seeing half of 
Frobisher’s mind as he observes himself, Heppenstall is able to replicate some of 
Frobisher’s own confusion about himself. The reader recognizes, as Frobisher does 
not, that he is a fractured man, that modernist archetype updated to reflect the trauma 
of World War II as well as the poverty and spiritual and ideological uncertainty of the 
late thirties. But beyond this, the reader is split, as Frobisher is, from a full 
understanding of this split self, is cut off from half of Frobisher, and from a 
comprehension beyond the bare symbol of the Doppelganger, of what it means for a 
mind to be split in two. 
 This central episode of the novel, then, as a seemingly paradoxical mix of split 
and unification—of the mind, of the body, of the personality, of the narrator. 
Heppenstall makes us keenly aware that the narrator is both the main character and 
not the main character, that the main characters thoughts and body are both himself 
and not himself, that the sort of narrative window into a character’s mind that is so 
central to modernist technique is only one window, with a necessarily incomplete 
perspective. It is one of Heppenstall’s central insights that an incomplete perspective 
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is not only a necessary aspect of any one view of the world, but that it is a 
fundamental aspect of the human mind, even, or perhaps especially, when it is turned 
upon itself. Frobisher is split apart (and, on another level, Heppenstall is split apart 
from his autobiographical main character), but it is the very split, and the recognition 
of that split, that makes him whole. That is, at least at moments of crisis—but, more 
broadly, for all minds that examine themselves—a representation of a mind unsplit is 
a representation of only part of a mind. By recognizing the split, Heppenstall at least 
suggests the whole person. 
 Saturnine’s short middle functions in a somewhat parallel manner for the 
novel as a whole. Like many traditional middles, it ties the novel together with a 
crisis in the plot—in this case, a low point for the directionless Frobisher. Like many 
modernist middles, including, for example Mrs. Dalloway’s rhetorically satiric 
encounter between Septimus Smith and Sir William Bradshaw, Saturnine’s short 
middle is also a crisis of narrative technique, in which objective narration of focalized 
subjective experience is stretched to the breaking point. Like the middle of Lord Jim, 
Frobisher’s wanderings after himself attempt to arrest a directionless narrative and 
main character and to inject that narrative with a renewed sense of meaning and 
purpose. Before this middle, Saturnine lacks an anchor for its themes of madness, 
spirituality, and their relationship to the material world. This middle locates and 
instantiates these concerns in the crisis of personality. Moreover, Saturnine suggests 
that the problems of personality are also narrative problems, that the whole of the 
story is inevitably split between the real and the unreal. In the simplest of narrative 
metaphors, Frobisher has completed his long road down and is about to begin his long 
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journey up. But meaning emanates from this narrative bottom, this narrative middle, 
and it is difficult to shake the notion that this is Heppenstall’s true vision of both 
personality and narrative. 
 While Saturnine eventually gives us a Frobisher apparently healed by a vision 
of death and a decision to re-commit himself to his family as well as enlist in the 
army, those later passages suggest a more conventional message that cannot fully 
overcome the sense of disintegration found in the novel’s middle. Indeed, the birth of 
Frobisher’s daughter provides him with another double, described in detached, 
precise physical detail: 
The child was sleeping. I had been led to suppose that new-born 
children had malformed heads and features for a day or two, especially 
after a rather difficult birth. This one had a shapely head, and its 
features were perfectly formed. The head was covered with fine, red-
gold hair. The features already suggested a likeness to myself. (142). 
This time, instead of fleeing toward his double, Frobisher flees from it: “I looked at 
the child again. I looked at Margaret. I kissed her. I fled. I did not propose to weep all 
over the hospital” (142). The narrator does not make clear just what it is about his 
daughter that has brought Frobisher to tears, but the description certainly suggests 
that he is disturbed both by coming face to face with himself and by the idea of a 
human being born into the world without deformation. In the army as well, Frobisher 
mocks the idea of a perfect physical body: “I was very pleased indeed to be Grade 
One and made the same joke to everybody I met during the evening—namely, that I 
was a perfect specimen of British manhood and that they were sending me in for a 
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beauty competition next week. This is the only kind of joke that is understood in St. 
John’s Wood” (151). Frobisher mocks the idea that he fits an ideal type—his 
perfection as a physical specimen—but he also deflects his joy at institutional 
approval with the gender-based humor of homosocial bonding, which, in his role as 
narrator, he partially disavows as a concession to his intellectually inferior neighbors 
and fellow enlistees. Saturnine begins with one sort of social estrangement—
Frobisher’s unemployment—and seems to re-tie the social bonds in the end with 
fatherhood and enlistment. But Frobisher’s reactions to these events suggest that 
outward visions of wholeness, completeness (narrative or otherwise), or perfection 
are suspect and, at best, contingent. 
 The suggestion of a female self echoes Frobisher’s reaction to his child, when 
he encounters her again, this time with a name, Judith. No longer referring to her 
distantly as a gender-neutral “child,” Frobisher again remarks that she “bore an 
astonishing likeness to myself” (145). His thoughts attempt to modify this reaction, to 
remove some of the sense of Judith as his double while imbuing her with a Romantic 
wholeness: “Who is she? What is her history? The likeness to myself will pass. A 
likeness to Margaret will develop and pass. For some time to come, this child will 
seem to belong to Margaret, to be a part of her. But she is not. She is herself. A 
child’s body may be the creation of her parents, but no child yet ever inherited a soul” 
(145). Frobisher entertains two ideas of the self here: first, the idea of Saturnine’s 
middle, that the self is a discontinuous whole composed of two parts (in this case, a 
mother and a father); and second, the Romantic idea that the self is continuous, 
whole, unique, and self-fashioning. This second idea aligns itself well with his near-
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death vision, in which life is self-determined. Here, however, he admonishes himself 
to keep away: “I must bear it in mind if I am one day tempted to assume a right and to 
make demands upon this Judy Frobisher. It may be that parents have a duty towards 
their child, but a child has none towards them. A child is born free, and this means 
free of parenthood” (145). Frobisher suggests that a free, unified soul is possible, but 
fragile, that external influence quickly destroys this second idea of the self. The self 
would then, presumably, fracture, defaulting to the first model. Frobisher sees his 
daughter born whole, but fears damage and fragmentation (he is reluctant to hold her 
for fear of dropping her). Events and external influence—the stuff of the middles of 
narratives—threaten the wholeness of beginnings and the possibility of wholeness of 
endings. 
 The heightened background of the war nevertheless provides Frobisher 
something of an anchor. Narrator and character seem both to assent in a judgment 
when he notes, “On Tuesday, April 9th, the war ascended to new heights of unreality” 
(135). At this point, the unreality no longer bleeds from Frobisher’s mind into the real 
world: the real world is itself unreal, allowing Frobisher to offer his own mind as a 
reassuring contrast. Frobisher joins the military on June 15, 1940, the day after the 
French government’s flight. Two days later, he remarks, 
For me the bottom had dropped out of the war. France was the only 
country of which I could ever at any time have conceived myself to be 
a citizen. When France collapsed, the world had ended. The outside 
world, that is to say. Throughout May, June and July, my inner world 
210 
 
was firm and secure, and its people lived together in a state of natural  
bliss as though I had already fought and won and lost my war. (147) 
Frobisher joins the army not as an act of participation in a broader community or as 
an attempt to defend a social order he believes in. Instead, his is an act of post-
apocalyptic nihilism and a retreat into the self. His reference to the people of his inner 
world suggests his family, but more literally refers to the multiplicity of the self. He 
figures the middle of Saturnine as a war that has ended with uncertain and even 
paradoxical results, but has at least resulted in peace. This peace is not the same as 
unity. In Frobisher’s inner life: the self is always divided into separate persons, and 
they cannot be unified; they can only be made to stop fighting so that life may 
continue. The suggestion that inner peace can most easily be attained in times of outer 
war is disturbing, and it leaves Saturnine with much of its unsettled quality, 
suggesting an always-warring inner life when the outer world is at rest, a never-
ending middle of either soul or society. 
 The healing of Frobisher’s mind, and thus the end of Saturnine’s long middle, 
is accomplished by his venture entirely into the imaginary world. Whereas in 
previous fantasy sequences, the real world is blended with Frobisher’s imaginings, 
Frobisher’s venture into the afterlife presents a world that is either wholly internal 
(from a skeptical point of view) or wholly external (from a spiritual point of view). 
Nevertheless, the depiction of this world, and the transition into it, is accomplished 
with the same split between Frobisher-as-narrator and Frobisher-as-character that 
suffuses Saturnine: the narrator states with apparent objective certainty, but with no 
sense of retrospective perspective, the subjective viewpoint of the younger Frobisher. 
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Thus, after a tile falls from the roof to strike Frobisher in the eye, Chapter Ten 
concludes, “I died instantly and without pain” (114). What follows is a near-death 
experience that is both more radical and less radical than Frobisher’s earlier 
supernatural visions. It is more radical in that the journey into Frobisher’s mind has 
taken Saturnine completely beyond the natural world. Yet, it is, especially after it has 
been resolved that Frobisher has not died, less radical in that it creates a clear 
separation between the spiritual or mental realm on the one hand and the physical 
realm on the other. In taking modernist rendering of the mind of its protagonist out of 
the real world, Saturnine flirts with postmodernism, but it also hearkens back to 
Medieval near-death visions, while resolving the cognitive instability that plagues 
much of Saturnine for both reader and protagonist. 
 Frobisher begins by describing the otherworld landscape, and in doing so he 
offers a rare narratorial intervention. Addressing the reader directly, in the manner of 
a meditation instructor, the narrator implores, “Imagine if you can a world in which 
every object is of animal nature. […] The land itself is animal. No veins of coal or 
mineral run through it. It is like yeast. […] Imagine, moreover, that all this is real and 
yet is not physically discernible to a physical eye” (115). The narrator’s description 
takes the form of a challenge: can the reader create for himself an improbable 
imaginary world whose characteristics are described in physical terms, yet cannot by 
physically seen. It is not enough to imagine something that we cannot see in ordinary 
life—we must imagine something that, even if it actually exists, cannot be seen in a 
literal sense: we must imagine a sort of spiritual sight, our imagination’s imagination. 
Frobisher also insists, however, that this is not an imaginary realm, but a real one. 
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This is an assertion he could not make of, say, the disintegration of Richard St. Hilda. 
The fact of Frobisher’s apparent death and the story’s complete exit from the physical 
world at last allows the narrator to confidently assert the reality of not just the 
spiritual realm in general, but the spiritual realm in particular as experienced by 
Frobisher. In the physical world, Frobisher’s point of view can be distorting, as 
delusions, spiritual possibilities, and physical realities mix. Here there is no mixing, 
and therefore no distorting, and no other possible point of view. In a sense, then, 
Frobisher has led us past the boundary of the Jamesian modernist tradition. 
Nevertheless, in his devotion to physical description of a landscape that is 
nevertheless not physical, the narrator poses a hypothetical alternative point of view. 
The paradox of a physical landscape whose most notable characteristics are not 
physical leads the narrator to describe it in terms of the impression it makes on the 
observer: “The effect of a typical landscape in this world is not unlike the effect of 
certain paintings by the surrealists” (115). But this impression is not Frobisher’s; 
instead it is used to distinguish both Frobisher and his spiritual experience from the 
imaginative experience of the viewer of a work of art: “To the ordinary human 
imagination, it must appear that such a landscape was ‘horrible’ and ‘eerie’. I did not 
find it so, presumably because I was there by right, by necessity and in a state 
consonant with its nature. In point of fact, I felt extraordinarily happy” (115). Here, 
the narrator insists that his point of view in this case is not intrinsic to himself, the 
result of an accumulation of past experiences, current circumstances, and natural 
temperament; instead, his point of view is extrinsic to himself, something imposed by 
the laws of the spiritual location. Here, Frobisher turns on its head the modernist 
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objection to realism: yes, an object may be different according to different points of 
view, but those points of view are in turn caused by the object itself. That is, the 
spiritual realm of Luna, identified by Frobisher according to his training at the 
Institute of Mystical Science, is a comprehensive reality, creating, like the omniscient 
Realist narrator whom Frobisher briefly imitates, all of the perspective that the 
observer requires in order to induce the correct effect. That is, it is very much like a 
fictional text. The narrator’s description in physical terms the non-physical 
impressions of a mystical or imaginary world within a fictional text mirrors the 
relationship of focalization, a visual metaphor, and all attempts to effect “seeing” 
through a text, or to describe the representative function of a text in visual terms, is 
explicitly an impossible task both because there is no real “seeing” to be had, as there 
is no physical world to be seen, and also because words are not sight.
24
 We have in 
Frobisher’s vision, then, the simultaneous collapse of both realist representation and 
modernist focalization, both the consequence of the removal from the novel of 
anything that may be mistaken for the real physical world. 
 Nevertheless, the mystical world maintains some ties to the material world. In 
perhaps the first clue that Frobisher is not in fact deceased, he chooses to move on 
from Luna, “not the abiding-place of the recently dead,” because “The restless will 
awakened within me, and as it did so I became aware of the pain in my head” (116). 
Frobisher seems to attribute this pain to the laws of Luna, but the reader can tie it to 
the head injury which has apparently killed him. Furthermore, Frobisher finds himself 
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next at Middlesex Hospital, which he identifies not as the location of his physical 
body, but as “evidently my spiritual home” (116). The latter is a direct quotation of 
Frobisher’s thoughts, while the former is given in free indirect discourse. Connections 
to the physical world intrude on the narrative at the same time that focalization 
returns to the narrative. 
This mingling of the spiritual and the physical continues in the second of three 
locations in Frobisher’s spiritual journey: Middlesex Hospital. Here, not only is the 
physical world blended with the spiritual world of Frobisher’s vision, but past, 
present, and future are blended, leading Frobisher to view this place as Hell, because 
“Hell is repetition” (116). As Frobisher notes, this is the hospital where he first 
received “treatment for a non-existent renal stone” (117) and the place where his wife 
will give birth to their child. He also identifies it as “my spiritual home” (116), but 
soon finds that it is also the current home to his physical body. Moreover, he initially 
cannot see his own body: “It was shut off from my physical vision by a group of 
doctors” (117). The implication is that he identifies the body through his spiritual 
vision. The notion is that in this realm, both of these visions meet. When he finally 
sees his body, as in Luna, he finds that he does not have the reaction he would expect 
to a normal, physical vision: “For the first time, I observed the expulsion of blood 
without feeling in the least nauseated or faint” (117). Finally, Frobisher is both 
present and absent, seemingly noticed by a familiar nurse, who gestures for him to be 
quiet, but ignored completely when he insists on protesting that “the patient is dead” 
(117). As the narrator notes of his examination of his own body, “My detachment was 
extraordinary” (117). The mingling of physical and spiritual realms has once again 
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resulted in a doubling—or repetition—of Frobisher. This time, however, there is a 
clear function for each Frobisher: one is his body, the other his spiritual 
consciousness. In fact, the identification of Hell as repetition at last lends a meaning 
to the doubling: rather than a narrative wandering, it is something to be escaped, here 
placed in the middle position in Frobisher’s spiritual journey.
25
 It serves both as an 
indication, to Frobisher and to the reader, that Frobisher has not actually died. The 
external examination of Frobisher’s own body also serves as a diagnosis of sorts of 
Frobisher’s mental and spiritual state: the splitting of the self coupled with a 
directionless relationship to his own personal narrative, marked particularly by an 
inability to distinguish adequately between past, present, and future. 
The final stage of Frobisher’s journey is the longest, and consists largely of a 
didactic conversation with the Guardian of the Threshold, whom Frobisher compares 
to St. Peter, but insists guards not heaven itself, but any number of gateways between 
spiritual realms (118). Initially, however, Frobisher sees figures both lonely and 
apocalyptic “recede to an infinite distance,” finding himself “at the centre of 
loneliness” (118). The typical pre-Dante Medieval itinerary for near-death journeys 
follows the pattern of purgatory, then hell, then a brief glimpse of heaven (Zaleski 
33). This is then followed by a series of obstacles and judgments (Zaleski 61-70). The 
encounter with the Guardian, as we shall see, follows the latter pattern, but the 
itinerary of purgatory, hell, and heaven is less clear. The first stage of Frobisher’s 
journey resembles both heaven (due to Frobisher’s joy in the strange landscape) and 
                                                 
25  Frobisher’s journey re-orders the typical near-death narrative. As Carol Zaleski notes, in both 
Medieval and modern narratives, such journeys often begin with the soul hovering over the body 
(45, 119).   
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purgatory (like many Medieval visionaries, Frobisher is somewhere he does not 
belong). The second stage resembles both purgatory, since it seems to be a holding-
place for Frobisher before he passes on to the next stage of existence, and, as 
Frobisher himself identifies, hell—but it most resembles the soul’s initial hovering 
over the body before initiating the journey through the afterlife (Zaleski 45). The third 
stage, meanwhile, is both a hellish apocalypse and a purgatorial absence from others. 
It is also purgatorial in its relative brevity—a paragraph-long interlude before a 
lengthy encounter with the Guardian. While it is therefore possible to map 
Frobisher’s vision onto the Medieval vision, and it is possible—as Frobisher himself 
does—to interpret the vision according to a twentieth-century spiritualist doctrine, the 
vision itself is ambiguous and possibly scrambled. In fact, the bizarre landscape of 
Luna could just as easily be a sort of hell or, as Frobisher unwittingly suggests, a 
surrealist landscape of the post-Freudian psyche. In modernist fashion, then, 
Heppenstall highlights the epistemological problems related to the interpretation of 
dreams and visions. Moreover, he highlights the uncertainties and problems related to 
the construction of narrative: he offers off a landscape that suggests, but does not 
confirm, a narrative order prescribed by both genre and religious doctrine. Moreover, 
he scrambles the relationship between this spiritual narrative and the physical world. 
Finally, in playing with such fundamental narratives of endings, he plays with 
beginnings, middles, and ends, suggesting that we cannot easily tell them apart and, 
in a brief vision of loneliness and apocalypse, that even these endings may not be 
endings, but in fact middles, uncertain crises and transitions that bring us from hazy 
beginnings to uncertain endings. 
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The ending Frobisher comes to with the Guardian is, however, anything but 
uncertain. If, as Miller suggests, modern novels generally attain narrative coherence 
through symbolic unity, Frobisher imposes narrative coherence on his own life and on 
the novel through an updated version of the Medieval near-death vision and its 
philosophical consolation. The force of the encounter is to purge Frobisher of the 
uncertainty and “anxiety” he cannot escape even in death (119). This anxiety, 
according to the Guardian, is largely attributable to an unhealthy relationship with 
time, something we might associate with both a modern mind-set and modernism 
itself. Frobisher is chastised for his obsession with the past, for his attempts to forget 
his past, and for his attempts to make contact with “Thea,” whom the Guardian 
establishes firmly as a woman Frobisher knew in a previous life (121). Furthermore, 
Frobisher is challenged for his explicitly Freudian diagnosis of his own condition: “I 
have been allowing the death-wish to predominate” (120). To this, the Guardina 
replies, “That is a phrase just now current on earth, I believe. It is a misleading 
phrase. It implies that death is peace, freedom from responsibility” (120). The 
Guardian’s answer implies not that the Freudian analysis is incorrect, but that, by 
naming the death-wish, we increase, rather than decrease, the chances that we will fall 
prey to the death-wish. That is, Frobisher’s encounter with the Guardian is not 
epistemological in nature, but ontological: it is aimed not at Frobisher understanding 
the nature of his psyche and its relationship to past, present, and future, but at altering 
his mode of being. And it is startlingly effective: no sooner has Frobisher been 
chastised for his attachment to “Thea,” than he is filled with happiness and “beg[ins] 
to wish that [he] had not died” (121). It is only a small step further for Frobisher to 
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change his wish into reality. Told by the Guardian that a return to the physical world 
“does not rest with me,” Frobisher concentrates on a happy moment from his past (an 
encounter with an old laborer named Sykes) and, as a result, “became aware of the 
earth and could see it from a great height” (122). Frobisher undergoes a final trial, a 
largely undescribed encounter with accusers who “waited with infinite patience for 
me to accuse myself” (123). Thinking again of the Guardian’s words, “Now I 
understood. He meant that it depended upon myself. With a cry like that of one 
emerging from an anæsthetic, I lost consciousness and sped towards my body” (123). 
This final blending of physical and spiritual experience, in which what may be 
happening in the physical world serves as simile for otherworld events, serves as a 
final reminder of the epistemological problems created by this encounter. Frobisher 
willfully interprets what may be authentic spiritual experience—but may be simply a 
dream or even his final delusion—and, in so doing, makes his will the determinant of 
his own narrative, and thus of life and death. 
Perhaps the most important interpretive question posed by Saturnine is the 
level of authority we should prescribe to the conclusion of Frobisher’s near-death 
vision. Are the Guardian’s words—and Frobisher’s interpretation of them—the 
correct way of interpreting the self’s place in the world (at least, the world of this 
novel)? Are the epistemological uncertainties of the novel’s middle and the Freudian 
splitting of the self superceded by the ontological certainties of this ending-of-the-
middle and the spiritualist rejoining of the soul and the body? I have already 
suggested that the ending which follows somewhat unsettles the matter, while the 
relationship of narrator to character points to a continued split of the self. However, 
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though the novel’s return to episodic, rather than ends-driven, storytelling in its final 
chapters suggests that even powerful spiritual visions cannot bring pure closure to the 
middle-driven stories of individuals and nations, there can be little doubt that the 
anxieties and, especially, the mingling of the psychical, physical, and spiritual worlds 
are almost entirely absent from the novel’s ending. If there is not closure to the 
narrative of Frobisher’s life, there is at least some degree of closure to the story of the 
mental and spiritual crisis that gives the novel its shape—the crisis that comprises the 
novel’s long middle. That long middle, with its modernist epistemological problems 
both psychoanalytic and narrative, dominates this novel, and its interpretation of the 
self, narrative, and reality is not wholly undermined by the novel’s ending. 
Nevertheless, Saturnine suggests that, though such middles may shape stories, and 
every moment—even an ending—is in some ways a middle—the concerns of 
modernist middles are not always dominant. Sometimes, that is, as Frobisher 
believes, we are governed by Saturn and sometimes, as Brian McHale writes, novels 
are governed by epistemological concerns. Authors, however, have other choices 
available to them and, possibly, a strong assertion of narrative may re-shape and 
confine the middle, making room for endings both joyful and apocalyptic. These are, 
according to Saturnine, however, narrative choices—even if they cannot be made 
quite so easily in real life, where the middle and its problems always threaten even the 
most definitive of endings: death for the individual, war and dissolution for the 




Chapter 5: A Noun-Like Narrative: 
The Middle as Unfixed Memory in B.S. Johnson’s The 
Unfortunates 
B. S. (Bryan Stanley) Johnson (1933-1973) was, according to The Cambridge History 
of Twentieth-Century English Literature, one of “[t]he two most significant English 
experimental writers” of the 1960s (Lucas 561). This reputation is founded largely on 
his most famous experiment, The Unfortunates (1969). The fourth of seven novels 
written before Johnson’s suicide at the age of 40, The Unfortunates is the second 
novel, after Marc Saporta’s Composition No. 1 in 1962, to be presented to the reader 
unbound, its sections to be read at random. However, while Saporta’s novel is a rigid 
formalist experiment—each section comprises a single page, and all are to be read at 
random—Johnson’s novel uses its more flexible form to mimic reality (more on the 
importance of reality to Johnson’s writing later). Twenty-seven individually bound 
sections are contained in a box, ranging in length from a single paragraph to twelve 
pages. The inside of the box instructs the reader as to how this novel is to be read: 
“Apart from the first and last sections (which are marked as such) the other twenty-
five sections are intended to be read in random order. / If readers prefer not to accept 
the random order in which they receive the novel, then they may re-arrange the 
sections into any other random order before reading.” This flexible form is used to 
contain discrete scenes from the narrator’s own memory. The Unfortunates therefore 
has a limited sort of randomness. The novel has a firm beginning and ending; 
between the beginning and ending, the reader encounters the narrator’s memories in a 
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random order. However, each memory retains its own integrity as a short narrative. 
Johnson’s novel therefore represents memory as a container that may be unlocked by 
an appropriate beginning and closed by an appropriate ending, but whose contents are 
unfixed, like a jar of marbles. Yet, no order in which the memories are removed from 
the jar may alter the shape or color of a single marble, nor significantly alter the pile 
of marbles one has placed upon the floor. That is, the long middle of The 
Unfortunates contains 25 factorial, or over 15 septillion, possible chronologies for its 
syuzhet, yet only a single fabula.  
 Johnson saw this form of unfixed yet stable narrative segments as the best 
possible method for representing not simply a generalized truth about memory, but a 
particular nonfictional truth. Johnson was generally devoted to a very literal sort of 
truth. He writes in the introduction to a later collection of short stories, “I am not 
interested in telling lies in my own novels. A useful distinction between literature and 
other writing for me is that the former teaches one something true about life: and how 
can you convey truth in a vehicle of fiction? The two terms, truth and fiction, are 
opposites, and it must logically be impossible” (Aren’t You 14). In his final, 
posthumous novel, See the Old Lady Decently, Johnson would follow the historian’s 
path, using research to construct, as best he could, a biography of his mother—though 
the limits of that research would also become part of the novel’s form and narrative. 
The Unfortunates, like the earlier Trawl, is instead concerned with conveying the 
truth not of the physical world, but of Johnson’s own memories. The Unfortunates 
itself is almost purely autobiographical, stemming from and recounting the narrator’s 
memories of his friend Tony, who has died of cancer, as he covers a football (soccer) 
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match in the Midlands town where Tony had lived. The narrator is unnamed outside 
of the byline of a phony newspaper account of the match on the box’s inside cover, 
and the last name of Johnson’s real-life friend, Tony Tillinghast, is not given in the 
novel—nor is the name of the town, which in real life would have been Nottingham. 
Furthermore, the teams playing in the match which the narrator covers are given the 
pseudonyms of United and City, an apparent exception to Johnson’s rule that truth is 
anathema to fiction. Nevertheless, the novel contains Johnson’s real-life memories of 
his friend and of himself. 
 The form of The Unfortunates, according to Johnson, is meant to represent the 
material in two ways. First, “the novel was to be as nearly as possible a re-created 
transcript of how my mind worked during eight hours on this particular Saturday” 
(Johnson, Aren’t You 25). That is, Johnson is interested not only in writing as 
accurately as possible his memories of Tony, but his memories of a particular 
occasion of remembering Tony. Thus, the section labeled “FIRST” contains the 
narrator’s arrival in the unnamed town and his recognition, suppressed until his 
arrival, that this was Tony’s home; while the section labeled “LAST” gives us the 
narrator’s thoughts as his train departs. These sections are fixed not only because they 
are plausible narrative entries into Johnson’s memories; they are fixed because, 
Johnson believes, they were, in the real world, the entry-points for the memories 
themselves.  An unfixed beginning and ending might alter the fabula itself—and, as 
nonfiction, the fabula is for Johnson sacrosanct. However, the middle is unfixed, and 
it contains not only the narrator’s memories of Tony, but various events in the 
narrator’s day—which sometimes, but not always, precipitate memories of Tony. The 
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middle therefore randomizes the novel’s anachronies, Genette’s term for “discordance 
between the two orderings of story [fabula] and narrative [syuzhet]” (Genette, 
Narrative Discourse 36). Nevertheless, it is easy to identify the two levels of 
narrative: the primary narrative, the time frame from which the narrator remembers, 
and a secondary time frame, which contains the narrator’s memories.
26
 The reader 
experiences randomized analepsis when moving from primary to secondary narrative, 
and prolepsis when moving from secondary to primary narrative, with little difficulty 
in distinguishing these events’ relative order in the fabula. However, distinguishing 
analepsis from prolepsis within a time frame may be more difficult. 
  In the first motivating factor Johnson gives for the form of the novel, then, 
Johnson emphasizes, in particular, how his mind worked, rather than what specifically 
his mind did. To this, Johnson adds that the randomness of the novel is meant to be “a 
physical tangible metaphor for randomness and the nature of cancer” (Johnson, Aren’t 
You 25). Richardson’s interpretation of what he calls the novel’s “unfixed syuzhet,” 
on the other hand, emphasizes the narrator’s grief: “It does not matter where he 
situates the account of his lunch, or where he places his memory of hitchhiking with 
his friend. The former event is utterly unimportant, and so is its placement; the latter 
event can appear anywhere, just as it will appear in a different setting when it is 
remembered again” (Richardson, “Unnatural Stories and Sequences”). It is not 
enough, however, to say that the order of events is unimportant to the grieving 
narrator: following Johnson, I would argue that the inability to recall or even 
experience events in a fixed order is a crucial part of the narrator’s experience. 
                                                 
26 The two time frames of the two narrative levels should not be confused with dual time, which 
entails “temporal contradictions” (Richardson, “Beyond” 51). 
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Perhaps the narrator, and not only the novelist, perceives this randomness as 
reflecting the randomness of his friend’s illness and death. Furthermore, the fixed 
beginning and ending to the syuzhet suggest that these events cannot be remembered 
again in a different setting—at least not in the same way. The randomized form of the 
middle of the novel is thus a sort of re-created transcript of how Johnson’s (that is, 
both the author and narrator’s) mind worked at a particular place and time. 
 Crucially, the novel is also a tangible metaphor. The reader does not 
experience the randomness of the middle within a text that occupies a familiar object, 
such as a bound book or (as with many hypertexts) a computer screen. Instead, every 
encounter with the text is awkward and unfamiliar, calling attention to the act of 
randomization which the reader must aid, literally picking out sections of the text as 
the narrator’s mind seems to pick individual memories at random and flit through the 
day itself at random. In this physical-narrative space, events, like the sections of the 
novel, are distinct enough in themselves, and it takes only a little effort at any 
moment to distinguish between memory and present events, but both memories and 
the day’s events seem to Johnson’s mind to pop up at random. The middle of The 
Unfortunates contains the tension between the unfixedness of representation, whether 
it be memory, metaphor, or novelization; yet by representing that unfixedness with an 
unbound physical form, Johnson seeks to bind his novel even more closely to reality 
by making it represent the narrative not only as a text but as an object. What is 
represented is, however, not so much a set of “true” events that are narrated—
although this sort of reality remains important to Johnson—but the reality of the 
“state of mind.” That is, The Unfortunates’ randomized syuzhet and stable fabula are 
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created by a formal device that represents through a violation of the traditional 
ontological status of the text a state of epistemological, rather than ontological, 
uncertainty: a modernist middle through arguably postmodernist means. 
 This chapter first considers the general theoretical implications of Johnson’s 
randomized middle for traditional narrative theory, grounded in the work of Genette 
and Todorov. It then enlists more Ronald Langacker’s more recent theories in 
cognitive linguistics to advance a framework for understanding how Johnson’s 
technique reifies the narrative line. Finally, I provide close readings of several 
sections from the novel. These close readings reveal how Johnson’s themes of 
memory, disease, death, and truthfulness interact with the novel’s unusual form. In 
particular, I will highlight how the beginning and ending of the novel frame its 
middle. Highlighting the stability of the novel’s fabula in contrast to its syuzhet, I 
note a particular a section that is marked as different from the rest, and which serves 
as a short middle of the fabula and a sort of anchor for the novel’s long middle. 
Finally, I conclude with a few short speculations on the effects of the novel’s form on 
the relationship between author and reader, particularly in regard to the theme of 
memory. 
 The form of The Unfortunates proceeds in part from the difficulty of creating 
a chronologically accurate transcript of this visit and the act of remembering 
contained within the visit. Johnson knows a beginning and ending for his narrative—
they are set by the project he has undertaken, and are the traditional narrative 
beginning and ending of arrival and departure. However, he cannot remember with 
certainty the order in which he remembered certain things about his friend Tony, nor 
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how these remembrances fit in with his journey through the town and time covering 
the football match. But each memory—of a particular time he visited Tony, of a 
particular place in town—is in itself discrete, even as the narrator struggles and 
stumbles in the act of remembering. In this sense, the form of the novel represents a 
complex theory of memory as well as a devotion to mimeticism as the motivating 
factor in experimental form. The form, however, is according to Johnson not only 
mimetic but metaphorical: “the whole novel reflected the randomness of the material: 
it was itself a physical tangible metaphor for randomness and the nature of cancer” 
(Johnson, Aren’t You 25). The form of The Unfortunates is not simply about 
randomness—it is about the fragility of the inside of the book itself, encased in its 
cardboard body. But the novel, too, is concerned about randomness in life, in death, 
in disease, as well as the effects of cancer on the body. In this context, the fixity of 
the “FIRST” and “LAST” sections acquires another meaning: the fixed beginning and 
ending of any life. In its beginning and ending, then, The Unfortunates is utterly 
conventional, and it sticks to conventional ideas about narrative: stories and lives can 
be easily given a natural beginning and ending, even if these beginnings and endings 
are somewhat arbitrary. The challenge to traditional narrative, therefore, is in the 
middle. 
 In some sense, that middle is completely Aristotelian: it is simply that which 
is between the beginning and the end. Allying the novel even more with traditional 
narrative, the novel’s form as whole resembles a simplified Proppian function. In the 
first section, the narrator’s arrival in town and the arousing of memories of his dead 
friend forming a disruption from a pre-existing equilibrium, and his departure in the 
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final section resolves the scenario. In the middle, the narrator not only must confront 
his memories, but he also responds to a specific test, as he must arrive at the match, 
write a story, and submit it to his editor on time. We can contrast this apparent 
conventionality to Hillis Miller’s reading of Johnson’s idol, Lawrence Sterne. Miller 
argues that digression is the key method by which middles avoid making a straight 
narrative line from beginning to end (Miller, Reading Narrative 68). Unlike Tristram 
Shandy, but like many modernist novels, The Unfortunates is relentlessly on task and 
on subject: tightly restricted to a particular time and place, it exhausts Johnson’s 
memories of Tony as well as his memories of his day in the Midlands town 
remembering Tony while focusing as well on key themes of randomness, memory, 
meaninglessness, and death. In one sense, every memory and every bit of wandering 
about town may be considered a diegetic digression for the narrator, as he diverges 
from his simple task of covering a football match. However, these digressions, such 
as they are, constitute the primary subject matter of the novel. That is, it has two 
clear, parallel tales to tell, and it attempts to exhaust Johnson’s memories of both in a 
way that Tristram Shandy can never exhaust the tale of his own life. Both 
thematically, and at the level of the fabula, then, The Unfortunates is hardly 
digressive—and largely matches traditional accounts of narrative structure, even in its 
middle. Digression, such as it is, is thus tightly contained within a narrative that is 
structured both by traditional narrative form and modernist thematic structure. 
 However, at the level of the syuzhet, The Unfortunates creates an even more 
radical disruption to the narrative line in its middle than does digression as theorized 
by Miller. The Unfortunates, like Miller’s subject, Tristram Shandy, moves about 
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anachronically in its narrator’s life. Nevertheless, the book’s physical form 
immediately defeats not only the straight narrative line, where relevant events 
proceed logically and chronologically from beginning to end, but the narrative line of 
the text itself. Even most anachronological texts generally have a fixed narrative line 
in the syuzhet. They may wander, as in Sterne, and they may jump, as in Faulkner, but 
the ordered stream of words exists on the page. Johnson breaks up the narrative line 
into a set of discrete narrative chunks—themselves subject to the vicissitudes of 
stream of consciousness narration. Although some of these chunks may be re-ordered 
in the reader’s mind (reconstruction most of what Johnson knows of Tony’s life 
chronologically, as well as the events of Johnson’s day apart from his disordered 
memories of his friend), there is no fully chronologically “correct” order for the 
sections. However, The Unfortunates is not an achronic narrative: the events are not 
“dateless and ageless” (Genette, Narrative Discourse 84). Instead, they are, following 
David Herman’s distinction, temporally indefinite. Neither is the novel temporally 
multiple, or “a kind of narration that exploits indefiniteness to pluralize and 
delinearize itself, to multiply the ways in which the events being recounted can be 
chained together to produce ‘the’ narrative itself” (Herman, Story 219). More 
importantly, at the level of narration as well as the level of the physical text, there is 
no single correct narrative line in the syuzhet. Indeed, for the book as an object (rather 
than a particular reading of the novel), there is no line at all, but a set of discretely 
bound component objects, arranged provisionally in a series.  
 The novel’s rejection of a fixed arrangement of the middle, even as first and 
last sections mark clear beginning and ending points for the narrative line, suggest 
229 
 
that each of the novel’s sections, however they may be arranged, is a sort of 
digression. That is, the syuzhet actively disrupts the linearity of the fabula. However, 
whereas Miller is able to adapt Tristram Shandy’s own image of a curved, snakelike 
narrative line to represent the digressions (both chronological and thematic) from a 
straight narrative line, no single line, however curved, can represent the fabula of The 
Unfortunates. Instead, such a line would only represent a particular instantiation of 
the text’s multiple syuzhets. In one sense, The Unfortuantes is a novel without a 
syuzhet. In another sense, the novel has two levels of syuzhet, in a relation to each 
other that is parallel to the relationship between fabula and syuzhet. On one level, 
there is the syuzhet that is created by any particular reading of the text. However, just 
as a syuzhet is theoretically only one possible ordering of the same fabula, so each 
reading of The Unfortunates produces a syuzhet that is only one possible ordering of 
the text. This is, of course, true of any particular reading of any particular text: the 
reader is not forced to read the words of a novel in any particular order, and many 
readers will do so. However, The Unfortunates makes multiple orderings a part of the 
text itself. The set of all possible orderings, then, is the text’s syuzhet, and this textual 
syuzhet stands between the reader’s syuzhet and the fabula. While some hypertexts 
also disrupt the fabula,
27
 this very disruption maintains the one-to-one relationship 
between fabula and syuzhet. By maintaining a consistent fabula, The Unfortunates 
creates a single tale without a single line. The text’s syuzhet creates from the fabula 
not a particular ordering of events, but a fixed set of possible orderings. I would 
suggest that a narrative line, with more or fewer spatial or temporal digressions, is no 
                                                 
27 Richardson gives examples of texts without a fixed order that either do or do not maintain a 
consistent fabula:  
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longer the correct model for thinking about such a syuzhet, even as the novel’s 
beginning, ending, and fabula continue to remind us of this or similar models. This 
narrative line still exists on the level of the fabula.  
 Let us turn, instead, to linguistically-based literary theory, starting specifically 
with Todorov’s theory of narrative episodes. In Todorov’s grammar of narrative, 
“there are two types of episodes […]: those which describe a state (of equilibrium or 
of disequilibrium) and those which describe the passage from one state to the other. 
[…] This definition of the two types of episodes (and hence of propositions 
designating them) permits us to relate them to two parts of speech, the adjective and 
the verb” (Todorov 111). Following Todorov, we can view the middle’s syuzhet as a 
set of episodes, each occupying an indeterminate location in a confined narrative 
space, which itself constitutes a larger fixed narrative episode, the novel’s middle. In 
one respect, the middle is adjectival in nature—it describes the narrator’s state of 
mind as he goes about his day and recalls his dead friend. Yet individual episodes 
may be verbal in nature—Tony grows ill in the narrator’s memories, the narrator 
submits a story to his editor. If the story is the story of Tony, or of a day on the job, 
the middle as a whole is as verbal as its individual episodes. What’s more, it is not 
entirely clear that the middle as a whole is descriptive of a state of mind, rather than 
the story of the process by which the narrator remembers and comes to terms with 
Tony’s life and death. Even more, if the reader is to share and engage in the process 
of remembering, the unfixed order of the syuzhet makes it difficult to view this 
process as singular and linear. The unfixed nature of the syuzhet fragments any verb 
we might find in the middle. Todorov’s choice between adjective and verb seems 
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inadequate to me for such a narrative process, not least because the word “process” 
already implies motion. Furthermore, it does not account for the importance the novel 
gives to the book as an object. While Todorov reserves the term “noun” for the agents 
of his narrative prepositions, I suggest that The Unfortunates turns narrative processes 
themselves into nouns. Let me indulge in a rough analogy to physics: the narrative 
line, or process, is like a wave of light. However, reading the novel is like measuring 
the location of a particle of light: the observation fixes its position and even, at this 
level, seems to change its behavior. When we read the novel, we transform verb into 
noun. 
 The form of The Unfortunates, and what that form does to what we might 
think of as the original story of the narrator’s visit to a Midlands town—or, rather, the 
form that story might take in a traditionally-bound book—is thus analogous to the 
grammatical process of nominalization. For a more precise understanding of what this 
process entails, I will turn to the cognitive linguistic work of Ronald W. Langacker. 
Cognitive linguistics gets its name from one of its basic assumptions: that language is 
not a separate cognitive ability. Instead, it is a product of more general cognitive 
abilities, and particularly, language “is basically conceptual structure” (Croft and 
Cruse 2). Moreover, cognitive linguistics takes the stance that grammatical 
constructions as well as semantic structures are conceptual—or, as Langacker puts it, 
“grammar is conceptualization” (qtd. in Croft and Cruse 3). In other words, according 
cognitive linguists, language reflects—and is produced by—the way we think. 
Language is not a machine-like structure, separate from the rest of human thought and 
experience, but is produced by the way the human mind thinks and interacts with the 
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world. Grammatical rules, in this version of linguistics, therefore have something akin 
to meaning—though that meaning is often difficult to put into words. It may be best 
to think of grammatical differences in words or sentences that refer to the same object 
or have the same semantic content as being differences not only in how we word 
something, but in how we think about something—that is, a difference in 
conceptualization. Specifically, Langacker marks out two components of meaning: 
content and construal
28
 (Langacker 5). Grammar, then, has meaning, but this meaning 
is primarily in how we construe the semantic content of words—that is, how we think 
about things. While I am in no position to evaluate the relative merits of the cognitive 
linguists’ case in the broader debate over the nature of language, their theories are 
well suited to an attempt to draw analogies between grammatical structures and large-
scale literary structures on a conceptual level, simply because cognitive linguistics 
emphasizes the primacy of conceptualization in grammar. The argument here is that 
the form of The Unfortunates represents a different way of thinking about narrative, 
and particularly about narrative middles—and that this difference causes its readers to 
think about, or conceptualize, its story in a fundamentally different way—in turn 
providing a fundamentally different way of thinking about the world than other 
                                                 
28 Langacker further divides construal into five dimensions: specificity, background, perspective, 
scope, and prominence (Langacker 5). The first “pertains to our capacity for conceiving and 
portraying an entity at varying levels of precision and detail” (Langacker 5). Background largely 
concerns the way words and concepts are understood by (implicit) comparison to other words or 
concepts, which form the background (Langacker 5). Perspective refers to the vantage point from 
which language is understood, including spatial position as well as notions such as subjectivity and 
objectivity (Langacker 5-6). Scope is “the array of conceptual content [an expression] evokes” 
(Langacker 6) Finally, prominence refers to the relative presence or importance a particular thing or 
concept has in the mind (Langacker 7). Langacker puts these dimensions to very specific uses in his 
linguistic analyses, but for my purposes I will stick to the basic concept of construal and the 
different meanings construed by nouns and verbs. 
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narratives. This fundamental difference is similar to the difference in Langacker’s 
work between a noun and a verb. 
 For Langacker, the classes of noun and verb each “combine a cognitively 
salient prototype with a highly abstract schema reflecting a basic cognitive ability” 
(Langacker 9). Each basic word-class allows us to put a basic cognitive ability into 
words and in turn allows words to invoke a basic cognitive ability. For nouns, this 
ability is “conceptual reification, our manifest capacity for grouping a set of entities 
and manipulating them as a unitary entity for higher-order purposes. […] At the most 
schematic level, a noun is thus characterized as an expression that profiles a thing” 
(Langacker 10). Nouns give thing-ness to our thoughts. Verbs are somewhat more 
complex, drawing on two basic cognitive abilities: “the ability to establish 
relationships, and to scan sequentially through a complex structure. It is claimed that 
every verb profiles a process, defined as a relationship that evolves through time and 
is scanned sequentially along this axis. A process might also be called a temporal 
relation, where ‘temporal’ refers to both its evolution through time and the sequential 
nature of its scanning” (Langacker 10). The double-temporality in verbs is analogous 
to the double-temporality of The Unfortunates: this novel, like many modernist 
works, is concerned not only with the temporal relations of the primary narrative 
(how the narrator related to Tony through time), but with the temporal relations of the 
focalizer and reader to that primary narrative (how the narrator remembers his 
relationship with Tony; how the reader learns about the narrator’s relationship with 
Tony as well as his process of remembering). It is not only the case that Tony and the 
narrator have had a temporal relationship to each other, but that conceptual access to 
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that temporal relationship is itself a temporal process—the narrator and the reader 
must mentally (and, in the reader’s case, physically) scan the history of their 
encounters in order to conceptualize the narrative. 
 This is, of course, true of all narratives, even if The Unfortunates brings a 
particular complexity to the process. However, The Unfortunates (or at least its 
middle) has a syuzhet that lacks a fixed sequence, even if any individual act of 
reading the novel does. Its narrative middle has been reified or nominalized, a 
sequence of events and memories of events turned into a thing. This “conceptual 
reification,” as Langacker calls the nominalization contained in “a nominalized verb 
like chirping, consumption, destruction, chanting, or breaking” (Langacker 86). To 
say that cancer destroys Tony’s body is to think of the effects of the disease with a 
temporal profile—to think of them at some relative point of time, through some 
relative period of time, to think of the temporal relationship between Tony and the 
cancer. To speak of the destruction of Tony’s body by cancer, however, is to 
conceptualize that whole relationship—including its temporal profile—as a thing, 
which can in turn be put into cognitive relationships with other things. 
 Likewise, The Unfortunates itself nominalizes its story—it conceives it not as 
a temporal relationship, but as a thing, and object that can be mentally manipulated as 
an atemporal whole. The fact that each section of the novel comprises a more 
traditional (verbal) narrative emphasizes that the novel is not simply a noun—not 
simply a collection of words or abitrarily marked-off sequences of words—that can 
be manipulated by the reader. Instead, The Unfortunates is a narrative whose middle 
has been reified—Tony’s life, the narrator’s act of remembering that life, has been 
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turned into a thing. In fact, as Johnson later wrote, the novel was intended to serve as 
a physical substitute for his own memory: “What matters most to me about The 
Unfortunates is that I have on recall as accurately as possible what happened, that I 
do not have to carry it around in my mind any more” (Johnson, Aren’t You 26). 
Memory, to Johnson, is an object, something that is metaphorically carried in the 
mind—and The Unfortunates is both a representation of the way memory reifies 
events and a substitute for Johnson’s real-world memory of his friend. 
 This tension between Johnson’s desire to render both the objective and 
subjective truth of what happened on both on the day of remembering and in the time 
and space remembered, also serves link this very same section to another section of 
present-tense narrative. As Johnson nears the center of the city, he recognizes a 
domed structure: “the town hall, only they don’t call it the town hall in this city, no, 
something else, city hall, no, too Americanized, what is it?” (“Cast parapet” 3). The 
narrator remembers shopping in the area on more than one occasion with Tony and 
his wife June, but the memory remains general, and the section soon ends with the 
narrator resolving to walk uphill. Rather than taking the dome as a trigger into a 
Proustian stream of memories, the narrator resolves to “make my way up there, it’s an 
object, it’s an objective, it will pass the time” (“Cast parapet” 3). The narrator 
maintains that the passage of time occurs in the present-day visit to the town, even as 
the novel’s form disrupts this passage of time—removes it to the reader’s present—by 
ending the section here. Architecture, moreover, once again serves as a metaphor for 
reified memory: it is a physical object as well as a physical and mental objective: 
something to be attained, something to be held. This is as true of the name of the 
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structure (which is its physical form on the pages of the novel) as it is of the physical 
structure itself. Furthermore, this attempt to attain the remembered object and the 
word that allows that object to be correctly written, links the fractured narrative of 
The Unfortunates. Another section begins, “This poky lane by a blackened sandstone 
church leads, is on my way up to the Council House, now it comes back to me, now I 
remember, the Council House, the local name for the Town Hall, in this city [...]” (1). 
Regardless of what order the reader encounters these two sections, when both have 
been encountered, they form a causal and chronological narrative of goal and 
attainment. The Unfortunates establishes that time does, in fact, pass, even though the 
passage of time is disrupted at the level of narration. The reader partially reconstructs, 
retrospectively, a linear fabula based on a fragmented object. This is why The 
Unfortunates is not simply a noun-like narrative, but a nominalized-verb-like 
narrative. The reader can see the temporal profile in the narrative, but does not 
experience it directly outside of the beginning and the ending. The fragmented, 
disordered set of single sheets and small, pamphlet-like stapled sections, forces the 
reader to separate the narrator’s experience of memory and sensation from her own 
experience of reading that experience of memory and sensation. The reader is forced 
to regard the passage of time on this single day not as a process, but as an object—
even when a chronological reconstruction of that day can be attained. 
 It may be argued that, on some level, all books reify the narratives they 
contain, since books are things. In this sense, Johnson’s project in The Unfortunates is 
not much different from Woolf’s in To the Lighthouse: both Tony Tillinghast and 
Woolf’s parents are removed from the memory and placed in the novel in order to 
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unburden the author’s memory. However, The Unfortunates goes beyond traditional 
and even most modernist narratives in making this reified form a present part of the 
reader’s experience. The physical form of The Unfortunates is defamiliarizing in a 
way that calls constant attention to the thing-ness of the book both because the 
physical form of the book is so unfamiliar and because it requires more (often 
awkward) physical work and grappling with the physical book in order to read. In this 
sense, The Unfortunates calls attention to the fact that it (and all books) are physical 
reifications of narrative. 
 More importantly, however, The Unfortunates creates in its form a conceptual 
as well as physical reification of narrative. In the act of reading virtually any novel, 
the words as physical object are scanned sequentially through time—that is, the 
narrative is given a temporal profile, (re-)verbalized. Both the narrative and the act of 
reading itself acquire a temporal sequence. If a reader is sufficiently familiar with a 
novel’s form, the physically reified narrative (the book) will lose prominence in the 
mind—the book disappears, and the reader enters the verbal narrative. 
Defamilizariation, therefore, plays an important role in disrupting the process by 
which narrative is conceptualized as a temporal sequence. However, The 
Unfortunates provides a further, conceptual barrier to the conceptual verbalization of 
its narrative. Embedded in any individual reading of the novel is the knowledge that 
this act of reading has produced neither a sequence of events that matches the novel’s 
fabula, nor even an series of anachronies and achronies that correspond to the novel’s 
syuzhet. Instead, the act of reading The Unfortunates gives at best one of many 
possible sequences or forms of the narrative middle. 
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 Johnson’s intent, however, is not to produce a writerly novel in the Barthian 
sense—a novel that allows the reader to impose upon it different narratives. The 
“FIRST” and “LAST” sections; the absence of achrony, emphasized by the relative 
ease with which many of the events can be logically ordered in time; the fact that 
each section is a non-arbitrary narrative episode; and the verisimilitudinous,
29
 
concretely specific content of the narrative all suggest that The Unfortunates is no 
more writerly than a typical modernist work. That is, while the novel calls attention to 
the thing-ness of the book—to its ontological status—the poetics of this device is 
epistemological rather than ontological. Because the ontological status of the book 
serves as a metaphor for memory, cancer, and other themes of the novel, it calls 
attention to the meaning of the events in the novel, rather than disrupting, permeating, 
or destabilizing the diegetic world, which remains in a highly stable fabula. Neither, 
however, can we easily classify The Unfortunates as a readerly novel, since its 
unconventional form alone makes it particularly difficult to read, and its individual 
sections do their best to avoid telling conventional stories about Tony’s life. 
Furthermore, changes in the novel’s syuzhet from reading to reading are not the 
products of the reader’s decisions, imagination, or interpretive framework, but instead 
by a form that fixes the syuzhet according to pre-determined laws, though not into a 
pre-determined order. 
                                                 
29 Prince defines verisimilitude as, “The quality of a text resulting from its degree of conformity to a 
set of ‘truth’ norms that are external to it” (Prince 103). In Johnson’s case, the truth norms are those 
of rigorous nonfiction—or, rather, of Johnson’s very literal interpretation of the word “truth.” We 
may contrast this to Genette’s examination of vraisemblance in 18th-century French discourse, 
where verisimiltude more closely resembles Aristotelian probability. Genette finds the norms of 
truth in “generic conventions [that] function as a system of natural forces and constraints” (Genette, 
“Vraisemblance” 242). Johnson attempts to locate his truth norms outside the realm of discourse. 
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 Instead, the middle of The Unfortunates must be encountered as something 
that can neither be written nor read. Generally, it cannot be written by the reader 
because the fabula is stable. This stability is important, I believe, to Johnson’s 
personal goals in writing the novel, to and his concept of truth—the memories are 
Johnson’s, not to be tampered with by the reader, and to be re-created as accurately as 
possible. Generally, the novel also cannot be read, because of the unfixed nature of 
the syuzhet means that no individual act of reading is a reading of the novel self, but 
instead of the novel in a particular reified state. This, too, is important to Johnson’s 
project of accurately recording his state of mind when remembering Tony. Johnson’s 
memories simply do not take the form of a fixed narrative syuzhet. The very temporal 
nature of a syuzhet imposes a temporal structure on Johnson’s memory of Tony that, 
for Johnson, simply does not exist beyond its original containment within a visit to 
Nottingham and subsequent containment within the book’s box. That is, the state of 
mind did seem sequenced—even anachronically sequenced—and even to the extent 
that such a sequence existed on a particular real day in the author’s life, that sequence 
is not recoverable. The unfixed syuzhet of The Unfortunates, as opposed to any of its 
possible read syuzhets, is not enacted by reading the novel. Reading the novel, 
instead, allows the reader to infer a syuzhet that must be conceptualized not in a 
temporal sequence with any particular order (even if provisional or arbitrary), but as a 
thing, a reified narrative that contains the possibility of any number of sequences, but 
does not itself have a sequence. The Unfortunates is a narrative whose middle has 
been turned as nearly as possible into a noun. 
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 However, the nominalized whole produced by the unfixed syuzhet is not a 
single object, but a set of objects. This middle—an ever-present, palpable object in 
the reader’s hand—is composed of as well as bordered by narrative segments that do 
have a temporal profile and conform to modernist narrative conventions. Part of what 
makes the middle of The Unfortunates different from the middle of nearly every other 
novel is the way it calls attention to the individuality of these segments, even as it 
makes each individually largely irrelevant to the progress of the narrative from 
beginning to end. These narrative segments can be divided into three primary groups. 
First, many segments contain only narration of Tony and the narrator’s past. Because 
they contain no framing narration, these sections cannot be convincingly placed 
within the story of the narrator’s day in the Midlands, though they sometimes seem to 
follow directly from each other and can often easily be placed in a chronological 
ordering of the narrator’s and subject’s lives. While the entire novel consists of the 
narrator’s interior monologue, there is in some sense a greater purity to the interiority 
of these segments, since they provide no anchor to the world outside the mind. 
Furthermore, these segments, taken as a group, give the clearest argument about 
memory that the novel’s narrative form makes: that it comes (and is in turn 
remembered) disordered, yet in discrete pieces, segments of more or less coherent 
memory stored in packets in our brains. Though the narrator often agonizes within 
each of these segments, interrogating his own memories for coherence, honesty, and 




 By contrast, the second type of section focuses its interior monologue entirely 
on the novel’s present-tense of the day in the Midlands, providing many of the details 
of comprehension associated with stream of consciousness narrative. The narrator 
gives his immediate thoughts and responses to sensory data, rarely pausing to explain 
what is going on. This contrasts with the rigorous attempts to clarify and explain the 
past—which largely succeed with regard to events, even if they explicitly fail with 
regard to meaning. These  present-day segments, too, can be rearranged in the mind 
(or in the box) in roughly chronological order, but are difficult to order relative to the 
past-focused segments. The final set of segments provide a mix of memories and 
immediate phenomena. They provide a partial but imperfect link between the present 
and the past, offering up the possibility that chronology of the fabula can be 
reconstructed completely, but ultimately failing to fulfill that promise. They indicate 
to the reader that the memories and the day take place in the same time, that they are 
indeed part of the same narrative, while preventing the reader from reconstructing 
that narrative. The “FIRST” and “LAST” sections are examples of this last type of 
segment. Their mix of memories and immediate narrative reinforces their role as 
narrative containers which hold the noun-like middle inside what appears to be a 
conventional modernist verbal narrative. These narrative anchors also provide 
analytical anchors against which the narrative effects of the three types of segments 
within the middle can be examined. 
 “FIRST” provides both a narrative and thematic framework for the reading the 
rest of the novel. The Unfortunates begins with a moment of recognition that brings 
present and past together: “But I know this city!    This green 
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ticket-hall, the long office half-rounded at its ends, that ironic clerestory, brown 
glazed tiles, green below, the same, the decorative hammerbeams supporting nothing, 
above, of course! I know this city! How did I not realize when he said, Go and do 
City this week, that it was this city?   Tony” (“FIRST” 1). At this 
point, a reader who comes to The Unfortunates without criticism or paratext will have 
some difficulty decoding where the narrator is and why he is there. The new edition 
provides a completed newspaper article on the soccer match which the narrator has 
arrived to cover on the inside back of the box (as well as a summary of the plot on the 
outside back of the box), this paratextual element was missing from the first edition. 
American readers, meanwhile, are likely to have particular difficulty decoding the 
reference to “City” as an English football club. (Americans may also have more 
difficulty recognizing the building as a train-station.) The fact that this City does not 
correspond to any named city (or any particular real club) compounds the difficulty. 
The narrator recognizes the city, but the reader likely does not. In Johnson’s life, the 
city was Nottingham (Coe 23). In the bare narrative, however, both city and narrator 
are anonymous. Moreover, this opening focuses somewhat oddly on the details of 
architecture rather than the nature or significance of the city. Architecture will remain 
a major theme in the novel, both in segments that focus on this day in the city and in 
segments that focus on the past. It is, then, a link between present and past—both 
because it appears in all three types of narrative segments, and because it remains in 
the city when Tony himself is gone. 
 Furthermore, architecture provides a metaphor for the human body. It is 
subject to detailed physical description, mixes form and function, failing sometimes 
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at both. This particular failure is given anthropomorphized intent: something about 
the combination of brown and green, and the functionless supports, is ironic. The 
narrator is not satisfied with noting a disjunction between form and function. He finds 
both an explicit and a contrasting, implicit, meaning in the train-station’s architecture, 
though he states neither. The perhaps hopeless search for meaning, which becomes 
particularly acute as the narrator explores the implications of Tony’s life and death, is 
from the beginning strained by a typically modernist predilection for both obscurity 
and sophistication. Architecture also provides a contrast with the human body 
because of its relative, but still incomplete, longevity. Architecture, unlike Tony’s 
body, is still there to be examined, marks this place in a way which Tony himself 
cannot. It is thus a site for interrogation of both the connections and disjunctions 
between present and past, not least in its role, here and in other places, as a Proustian 
trigger for memory. 
 Johnson’s narrative, however, does not flow into the past. The shift from 
architecture to Tony is not explained, but is presented as an unconventional gap in the 
page, representing a gap in thought (or perhaps a gap in verbalizable thought). In the 
segment beginning, “Up there, yes,” a similar gap marks the narrator’s mind as it 
skips from recognizing a building he associates with Tony. The Unfortunates uses 
these gaps frequently to represent empty spots in the narrator’s stream of 
consciousness, but also to mark shifts in memory. This is particularly important in 
sections that mix past and present, like “FIRST” and “Up there, yes.” In the latter, 
each gap brings the narrative more deeply into memory. Walking about town, the 
narrator recognizes a radar tower, which leads his mind to what Tony had said about 
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it and then, after a break in the text, into a suppositionally-constructed memory of the 
time Tony spoke about the tower: “But they were building it at that time, Tony 
pointed it out to us as a new landmark which would be useful to us in finding our way 
about the city, only my second visit, and her first, Wendy’s.  We must 
have come up this hill, there, past here, and on, he leading, Tony, we two lovers, like 
Merlin in the tale, we were besotted, or illfated, at least I was [...]” (“Up there, yes” 
1). Architecture leads to voice, which leads to the past, which leads not to 
illumination of Tony, but a reading of Tony in his importance to the narrator and, 
particularly, to the most emotionally salient aspect of the narrator’s life—here the 
failed love affair that was the primary subject of Johnson’s previous novel, Trawl. 
The narrator, however, protests that the opposite is true: “Very much in love with her, 
yes, Wendy, then. As not now, in this city memories are not now of her so much, but 
only of her in relation to him. So his death changes the past: yet it should not” (“Up 
there, yes” 1). Here, “the past” is conflated with the narrator’s memory of the past, 
and so the unifying force of Tony as subject of both memory and novel inevitably 
distorts that past, even as it may seem to the reader that it is the solipsism of the 
narrator’s memory that distorts Tony’s past. 
 A further gap, then, moves the narrator from a speculative past—what must 
have been—and ruminations on Wendy and the nature of memory to a purer narrative 
of his second visit: 
He had booked for us at a guesthouse, boarding house, private hotel, I 
forget which gentility it was known by, at which his parents had once 
stayed, and which he therefore had some slight cause to recommend, 
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as knowing it, as he did not know others in the city, which might be 
full of nits and bedbugs, fleas and vermin: just opposite the tech. 
 Before leaving London we had in the Strand Woolworths 
bought a wedding ring […] (“Up there, yes” 1) 
The narrative begins to move chronologically through the visit, but it begins in the 
pluperfect, marking a shift from the original remembered moment. So do most of the 
memories in The Unfortunates move: as straightforwardly as possible, but including 
the narrator’s struggles to remember and supply as many relevant details as possible. 
Once the memory has been triggered, the narrative problem is not how to render the 
preverbal flow of memory, with the temporal shifts and over-closeness to sensory 
data commonly associated with modernism. Instead, the problem is how to extract 
facts from memory. Of the (unspecified) symbolism of a wedding band he and 
Wendy buy so that they can rent a room together, the narrator wonders, “Or yet again, 
do I impose this in the knowledge of what happened later? A constant, ha, distorting 
process, what is true, about that past, about Wendy, about Tony?” (“Up there, yes” 2). 
The narrator returns to the theme that subsequent memories distort memories of the 
past—calling the entire project of the novel into question, since Tony’s death may 
distort the narrator’s memory not only of the city, but of Tony himself. 
 “Up there, yes” continues to tell the story of this second visit to the Midlands 
town, sometimes remembering with certainty, sometimes reasoning about what 
probably or must have happened. It does not, however, return to the frame of the 
narrator’s walk around town before covering the soccer match. As a rare segment in 
the middle of The Unfortunates that combines both the narrator’s current visit and 
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memories of prior visits, “Up there, yes” echoes the beginning of “FIRST” in 
jumping from a piece of architecture to a memory. It also echoes the overall function 
of “FIRST” in the novel by setting up both the trigger to memory and some of the 
thematic issues relevant to the memory: in this case, the relationship between the 
narrator’s memory of Wendy and his memory of Tony, and the way their subsequent 
respective break-up and death distort that memory. “FIRST,” however, frames the 
overall set of memories and wanderings that comprise the middle of The 
Unfortunates. For any individual section in the middle, it is the only guaranteed prior 
knowledge the reader will possess. It is first, and every other section is a possible 
second. It therefore sets up not only the narrative framework in which the disordered 
memories will operate, but also serves as a starting place for how both how the 
novel’s primary subject, Tony, and its unusual form, will be understood. The 
disordered form of The Unfortunates eliminates the middle’s dependence on the 
beginning for the narrative line, but it increases the dependence of each individual 
section of the middle on the thematic and epistemological priority of the beginning. 
That is, because The Unfortunates does not move through time from beginning 
through middle to end, the beginning must hold all of the middle in its frame. 
 In “FIRST,” another gap follows the one-word sentence “Tony,” isolating the 
novel’s subject on the page. It is followed by a detailed physical description of 
Tony’s body: 
His cheeks sallowed and collapsed round the insinuated bones, the 
gums shrivelled, was it, or shrunken, his teeth now standing free of 
each other in the unnatural half yawn of his mouth, yes, the mouth that 
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had been so full-fleshed, the whole face, too, now collapsed, derelict, 
the thick-framed glasses the only constant, the mouth held open as in a 
controlled scream, but no sound, the head moving only slightly, the 
white dried and sticky saliva, the last secretions of those harassed 
glands, cauterized into deficiency, his mouth closing only when he 
took water from a glass by his bed, that double bed, in his parents’ 
house, bungalow, water or lemon he had to take frequently, because of 
what the treatment had done to his saliva glands, how it had finished 
them.  Him (“FIRST” 1) 
Our first image of Tony is, in the section labeled “FIRST” is nearer the narrator’s last 
memory of his friend than his first. The effects of chemotherapy on Tony’s salivary 
glands will be encountered again, in the section beginning “At least once he visited us 
at the Angel, we were married then,” but there the narrator remembers a healthier 
Tony, cancer in remission, visiting a flat the narrator kept during his first few months 
of marriage (2). In this first description, however, Tony suffers from not only the 
failure of his salivary glands to function, but a failure, seemingly, of the entire head. 
The description of Tony’s face echoes the architectural description that comes before 
both in the nonfunctionality of the structure of Tony’s face, but in some of the word 
choices (“now collapsed, derelict”) and in the placing of the nonfunctional head of 
Tony in the larger structure not of his body, but of “his parents’ house, bungalow”—
signaling Tony’s dependence and revising the statement to further diminish the 
dignity of the structure. Everywhere, Tony is diminished: “Shrivelled,” “shrunken,” a 
“half yawn,” “harassed glands cauterized into deficiency.” Everything is less than it 
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was and less than it should be. This sense of diminution contrasts with the 
architecture of the station, which is notable for its sameness, end to end and through 
time. Nevertheless, the result is similar: as the clerestory beams support nothing, 
Tony’s open mouth emits nothing. While the absence of speech is clearly implied, the 
description is not of a silenced speaker, but of pre-verbal expression silenced: first 
“an unnatural half-yawn,” then “a controlled scream.” The clerestory suggests irony 
through its lack of function: sophisticated, verbal double-meaning. Tony’s mouth 
suggests unsophisticated double-meaning. But, while the clerestory’s meaning 
remains obscure, Tony’s mouth suggests the emotional content of his condition: 
boredom and terror. These remain significant themes throughout The Unfortunates: 
the terror of death and of meaninglessness, the boredom of day-to-day existence. And 
they are caused by, as well as read into, Tony’s inability to speak in the complicated, 
rational (unemotional) language of words. 
 When the narrator first meets Tony, on a trip to a printer as editor of a college 
literary magazine, he is struck by Tony’s intellect, and, particularly, his 
conversational ability: “He had that sort of mind, Tony, that could marshall an 
argument methodically, both or all sides, yet leave you quite clear as to which he 
advocated, supported, and why” (“That was the first time, that must have been the 
first time, yes” 3). Frequently, the narrator will be unable to remember the specifics 
of conversations he has had with Tony—unwilling to supply unremembered dialogue 
and leaving even the subject or occasion of conversation as a matter of speculation. 
But Tony’s way of talking was of such great interest to the young narrator that he and 
his co-editor “had asked him to be a guest contributor to our magazine, to write as he 
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had talked, Tony” (“That was the first time, that must have been the first time, yes” 
4). The Unfortunates, by contrast, is generally unwilling to write as Tony talked: it 
leaves Tony as we find him in the first paragraph of “FIRST,” unable to speak. The 
novel begins, then, with an arresting image of Tony’s speechlessness, but Tony’s 
death, the limits of memory, and the limits of novel-writing itself leave him largely 
speechless in the novel as a whole. As Philip Tew argues, “Johnson cannot render 
Tony independently of himself” (Critical Reading 42). Tony’s lack of independence 
in the novel is an extension of his lack of independence in this first image: he is a 
speechless expression of existential anxiety contained within a structure owned by 
another. 
 “FIRST” goes on to set up other major themes and techniques in the novel as 
well. As the narrator ponders how he will venture out into the city, he states in plain 
terms the novel’s theory of memory: “The mind circles, at random, does not 
remember, from one moment to another, other things interpose themselves, the 
mind’s” (“FIRST” 1). Circling, randomness, and interposition, then, are some of the 
terms with which we can think of both the stream of consciousness within each 
section and the overall form of the novel. The novel, and the narrator, circles both 
Tony and the unnamed Midlands city. The circle has subject matter as its center, but 
the process of circling has no defined middle: the reader continues around the circle, 
stopping at one point or another, but unable to tell when the process of circling (or the 
circle itself) has reached its mid-point. Circling does not lead from beginning to end 
in an ordered progression, but rather, as a process, has a beginning and an end in time. 
One does not circle to get somewhere, but when one has arrived at one’s destination, 
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but is unable to complete the journey—just as the story of Tony’s life, of the 
narrator’s relationship to Tony, has already reached its end at the beginning of The 
Unfortunates, but memory prevents the story from reaching closure, demands that it 
continue aimlessly until the narrator’s day in town is through. Additionally, while the 
narrative of The Unfortunates itself has no order and no temporal profile, the act of 
reading does: the individual reader circles the narrative, even as the narrator’s mind 
circles Tony. 
 It is more obvious how The Unfortunates instantiates randomness in its form. 
However, while within each section, the randomness of memory seems motivated, as 
the narrator’s first memory of Tony is motivated by the station, the reader’s 
experience of randomness from section to section has no particular motivation. 
Randomness, then, is not an unproblematic term: there is the seeming randomness of 
thought, associating sensory stimuli and thoughts to other thoughts; and there is the 
formalized randomness of the middle of the Unfortunates: a set number of parameters 
left to pure chance. This suggests that, while randomness is ostensibly a characteristic 
of memory, this is illusory: true randomness is a characteristic not of the memory, but 
of the universe: of Tony’s fate, not of the narrator’s recollection of that fate. This, 
then, produces a reverse reading of the disordered middle of The Unfortunates: while 
it may represent the inability of memory to produce an ordered reconstruction of 
events, it may also represent the arbitrary disruption by random events of the 
meaning-making, associational “randomness” of memory. There is thus a central 
irony to the form of The Unfortunates: it is both a modernist representation of 
memory—an experimental formal solution to a problem in realistic mimesis—and a 
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repudiation of its own central modernist goal of accurately representing the workings 
of the human mind. As The Unfortunates piles meanings on its structure, those 
meanings clash and destroy each other, and we are left with the possibility that the 
only meaning of The Unfortunates’ random ordering of its sections is an absence of 
meaning. 
 There are two further characteristics of the mind in this first theorization in 
“FIRST.” Of these, interposition is clearly carried out in the novel’s form, sections of 
memory interposing themselves. The physical fact of separately-bound sections 
makes this interposition palpable: objects placed between each other, memories and 
experiences cutting in as stacked objects rather than a story moving through time. 
Notable, too, however, is the fact that the narrator’s mind frequently does not 
remember. This is a novel as much about absent memories as present memories—as 
though Proust’s Marcel, after the first prodding of tea and cake, were left on the 
outside of his memories looking in, unable to transport himself back to his youth. The 
Unfortunates contains some rich descriptions (such as further descriptions of 
architecture and the condition of Tony’s body), but it refuses, even in the sections that 
exist entirely in the past in which Tony lived, to transport the reader fully into 
memory, leaving each memory an object to be pondered and fact-checked, a 
recollection rather than a story. 
 “FIRST,” after one such anecdotal recollection of a trip to the Midlands town, 
concerned more with the narrator’s memories of a former girlfriend by the name of 
Wendy than with Tony, ends by emphasizing the importance of Tony’s talk (and the 
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narrator’s problematic relationship to his friend’s words) and a question which seems 
to be answered by the novel’s disordered middle: 
My visits here were long talks broken only partly by eating, what a 
generalization, there, more talk on his part than mine, far more, but I 
learnt, I selected and elected to hear what I needed, what was of most 
use to me, at that time most use, from his discourse, yes, the word is 
not too pompous, discourse, a fine mind, a need to communicate 
embodied in it, too, how can I place his order, his disintegration? 
(“FIRST” 3-4).  
This sentence suggests a prior, self-interested but non-arbitrary selection of available 
materials: the narrator remembers only what he previously found of use—but that use 
is not the same as the use of telling Tony’s story, or giving an accurate account of 
Tony’s life, even in the restricted sense of its relation to the narrator. These memories 
then must be placed by the narrator—in a story, in a novel, in a meaningful 
relationship to his life. In doing so, the narrator is faced with a problem: he admires 
his friend’s discourse, the well-ordered nature of Tony’s thoughts and words. But 
impinging on this is the memory of Tony’s disintegration—which seems itself to be 
the order of Tony’s life. We can see the solution to this problem in The Unfortunates’ 
box: orderly (by modernist standards) chunks, disintegrated. The reader is placed in 
the narrator’s position by being forced to place this disordered whole in some sort of 
order—but the only answer for how is “at random.” However, just as the narrator’s 
“random” memory is limited by the selections of his former self, so too is the reader 
limited by the priority of Johnson, both in his role as author and as 
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narrator/rememberer. Johnson maintains, in “FIRST,” the modernist author’s power 
to direct meaning, to set the thematic and structural parameters of his novel in the 
beginning, which functions in this sense much as Edward Said says beginnings do. 
Furthermore, by setting “FIRST” first, Johnson yokes The Unfortunates a modernist 
tradition (exemplified by Faulkner as well as Proust) that frames the past—and the 
attempt to discover its meaning—within present memory. If the past, as Faulkner 
famously says, is not past, it is in The Unfortunates a scattered object to be held, 
mixed up with the present in a random middle, held together only by parameters set 
up from the first by authority and circumstance. In the noun-like form it takes in The 
Unfortunates’ middle, memory is thus the subject of both phenomenological mimesis 
and after-the-fact critique. 
 One section of The Unfortunates is devoted to the narrator’s efforts to write 
and phone in his article on the soccer match as he watches it. This section is the most 
divorced from memories of Tony, and is thus the purest example of a segment set 
entirely in the novel’s fictional present. It is also, as Nicolas Tredell observes, a 
portrait of “not ‘the writer,’ but writing” (36). For Tredell, the narrator of The 
Unfortunates is a cross between a transcription of Johnson’s thoughts on that day, and 
a retrospective narrator who is writing the text of The Unfortunates (36). This is 
apparent both in the orderly narratives that comprise each segment of the narrator’s 
memory, and in the narrator’s writerly searching for the correct fact and the correct 
word. We can see this separation—this criticism of the narrator’s present day 
thoughts—as he negotiates between his desire to eat and his guilt at being 
overweight: “[...] I enjoy eating in a strange city, I must eat anyway, I persuade 
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myself, wrongly, I should think, who knows, but on these jobs I feel so hungry [...]” 
(“Cast parapet” 1). The novel here attempts to capture a present-tense internal debate, 
but it does so by creating a narrator who actively narrates—and corrects—his 
thoughts. “I persuade myself, wrongly,” is either a self-narrating thought in a mind at 
a level of detachment from its own stream-of-consciousness debate, or else the 
intervention of a narrator in the process of writing the novel who cannot resist 
critiquing and correcting his thoughts even as he attempts to re-create them in written 
form. In either case, the stream of consciousness is framed by a writerly critique, 
retrospective if only by a split second, even though it remains in the present tense. 
 As the narrator watches the soccer match between City and United, however, 
negotiations between the present-tense stream of consciousness and the retrospective 
needs of the writer to get things right and to fit them into a particular form become 
explicit. From the beginning of the section, the narrator searches for a word that will 
satisfy both the need for accuracy and the need to provide evocative language (both 
the mimetic and the expressive): “The pitch worn, the worn patches, like  
 There might be an image there, I could use an image there, if I can think of 
one, at this stage of the season, it might too stand for what these two teams are like, 
are doing.    If I can think of one” (“The pitch worn” 1). 
Here, the narrator’s stream of consciousness—his immediate thoughts on his 
environment as he experiences it—are blended completely with his attempts to mold 
those thoughts into written language that will serve the purposes of a newspaper 
account of the match. It is impossible for the reader to determine whether “The pitch 
worn” is the thought in the narrator’s mind as he sees the field, or if it is already 
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retrospective, an attempt to think into writing a phenomenon already witnessed. There 
is the additional possibility that this is a comment on how writing as both a process 
and as a profession distorts thought and memory. Indeed, the narrator’s professional 
experience is a barrier to his ability to accurately capture in words the unique event 
before him: he cannot narrate the soccer match without concerning himself with how 
it compares to other soccer matches, cannot form the words without concerning 
himself with how they compare to other words about soccer matches. Having already 
reported on several matches this season, the narrator finds some difficulty writing 
about what these teams, this match, are like, particularly as he soon loses interest. The 
teams aren’t playing well, and he cannot drum up even a provisional rooting interest 
in any team other than his beloved Chelsea. The standard narrative frames, whether 
those of the fan, or of conventional sportswriting, prove inadequate for this particular 
match. That is, traditional narrative frameworks prove inadequate to the material 
provided by this particular match, much as a traditional narrative forms such as 
biography seemed inadequate to Johnson as a means for representing the randomness 
of Tony’s cancer as well as the experience of remembering him. The narrator, that is, 
cannot construct a fixed narrative line—even an unusual one—from the individual 
episodes of the match. 
 From this first difficulty finding a proper metaphor, the problem here is 
particularly one of middles. The pitch is a prospective image for something that has 
no particular shape. The match is of no particular importance, the teams of no 
particular importance. The moment in the season has no particular importance. The 
narrator searches for the start to a linear narrative, first in the hope that this will turn 
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out to be the rare extraordinary match: “The one moment, the one match. A new 
beginning, is it?   But already I suspect the worst of these two 
sides [...]” (“The pitch worn” 1). Neither the teams nor the time suggest a particular 
narrative, so the narrator must struggle to find a beginning, middle, and end for his 
story. The section follows him as he writes provisional sections of the story (given in 
italics), but the narrative crystallizes only with an ending: 
A fast, violently in-swinging cross from Kelvin was  proved too 
fast and inswung from Williams as the cent Christ! No! 
 That’s the story, then, the story, as the subs will think. It 
doesn’t matter what happens in the last eight minutes, that’s the match, 
that’s the story. 
 
It appeared the most innocuous of shots. Gordon, making ground from 
the position that used to be called right half back, felt that the United 
defence had fallen back sufficiently for him to try  a long shot, but 
mishit it with that anti-climactic inefficiency which had characterized 
the whole match and, as Edson advanced and  
 stooped academically correctly to gather the ground shot with 
his body behind it, some demon chance gremlin trog thought took 
over in Mull’s mind that he could stop it himself and accordingly stuck 
out a boot. To the chagrin of the rest of the United players however
   and the unholy delight of the City supporters 
(who must be used to and thrive on this kind of farce, be fed weaned on 
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it, welcome it) the ball spun lazily slowly inevitably off his boot in a 
lazy parabola as some would say looping up and clear of the still 
stooping Edson’s now upreaching arms to bounce once before 
crossing the line into the back of the United net. That leaves the goalie 
in a very strange position, posture. (“The pitch worn” 8-9). 
The farcical goal here is subordinated to the narrator’s consciousness, but specifically 
to his consciousness as a writer. The choice of the narrative to follow the writer’s 
consciousness results, in turn, in a split between the apprehensions of the narrator and 
the apprehensions of the reader: the reporter knows what has happened from the 
exclamation “Christ! No!” but the reader must wait for the italicized words to be 
written in the notebook. Knowledge of impressions is here explicitly dependent on 
the writer’s ability to formulate expressions. 
 Furthermore, the expressions are dependent on the writer’s ability both to 
find, in the moment of writing, the right word, but also on the writer’s ability 
determine the story. The narrator’s hesitations (represented by white space in the text) 
and revisions (“demon chance gremlin trog”) bring together in-the-moment 
consciousness with writerly retrospection: once again, Johnson calls attention to the 
difficulty of capturing, of reifing, the flow of time when every point of view 
inevitably imposes its own temporal flow. The narrator’s mind reaches for language 
of a religious nature for even this anti-climax (“demon,” “unholy”), an attempt to 
dramatize the absence of drama and tie the ephemeral to the eternal. The most crucial 
narrative choice made by the narrator, however, is not linguistic or metaphorical. 
Rather, it is the authoritative decision he makes to determine that this moment is the 
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end of the story, though he is reluctant to imbue this authority entirely in himself (“as 
the subs will think”). The moment that ends the story is near the end of the match, but 
is not itself the end of the match. Even in systems such as sporting events that have 
rules to determine their beginnings and ends, narrative, whether determined 
collectively (by the conventions of sportswriting, by common assumptions about the 
probabilities of various outcomes) or individually (by a particular writer, by the coach 
who removes his star players from the game) remains an irregular arbiter of 
beginning, middle, and end. The middle of the game is such that any moment, given 
the proper match between story and event, may become critical, may become the end. 
In the act of writing, middle is not defined by a predetermined beginning and end; 
instead, beginning and end are plucked out of an indeterminate middle. That 
indeterminate middle that is being molded into a story here (as in The Unfortunates) 
is ever-receding memory, which writing and consciousness attempt to bar off within a 
beginning and ending. 
 Ultimately, however, the narrator chooses to write a story that frames a 
narrative not of the match itself, but of an experience of the match, much as The 
Unfortunates itself is a novel about the experience of remembering a dead friend, 
rather than about the friend himself (or even the memories themselves). In the case of 
the match, this approach allows the ending of the narrator’s story to extend beyond 
the end, for narrative purposes, of the match itself. The section ends with the narrator 
calling in his story, and we hear the image’s final place in the story’s first sentence: 
“Skill was as uncommon as grass  on the bone hyphen bare bone hyphen 
bare pitch  on which City beat United one hyphen nil [...]” (“The pitch 
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worn” 9-10). The image finds the object for which it is a metaphor in the sheer 
ineptitude of the play. This story of ineptitude, and the way the metaphor which 
begins the phoned-in story reflects the narrator’s own first experience of the match, is 
like many modernist stories: it is not a story of exceptional importance or of 
exceptional people, but instead of an arbitrary time period in a place to which the 
narrator is arbitrarily assigned. Furthermore, despite hewing fairly closely to the 
conventions of sports journalism, the account the narrator phones in roughly follows 
his own experience of the match. The story begins, as the section of The Unfortunates 
does, with the image of the torn-up field. It ends with little attention to the on-field 
play after the lone goal is scored: “The remaining eight minutes  were 
played out to the continuing sound  of the City supporters s apostrophe 
delight at the goal comma […] For they are that kind of crowd comma  and 
this was indeed their kind of match full point. That’s the lot, that’s the end” (“The 
pitch worn” 12). The narrator’s story thus ends not with a logical consequence of 
actions on the field, and not even with the chronological ending to events on the field. 
Instead, it ends with a characterization of the crowd to match the characterization of 
the players with which the report begins. The narrator gives his story a unity of tone 
rather than a causal narrative. And that tone is a very modernist sense of alienation—
from the match, from the city, from the people around the narrator, from the act of 
storytelling. Between a beginning and ending that frame this sense of alienation, there 
is a seemingly random event that gives the match a result, if not a meaning. Like 
Tony’s death, the goal at the soccer match is both shocking and deadening, an event 
in the middle which startles, but ultimately only confirms the meaninglessness of the 
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whole. Even this attempt to find meaning in meaninglessness, however, is ultimately 
stifled. On the inside of the box, the final version of the story is printed. In this 
version of the story, both the opening metaphor of the pitch and the final description 
of the crowd have been cut. Here, the story ends, “And then farce. Gordon hit a fierce 
shot, the ball struck Mull’s outstretched foot and went over Edson into the goal.” 
Space limitations—and the conventions of journalism—limit the scope of the story. 
From the perspective of the narrator’s version of the story, this final version is all 
middle, both spatially and temporally: it contains its narrative to the field and to the 
long middle of the match (the first event narrated comes “Within the first ten 
minutes,” while the last comes with eight minutes to spare). Ironically, this version of 
the story was not printed in the first edition of the novel, which was more purely a 
book in (that is, in the middle of, not printed on) a box. 
 The two sections from the middle of The Unfortunates that I have discussed at 
length (“Up there, yes,” “The pitch worn”) are the longest in the novel. The second-
shortest describes Tony’s funeral. In the shortest of all, the narrator learns of Tony’s 
death: 
June rang on the Saturday, was it, or the Thursday before, no, quite 
late, we had already arranged to go, though what arrangements could 
we have needed to make, saying there was no need for us to come 
down now, on Sunday, for he had died that evening, had not recovered 
consciousness that morning from his sleep, but previously there had 
been the opposite of a relapse, three days when his mind had been 
virtually normal, for which she had been grateful, June, it had seemed 
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like a miracle, though he still could not move, his mind had come back 
and they had talked very seriously about everything, for the first time 
had talked about death. 
This is the complete text of the section. It is, as Tredell notes, a remarkably second-
hand moment (Tredell 39). Partly, this is a recognition of the narrator’s own distance 
from his subject: he is not important enough in Tony’s life to have a final, intimate 
conversation. (His own conversations with Tony are generally either light or 
intellectual.) However, the narrator not only makes no attempt to re-create Tony and 
June’s final conversation with any specificity, despite his perhaps-ironic assertion 
elsewhere that, “generalizations are useless” (“Time” 3). The narrator does not here 
express any specific frustrations at this fact, but his own reluctance to conjure 
factually dubious specifics robs this conversation (and many other moments in the 
novel) of the realistic specificity that might give them uniqueness. Johnson is devoted 
to avoiding generalization because, “In general, generalization is to lie, to tell lies” 
(“LAST” 6), but that same determination to avoid telling lies often commits his 
narrative to, if not quite generalization, a limitation to only general facts, from which 
the reader may make generalizations. Tony and June’s talk about death becomes not a 
specific talk about death, but is reduced to the words which denote it: “a talk about 
death.” The deathbed conversation is thus fully nominalized: it is contained wholly in 
a noun-phrase, rather than a story with a temporal profile. 
 Even the narrator’s conversation with June, however, receives strangely 
attenuated description. This event would seem to form a possible short middle for the 
narrative of The Unfortunates: the death of Tony the central event from which 
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extends, in the one direction, Tony’s life and, in the other direction, the narrator’s 
remembering of that life. In a chronological ordering of the novel that places 
memories of Tony before the account of the narrator’s day, this section would in fact 
come fairly near the middle—the sixteenth or seventeenth out of twenty-seven 
sections. Nevertheless, and despite the narrator’s self-acknowledged “solipsism” 
(“LAST” 6), the narrator does not delve deeply into his own consciousness in the 
moment of the phone call. In the novel’s final sentence, the narrator does attempt to 
analyze the importance of Tony’s death: “Not how he died, not what he died of, even 
less why he died, are of concern, to me, only the fact that he did die, he is dead, is 
important: the loss to me, to us” (“LAST” 6). When the novel narrates the moment at 
which the narrator learns of this loss, provides no such retrospective assessment. But 
it also does not provide the a stream-of-consciousness rendering of the importance. 
We may surmise that the narrator’s mind was largely blank at that moment (though he 
might have said so). We might surmise that his memory of that moment is likewise 
blank. But what seems more likely is that this final assessment—that only the fact of 
Tony’s death is important—has overruled Johnson’s intent to render his memories 
(and the consciousness of memory) as fully as possible, as stated in Aren’t You 
Rather Young to Be Writing Your Memoirs?. Instead, what might have been the 
novel’s emotional core is concerned primarily with getting the day correct. This is 
typical of the method of The Unfortunates: more often than not, the novel represents 
the mind as it attempts to peg down memories. This technique is at its starkest in the 
starkest moment of the novel. 
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 By contrast, when the narrator first hears that Tony has cancer, the narrator 
does give his reactions: “[...] he wrote to say he was in hospital for the removal of a 
tumour in the neck, on the neck, and would not therefore be at  home when I came: 
but I could see him in hospital, if I cared to, and I did, it worried me, shocked me, 
thinking the obvious, yes, I cared to very much, when I heard” (“Just as it seemed” 5). 
More details of the cancer (June tells the narrator it is in Tony’s collarbone) follow. 
The narrator is equally forthcoming with his less sympathetic reactions: “No, he 
couldn’t read, in the circumstances, and I could never understand why, all through his 
illness, that it deprived him of his ability to read [...]” (“Just as it seemed” 7). In 
general, Johnson does not spare himself, shows himself to be, though a devoted 
friend, self-interested in his dealings with Tony, impatient when Tony is no longer 
able to edit his novels. All these emotions are rendered retrospectively—they are facts 
to be remembered, just as the letter from Tony and the day of the phone call from 
June are facts to be remembered. But, in the moment of death (or, rather, the delayed 
moment of the notification of death, when death is apprehended), emotional facts are 
entirely absent. It is impossible to tell whether it is the narrator, remembering that 
phone call at some indeterminate time during a day in his dead friend’s hometown, 
who declines to examine his own reactions at that crucial moment, or whether it is the 
writer, transforming a day of remembering into a novelistic expression, who chooses 
to elide the emotional content of this memory. Ultimately, though, the effect is one a 
narrated mind that obsessively attempts to fix the inconsequential (the day of the 
week) in order to avoid looking to deeply at the consequences of death. 
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 This undernarrated phone call may be the second section in the novel for the 
reader, and it may be the twenty-sixth. The presence of the “FIRST” section, 
however, guarantees that it will not be the first time the reader learns of Tony’s death; 
conversely, the “LAST” section guarantees that Tony’s death cannot be the last event 
of the novel. By containing Tony’s death somewhere in the middle of the novel, 
Johnson guarantees that the reader’s knowledge of Tony’s death will not coincide 
with the moment the past-tense version of the narrator learns of his death. The reader 
is thus separated from the narrator’s experience of Tony’s death on a broader 
narrative level. Furthermore, that death is not allowed the priority of beginning or 
ending. This priority is reserved for the narrator as he gets off a train and as a train 
pulls away from town, respectively. 
 The journey to and from memory is thus prioritized—and the middle of The 
Unfortunates serves as a formal expression of that memory. The Unfortunates, and by 
extension its theory of memory, is not like traditional narrative, with a fixed syuzhet, 
however anachronous, corresponding to a fixed fabula. Nor is it like many modernist 
narratives, where a fixed fabula is implied, but may be difficult or impossible to 
construct with certainty from the syuzhet, which may contain both anachronies and 
achronies, as well as other narrative devices that produce epistemological difficulties. 
Nor, like much postmodernist literature, does The Unfortunates go further and create 
a fabula that is itself unfixed or unstable, creating ontological difficulties. Instead, It 
is an odd combination of fixed fabula and radically unfixed syuzhet that nevertheless 
poses relatively few difficulties in reconstructing the fabula, but instead foregrounds 
epistemological problems related to the meaning of events and their relationship to 
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memory: a mixture of the ordered and the disordered, of the stream of consciousness 
and the judgment of the writer. In so doing, The Unfortunates attempts to examine the 
epistemological problems of memory and narrative as a thing, rather than as a 
process—a probing of the epistemological problems related to turning events 
(particularly, for Johnson, true events) into memories and memories into novels. 
 This middle layers memory upon memory, as it remembers a day of 
remembering. It questions the accuracy of memory even as it attempts to preserve 
memory as a fact in itself. It suggests that the apprehension of narratives, of stories—
of beginnings and endings—threatens to distort prior memories, yet it operates within 
its own fixed beginning and ending. By giving the reader a choice in the ordering the 
text, it suggests the possibility of a writerly text—a text whose form and meaning are 
subject to the whims and interpretations of the reader. But the same randomness 
which suggests this possibility also destroys it: the reader has no real choice, beyond 
whether and how many times to shuffle the pages. The Unfortunates suggests that, 
while memory is unlikely to re-create the exact chronological order of events, or even 
the order of previous acts of remembering, it does preserve some of time’s original 
chronological ordering. What’s more, it maintains a certain confidence that events do 
happen in a particular chronological order, and that that chronological order can be 
mostly (if not completely) recovered. But it is recovered as an object, not as an 
experience. This is what it means for memory to be nominalized: we can gather up 
what we know of our past, of our memories, we can evaluate their veracity, and we 
can put them in a box—but we cannot re-create the experience of them. We know the 
past, and the memories which contain it, happens in time—but we know it only in our 
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own time. Rather than push his readers into an experience of their own unique time, 
The Unfortunates and its randomized middle seeks only to alienate its readers from 
the temporal profile of Johnson’s past, and of his memories, which have become only 




Chapter 6: Indivisible Form, Divided:  
The Middle as Leap from Modernism to Postmodernism in 
Brigid Brophy’s In Transit 
 The Anglo-Irish novelist Brigid Brophy’s 1969 In Transit: An Heroi-Cyclic 
Novel begins where The Waste-Land ends: with the cross-cultural, multi-linguistic 
disintegration of language. It ends, in postmodernist fashion, with an explicit nod to 
the Baroque, with an address to the reader that puts into question the relationship 
between narrator and reader, fiction and reality. The novel’s middle both dramatizes 
the transition from the end of high modernism, with its linguistic dance between order 
and chaos, to the simultaneously iconoclastic and traditionalist meta-storytelling of 
postmodernism, while also serving as the glue that binds these two narrative modes 
into a single novel. Brophy’s novel, written in the age of counterculture and nascent 
postmodernism, dramatizes this transition through its themes of gender and genre as 
well as language, linking a late modernist beginning to a postmodernist end with a 
leap across ontological boundaries. By shifting from modernism and postmodernism 
through an actual textual middle, Brophy takes her readers with her across the chasm 
between modernist and postmodernist approaches. This shift goes beyond a change in 
narrative direction or a change in formal approach to the narrative (though it is both 
of those): it is an upending of the very ontological status of the story being narrated 
and the world in which it takes place. In making this profound shift, Brophy builds on 
the structurally-important middles of modernist novels, showing both the limitations 
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of the modernist approach and the potential uses of the middle in a pluralistic and 
postmodernist future. 
 Brian McHale’s theories of modernist and postmodernist fiction have formed 
the basis for the definition of modernism used in this study. Modernism and 
postmodernism are distinguished in his work not by historical periodization, by their 
relationship to the concept of the modern, or to a list of typical traits or techniques 
(though McHale does often supply the latter). Instead, they are distinguished by the 
concept of the dominant, which McHale credits to Jurij Tynjanov via Roman 
Jakobson. For McHale’s (and our) purposes, the dominant is the primary focus of the 
work, conceived by McHale in this case as a philosophical category around which a 
work structures its thematics. For modernism, the dominant is the epistemological, 
while for postmodernism, the dominant is the ontological. That is, modernism is 
concerned with questions about the nature of knowledge, while postmodernism is 
concerned with questions about the nature of the world. However, a thematic 
epistemological or ontological dominant is not enough to make a work modernist or 
postmodernist. McHale connects each philosophical category with a type of genre 
fiction: the epistemological with detective fiction; the ontological with science 
fiction. These genres explore their dominants thematically, as well as through plot 
mechanics. However, they differ from modernism and postmodernism in that the -
isms incorporate the dominant in their poetics as well as their thematics. 
 The line between postmodernism and world-building genre fiction such as 
science fiction or fantasy is a good deal thinner than the difference between 
modernism and detective fiction or other mystery-driven forms of realism. This is 
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because postmodernism concerns the nature of the world itself—which can be 
destabilized not only by literary technique, as such, but by the choice of a high-
concept world. That is, the poetics of postmodernism cannot easily be confined to a 
separate category of “literary technique” as can the poetics of modernism. This 
perhaps at least partly explains why postmodernism is often identified with a self-
aware return to traditional genre writing as it is with “difficult” writing by authors 
such as Thomas Pynchon.
30
 This also may explain how easily many popular art forms 
incorporate or anticipate postmodernist techniques (particularly to humorous effect), 
from the flexible physics and repeated breaking of the fourth wall found in Looney 
Tunes to the literary mash-ups and hopping between books found in, for example, the 
stories of Woody Allen and the novels of Jasper Fforde.
31
 That is, the breaking of 
ontological boundaries is a well-founded popular form of storytelling and joke-
telling, based, at least in part, on the delight involved in both disturbing and 
confirming our expectations of genre and world stability. So, when examining the 
presence of both modernism and postmodernism in In Transit, I will argue that the 
novel’s postmodernism is both an extension of modernism and its techniques into the 
realm of the ontological, and a return to the traditional realms of genre writing and 
popular joke-telling. 
                                                 
30 See, for example, The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century English Literature, which includes 
“period pastiche” such as A. S. Byatt’s Possession: A Romance to be a key strain “of Postmodern 
British fiction, which by reanimating styles from the literary tradition, explores the relation of that 
tradition to the fate of language and literary culture in the contemporary era” (Murphet 722).  
31 Allen’s “The Kugelmass Episode” tells the story of a bored professor who enters the text of 
Flaubert’s Madame Bovary in order to engage in an affair with its protagonist, who eventually finds 
her way into the real world; in Fforde’s The Eyre Affair, the protagonist must prevent a villain from 
erasing Jane Eyre from all copies of the novel by entering the book itself. The novel and its sequels 
contain many similar crossings between “real” and “fictional” worlds. 
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 McHale’s lists of the questions posed by modernism and postmodernism are 
especially useful for illuminating the difference between In Transit’s two halves. 
McHale begins with the Cognitive and Postcognitive Questions, proposed by Dick 
Higgins in A Dialectic of Centuries (1978) as the fundamental questions posed by 
20th-century artists before and after approximately 1958. The Cognitive Questions 
become McHale’s epistemological questions of modernism: “How can I interpret this 
world of which I am a part? And what am I in it?” (qtd. in McHale 9). To these, 
McHale adds, “What is there to be known?; Who knows it?; How do they know it, 
and with what degree of certainty?; How is knowledge transmitted from one knower 
to another, and with what degree of reliability?; How does the object of knowledge 
change as it passes from knower to knower?; What are the limits of the knowable?” 
(McHale 9). These epistemological questions are specified in In Transit as questions 
about the main character’s gender and questions about language as a medium of 
knowledge and transmission of knowledge, in addition to questions for the reader of 
how to translate the modernist narrative’s account of a character’s perceptions into 
knowledge about the story and its world. The Postcognitive Questions become 
McHale’s ontological questions of postmodernism: “Which world is this? What is to 
be done in it? Which of my selves is to do it?” (qtd. in McHale 10). In Transit poses 
in its second half questions of radical action in a constantly shifting reality, where the 
main character is split into multiple selves. We have encountered multiple selves 
already in Heppenstall’s Saturnine, but whereas that earlier novel grounded the 
splitting of the self in the internal psychology of its narrator, Frobisher, in In Transit 
the split is presented externally, to the point where this split seems to effect changes 
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in the diegetic reality of the novel. McHale’s additional questions address the 
dominance of genre play and overt shifting literary forms in the novel’s second half: 
“What is a world?; What kinds of world are there, how are they constituted, and how 
do they differ?; What happens when different kinds of world are placed in 
confrontation, or when boundaries between worlds are violated?; What is the mode of 
existence of a text, and what is the mode of existence of the world (or worlds) it 
projects?; How is a projected world structured?” (McHale 10). Throughout In Transit, 
most of the epistemological and ontological questions are raised to one degree or 
another. 
 Contrary to previous critics who read In Transit  primarily as a unitary (if 
progressive) exploration of language, gender, and literary technique, I argue that the 
dominant concerns as well as poetics of In Transit undergo a major shift in the middle 
of the novel. Hopkins, for example, argues that the novel is postmodernist from the 
start: 
The self-consciousness within the narrating voice of the problems of 
stream of consciousness narration is striking and an index of the 
novel’s obsession with narration and language. Indeed, this metafictive 
quality (an awareness of fiction as an issue to be explicitly emphasized 
with the fiction itself) and the simultaneous self-awareness and 
fragmentation of the narrator over numerous different kinds of 
discourse take this novel towards postmodernism in a more obvious 
sense than that suggested earlier as applicable to Brophy. (Hopkins 17) 
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Obsession with narration and language, however, is a quality common to modernist 
narrative texts, notably those of Conrad, Joyce, and Faulkner. The fragmentation of 
the narrator of In Transit is, on the other hand, a second-half occurrence. 
Fragmentation, too, is a common modernist trope. It is the realization of these 
modernist concerns in the novel’s second half as transformations in the story world 
and the rules that govern its functioning as well as its narration that marks the 
transition between epistemological and ontological. This shift is worthy of 
investigation in its own right, as a technical device and a structural feature of 
Brophy’s novel. It is also worthy of investigation as it relates to how we read the 
nove’’s themes of gender and language: for it posits a fundamental disjunction 
between the language of the self and its construction of gender, and the languages of 
the world and their very different constructions of gender. While In Transit suggests 
that the lines between the ontological and epistemological are porous, it also 
establishes that they exist. In In Transit, there is both and essential self with a 
coherent identity and limited knowledge, and multiple social selves—and it is the 
anxiety of transmission between the two, particularly in regards to gender, which 
fuels the novel. 
 In Transit uses music as inspiration to mark itself as a complete work of art 
formed of disparate parts. In Transit is divided into four sections, plus a brief 
CODETTA. All five have a primary title and a subtitle; the former is thematic, while 
the latter always a typical title of a movement of a classical symphony or sonata. The 
four main sections also have a supertitle, indicating (often playfully) the section 





Allegro non troppo 
 
sexshuntwo 






Scherzo and Fugue 
 
section four 
LET IT ALL COME BREAKDOWN 





While each section of In Transit has, to a certain extent, its own themes and its own 
poetics, the middle which takes us from Section 2 to Section 3 represents a 
fundamental shift in the novel’s dominant. We can see this reflected in the section 
titles themselves. LINGUISTIC LEPROSY foregrounds both language and 
disintegration, both prototypical modernist concerns. The chapter itself follows the 
narrator’s decision to remain in the international transit lounge of an airport, 
memories of childhood trauma and transplantation from Ireland to England, as well as 
the difficulties of knowing the world through language, especially given the 
internationalization of language(s). THE CASE OF THE MISSING (RE)MEMBER, 
as a title, echoes detective fiction, McHale’s genre-fiction twin of modernism. It 
concerns the narrator’s struggle to determine his or her gender. Both of these sections 
take place in a stable, realistic world—the difficulty for both narrator and reader is in 
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determining facts about that world and the plot through the narrator’s limited and 
perhaps distorted perceptions. DE REBUS, on the other hand immediately moves us 
from knowledge and perception to things themselves. The main character (no longer 
narrator) alternates and later splits him/herself between the genders, encountering 
often impossible characters and situations that both demonstrate and place the main 
character in various well-defined gender roles, often drawn from literary genres. LET 
IT ALL COME BREAKDOWN once again refers to things, rather than perceptions, 
with unconventional (broken?) grammar—but the concern is not simply “things,” but 
the world itself. Appropriately, it is not just the adventures of a single main character 
that undergo postmodernist destabilization. The narrative now follows multiple 
characters, some or none of whom may be offshoots of the main character, in 
alternating narrative tones and genres, as the airport is taken over by revolutionaries. 
At this stage, for the first time, therefore, there is something resembling a traditional 
plot for a popular narrative: there are large-scale events, and they come to a climax 
when a man who has usurped the control tower from the revolutionaries deliberately 
causes two planes to crash into each other. The CODETTA continues the 
postmodernist trend while grounding itself in a partial technical return to the first two 
sections: the main character returns as narrator and offers three endings, including a 
gesture to the reader. All of these are typical postmodernist techniques, calling 
attention to the ambiguous relationship between the world of the novel and the real 
world, as well as the relationship which has been central to In Transit as a whole: the 
relationship between writer, narrator, and reader. 
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 In Transit’s musical subtitles also emphasize the novel’s overall structure as a 
juxtaposing of disparate parts. Like the “titles” of movements of actual classical 
works, the novel’s subtitles are descriptions of form and style, often literally simply 
an instruction to the player(s) regarding the speed at which the movement is to be 
played.
32
 “Allegro non troppo,” for example, literally means “not too fast,” but, 
combined with the knowledge that this is a first movement, indicates the sonata 
allegro form, which prescribes a particular pattern for the development of thematic 
material and also connotes a certain amount of musical seriousness or “weightiness.” 
“Scherzo and Fugue,” on the other hand, is literally a joke and a flight. In music, a 
scherzo is a movement of lighter character, generally associated with Classical and 
Romantic-era music of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centures. The fugue is a 
musical form most strongly associate with Bach and the Baroque era, where multiple 
musical lines or voices “chase after” each other; the form was also often improvised, 
though it is often considered weightier than a scherzo, especially when employed in a 
                                                 
32 Annegret Maack argues that these subtitles are taken from Brahms’ Fourth Symphony, “conceived 
as a renunciation of the classical three-movement symphony”  (44). This is problematic on both 
counts. Only the first and fourth movements match Brahms exactly. Furthermore, the four-
movement symphony was long-established by the time Brahms wrote his symphonies. Haydn, for 
example, wrote his later symphonies in four movements. It is also worth noting that, even in his 
own lifetime, Brahms, despite a number of musical innovations, was set up as the avatar of the 
conservative camp, opposed to Wagner’s attempts to inaugurate a new approach to music. Thus, 
while a four- or five-movement work may signal an association with Romanticism and its 
stretching of Classical (and Baroque) forms, this is in the manner of an extension, rather than a 
renunciation. If Brophy allies herself with Romanticism, it is with the Classical branch of 
Romanticism. In the 1965 essay “A Literary Person’s Guide to the Opera,” Brophy wrote, “my own 
deepest conviction is that form is one and indivisible, and constant for all the arts. (The most 
copybook example I know of ‘sonata form’ is Andrew Marvell’s poem ‘To His Coy Mistress’.)” 
(Don’t Never Forget 109). Brophy’s musical subtitles are part of a formalist, not an anti-formalist, 
project, a connection with rather than a breaking-off from both the forms of the past and the forms 




more classical context, as by Beethoven. Single movements that include both scherzo 
and fugue are most common in the latter half of the twentieth century, coinciding 
with a postmodern move to revisit traditional musical forms. “Scherzo and Fugue” in 
particular thus speaks directly to a postmodernist impulse to re-purpose, hybridize, 
and juxtapose traditional forms. 
In general, the section sub-titles are, metaphorically, statements about each 
section’s genre. Collectively, they indicate not only a parallel musical form, but 
specifically the form of a concert-piece that collects into a single work multiple 
sections with independent styles and themes. Traditionally, these movements would 
be connected by a key, a tonal center which grounds the movements and describes 
their relationship to each other. The further we get from late eighteenth-century 
classicism, however, the more the movement’s fixed relationship to a key is broken; 
simultaneously, later works are more likely to connect the movements thematically. 
The musical form implies a connection between the novel’s unstable form and the 
unstable forms of classical music, both of which seek to bind together a large amount 
of often disparate material into a unitary whole. In any such work, the question of the 
middle is essential: beginnings and endings can supply thematic material, and they 
can supply direction (from the former or towards the later) in which the thematic 
material is developed, but as single points, they cannot hold a long work together. 
Middles define the relationship between beginning and end—they define how the 
disparate materials of a novel are bound together, for they are themselves the binding. 
The modernist middles I have been exploring bind explicitly disparate materials—
277 
 
they are perched between or represent themselves differing genres, points of view, 
times, settings, and literary techniques.  
 Like The Golden Bowl, In Transit has a middle which crucially shifts the 
novel’s point of view around clear textual markings. In both cases, the shift is 
effected by an event in the narrated world. Unlike The Golden Bowl, however, In 
Transit narrates the event directly, without any prolepsis or analepsis to separate 
fabula from syuzhet, and the shift in point of view does not line up neatly with the 
marked sections of the novel. In Transit’s shift from modernism to postmodernism 
occurs both thematically and, most important for the present study, in narrative 
technique. It is represented in the world of the story by the protagonist’s passing 
through a doorway and out of the Aristotelian unity of place provided by the Transit 
Lounge. In the narrative discourse, this shift is represented by a switch from first-
person to third-person narration. Both these shifts are metaphors for an exit from the 
interior world of modernism, the world of a mind’s attempt to know a fixed world, to 
the exterior world of postmodernism, where the self can be known only through the 
social, physical, and discursive environment, but where that environment is itself as 
unstable as modernist perception. 
 Both of these transitions are strongly connected to the protagonist’s search for 
a stable gender identity. The first-person narrator disappears, with a suicide note, one 
chapter after acquiring a male gender identity, “hurling myself from top to bottom” 
(114). That is, the end of the first-person narrator is figured as a suicide, precipitated 
by the determination of gender. The narrator’s flight down the stairs, from the transit 
lounge proper to the lavatory, becomes a leap into death. At this point, the first-
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person narrator transforms into the third-person O’Rooley. Confidently entering the 
men’s lavatory, O’Rooley takes advantage of the privacy and searches for physical 
proof of gender, but finds that “Something – flesh briefly veiled by underclothes – 
was there, but not in the expected form” (117). To this point, the narrator has 
attempted to resolve gender confusion based on the performance of gender roles in 
public: how the narrator is dressed, how others react to the narrator, the narrator’s 
memories of behavior and encounters with others in the past. The narrator has 
assumed a fundamental coherence between gender and sex; when one has been 
determined, the other will be as well. The narrator is therefore left with an 
epistemological problem, attempting to gather knowledge of gender from the 
comically unavailable or ambiguous evidence. Sexshuntoo has been the Tale of the 
Missing Remember: a modernist mystery concerning the difficulty of determining 
reality using the unreliable medium of subjective memory. Once the narrator is able 
to confront the body in private, however, the chapter is transformed into the Tale of 
the Missing Member. Rather than using gender performance to epistemologically 
determine sex, the novel from this point uses sex to ontologically determine gender. 
The disappearance of the first-person narrator at this point abets this shift: gender is 
now something that is determined extradiegetically, a fact of the story-narrated from 
outside, rather than a diegetic hypothesis. 
 At the end of Sexshuntwo, the now-female protagonist Patricia “crept through 
the gap and stood upright,” exiting not only the transit lounge, but the building itself 
(124). The language suggests both birth and development. That is, Patricia is born or 
grows into the novel’s second half, which will be dominated by gender roles that are 
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performative in a Butlerian sense, but a sense that is particularized to narrative. Butler 
clarifies her definition of gender performativity in order to repudiate what she sees as 
a misunderstand of her use of the term: 
The misapprehension about gender performativity is this: that gender 
is a choice, or that gender is a role, or that gender is a construction that 
one puts on, as one puts on clothes in the morning, that there is a ‘one’ 
who is prior to this gender, a one who goes to the wardrobe of gender 
and decides with deliberation which gender it will be today. (Butler 
21) 
Instead, Butler argues, “Gender is performative insofar as it is the effect of a regulator 
regime of gender differences in which genders are divided and hierarchized under 
constraint. Social constraints, taboos, prohibitions, threats of punishment operate in 
the ritualized repetition of norms, and this repetition constitutes the temporalized 
scene of gender construction and destabilization” (Butler 21). In Transit’s 
narrator/protagonist(s) is not capable of deciding his or her gender—instead, gender is 
something that must be epistemologically determined, according to a given set of 
criteria. In the novel’s second half, this protagonist will undergo multiple instances of 
gender construction and destabilization, according to outside constraints. These 
constraints, however, are not purely social.
33
 Instead, the constraints are particularly 
genre constraints, as Brophy investigates the ways particular gender roles are 
embedded in—and perhaps created by—particular literary (and other artistic) 
conventions. That is, in the postmodernist second half of Brophy’s novel, literary 
                                                 
33
 Although it is particularly notable that social constraints prevent the narrator from determining his or 
her gender in the novel’s first half: Pat is constrained from taking off his or her clothes in public. 
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performance (on the part of an author or narrator) is like both analogous to and deeply 
bound up with Butlerian gender performance. However, the novel’s modernist first 
half does, contra Butler, suggest a self that exists prior to gender—suggested 
metaphorically as a self in the womb or in childhood. And In Transit goes even 
further: this pre-gendered self is more of a self than a gendered self could possibly be: 
only this pre-gendered self is a subject, rather than an object, narrator rather than 
narrated. Nevertheless, Butler’s rule still applies: the first-person narrator cannot 
simply choose a gender at will; and, indeed, even the ungendered nature of the 
narrator is presented not as a choice, but as an absence against which the narrator 
struggles: an absence of normal memory and normal evidence, and then an absence of 
normal genitalia (here invoking Freud, but possibly suggesting the presence of some 
sort of transgendered genitalia). There is either the pre-gendered subject or the object 
of constantly shifting genre-related gender constraints. But the subject is not the pre-
modernist stable subject: it is an unstable modernist subject, grasping for 
determinable gender. 
 In Transit tackles these issues of gender throughout, but particularly in its two 
middle sections. However, the modernist approach that dominates the first half of the 
novel represents a fundamentally different approach to gender than that offered in the 
novel’s latter half. This difference—and the novel’s very leap into a postmodernist 
approach, is driven by Brophy’s views on the relationship between gender, identity, 
consciousness, and art. Section One ends with the narrator’s musing on the meaning 
of the story of Orestes, as told in the gender-bending (and mythology-mixing) Italian 
opera Alitalia, which is being piped over the public-address system. Pat ponders “why 
281 
 
the chorus describe themselves as all akin to Orestes” (58). Pat concludes that this is 
“a metaphor of the social nature of the act of art,” “a metarphor of the social nature of 
an operatic performance and the hybrid structure of opera as an artistic form 
(opera=coopera),” and “an epidomized though no doubt […] unconscious account of 
the socio-texture of Italian life” (58). This interpretation is followed by the chorus 
listing various ties of kinship (59). The move to the social realm here is in stark 
contrast to the novel’s opening sentence, “Ce qui m’étonnait qui’it was my French 
that disintegrated first” (11). This opening sentence announces the novel’s interest in 
multi-linguistic puns, language, and the classic modernist trope of disintegration. The 
sentences that follow further clarify that this first section of the novel will be 
concerned with the narrative “I,” and the complex relationship it creates between 
narrator (with some powers of retrospecitivity that allow the French, in some sense, to 
be retained) and the “I” that exists within the world of the narrative: 
Thus I expounded my affliction, an instant after I noticed its onset. My 
words went, of course, unvoiced. A comic-strippist would balloon 
them under the heading THINKS – a pretty convention, but a 
convention just the same. For instance, is the ‘THINKS’ part of the 
thought, implying the thinker is aware of thinking? 
   Moreover, and this is a much more important omission – comic 
strips don’t shew whom the thoughts are thought to. (11) 
The as-yet-unnamed Pat is here revealed to be a complex construction, without 
French and yet with French, speaking and yet not speaking. Language, the narrator 
seems to indicate, is inherently social, yet the conventions of narrative prose as well 
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as the conventions of thought itself allow for or even demand a sort of internal 
narrative, a social transaction with, seemingly, a single party. The language used by 
the passage itself emphasizes the drive to internal language: the French that is lost is 
“my” French (or not lost—the meaning of “disintegration” is never quite clear in In 
Transit, and this, too, may be taken as a critique of modernist anxiety, where change 
and commingling and epistemological difficulties are sometimes made synonymous 
with loss). The words and affliction, too, are “my,” and two “I”s at the top of the 
novel’s second paragraph announce the section’s solipsism. 
 So, by the end of Section One, we are moving toward a view of the self and its 
language as socially constructed—or, rather, moving toward an exploration of the 
social aspects of the construction of the self. The “I,” however, remains, and is able to 
consider the social as something essential but in some crucial way separate. 
Sexshuntwo begins, “I was a fine one to have declared myself out of sympathy with 
lost identities. Before a cock or a contralto could reasonably have crowed thrice, and 
while my system still pulsed to the informally fugal effect of that splendid closing 
chorus from Alitalia” (63). Identity—defined by Alitalia and Pat’s reading of the 
opera as social in nature—has become the crucial question of the novel. However, the 
meaning of the word itself—much like the meaning of “disintegration” or “I,” is 
definitively ambiguous. While Sexshuntwo will for the first time make gender issues 
a primary theme of the novel, in the beginning of Sexshuntwo gender and identity are 
two separate issues entirely: 
there went missing in my own mind not, indeed, my sense of my 
identity (on which I retained a clear, firm clasp throughout the 
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lamentable incident which I am now going, in a manner as 
straightforward and circumstantial as I can muster, to narrate) but a 
piece of information which, though less individual to me than my 
identity, was in certain immediate respects even more vital. (In Transit 
63) 
The even more vital piece of information referred to by the narrator is the knowledge 
of the narrator’s own anatomical sex and gender. 
 The narrator seems to reject the view of identity as a pure social construct, the 
view associated with the more extreme interpretations of Butler’s performativity that 
Butler eventually rejected. Nevertheless, identity is first invoked in the social realm—
a loss of identity being somehow a loss of a sense of kinship with others. Identity here 
is not the same thing as consciousness, and particularly not the linguistic aspect of 
consciousness that is reproducible through language. Modernist stream-of-
consciousness narrative gives us partial access to consciousness, but this 
consciousness is itself already a social mediation of identity itself. Consciousness 
may be socially permeable, even partly readable, but identity is not. Sheryl Stevenson 
argues that In Transit throughout (but especially following Pat’s gender confusion) is 
an extension of the Bakhtinian mix of discourses into a world of unstable language 
and gender norms: 
A hodgepodge of voices, the first-person narrative conveys a psyche so 
permeated by social discourses that it seems, as Bakhtin says, a 
‘borderline’ phenomenon, merging self and society and so having 
‘extraterritorial status.’ In both Bakthin and Brophy this metaphor of 
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extraterritoriality (of being in transit, between states) reflects a notion 
of language as the constituting element of a radically social psyche. 
(183) 
This psyche is not what the novel defines as identity, but the stream of consciousness, 
which is not any more radically social in In Transit  than it is in any other situation: 
for this is not identity, but thought that is at stake. Moreover, rendering only the 
stream of consciousness limits the narrative’s ability to represent the social context in 
which the mind operates. As Alan Palmer argues, stream of consciousness—
particularly stream of consciousness conceived of as direct and indirect representation 
of specifically verbal conscious thought (direct and free indirect thought)—represents 
only some of a character’s mental processes. In particular, Palmer notes, “Analyses of 
particular passages of free indirect thought or direct thought will necessarily reveal 
the social context of the thought under discussion” (Palmer 33). By extension, 
representations of consciousness that rely primarily on direct and free indirect thought 
do not give a reader a full account of the social context of the thought. That is, stream 
of consciousness narrative, rather than being the most full and accurate representation 
of a character’s mental processes, instead provides a contextually limited 
representation of those processes—and often limits the processes represented to 
verbal processes specifically. However, In Transit goes beyond this problem, because 
Pat seems to be suffering from the same limited access to Pat’s mind that the reader 
does. The basic social context of gender—as well as others, such as a shared 
understanding of what language is being spoken—is missing. By operating primarily 
through a modernist stream-of-consciousness discourse, the narrator represents the 
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social component of thought only through the variety of discourses that weave their 
way through Pat’s stream of consciousness. However, this does not supply the social 
context in which these thoughts occur, nor is this a complete account of Pat’s psyche. 
The identity of that psyche is rooted firmly in the stability of the narrating “I,” yet we 
(and, seemingly Pat as well) know little if anything about its relationship to the social 
environment. 
While the first-person narrator certainly engages with multiple discourses—
the multiple languages of the transit lounge, opera from the public-address system, 
formal logic—these are tools the narrator uses in an attempt to understand the world 
and the narrator’s place in it: epistemological questions, as, for example, when the 
narrator uses multi-linguistic play, the cultural precendent of opera, the narrator’s 
own Irish heritage, and a reference to the environment of the airport to explore new 
possibilities of the gendered state: 
   I even blamed opera, which I Irished and reproached as O’Pera, 
O’Pera. 
   For O’Pera it was that had introduced this confusion in the very first 
place – by its habit of so perversely running counter to the tenor of the 
secondary sex 
characteristics and 
send }   ing up camp castrati to a contraltitude 
              
  cast 
(cugini 
cognati 
castrati) . . . 
 
  Was I, perhaps, castrato/a? Was the truth behind my oblivion that I 
had no sex? (75) 
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The narrator here has access to many discourses and mixes them freely. The 
narrator’s consciousness is indeed multi-linguistic and multi-discursive and 
constantly influenced by Pat’s surroundings. But self and society are not merged. The 
narrator plays, actively, with the international space of the lounge and delights in the 
disintegration of language as a coherent, stable source of meaning. But the narrator’s 
identity and consciousness are not threatened by this linguistic and gender play. 
 Identity, then, seems to be intimately bound up with the social realm, as our 
sense of ourselves as separate persons depends on our sense of other persons. 
Identity, as a sense of oneself as a coherent being, then, is in some sense constructed 
out of a social sense, a sense of kinship—these are other selves, I have such-and-such 
a relationship to these selves. But Sexshuntwo leaves identity in this realm—in transit 
between a sort of pure consciousness and a socially constructed role that reifies the 
consciousness. Identity exists both completely apart from and intimately bound with 
the social role. Pat’s identity depends on her social sense, but it is not determined by 
the roles assigned by the social realm. Instead, in this “Case,” the social realm is a 
source of information, a source of “facts” that the narrator (and the narrator’s narrated 
self) can use to learn more about the stable “I” of identity. 
 The social status of gender and the physical status of sex are questions which 
the narrator’s agile, socially un-anchored consciousness can explore fluidly, safe in 
the certainty of the narrating “I” and its active stream of consciousness. As Karen 
Lawrence argues, the ungendered first-person pronoun enables a sort of gender 
agnosticism for both narrator and reader (Lawrence 40). The stream of consciousness 
that pours out from the narrator allows both narrator and reader to infer a unified 
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identity, which remains unitary and unthreatened throughout. The linguistic form 
implies that gender is something extraneous to consciousness—something that must 
be sensed by the narrating consciousness rather than being an innate aspect of that 
consciousness. The wholeness of identity is, with the possible exception of some 
cases of schizophrenia, unassailable from within the realm of consciousness which 
the first-person narrative explores. Gender identity is almost, if not absolutely, an 
oxymoron, because gender roles (as explored in the latter half of the novel) are social 
constructs, while identity is fundamentally private and exists outside of labels—
outside, even, of language. By defining gender as extrinsic to identity, Brophy reveals 
a fissure in the techniques of modernism. The narrator’s gender is fundamentally an 
epistemological question. However, as announced by title of Sexshuntwo, “The Case 
of the Missing (Re)member,” it is an epistemological question that can be addressed 
comfortably within the popular form of detective fiction. And, indeed, Sexshuntwo 
finds Pat repeatedly attempting to gather clues about his or her gender: from 
memories, from physical observation, and from social observation. 
 It is the social realm which proves (temporarily) decisive for Pat’s gender, and 
also proves the undoing of the first-person narrator. Pat encounters a man, an airedale 
by the name of Donaghue, who announces himself as the husband of an old friend of 
Pat’s by the name of Betty. Pat, who neither remembers him nor is able to hear him 
clearly, supplies the old friend with the full maiden name of Betty Bouncer. As Pat 
fakes her way through the conversation, she attempts to learn the nature of her own 
relationship with Betty, in an attempt to discern her gender. Donaghue departs with 
the declaration that Betty spoke of Pat as either her “first date” or her “first mate” – 
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once again, the slipperiness of the spoken word combines with Pat’s comically 
limited ability to make observations about the outside world to thwart epistemological 
resolution. Pat, however, seems determined to come to a conclusion on the gender 
question. Betty, since married, is in Pat’s mind likely heterosexual, making a “first 
date” or a “first mate” (sexual meaning) male—with the “punning on some nautical 
pastime or get-up” also implying a male “bo’sn’s mate” (114). Objectively, the 
evidence is not particularly decisive, but just as Pat “will convince myself memory 
now brings you back in festoons of blonde hair jauntily but insecurely tucked up 
under a yachting cap, while you play cap’n or bo’s’n or any other apostrophe’d rôle 
you please,” Pat makes the decision to make of the evidence not a fact of identity, but 
a gender role: “whichever world your husband said, beloved Betty Bouncer, and 
whichever way you care to read the evidence, I quite clearly am, must be and can 
only be A MAN” (114). 
 Pat’s assertion that this conclusion is epistemologically based is 
fundamentally weak. The decision is framed within the realm not of evidence and 
logic, but in the realm of social convention (by which Pat reads Donaghue’s 
indeterminate words) and imagination (by which Pat creates both Betty Bouncer and 
a roleplaying past for herself). The epistemological basis of gender is, in short, a lie 
we tell ourselves. The relevant facts of sexuality, comically unavailable to Pat, are 
obvious in the real world: they are not epistemological problems. Identity, as rendered 
by the stream of consciousness, is also fundamentally unchanged by questions of 
gender. Gender is important, Pat asserts instead, in the ontological realm. Gender is a 
story and a social transaction, an act of imagination. Pat’s desire to assign a gender is 
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not an effort to give the narrator an identity—it is a desire to make Pat not the 
narrating consciousness, but a narrated character, someone about whom stories can be 
told. Pat’s declaration of manhood is followed by decisive action: “I walked not 
towards the exit-strait, though it was now empty, but, firmly and quickly, to the 
stairs” (114). This is followed by the novel’s last piece of first-person narration until 
the CODETTA: an “INTERLOO” equating this decisive action (and decisive 
gendering) as the narrator’s suicide: 
And in hurling myself from top to bottom of them I shall be destroyed. 
For, triumph, triumph! I have attained (or had handed to me on a 
chatter-platter) my suicide; and this, which I, being at the time in my 
bright mind, address to my Reader-coroner, is my suicide note. 
    Yours In Quest, 
              P. (Sir)(Knight Errant)  (114-115) 
This INTERLOO, like many of the novel’s interludes, seems to come from a different 
narrative perspective than the primary narration. That is, the narrator speaks directly 
to the reader as reader, clarifying the difference, even in first-person narration, 
between Pat-the-narrator and Pat-the-character. Tense, however, confuses what would 
seem to be a strong retrospective voice, for the narrator “shall be destroyed” by an 
action taken, seemingly, in the past. How can a character, retrospectively narrated, be 
the engine of suicide for a future narrating-self? Any pretense of a logical relationship 
between character and narrator is essentially broken. Instead, narrator fluidly takes on 
the gender of the character, and anticipates the genre role-playing which will 
dominate the next section of the novel. But by thus becoming a character, by 
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becoming definable, the first-person narrator is destroyed. Whether the third-person 
narrator who follows is, in some sense, the same narrator is uncertain. 
 Brophy’s non-fictional writings give us some insight into the relationship 
between consciousness, fiction, and the shift both to a third-person narrator and to 
postmodern techniques. In a 1963 essay, “The Novel as a Takeover Bid,” Brophy 
argues that the novel goes beyond a mixing of discourses in the consciousness, 
beyond the epistemological problems tackled by modernism and detective fiction. 
The novel, with its demand that we submit, for hours and days at time, to a world and 
point of view not our own, is a temporary threat to identity itself: “The novel doesn’t 
stop short at taking you out of yourself: it puts the author in your place. It forces you 
to become the author” (Don’t Never Forget 99). True immersive storytelling, which 
Brophy values immensely, does not simply upset the consciousness epistemologically 
with questions of what is happening in the story, what is the solution to the mystery, 
what is the point of view of this or that character or narrator: it removes and replaces 
the very identity that would ask these questions. Novel-reading is for Brophy an 
ontologically-transformative experience. It doesn’t just change how we exist in the 
world: it removes both ourselves and the world and replaces them with the author. 
 This author, as Brophy argues elsewhere, is “in position not of Ego, but of 
God” (Prancing Novelist 56). This marks a fundamental distinction between character 
and narrator which much stream-of-consciousness and autobiographical modernism 
may seem to elide. People, however, would often prefer to be replaced by a character 
than by a god: “People are not ‘characters’. They may pretend to be, perhaps in the 
hope of becoming as popular as the characters in Victorian fiction” (Prancing 
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Novelist 33). That is, Pat-the-narrator cannot ever be equivalent to a conscious mind: 
Pat’s identity has always been an illusion, one propped up, rather than inhibited, by 
uncertainty about gender. Once Pat acquires gender, Pat is able to emerge from the 
story-minimal world of modernism, from the world of the representation of thought. 
Pat reveals himself as a character, and the illusion of identity disappears, to be 
replaced by a series of roles, characters, and stories. Pat has never been the God who 
mimics, absorbs, sometimes masters and sometimes drowns in multiple discourses, 
because Pat is not the author. From this point, Brophy cuts the reader’s relationship to 
a consistent character, to the illusory consciousness, to deal more directly with the 
ontological, rather than epistemological, threat and pleasure of stories. 
 “The Case of the Missing (Re)Member” itself, however, lingers on for five 
subsections, including the INTERLOO, following Pat’s gender-confident walk down 
the stairs in sub-section 5. That is, while the first-person Pat dominates Sexshuntwo 
in terms of words and number of pages, the last of this modernist first-person 
narrative takes place in the precise middle in terms of sub-sections. The final four 
sub-sections represent the male O’Rooley (most of 6), then the female Patricia (end of 
6-10) in the gendered space of the men’s restroom. Confident in his gender, Patrick 
O’Rooley  
approached the lavatory, unzipped his trousers and reached his hand 
inside. 
   There was nothing there. 
   That is inexact. Something – flesh briefly veiled by underclothes – 
was there, but not in the expected form. 
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   Half-fainting, Patricia staggered against the wall and dully heard that 
she had knocked her briefcase thumping to the floor. (117).  
This moment represents not only a shift in the protagonist’s gender (and, with the 
third person in place, perhaps a shift in the protagonist), but another shift from the 
epistemological to the ontological. Up until this point, Sexshuntwo has been primarily 
concerned with Pat’s mental processes—memory, observation, and deduction—as 
they relate to determining the character’s gender. The strangeness of the novel in this 
section has not been related to external realities, but to Pat’s comical inability to 
determine a seemingly basic fact, with the failing of memory being perhaps the 
strangest and most obvious circumstance, as highlighted by Pat’s reactions to the 
“evidence” of Betty Bouncer. It has been, up until this point, The Case of the Missing 
Remember—a detective story about an epistemological problem. In this moment, 
however, the section becomes The Case of the Missing Member, as Pat’s problem 
transitions from an epistemological one to an ontological one. That is, Pat has been 
attempting to determine his or her physical sexual characteristics based on a variety 
of evidence, and has found the evidence inconclusive. Pat’s assumption has been that 
sex and gender are equivalent, and that binary categorization is possible—that is, that 
gender is a stable reality, a fact about the world, with two simple possibilities for 
classification. However, what Pat finds is something that is incompatible with pre-
existing categories—so much so that the narrator has no word with which to name it 
directly. This is the tipping point between epistemology and ontology—it is not 
simply that the sex is unknown, but that, as far as existing categories go, it does not 
exist. One could imagine an epistemologically-dominant text that is concerned 
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primarily with classifying Pat’s transgendered genitalia. However, Pat adopts a 
Freudian model, where sex is defined as the presence or absence of male genitalia. 
The problem is no longer absence of knowledge about Pat’s sexual characteristics, 
but the absence of the characteristics themselves. The world itself has violated Pat’s 
epistemological models, and Pat locates the problem in the world rather than in those 
models. 
 As Patricia escapes first the lavatory and then the Transit Lounge itself—
outside onto a ledge in the “wide, deep, cold space” (124), she finds herself in Section 
Three no longer in the naturalistic world occupied by most modernism. With the 
beginning of Section Three, Patricia instead finds herself in “the lesbian underworld,” 
where “all the porters were women” (130). At first, this world appears to still be that 
of a realistic airport: subsection 1 takes place in the familiarly mechanical world of 
luggage conveyance. However, once Patricia has identified this (physically 
naturalistic) space as the (socially fantastical) lesbian underworld, we can see that the 
genres and language play which in the first half of the novel dominated Pat’s mind 
now begin to meld into the world itself. Making her way back up to the airport via the 
conveyor belt, Patricia sees 
two inscriptions, one on each side of the flap she was headed for. 
   The left flank read 
 
 WOMEN OF THE WORLD UNITE. 
 YOU HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE 




The right complemented the doctrine with 
 
 WOMEN OF THE WORLD UNITE. 
 YOU HAVE EVERYTHING TO 
 GAIN – IN PARTICULAR, 
 YOUR DAISY CHAINS.  (132) 
Politics—and in particular the politics of socialism—is here invoked, gendered, 
sexualized, and punned out of self-seriousness into a playful celebration of sexual 
play and linguistic pleasure. The parody, delight in language, and themes have been 
characteristic not only of Brophy, but of Pat’s mind, whether narrated in first or third 
person. Here, seeing an inscribed mirror of her own thought process, bumps her head 
on it, as Pat’s addled mind is further externalized. 
 The bumped head on a gateway is yet another indication that we are entering a 
new realm, another ratchet away from realistic modernism to fantastical 
postmodernism, to a realm where mind and world collide. At the end of this first sub-
section, Sexshuntwo’s title is definitively transformed yet again, as the sexual 
becomes not only physical, but social and political: “just in time! The missing 
member!” cries an unknown man. But this does not turn out to be a political 
membership, as the novel quickly abandons the lesbian underworld for an even more 
inexplicable world: a game show appearing seemingly out of nowhere. Playing the 
game WHAT’S MY KINK, Patricia is addressed as a man and, as a result, gradually 
becomes Patrick again. The physical member, so crucial at the end of Sexshuntwo, is 
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now irrelevant, replaced by the purely social membership in a particular gender and, 
increasingly, in a very particular gender role. Later, two Irishwomen seem to refer to 
Pat as “one of us,” putting Pat’s gender once again in doubt—and making a muddle 
of gender and national identities. 
 As Section Three continues, Pat takes on a number of more specific, highly 
gendered identities. These include “the high proud lesbian-queen” resisting the 
advances of a Don Juan figure (149); a slave boy headed to market, a highly 
sexualized identity precipitated by the same Don Juan figure referring to Pat as a boy 
(151); Slim O’Rooley, a detective investigating the theft (not loss) of the missing 
member (154); Sir Patrice, “the best knight in the world” (160); Burleigh O’Rooley, a 
lawyer whose name is a pun on Raymond Burr, the gay actor who played Perry 
Mason (161); Patricia “Bunny” (last name not given, Burleigh’s secretary; 
Oruleus/Ulrix/Unruly, a fantasy hero who sets off into “the dread realm of the Great 
Camp King” (177); and possibly Oc herself, the heroine of the pornographic novel 
Pat has been reading. Gender roles become increasingly indistinguishable from genre 
roles. Gender is treated, then, as postmodernist fiction. With the force of a controlling 
narrative voice ceded to a disembodied narrator, Pat’s identity, too, is ceded to 
fiction. This echoes Brophy’s description of the reader’s submission to the author, the 
total immersion, in “The Novel as a Takeover Bid” (1963): “The novel doesn’t stop 
short at taking you out of yourself: it puts the author in your place. It forces you to 
become the author” (Don’t Never Forget 99). While Brophy celebrates the giving up 
of oneself to the author as one of the supreme joys of fiction, and as a perceived threat 
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by various conservative cultural forces, in In Transit Brophy reverses the terms. It is 
not the reader, but the character, who disappears into a series of literary roles. 
 This is clearly postmodern territory. McHale argues that the overt destruction 
or creation of a character is highly disruptive to a narrative’s ontology in two ways: 
“on the one hand, the ontological instability and tentativeness of the fictional world is 
demonstrated; on the other hand, the ontological superiority of the author is 
dramatized” (211). Pat is not quite destroyed in Section Three, but the ontological 
problem here is arguably even more severe. Rather than giving the reader a clean 
break from the character, Brophy takes the character apart, replacing Pat with stock 
fictions who, even more puzzlingly, seem to have been created at least partly from 
Pat’s mind. That is, the author-character drama is played out within the character of 
Pat, who does not demonstrate her superiority to her fictions, but instead is replaced 
by them. What’s more, the stock nature of these fictions reveals Pat’s mind—so much 
the subject of the first two sections of the novel—as itself a product of pre-existing 
fictions. Brophy is therefore able to simultaneously dramatize the superiority of the 
author while also demonstrating the ultimate inferiority of the author to the fictions of 
mass culture. This wrinkle in the character-author ontological relationship is further 
emphasized by the fact that Pat was the narrator in the first two sections of the novel, 
and in particular a narrator with strong autobiographical elements. As a semi-
authorial narrator, often expounding views on subjects such as fiction and opera 
similar to Brophy’s own, Pat plays a large part in creating the implied author of the 
novel. That is, Pat-as-narrator serves as not only the Ishmael-like connective tissue of 
the novel, or guide and digressive commentator, but also as something of a conduit 
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between reader and author. When Pat is shattered, so too is that conduit. We sense the 
author’s complete ability to control the narrative—to destroy what once seemed a 
stable part of this world—even as our sense of that author herself is shattered and the 
ability of any author to control her own narrative—even of herself—is brought into 
question. This is even more disturbing when we consider Brophy’s view of the 
reader’s relationship to the author of a work of fiction: “The novel doesn’t stop short 
at taking you out of yourself: it puts the author in your place. It forces you to become 
the author” (Don’t 19). As Pat splits, disintegrates, or is taken over by these various 
roles, so too does the reader’s Brophy, and, by extension, the reader. 
 This is why it is so crucially important that the transformation of In Transit 
from modernist to postmodernist text take place in the middle of the novel. If In 
Transit had begun as a postmodernist novel—that is, as a novel in which the main 
character shifts between identities and the narrative between genres from page to 
page—it would be unable to establish the bond between character, narrator, author, 
and reader. That is to say, by establishing itself as a postmodernist novel from the 
beginning, In Transit would create a set of rules or expectations—even if those rules 
are simply, “the rules may be broken at any time.” By establishing a modernist 
narrative structure, with its adherence to the conventional ontological stability of 
character and world, Brophy is able to immerse the reader in that world, to put the 
reader in the place of the author of the world. Then, in the middle of the novel, 
Brophy announces that this world and its rules are gone and that the author whom the 
reader had inhabited does not exist. It is an invasion of the fictional world in some 
ways more ontologically disruptive than novels that adhere to similar postmodernist 
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conventions from the beginning. Similarly, it is more ontologically disruptive than 
postmodernist endings, such as B.S. Johnson’s announcement in the final paragraphs 
of House Mother Normal that the novel has been a fiction of his creation, or even 
Brophy’s (or some Brophy-like narrator’s) somewhat similar address to the reader at 
the end of In Transit itself, which I will discuss in more detail later. By transitioning 
not simply between genres, as Conrad does with the middle of Lord Jim, and as 
postmodernist fictions may do at any moment, but between the epistemological and 
ontological dominant—long enough for both dominants to establish themselves 
firmly—Brophy is able to highlight the ontological conventions of modernism and 
nascent postmodernism alike. This is not simply a switch of narrative modes, but a 
switch in the definition of narrative itself, and its attendant relationships between 
author, reader, and fictional world. By creating this middle space between modernism 
and postmodernism, Brophy is able to examine with even greater force some key 
ontological themes of postmodernism, including the nature of fiction and the line 
between the individual mind and the social world. It is crucial, then, that Brophy 
explores this by splitting a single character into many, a character who is at the same 
time both author and reader. 
 So while Pat in Section Three is in transit between existing and not existing as 
a character, In Transit itself as an ontological construct, a stable fiction with a stable 
author, is also in transit. The destruction of Pat as coherent character living in a 
coherent, realistic world with a stable relationship with the reader is made even more 
obvious when Pat is split into Burleigh and Bunny. This, too, emphasizes that 
shattering a character has consequences not only for that character: it has disruptive 
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consequences for the entire world of the transit lounge’s ontology, which first came 
under attack (more on this theme in Section Four) from the lesbian underworld just 
outside. Initially, these two characters appear in the same scene, with Burleigh the 
lawyer touting his Holmesian devotion to Logic while discussing the case with his 
secretary Bunny. Their initial dialogue may be read as an externalization of two 
aspects of an internal character—that is, spoken words from two different characters 
standing in for thoughts from two parts of a single character’s personality. Even here, 
however, we are reminded that this is no transparent dramatization of Pat’s “true” 
complex personality and thoughts. Instead, we have comically hackneyed dialogue, 
with the woman in a clearly subservient position. Despite this doubling of character, 
Bunny seems to be there only to encourage Burleigh; her contribution to the dialogue 
is perhaps even less than the contributions of Socrates’ disciples (detective fiction is 
not the only genre invoked here), with affirmations (“I’ll do that, chief”) and 
expressions of concern (“You will be careful, chief?”) (164). Soon, however, 
Burleigh and Bunny split up, with an agreement to meet again in the bar. When 
Bunny fails to arrive, the narrative itself splits in into two columns. Whereas, in 
Sexshuntwo, these columns represent the parallel thoughts of a single consciousness, 
here they represent the separate thoughts and actions (still in third person) of two 
separate characters. Burleigh and Bunny’s attempts to meet as they investigate the 
“mystery” have a Superman/Clark Kent quality, but the novel undermines the idea 
that they are, in fact, one person. Burleigh and Bunny not only exist as external 
personas, but also display an independent consciousness and awareness of each other. 
They also engage in parallel actions in the same investigation, so that the reader is 
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held in suspense about when they will be reunited. The two columns, with Burleigh 
(increasingly referred to as O’Rooley or Patrick) on the left and Bunny (increasingly 
referred to as Patricia or simply “the heroine”) on the right) alternate in Section 
Three—once again preserving at least the idea that these two characters cannot be in 
the same place (here, the same place on the page) at once. Split from each other, 
Burleigh and Bunny fall into other genres, roles, and personalities. Opera once again 
seems to dominate, with the stagecraft keeping the two characters apart marked by 
diagrams. The various roles Pat takes on in Section Three are therefore portrayed both 
as manifestations of one character and as irreconcilable both to each other and to a 
stable reality. These roles are explicitly the roles of fiction, with the characters’ very 
actions dictated by the needs of fiction. This includes the very suspense created by the 
metafictional idea that these two characters are in fact the single character we have 
known through the novel’s first half. We might, therefore, look for a unifying 
consciousness not in roles or characters within the drama, but in the genre itself. That 
is, if Pat can still be said to exist in this novel, the character is increasingly present 
only as an author—but, specifically, an author whose material is an explicit 
patchwork of existing genres and tropes. By late in Section Three, therefore, not only 
has Brophy eliminated the single fictional character as the storehouse for a single 
fictional consciousness, but has crushed the very connection between character and 
consciousness. 
 By removing us from not only a realistic, logically coherent world, but also 
from a world in which character and consciousness are bound together, Brophy has 
made her most decisive move into postmodernism. It is not simply the case that the 
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world presented to the reader in Section Three is ontologically unstable, but that the 
philosophy of character and consciousness implied by the narrative makes the sort of 
questions about consciousness and point of view typically posed by modernism 
impossible to even consider. Section Three includes various characters in various 
roles, but because they do not embody individual consciousnesses, they do not have 
individual points of view. Even the Pat of Section One is now suspect—are her 
thoughts in fact thoughts, or is this simply the way verbally-adept modernist 
psychodrama plays out? 
 The novel’s first half includes its own clues as to why, at the middle of this 
novel, modernism fails in its attempt to render Pat as a single consciousness facing 
(and posing) primarily epistemological problems. Pat’s increasing disappearance into 
a series of stock roles and genres (even if they always maintain a hint of playfulness, 
as Brophy highlights the patriarchal as well as the subversive implications of various 
genres and gender tropes) can be read as a direct result of the failure of the modernist 
stream-of-consciousness anti-narrative to solve the problems of the middle. Early in 
the novel, Pat poses the Transit Lounge itself as a sort of challenge—to inhabit the 
present as a narrative tense ungoverned by beginnings and endings: 
Relaxed but not to the extent of sleep or anaesthesia, whetted enough 
to enjoy but not cut yourself on your own ambition or anxiety, not so 
intent on the future as to be tensed-up, you could inhabit this tense. 
Your fingers could sink into the very nap and texture of now. 
 It was obvious to me that it was myself whom I had, in my 
euphoric, light-and-airy boldness, already cast in the rôle of this 
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pioneer who should for ever (or at least for some hours) remain in the 
Transit Lounge and thus perpetually or for a simulacrum of perpetuity 
remain in the present moment, in at least semi-sempiternal transit 
between departure from the past and arrival at the future. 
 Yet even as I hectored the public-address system to that effect, 
the corner of my eye, from its perch on my floor-adhesive stalk before 
the bar, was casting up the amenities within stroll and including among 
them the bookstall whence cometh my anaesthesia, in the form of 
those vertical take-off flights directly out of the present into the never-
never tense: fictions. (24) 
By staying in the Transit Lounge, Pat is attempting to manipulate reality, to create an 
eternal present where origin (beginning) and destination (ending) are not only 
unknown, but actively disavowed. From this early point, however, Pat seems to 
identify this very narrative austerity with a vulnerability to fiction. In the Transit 
Lounge, this means the rather limited fictions available from an airport bookshop, 
magazine rack, and public-address system. That is, the attempt to construct a pure 
middle, which is also, for the novel, an attempt to construct a somehow pure, 
ungendered narrative consciousness, is far from an effective bulwark against the 
threats of Aristotelian narrative, calcified gender roles, and hackneyed fictions. Quite 
the opposite: without a well-defined traditional narrative (that is, a movement from 
beginning to ending) of Pat’s own life, the character is left to inhabit pre-defined 
roles. The longer Pat remains in the transit lounge, the more these roles take over, 
until they snuff out Pat’s own identity entirely. Pat, by taking a pause in the narrative 
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of Pat’s own life, and by forgetting crucial pieces of that life, increasingly is replaced 
by those anaesthetic books. Once again, we see that Pat is in the role of the reader of 
Brophy’s immersive novel, who gives herself up to the mind of the author. Only in 
Pat’s case, there seems to be no singular author within the fictional world. (There is 
inevitably an author in the sense that Pat, as a character in a novel, is from the 
beginning controlled fully by the author.) The difference here, the difference of being 
in transit, is the difference of giving oneself, one’s consciousness and one’s narrative, 
up to not a single coherent narrative, a single world, but to the whole world of 
fiction—at least as it is available in an airport bookshop. 
 Transit-lounge-as-middle is an escape from reality and its temporal, if not 
narrative, motion, into the world of overdetermined narrative discourse and its 
recursive relationships between author, reader, and character. Pat’s attempt to live in 
the transit lounge may be read as an attempt to live “in the middest,” Kermode’s term 
for the “irreducibly intermediary preoccupations” of human life (Kermode 7). That is, 
both Pat and Kermode seem to regard the middle, divorced from beginning and 
ending, as more authentically expressing human existence than a life lived with 
narrative reference to beginning or ending. For Kermode, fiction is founded on a 
“concordance of beginning, middle, and end” (Kermode 35). Breaking the 
concordance, Pat seeks to live—at least for awhile—a non-fictional life. Yet the 
result, at the beginning of the novel, is an even more fictional life. Instead of a 
narrator comprehending life through a fiction, Pat becomes in the middle of the novel 
a collection of fictions. Instead of replacing fiction, Pat is replaced by fictions—not 
simply fictional characters, but the fictions themselves. In a sense, this is inevitable, 
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because Pat attempts to deny the basic human need for fictional concordances: “Men, 
like poets, rush ‘into the middest,’ in medias res, when they are born; they also die in 
mediis rebus, and to make sense of their span they need fictive concords with origins 
and ends, such as give meaning to lives and to poems” (Kermode 7). To live only in 
the middle would be, for Pat, to live without meaning—perhaps, as Kermode argues, 
a psychological impossibility for a human being. Brophy seems to agree, and to 
further suggest that this is a narrative impossibility for a character. During In 
Transit’s first half, where psychological concerns (here a subset of epistemological 
concerns) trump metafictional concerns (here a subset of ontological concerns), we 
witness a mental breakdown. During In Transit’s second half, the metafictional 
concerns predominate, and we witness a breakdown of character and narrative. In 
both halves of the novel, these concerns serve as metaphors for each other, even as 
the distinctions between narrative and mind, character and reader, reader and author, 
collapse. 
 Section Four takes this collapse even further, as the Patrick and Patricia 
characters disappear almost entirely. At the end of Section Three, Bunny is kidnapped 
by lesbian revolutionaries. She takes on the pseudonym of BARBARA, but 
immediately upon doing so, she is revealed to be a man. Thus, the shifting-gender 
equilibrium of the middle of the novel is temporarily restored, but this time both 
genders are subsumed by a pseudonym. With that pseudonym comes a role in both a 
group of people (the revolutionaries) and a genre (Barbara is the leader of the 
revolutionary group in a high-stakes action-suspense tale). However, before the group 
makes it to the control tower, Barbara abdicates her role as leader. Soon after, the 
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revolutionaries find that another group of revolutionaries has already seized the 
control tower. By abdicating a leadership role in the drama, Pat abdicates a central 
place in the narrative. 
 Nevertheless, the narrative, increasingly driven by action-oriented genre 
conventions, with the stakes externalized to the fate of an entire airport at least, 
continues. Pat initially seems to have been wiped entirely from the narrative. No 
longer can we see Burleigh and Bunny playing out the operas and detective fictions 
running through Pat’s head, pursuing her concerns about the “missing member” in an 
otherwise apparently uneventful Transit Lounge. At the beginning of Section Four, 
and periodically throughout, a detached third-person voice, no longer connected to 
any consciousness, gives a pseudo-scholarly account of the Revolution of Perpetual 
War. Other lines of narrative include parodic accounts of God Almighty, the 
“mannerist angel” (and the attempts of Baroco, a black member of the lesbian 
revolutionaries, to set off an explosion). 
 Eventually, however, Pat begins to re-emerge as something other than the 
abdicated author of the proceedings. Pat appears somewhat obliquely in two pairs of 
dialogues: Och, the protagonist in the pornographic novel Pat had been reading, 
discusses language and philosophy with a professor emeritus; they are later joined by 
O’Rooley, pondering language by the bookstand. Meanwhile, a Father Itis discusses 
Ireland and religion with a “son” who turns out to be named Pat. What may remain of 
Pat’s consciousness has been spread thin, as possible versions of the novel’s main 
character discuss the interests of the Pat of Section One with authority figures. 
Meanwhile, the fate of the revolution, often punningly and cryptically communicated 
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not through the intimate voice of the public-address system, but instead through 
captions on a monitor, takes center stage. The revolutionaries increasingly bicker, and 
the Transit Lounge descends into chaos.  
 The novel has taken on the clear narrative of a disaster film, lending a certain 
level of stability to the proceedings. On the one hand, this seems to mark a move 
away from postmodernism since, despite the high level of absurdity, the reader can 
now follow a fairly conventional narrative. Within this narrative, there are clearly 
defined stakes. With Och and the professor killed off, O’Rooley eventually emerges 
as the protagonist of a disaster story, making it up to the control tower amidst 
increasing chaos in time to witness a terrible plane crash, as a mad “commietsar” in 
the control tower arranges for two planes to crash into each other. Once again, genre 
conventions are re-affirmed: in the wake of the crash, “The official demolition squads 
and refrigeration units screamed off first, wailing into the drizzle and swerving down 
the storm-greased track as in a B-feature movie” (230). However, the very invocation 
of the B-feature movie indicates that Section Four has taken the postmodernist 
ontological experiment to its logical conclusion. With constantly shifting genres and 
characters, an authorial consciousness is still visible. But with the dominance of a 
single genre, the ontological transformation is complete: the modernist novel has not 
simply been undermined and destabilized by ontological concerns: it, like its 
characters, has been overwritten by a conventional genre. And within the now more 
stable, and hence more immersive, narrative world of the story, we see that reality 
itself has become like a generic tale. 
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 However, Brophy is not entirely done with modernism. Midway through 
Section Four, there is a suggestion that the seemingly radical ontological changes in 
the airport are in fact radical epistemological changes. As Baroco becomes a “self-
destructive artist” by decapitating himself on a propeller blade, “Indoors, the Transit 
Lounge, without any physical change being wrought, suddenly sprang into a new, 
temporary existence as an art gallery, like a pattern leaping into 3-D when viewed 
from a new standpoint” (211). Here, Brophy’s narrator asserts something of a middle 
ground, the moment where modernism is transformed into postmodernism. The 
Transit Lounge does not simply appear to become an art gallery from a certain point 
of view: it becomes an art gallery. This non-physical transformation is compared to 
the effects of point of view on certain objects, but the narrator does not explicitly state 
that this transformation is the result in a change of point of view. Such a shift in point 
of view would have to be a collective shift, since the art gallery is not simply there 
from the point of view of certain characters. This reinforces the novel’s general shift 
away from the individual consciousness to the collective. So we have a 
transformation that is non-physical, similar to a transformation in an individual’s 
point of view, but that does not seem to be merely a change in perception, but a 
change in reality. What actually effects the transformation is the narrator’s statement 
that such a transformation has taken place. This is, therefore, as close as we might 
come to a purely narrative transformation in reality. This narrative transformation 
straddles the line between ontological (highlights the narrative universe and its 
questionable ontological status) and epistemological (highlights the ability of 
interpretation, rather than concrete physical changes, to alter reality). This 
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transformation, then, occupies the moment immediately after modernism, just as it is 
transforming into postmodernism. 
 The final sub-sections of Section Four are similarly suggestive that this 
middle space is the key to the novel’s inquiries about the nature of identity, 
consciousness, language, and reality. Airedale Donaghue, Betty’s husband, is the lone 
survivor of the climactic plane crash. Don Donovan (perhaps the Irish footballer, 
perhaps an echo of Pat’s earlier statement that Donaghue looked like a Don), 
searching the wreckage, discovers the missing member, at last referred to explicitly as 
a penis. Don calls out “Quis,” and 
The response was half-hearted and came slow and spasmodic from 
here and there round the sparse circle of bidders at auction, responding 
as they were at half-vocal-power and that only because there really 
was nothing else left: 
 ‘Eg – o’ 
 ‘Eg – o’ 
 ‘Eg . . . ‘ (232-33) 
The novel has returned to Sexshuntwo’s central Freudian mystery plot. While we 
have not returned to a mostly-ordinary transit lounge, we have returned to material 
and a narrative mode that echoes the novel’s middle—where an individual 
protagonist’s mental crisis begins to manifest itself in the novel’s narrated world. Pat 
has returned, if not as narrator or character, at least as a memory that haunts the 
novel. The individual consciousness (and its problems of gender identity) exists here, 
explicitly, as an echo in anonymous mouths and as the dismembered symbol of 
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masculinity. Its manifestations are physical and social, but the novel suggests that 
modernism’s individual consciousness, fraught with epistemological difficulties, is 
the source of the postmodernist chaos. This allows for two possible interpretations.
34
 
First, the modernist interpretation in which the latter half of In Transit, like the 
Nighttown episode of Ulysses, takes place in the ordinary world as distorted through a 
character’s mind as well as an author’s conceit. In this interpretation, none of the 
events we read about are real, but are instead only metaphors for Pat’s psychic 
journey, or perhaps are literal manifestations of Pat’s dreams or hallucinations. 
Second, the postmodernist interpretation follows the line that begins with Borges’s 
“Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius.” Whereas in that story, the collective belief in a fantasy 
world eventually creates a new reality, here Pat’s individual stream of consciousness 
creates an ever-shifting reality, perhaps gaining its power from its grounding in 
collective myths and common narrative forms. In either case, however, the individual 
consciousness has returned to some importance, returning the reader to the middle 
place between modernism and postmodernism, where epistemological and 
ontological problems bleed into each other and the stability of the laws of a narrative 
world is itself an open question. 
 In some ways, this middle place between modernism and postmodernism is 
more postmodernist than the postmodernism proper that dominates Sections Three 
and Four. In Section Three, the instability of the narrative world and its characters is 
itself a sort of stability. That is, once we accept that Pat is no longer simply Pat, once 
                                                 
34 McHale describes fiction that “looked at one way […] seems to be focused on epistemological 




we accept that a genre and a role can take over at any moment, this very instability 
becomes a recognizable narrative form with its own rules. Section Four, meanwhile, 
is even more consistent in its genre parody. It takes place in a fantastic world where 
constantly shifting revolutions can take over an airport and books laden with 
metaphor and pun become deadly threats, but this is, in its own way, a stable 
universe. And it is instability within the narrative world as well as between the 
narrative world and the real world that creates the most radical ontological poetics. To 
the extent that these Sections are highly unstable, this instability comes largely from 
the reader’s memory of the novel’s modernist first half. When Pat is seemingly erased 
from the novel, this is a major ontological problem because Pat has been established 
as more than a wholly artificial character Pat has not been introduced to the reader as 
a “character” created by an author, as in Flann O’Brien’s At Swim-Two-Birds. 
Instead, Pat has been introduced as an authorial narrator with a complex personality 
whose consciousness has been the main field of narrative and thematic interest. 
Postmodernism, as we find it in the second half of In Transit, is most 
ontologically disruptive when it is disrupting a particular narrative ontology. As the 
stable story-world of modernism increasingly slips away, each successive 
transformation is less disruptive. Genre pastiche, characters that appear and 
disappear, instantaneous transformation of discourse into reality—these become 
collectively a stable set of rules by which the story-world itself can operate. That is, 
ontological problems simply become a different ontology. In order to clearly 
distinguish itself from science fiction or other genres of speculative fiction, 
postmodernism requires an ontological reference point outside itself, a stable reality 
311 
 
to violate. In Transit’s postmodernism is then, in part, a product of its modernism. In 
this sense, In Transit enacts McHale’s theory of how postmodernism emerges from 
modernism. McHale argues that postmodernism should be thought of, both logically 
and historically, as “POSTmodernISM,” or “after the modernist movement” (5). The 
key logical mechanism for this theory is the idea that 
Intracable epistemological uncertainty becomes at a certain point 
ontological plurality or instability: push epistemological questions far 
enough and they ‘tip over’ into ontological questions. By the same 
token, push ontological questions far enough and they tip over into 
epistemological questions – the sequence is not linear and 
unidirectional, but bidirectional and reversible. (11) 
I would argue that this bidirectionality is essential to the vitality of postmodernism, at 
least as we see it in In Transit. By highlighting the fact that, for example, that a 
physical transformation of the transit lounge into a library would be a violation of a 
“normal” stable reality, In Transit simultaneously moves away from the ontological 
dominant in the latter part of Section Four, while reinforcing the ontological problems 
posed by the text as a whole. 
In Transit’s CODETTA further mixes epistemological and ontological 
problems, as well as beginnings and endings, and linear and cyclical narratives. The 
CODETTA’s rapid-fire approach serves as a reminder of the various narrative 
methods of the novel as a whole, while ultimately emphasizing the novel’s status as a 
piece of narrative discourse: that is, a social exchange between narrator and hearer in 
which the narrator’s relationship to the story and its characters—even an apparently 
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diegetic narrator—is ultimately arbitrary. This postmodernist effect—an exploration 
of the ontological status of the story as a product of the narrative discourse—is 
nevertheless accomplished by reminding us of the novel’s passage from 
epistemological to ontological dominant that largely dismisses some of the novel’s 
major epistemological and ontological concerns. In the CODETTA’s first line, the 
first-person narrator of the modernist first half returns with an invocation of 
beginnings. Simultaneously, however, it declares the epistemological problems posed 
by the first-person pronoun irrelevant: “And out of that egg, ego too am re-hatched. 
[/] It no longer matters a damn of course whether ‘I’ is masc. Or fem/ or whether 
‘you’ is sing. Or plur.” (234). This is an ending of the first half’s epistemological 
crisis without solving the epistemological riddles that evoked the crisis. Similarly, the 
heightened drama of the novel’s second half seems to be resolved on the level of plot, 
rather than erased from existence: “the revolution has achieved resolution by coming 
to full revolution” (234). What’s more, the narrator continues to enact the heightened 
drama of that characterizes much of the novel’s second half, climbing out onto a 
ledge and contemplating suicide. The narrator is re-born, seemingly, to mirror this 
full revolution, reaching the point where beginnings are also endings. The narrator, 
moreover, vacillates between considering the suicide as related to an epistemological 
problem—the narrator’s place in the world—and being a pure ontological fact. In the 
first place, the narrator looks at the crowd below and “I recognize them as, indeed, 
my very close kin. I think that is why I want to suicide” (235). However, with 
allusions to the Aeneid and De rerum natura—that is, a work of nationalist myth-
making and a work of naturalist philosophy fundamentally concerned with matters 
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ontological—shifts to consider depression as a fact that explains itself, or, rather, is 
explained by the physical signs of its existence: “I would suicide purely by reason of 
lacrimae rerum. My posthumous autobiography: De Rerum Tristitia (by Partitia)” 
(235). Much as genitalia fully explain gender in the novel’s second half, here tears 
fully explain suicide. In an ending that is also a beginning, epistemological and 
ontological problems are rapidly juxtaposed in a way that seems largely to sublimate 
both to a more traditional plot resolution: the narrator’s impending suicide. 
However, before the suicide is completed, the narrator once again reminds the 
reader of the difference between story and discourse, emphasizing the narrative 
transaction, rather than the narrator’s role as a character in the story. However, where, 
in the middle of the novel, diegetic narrator was seemingly replaced by an extra-
diegetic narrator and a variety of characters, here, in the middle of the CODETTA, 
the narrator takes responsibility for the alteration in narrative discourse, and makes it 
explicitly part of a social transaction: “I warned you I wouldn’t play god, disliking as 
I rigorously do that old fraud’s authoritarian temperament. [/] So You’ll have to make 
the choice” (235). The choice the narrator offers is between third-person narratives of 
Patrick or Patricia, side by side again, but there is little real choice: the reader 
inevitably reads both, and both involve the protagonist falling to his or her death.
35
 
                                                 
35 McHale writes that “the multiplication of endings” of At Swim-Two-Birds, “occurs not in the ‘real’ 
world of this novel, but in the subjective subworld or domain of the character-narrator” (109). 
Explicitly fictionalized, the multiple endings of In Transit are also subjective—but they are 
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endings with the true multiple endings found in B.S. Johnson’s story, “Broad Thoughts from a 
Home,” offered, as in In Transit, as a choice for the reader (McHale 110). The subjective element 
in Brophy’s novel suggests a more modernist project, but the focus on the reader suggests 




The narrator identifies this as “Explicit fiction,” then concludes with a declaration of 
love to the reader, suggesting that the lines between reader and writer, like those 
between modernism and postmodernism, are permeable: “Love of You has, I mean to 
say, decided me to live. I conceive I can read as well as be read like a book. I desire 
You to locute me. […] both of You” (236). The emphasis here on the implied 
reader—important in the first section of the novel—gains new meaning after the 
pluralization of protagonists in the novel’s second half. If, as Brophy has argued, 
readers of novels allow themselves to be taken over by authors, In Transit suggests 
that the narrator of a novel is equally a reader. If, in the middle of the novel, the 
narrator seemed to become alternately (or simultaneously) Patrick and Patricia, the 
CODETTA suggests that it as much the reader who is transformed into multiple 
personae as the narrator. The text is celebrated as a space where identity is permeable, 
and ambiguity of meaning is a source of joy rather than anxiety. In a sense, this is a 
postmodernist celebration of modernism, epistemological problems of the text re-cast 
as ontological solutions to the problem of isolated identity in a polyglot world. The 
postmodernist turn on verbal ambiguity is extended on the novel’s final page, which 
consists of the word “FIN” placed in a drawing of a fish (237). The visual and verbal 
pun further emphasizes the text as discursive transaction. The word “FIN” is both a 
speech act that ends both story and discourse and a sign that labels the fish’s fin. 
Furthermore, the “fin” it refers to is both the fin in the drawing on the page and the 
fin of the imagined fish to which the drawing refers. Simultaneously, the fin in the 
drawing refers back to the end of the novel. That is, story and discourse is multi-
layered here, as signs refer to further signs, and discourse itself becomes the story. 
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 However, I would argue that we read this collapse of story into discourse as a 
violation of ontological boundaries specifically because of the prior assumption that 
those boundaries exist. Similarly, In Transit shows how postmodernist narrative 
grows out of the grounds of modernist narrative. Ontological plurality and instability 
not only may follow from epistemological uncertainty; they also depend on prior 
epistemological uncertainty in order to retain their own instability. If we were to 
begin In Transit in the middle—with its shifting multiple genres, stock characters, 
and shifting realities—we could read the narrative as simply occurring in a fantastical 
world. Alternately, we might read it not as a narrative at all, but purely as a discursive 
transaction. In both cases, there is relatively little destabilization of our sense of 
reality. However, because these changes in the story world first gain expression 
primarily as epistemological problems—because we first assume that there is a stable 
world about which we have incomplete knowledge or differing points of view—In 
Transit creates in its middle a deeply ontologically disruptive narrative poetics. 
Modernism emphasizes the separation between story and discourse, between the 
world and the consciousness. It is by disrupting this relationship—by implying a 
stable story-world and then yanking it out from under us—that In Transit achieves its 
greatest ontological disruption. The possibility that a dream may be reality, or that 
reality may be a dream, is what gives both dream and reality the sense of plurality and 
instability. Once we know we are in a dream, the dream’s own logic and rules can 
become their own sort of comfort, a stable realm of escape. In Transit’s narrative 
middle is thus simultaneously the space between modernism and postmodernism—
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the space between the Transit Lounge and lesbian underground, the space between 




 Modernism and narrative middles are mutually illuminating subjects. 
Modernist texts frequently employ extreme, experimental, or variable narrative 
techniques. When they employ or alter these techniques in the middle of a text, they 
help the audience to identify a distinct narrative middle: a central section of the text 
or division in the text that is a key structuring element of the text as a whole. 
Narrative middles may be used to reshape genre the direction of the narrative, as they 
are in Lord Jim. They may reconfigure point of view, as does the middle of The 
Golden Bowl. They may depart radically from the narrative technique of the rest of a 
novel, creating their own space for exploration of narrative tense, mood, and voice, as 
we have seen in To the Lighthouse. Narrative middles may also delve deeper into the 
consciousness, upsetting some of the assumptions of traditional narrative and unified 
character, as we have seen in Saturnine. Narrative middles may also be the site of a 
disruption in the one-to-one relationship between fabula and syuzhet, as in The 
Unfortunates. Finally, narrative middles may reshape a novel’s poetics entirely, as 
when In Transit shifts from modernist beginning to postmodernist ending. In all of 
these cases, the middle is characterized by differences in the narrative discourse. 
While these differences may cause us to view a text as fragmented—or may even 
tempt us to read a single novel as two or three separate narratives—this difference 
also binds disparate pieces of modernist novels into a whole. That is, modernist 
narrative middles, because they are enclosed in a single text (and, generally, a single 
physical object), create new narrative structures, often out of disparate parts. By 
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structuring novels around the middle, modernist novelists are able to circumvent old 
narrative structures and create new ones, opening up a space for new points of view 
and new epistemological complexities. 
 This dissertation has focused on a selection of British modernist novels. 
However, even within modernist narrative fiction, there are a wide variety of texts 
that that could be explored. Of the six texts I have read here, only The Golden Bowl 
was originally published in more than one volume, and reprintings are generally 
bound in a single volume. Multi-volume novels and series of novels would likely 
expand the scope of possible middles, perhaps enabling further connections between 
modernist middles and middles of the nineteenth-century literature explored in 
Narrative Middles. Expanding the study of modernist middles to additional texts and 
different types of texts might yield new questions and new answers. We might, for 
example, look for structural turning points in multi-volume novels by authors such as 
Dorothy Richardson, Marcel Proust, and Anthony Powell. We might consider how 
Malone Dies functions as a transition in narrative technique between Molloy and The 
Unnameable. Moving from the large-scale to the small-scale, we might examine the 
middles of modernist short stories, and the different narrative middles that are created 
by story collections such as Hemingway’s The Nick Adams Stories. 
 Postcolonial literature is also potentially fertile ground for the study of 
narrative middles, modernist or otherwise. For example, Chinua Achebe’s Things 
Fall Apart arguably represents a shift in the point of view of its protagonist and 
focalizer, Okonkwo, through a change in how narrative time is typically represented. 
The novel is divided typographically into three parts, but Part One takes up 
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approximately half of the narrative. As Wole Ogundele argues, Part One is 
characterized by repeated rituals, analepsis, and vague temporal markers, while Parts 
Two and Three feature clearer temporal markers and frequent and often large ellipses; 
this shift in the approach to narrative tense marks a shift in the perception of time 
from cyclical to linear and from a mythic to a historical imagination (Ogundele 135). 
That is, the narrative discourse reflects a shift in epistemology that occurs due to the 
disruption of traditional communities by the appearance of Western colonizers. I have 
made only the slightest sketch of a reading of one of the most influential postcolonial 
novels in the English language, with the intention of suggesting the territory for 
further study. Particularly in light of recent efforts to expand the reach of modernist 
studies to include many postcolonial texts, there is room for the study of not only the 
narrative middles of postcolonial texts, but of the specifically modernist narrative 
middles to be found in some postcolonial texts. 
 Graphic novels, as well, contain narrative middles, with some radical 
approaches that may help us to understand how middles may shape our understanding 
of narrative. The American Chris Ware’s 2012 graphic novel Building Stories is a 
successor to The Unfortunates in its use of a “book-in-a-box” format that allows 
readers to choose a different syuzhet without affecting the fabula. It goes further than 
The Unfortunates, however, in that its 14 separate sections do not include a beginning 
and ending and, even more radically, do not share a common format. Instead, the box 
contains a variety of physical formats, from small pamphlets to hard-bound volumes 
to posters to a piece of cardboard that can be unfolded like the playing surface of a 
board game. Consisting largely or previously published material, Building Stories 
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suggests on the back of the box that serves as its cover “appropriate places to set 
down, forget or completely lose any number of its contents within the walls of an 
average well-appointed home” (Ware). Thus, Building Stories suggests both how 
containing the fragments of a middle within even an unconventional physical 
structure creates a coherent narrative, even as parts of that middle may be easily 
jettisoned or lost. By suggesting that its component parts are as much objects in the 
reader’s home as they are pieces of a single narrative, Building Stories takes a further 
step in the direction of postmodernism. 
 Films may also employ modernist narrative middles. One particular recent 
film contains a modernist narrative middle that shine some light on the connections 
between modernist and postmodernist narrative. Rian Johnson’s time-travel drama 
Looper (2012) shifts its tense, mood, genre, and visual style quite dramatically in its 
middle. From a fast-moving urban crime drama, shown through its young male 
protagonist’s eyes, it shifts to a slow moving rural fantasy/horror drama seen initially 
through the eyes of a young woman. The shift in point of view is eventually reflected 
in the young man’s actions, as he begins to see the needs and desires of others. His 
actions, culminating in his suicide, eventually affect the world ontologically, wiping 
out most of the events of the film. That is, an epistemological shift at the film’s 
middle effects an ontological shift at the film’s end. This shift begins with a change in 
how the audience perceives the narrative. 
 As some of the possibilities I have outlined above suggest, the study of 
narrative middles is in its infancy, and its scope should extend well beyond 
modernism. While it is certainly not the case that the middles of texts have been paid 
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little attention in the past, little of that attention has focused on the middle as a 
middle. As I hope this study has shown, there is much to be gained by thinking 
explicitly of narrative middles. Attention to narrative middles can help illuminate 
narrative structures, highlight new texts or new passages, and, perhaps most 
importantly, can help us re-think what makes a text a single narrative. If we are to 
think of texts primarily through their beginnings and endings, the middle very easily 
may become a muddle. To escape an Aristotelian model of narrative means, in part, 
to think of the middle as something distinct, a text in itself, a space that creates, rather 
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